Pre-war violence The years between the Easter Rising of 1916 and the beginning of the War of Independence in 1919 were not bloodless.
Thomas Ashe, one of the Volunteer leaders imprisoned for his role in the 1916 rebellion, died on hunger strike, after attempted force-feeding in 1917. In 1918, during disturbances arising out of the anti-conscription campaign, six civilians died in confrontations with the police and British Army and more than 1,000 people were arrested. There were raids for arms by the Volunteers, and two Kerry Volunteers (John Brown and Robert Laide) were shot and killed on 16 April 1918 during a raid on the police barracks at Gortalea. Those men were the first Volunteers to be killed during a raid for arms. At this time there was at least one shooting of a Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) policeman, and an RIC barracks in Kerry was burnt. The attacks brought a British military presence from the summer of 1918, which only briefly quelled the violence, and an increase in police raids. However, there was as yet no co-ordinated armed campaign against British forces or RIC. In
County Cork, four rifles were seized from the
Eyeries barracks in March 1918, and men from the barracks were beaten that August. Patrols in
Bantry and Ballyvourney were badly beaten in September and October. In November 1918,
Armistice Day was marked by severe rioting in Dublin that left over 100 British soldiers injured.
Initial hostilities , one of those involved in the
Soloheadbeg Ambush in 1919. While it was not clear in the beginning of 1919 that the Dáil ever intended to gain independence by military means, and war was not explicitly threatened in Sinn Féin's
1918 manifesto, an incident occurred on 21 January 1919, the same day as the First Dáil convened. The
Soloheadbeg Ambush, in County Tipperary, was led by
Seán Treacy,
Séumas Robinson,
Seán Hogan and
Dan Breen acting on their own initiative. The IRA attacked and shot two RIC officers, Constables James McDonnell and Patrick O'Connell, who were escorting explosives. Breen later recalled: This is widely regarded as the beginning of the War of Independence. The British government declared South Tipperary a Special Military Area under the
Defence of the Realm Act two days later. The war was not formally declared by the Dáil, and it ran its course parallel to the Dáil's political life. On 10 April 1919 the Dáil was told: In January 1921, two years after the war had started, the Dáil debated "whether it was feasible to accept formally a state of war that was being thrust on them, or not", and decided not to declare war. Then on 11 March,
Dáil Éireann President
Éamon de Valera called for acceptance of a "state of war with England". The Dail voted unanimously to empower him to declare war whenever he saw fit, but he did not formally do so.
Violence spreads Volunteers began to attack British government property, carry out raids for arms and funds and target and kill prominent members of the British administration. The first was Resident Magistrate John C. Milling, who was shot dead in
Westport, County Mayo, for having sent Volunteers to prison for unlawful assembly and drilling. They mimicked the successful tactics of the
Boers' fast violent raids without uniform. Although some republican leaders, notably Éamon de Valera, favoured classic
conventional warfare to legitimise the new republic in the eyes of the world, the more practically experienced Collins and the broader IRA leadership opposed these tactics as they had led to the military débacle of 1916. Others, notably Arthur Griffith, preferred a campaign of
civil disobedience rather than armed struggle. During the early part of the conflict, roughly from 1919 to the middle of 1920, there was a relatively limited amount of violence. Much of the nationalist campaign involved popular mobilisation and the creation of a republican "state within a state" in opposition to British rule. British journalist
Robert Lynd wrote in
The Daily News in July 1920 that:
Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) as special target The IRA's main target throughout the conflict was the mainly Irish Catholic Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), the British government's armed police force in Ireland, outside Dublin. Its members and barracks (especially the more isolated ones) were vulnerable, and they were a source of much-needed arms. The RIC numbered 9,700 men stationed in 1,500 barracks throughout Ireland. A policy of
ostracism of RIC men was announced by the Dáil on 11 April 1919. This proved successful in demoralising the force as the war went on, as people turned their faces from a force increasingly compromised by association with British government repression. The rate of resignation went up and recruitment in Ireland dropped off dramatically. Often, the RIC were reduced to buying food at gunpoint, as shops and other businesses refused to deal with them. Some RIC men co-operated with the IRA through fear or sympathy, supplying the organisation with valuable information. By contrast with the effectiveness of the widespread public boycott of the police, the military actions carried out by the IRA against the RIC at this time were relatively limited. In 1919, 11 RIC men and 4 Dublin Metropolitan Police
G Division detectives were killed and another 20 RIC wounded. Other aspects of mass participation in the conflict included strikes by organised workers, in opposition to the British presence in Ireland. In
Limerick in April 1919, a
general strike was called by the Limerick Trades and Labour Council, as a protest against the declaration of a "Special Military Area" under the Defence of the Realm Act, which covered most of Limerick city and a part of the county. Special permits, to be issued by the RIC, would now be required to enter the city. The Trades Council's special Strike Committee controlled the city for fourteen days in an episode that is known as the
Limerick Soviet. Similarly, in May 1920, Dublin dockers refused to handle any war
matériel and were soon joined by the
Irish Transport and General Workers' Union, who banned railway drivers from carrying members of the British forces.
Blackleg train drivers were brought over from England, after drivers refused to carry British troops. The strike badly hampered British troop movements until December 1920, when it was called off. The British government managed to bring the situation to an end, when they threatened to withhold grants from the railway companies, which would have meant that workers would no longer have been paid. Attacks by the IRA also steadily increased, and by early 1920, they were attacking isolated RIC stations in rural areas, causing them to be abandoned as the police retreated to the larger towns.
