Early Muslim communities The second caliph,
Umar ibn al-Khattab, funded a group of Muslims to study the revelations, stories of Muhammed's life, "and other pertinent data, so that when he needed expert advice" he could draw it from these "people of the bench". According to
Tamim Ansary, this group evolved into the
Ulama Fiqh The formative period of
Islamic jurisprudence stretches back to the time of the early Muslim communities. In this period, jurists were more concerned with pragmatic issues of authority and teaching than with theory. Progress in theory began to develop with the coming of the early Muslim jurist
Muhammad ibn Idris ash-Shafi'i (767–820), who codified the basic principles of Islamic jurisprudence in his book
ar-Risālah. The book details the four roots of law (Qur'an,
Sunnah,
ijma, and
qiyas) while specifying that the primary Islamic texts (the Qur'an and the hadith) must be understood according to objective rules of interpretation derived from scientific study of the Arabic language. According to Feldman (2008), under many Muslim caliphate states and later states ruled by sultans, the ulama were regarded as the guardians of Islamic law and prevented the Caliph from dictating legal results, with the ruler and ulama forming a sort of "separation of powers" in government.
Early modern Islamic empires The Sunni Ottoman, and the
Shi'a Safavid Persian dynasties, rulers of the two opponent early modern Islamic empires, both relied on ulama in order to legitimise their power. In both empires, ulama patronised by the royal courts created "official" religious doctrines which supported the dynastic rule. At the high points of their political power, respectively, the development took different paths: The Ottoman Sultan
Süleyman I successfully integrated the imperial ulama into the imperial bureaucracy, and Ottoman secular law into Islamic law. described the deeds of the Ottoman sultans in terms of idealised Islamic
ghazi warriors. According to Burak (2015), the
Ottoman literature genres of the "rank order" ( and the "biografic lexicon" () compiled the biographies of scholars in such ways as to create a concise and coherent tradition of the doctrine and structure of the Ottoman imperial scholarship. During the 16th century, scholars like the Shaykh al-Islām
Kemālpaşazade (d. 1534),
Aḥmād b. Muṣṭafā Taşköprüzāde (1494–1561), Kınalızāde ʿAli Çelebi (d. 1572) and Ali ben Bali (1527–1584) established a seamless chain of tradition from
Abu Hanifa to their own time. Explicitly, some authors stated that their work must not only be understood as the historiography of the Hanafi
madhhab, but that it should be consulted in case of eventual disagreements within the school of law. This exemplifies their purpose to establish a canon of
Hanafi law within the Ottoman imperial scholarship. which modern Ottomanists termed the "Ottoman Islam". After 1453,
Mehmed the Conqueror (1432–1481) had established eight madrasas in former Byzantine church buildings, and later founded the
sahn-ı şeman or "Eight courtyards madrasa", adjacent to the
Fatih mosque, where he brought together the most distinguished Islamic law scholars of his territory. In his 2015 study on the "second formation of Islamic law", Burak has shown in detail how the Ottoman state gradually imposed upon the traditional ulama a hierarchy of "official imperial scholars", appointed and paid by the central government. From the conquest of the
Mamluk Sultanate of Cairo in 1517 onwards, the Ottoman ulama set up their own interpretation of the Sunni Hanafi doctrine which then served as the official religious doctrine of the empire. The formal acknowledgment by decree of the sultan became a prerequisite to issue fatwas. In the 17th century, the annalist al-Hamawi used the expression "sultanic mufti" (''al-ifta' al-sultani
) to delineate the difference between the officially appointed religious leaders and those who had followed the traditional way of education. Other authors at that time called the Ottoman law scholars "Hanafi of Rūm [i.e., the Ottoman Empire]" (Rūmi ḫānāfi)
, "Scholars of Rūm" (ʿulamā'-ı rūm)
or "Scholars of the Ottoman Empire" (ʿulamā' al-dawla al-ʿUthmaniyyā''). The
Shaykh al-Islām () in Istanbul became the highest-ranking Islamic scholar within, and head of the ulama throughout the empire. The ulama in the Ottoman Empire had a significant influence over politics due to the belief that secular institutions were all subordinate to Islamic law, the
Sharia (). The ulama were responsible for interpreting the religious law, therefore they claimed that their power superseded that of the government. Within the Ottoman hierarchy of ulama, the Shaykh al-Islām held the highest rank. He exerted his influence by issuing fatwas, his written interpretations of the sharia had authority over the entire Ottoman population. In the 16th century, as the support by the ulama of the sultan and the central government was essential for shaping the still-growing empire, the importance of the office rose, and its power increased. As members of the
Ilmiye, the imperial scholars were part of the Ottoman elite class of the
Askeri, and were exempt from any taxes. However, by approving scholars and appointing them to offices, over time the sultan's influence increased over the religious scholars, although, as a Muslim, he still stood under the Islamic law. Even the Shaykh al-Islām was subordinate to the sultan; his position, like the ranks of the muftis, was described as a "service" () or "rank" ( or
paye-ı Sahn), to which a candidate was appointed or elevated. Sometimes, the sultans made use of their power: In 1633,
Murad IV gave order to execute the Shaykh al-Islām Ahīzāde Ḥüseyin Efendi. In 1656, Shaykh al-Islām Ḥocazāde Mesʿud Efendi was sentenced to death by sultan
Mehmed IV. The use of the Sunni Islam as a legitimisation of the Ottoman dynastic rule is closely linked to Sultan
Süleyman I and his
kazasker and later Schaykh al-Islām
Ebussuud Efendi. Ebussuud compiled an imperial book of law (
ḳānūn-nāme), which combined religious law
(sharīʿah) with secular dynastic law
(ḳānūn) in the person of the sultan. For example, Ebussuud provided a reason why the government could own land, or could levy and increase taxes, as the government was responsible for the protection of the common good of all Muslims. In 1533, Shah
Tahmasp I commissioned a new edition of the
Safvat as-safa, Shaikh Ṣāfī's genealogy. It was rewritten in order to support the royal family's claim at descendency from
Musa al-Kadhim, the Seventh Imam, and thus to legitimise the Safavid rule. During the reign of Shah
Abbas I (1571 – 1629 AD), the argument of the
theocratic unity of religious and political power was no longer sufficient to legitimise the Shah's authority: Shi'a ulama renounced the monarch's claim to represent the hidden Imam by teaching that descendancy did not necessarily mean representation. Likewise, as the influence of Sufi mysticism weakened, the Shah's role as the head of the Safaviyya lost its significance as a justification for his political role. Abbas I thus sought to associate himself with eminent ulama like
Shaykh Bahāʾi (1574–1621 AD), whom he made Shaykh al-Islām in his new capital, Isfahan. Other famous ulama working under Abbas's patronage were
Mir Damad (d. 1631 or 1632 AD), one of the founders of the
School of Isfahan, and
Ahmad ibn Muhammad Ardabili (d. 1585). By their teachings, they further developed the Shi'a Islamic teachings and religious practice. However, as religion did no longer suffice to support political power in Persia, Abbas I had to develop independent concepts to legitimise his rule. He did so by creating a new
ghulam army, thus evoking the
Turco-Mongol tradition of
Timur and his reign.
19th century New Ottoman scholarly elite By the beginning of the 19th century, the Ottoman ulama still retained their political influence. When sultan
Selim III tried to reform the
Ottoman army, the ulama opposed his plans, which they rejected as an
apostasy from Islam. Consequently, his reform failed. However, Selims successor
Mahmud II (r. 1808–1839) was more successful: He called the new troops, organised according to European models, by the name "Victorious army of Muhammad" (
Asâkir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye). By doing so, he was able to overcome the accusation of apostasy and secure the ulama's support. Mahmuds reforms created a new imperial elite class who spoke Western European languages and were knowledgeable of the Western European societies and their political systems. As the political and economic pressure increased on the Ottoman Empire in the course of the 19th century, this new elite carried on the Sultan's reforms and helped initiating a new era of reform, the
Tanzimat. In parallel, the political influence of the ulama was circumvented and reduced step by step. A
ministry for religious endowments was created in order to control the finances of the
vakıf. Thus, the ulama lost direct control over their finances, which significantly reduced their capacity to exert political influence. Already some of the last Safavids,
Sulayman Shah (r. 1666–1694) and
Tahmasp II (r. 1722–1732) had sought the ulama's support in an attempt to strengthen their authority. Particularly, they associated themselves with a group of ulama who supported the "official"
Twelver Shi'a doctrine, established by the Iranian Shaykh al-Islām
Mohammad-Baqer Majlesi (1627–1699) during the later decades of Safavid rule. The dispute between the Twelver Shi'a and
Mir Damad's (d. 1631 or 1632) and
Mulla Sadra's (c. 1571/2 – 1640)
School of Isfahan, who promoted Sufi mysticism and
Islamic philosophy, continued throughout the 18th century, and shaped the relationship between ulama and government during the reigns of the subsequent dynasties. With the accession of
Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar to the Iranian throne, the
Qajar dynasty consolidated the central power. However, the Qajar Shahs, in particular
Naser al-Din Shah Qajar (r. 1848–1896), whose reign paralleled that of the Ottoman Sultans of the Tanzimat time, failed at obtaining central control over the ulama. The
Shiite scholars retained their political influence on the Persian society. They also maintained unrestricted access to the financial resources from the religious endowments. In addition, the Islamic
Zakat tax was paid to individual imams and not to state-sponsored tax collectors. Both their religious influence and their financial means allowed the Shiite ulama to act, at times, against the Shah. Thus, under the Qajar dynasty, the ulama provided a source of religious legitimacy and served as interpreters of religious law in a dual legal system where the state administered law based on custom
(ʻurf).
19th/20th century: Ulama and Muslim reform Reformers and concepts Starting in the first half of the 19th century, direct contacts began and gradually increased between members of the ulama and modern Western Europe. The Egyptian alim
Rifa'a al-Tahtawi (1801–1873) was amongst the first members of the ulama who travelled to Europe. As a religious counsellor to a delegation by the Egyptian
khedive Muhammad Ali Pasha he stayed in Paris from 1826 to 1831. His report "The Extraction of Gold or an Overview of Paris" (
Taḫlīṣ al-ibrīz fī talḫīṣ Bārīz) (1849) included some outlines of future reforms and potential improvements in his native country. Although al-Tahtawi had gone through the traditional education of an alim, his interest focused on modern French concepts of administration and economy. He only referred to Islam in order to emphasize that Muslims can adopt practical knowledge and insights from Europe. As such, lt-Tahtawi's report reflects the political efforts of Muhammad Ali Pasha, who did not intend to reform al-Azhar university, but aimed at building an independent educational system sponsored by his government.
Hayreddin Pasha (1822/3–1890) was an
Ottoman Tunisian alim and statesman who reformed the administration and jurisdiction of the province. He was able to explain his ideas in French (
Réformes nécessaires aux États musulmans – Necessary reforms of the Muslim states. Paris, 1868), which he had learned whilst representing his sovereign
Ahmad Bey at the court of
Napoleon III from 1852 to 1855. In contrast to al-Tahtawi, Hayreddin Pasha used the religious concept of the Muslim collective interest
(maṣlaḥa) to make his point, thereby applying the idea of
ijtihad to public affairs. In his works, he emphasized the special importance of a reform of the traditional madrasa system, which was taken to disadvantage by the parallel establishment of the secular, state-sponsored educational system in Egypt. He strove at reconciling the traditional and modern educational systems, thereby justifying from the point of view of Islam the introduction of modern institutions by the national state. He referred to the Islamic concept of the collective interest or
common good of the Muslim community
(maṣlaḥa), to which he accorded overarching importance
(al-maṣlaḥa shar) in the interest of his fellow Muslims. The concept of
islāh gained special relevance for the future, as it strives at understanding and justifying all aspects of modern life from the Islamic doctrine. Thus, the teachings of the Yemeni alim
Muhammad ash-Shawkani (1759–1839), which had already been discussed since the 1880s, gained greater publicity. Likewise, the writings of the
Hanbali scholar
Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328) came to attention again. Ibn Taymiyyah's doctrine provided a link between the
wahhabiyya and parts of the
salafiyya movements. The theological differences between the two movements were altogether too large for a complete union of the two doctrines. However, the opening of the Salafi movement towards Wahhabism helped to reconcile the latter with the Islamic public after king
Ibn Saud's invasion of the
Hijaz in 1924. The Central Arabian militias (
Iḫwān) had occupied and looted the holy towns of Mecca and Medina, thereby destroying monuments which they considered pagan (
shirk). Starting with the Pan-Islamic Congress in Mecca in 1926, the pro-Saudi movement developed into one of the most relevant currents of Islamic thought. In his Egyptian exile, the Syrian alim
Abd ar-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1854–1902) met al-Afghani, Abduh and Rida. In his books
Ṭabāʾiʿ al-istibdād ("The nature of
despotism") and
Umm al-Qurā ("Mother of villages [i.e., Mecca]", 1899) he accused the Ottoman sultan
Abdülhamid II of corrupting the
Islamic community. The Ottoman despotism "encroaches on the rights of its citizens, keeps them ignorant to keep them passive, [and] denies their right to take an active part in human life". Therefore, the law must be reformed. By the use of
ijtihad, a "modern and unified system of law" must be created, and "proper religious education" must be provided. Because of the central position of the Arabic peoples in the
ummah and the Arabic language in the intellectual discourse, but also because "Arabian Islam is ... free from modern corruptions and the
bedouin are free from the moral decay and passivity of despotism", the balance of power must shift from the Turks towards the Arabs. The Ottoman dynasty must give up their claim to the
caliphate, and a new caliph of
Quraysh descent must be elected by representatives of the
ummah. His temporal authority would be set up in the
Hejaz, whilst he would hold religious authority over the entire Muslim community, "assisted ... by a consultative council nominated by the Muslim rulers".
Muslim mass organizations In 1912, the
Muhammadiyah organization was founded in
Yogyakarta (in modern-day
Indonesia), which, together with
Nahdlatul Ulama ("Reawakening of the ulama"), founded in 1926, form the two largest Muslim organizations in the world. Since the 1930s, their religious boarding schools (
pesantren) also taught mathematics, natural sciences, English and history. Since the 1980, the Nahdlatul Ulama schools also offered degrees in economy, jurisdiction, paedagogical and medical sciences. In the 1990s, under their leader
Abdurrahman Wahid, the organization adopted an anti-fundamentalistic doctrine, teaching democracy and pluralism.
Darul Uloom Deoband, next to al-Azhar one of the most influential madrasas, was founded in the city of
Deoband,
Uttar Pradesh, in 1867. Initially, the intention of the school was to help Indian Muslims, who had become subjects of the British Empire after 1857, to lead their lives according to Islamic law. The Deobandi propagate a Sunni Islam of the Hanafi school, which was the most prevalent madhhab in South Asia. Still today, they aim at a revival of the Islamic society and education. Following the example of Deoband, thousands of madrasas were founded during the late 19th century which adopted the Deobandi way of studying fundamental texts of Islam and commenting on Quran and Hadith. By referring back to traditional Islamic scholars, the Deobandi School aims at defending the traditional Islamic madhhab, especially the Hanafi, against criticism which arose from other Islamic schools like the
Ahl-i Hadith. During the 1990s, the Afghan
taliban also referred to the Deoband School.
Ashraf Ali Thanwi (1863–1943) is one of the most prominent teachers of Darul Uloom Deoband. Thanwi initiated and edited multi-volume encyclopedic commentaries on the Quran. However, he was also able to reach out to a larger audience: His book
Bahishti Zewar, which is still widely read in South Asia, as it details, amongst other topics, the proper conduct and beliefs for Muslim women.
Ahl-i Hadith is a movement which emerged in North India in the mid-19th century. By rejecting
taqlid (following legal precedent) and favouring
ijtihad (independent legal reasoning) based on the foundational scriptures of Islam, they oppose the traditional madhhab and criticize their reliance on legal authorities other than the traditional texts. The Ahl-i Hadith was the first organization which printed and spread the works of Muhammad ash-Shawkani, whose writings did also influence the doctrine of the Salafi movement in the Arab Middle East and worldwide.
Muslim World League is an international non-governmental Islamic organization based in
Mecca, Saudi Arabia that is a member of
UNICEF,
UNESCO and
OIC. It aims to resolve the issues faced by the Islamic community by organizing scholarly conferences with the ulama around the world in order to form public Islamic opinions based on principles of moderation, peace and harmony.
Ulama in the secular national states of the 20th century In most countries, the classical institution of the madrasa as a place of teaching remained largely intact until the beginning of the 20th century. In the Western parts of the Islamic world, national states arose from the disintegration and partition of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War. The government of
Kemalist Turkey sought to distance the nation from the religious traditions and institutions of the Ottoman past. In Egypt, the establishment of a state-controlled educational system had already begun in the 1820s. Initially giving rise to modernist reforms, up to a certain degree the state-sponsored faculties were able to retain their independence from government control. However, as Pierret has pointed out in detail for Syria, in some countries the orthodox madrasa system remained largely intact, its decentralised organisation protecting it from state control. In fact, the government's attempt at controlling the religious education focussed largely on the academic institutions and neglected the traditional madrasas. By their continuing ability to provide social support and access to an educational alternative which was propagated as being more orthodox according to Islamic faith, the traditional ulama not only maintained their influence on large parts of the population, but actually increased their political influence and power. From 1925 onwards, the traditional
dervish tekkes and Islamic schools were dissolved. Famous convents like the
Tekke of the Mevlevi order in Konya were secularized and turned into museums.
Iran In Iran, contrary to many other Islamic countries, the Shi'a ulama have maintained their religious authority together by
Khums tax. Thus, they maintained their ability to exert political pressure. Between 1905 and 1911, a coalition of ulama,
bazaari, and some radical reformers incited the
Persian Constitutional Revolution, which led to the establishment of the
parliament (majlis) of Iran during the
Qajar dynasty. The
Islamic Revolution in Iran was led by a senior
Shia cleric—the
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini—who then established the
Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist.
Syria In his study
Religion and State in Syria (2013), Pierret pointed out how the training of Syria's ulama gradually became more institutionalised, based upon the traditional madrasa system. In 1920, the madrasa of the
Khusruwiyah Mosque complex (which was to be destroyed in 2014 during the
Syrian Civil War) introduced an entrance exam and a stable curriculum for its Islamic seminary. Graduates were issued a diploma carrying the name of the institution, which bore the signatures of all teachers, signifying individual
ijazah. In 1947, courses also included natural sciences and foreign languages. In 1947, the state-run "Faculty of Sharia" was initiated in Damascus by
Kamal al-Qassab (1853–1954), a former student of Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) in Cairo. Until 1954, all Syrian ulama aiming at higher degrees had to join
Al-Azhar University in Cairo. In 1954, however, Syria's first higher faculty of sharia was founded by members of the modernist wing of the
Muslim Brotherhood. Its curriculum, which included economy and the "current situation of the Muslim world", according to Pierret, "anticipated the 1961 modernist reform of al-Azhar by
Nasser". In 1972, the curriculum of the state-run "Sharia high schools" was reformed again, thus providing access for their students to all faculties of Syrian high schools. According to Pierret (2015), the
Ba'ath Party coup of 1963 brought about a weakening of the state-controlled sharia high schools by the secular government. Many teachers of the Damascus faculty of sharia were forced into exile during the 1960s. Attempts of the regime during the 1980s at changing the curricula of the faculty and create a new "Ba'athist ulama" failed. The faculty, maintaining their ability to recruit competent teachers, was able to resist the political pressure. Consequently, the Syrian government prohibited the faculty to grant doctorates until 1998, and delayed the establishment of another faculty in Aleppo until 2006.
Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq In 1961,
Gamal Abdel Nasser put the Al-Azhar University under the direct control of the state. "Azharis were given military uniforms and found themselves marching in step under the orders of army officers." After the independence of
Algeria, President
Ahmed Ben Bella also deprived the Algerian ulama of their power.
Baathist repression in Iraq led to a drop of enrollment in the Shia holy cities of Iraq from 12,000 students in the early 1900s to only 600 scholars and students in 1977.
Pakistan In the 1980s and 1990s, competition arose between Sunni and Shia interests in
Pakistan, with Saudi Arabian humanitarian organizations using the sponsorship of madrasas to spread their
Wahhabi doctrine, while the Islamic Republic of Iran used Shiite madrasas to similarly peddle influence. For poorer communities in Pakistan, internationally sponsored madrasas could be the only accessible form of education. This influence from institutions which were financially independent from the state led to a resurgence of the social and political influence of the traditional ulama, while the insufficient state control over the educational institutions, insufficient qualification of the teachers and ideologic indoctrination of such institutions all become considerable issues. Graduates
(talib) from North Pakistani madrasas like "
Mullah"
Mohammed Omar subsequently played a role in the establishment of the Afghan
Taliban regime. ==Modern challenges==