Collapse of the British administration In early April 1920, 400 abandoned RIC barracks were burned to the ground to prevent them being used again, along with almost one hundred income tax offices. The RIC withdrew from much of the countryside, leaving it in the hands of the IRA. In June–July 1920,
assizes failed all across the south and west of Ireland; trials by jury could not be held because jurors would not attend. The collapse of the court system demoralised the RIC and many police resigned or retired. In August 1920 the
Chief Secretary for Ireland Hamar Greenwood reported that 556 Constables and 313 Magistrates had resigned within two-month period. The
Irish Republican Police (IRP) was founded between April and June 1920, under the authority of
Dáil Éireann and the former IRA Chief of Staff
Cathal Brugha to replace the RIC and to enforce the ruling of the
Dáil Courts, set up under the Irish Republic. By 1920, the IRP had a presence in 21 of
Ireland's 32 counties. The Dáil Courts were generally socially conservative, despite their revolutionary origins, and halted the attempts of some landless farmers at redistribution of land from wealthier landowners to poorer farmers. The
Inland Revenue ceased to operate in most of Ireland. People were instead encouraged to subscribe to Collins' "National Loan", set up to raise funds for the young government and its army. By the end of the year the loan had reached £358,000. It eventually reached £380,000. An even larger amount, totalling over $5 million, was raised in the United States by Irish Americans and sent to Ireland to finance the Republic.
Rates were still paid to local councils but nine out of eleven of these were controlled by Sinn Féin, who naturally refused to pass them on to the British government. By mid-1920, the Irish Republic was a reality in the lives of many people, enforcing its own law, maintaining its own armed forces and collecting its own taxes. The British Liberal journal,
The Nation, wrote in August 1920 that "the central fact of the present situation in Ireland is that the Irish Republic exists". The British forces, in trying to re-assert their control over the country, often resorted to arbitrary reprisals against republican activists and the civilian population. An unofficial government policy of reprisals began in 1919 in
Fermoy, County Cork, when 200 soldiers of the
King's Shropshire Light Infantry looted and burned the main businesses of the town on 8 September, after a member of their regiment—who was the first British Army soldier to die in the war—was killed in an armed raid by local IRA volunteers on a church parade the day before (7 September). The ambushers were members of a unit of the No. 2 Cork Brigade under the command of
Liam Lynch, who also wounded four British soldiers and disarmed the rest before fleeing in their cars. The local coroner's inquest refused to return a murder verdict over the soldier and local businessmen who had sat on the jury were targeted in the reprisal. Arthur Griffith estimated that in the first 18 months of the conflict, British forces carried out 38,720 raids on private homes, arrested 4,982 suspects, committed 1,604 armed assaults, carried out 102 indiscriminate shootings and burnings in towns and villages, and killed 77 people including women and children. In March 1920,
Tomás Mac Curtain, the Sinn Féin
Lord Mayor of Cork, was shot dead in front of his wife at his home, by men with blackened faces who were seen returning to the local police barracks. The jury at the
inquest into his death returned a verdict of wilful murder against
David Lloyd George (the British Prime Minister) and District Inspector Swanzy, among others. Swanzy was later tracked down and killed in
Lisburn,
County Antrim. This pattern of killings and reprisals escalated in the second half of 1920 and in 1921.
IRA organisation and operations Collins was a driving force behind the independence movement. Nominally the
Minister of Finance in the Republic's government and IRA Director of Intelligence, he was involved in providing funds and arms to the IRA units and in the selection of officers. Collins' charisma and organisational capability galvanised many who came in contact with him. He established what proved an effective network of spies among sympathetic members of the Dublin Metropolitan Police's G Division and other important branches of the British administration. The G Division men were a relatively small political division active in subverting the republican movement. They were detested by the IRA as often they were used to identify volunteers, who would have been unknown to British soldiers or the later Black and Tans. Collins set up the "Squad", a group of men whose sole duty was to seek out and kill "G-men" and other British spies and agents. Collins' Squad began killing RIC intelligence officers in July 1919. Many G-men were offered a chance to resign or leave Ireland by the IRA. One spy who escaped with his life was
F. Digby Hardy, who was exposed by Arthur Griffith before an "IRA" meeting, which in fact consisted of Irish and foreign journalists, and then advised to take the next boat out of Dublin. The Chief of Staff of the IRA was
Richard Mulcahy, who was responsible for organising and directing IRA units around the country. In theory, both Collins and Mulcahy were responsible to Cathal Brugha, the Dáil's Minister of Defence, but, in practice, Brugha had only a supervisory role, recommending or objecting to specific actions. A great deal also depended on IRA leaders in local areas (such as Liam Lynch, Tom Barry,
Seán Moylan,
Seán Mac Eoin and
Ernie O'Malley) who organised guerrilla activity, largely on their own initiative. For most of the conflict, IRA activity was concentrated in
Munster and Dublin, with only isolated active IRA units elsewhere, such as in
County Roscommon, north
County Longford and western
County Mayo. While the paper membership of the IRA, carried over from the Irish Volunteers, was over 100,000 men, Collins estimated that only 15,000 were active in the IRA during the war, with about 3,000 on active service at any time. There were also support organisations
Cumann na mBan (the IRA women's group) and
Fianna Éireann (youth movement), who carried weapons and intelligence for IRA men and secured food and lodgings for them. The IRA benefitted from the widespread help given to them by the general Irish population, who generally refused to pass information to the RIC and the British military and who often provided "
safe houses" and provisions to IRA units "on the run". Much of the IRA's popularity arose from the excessive reaction of the British forces to IRA activity. When Éamon de Valera returned from the United States, he demanded in the Dáil that the IRA desist from the ambushes and assassinations, which were allowing the British to portray it as a terrorist group and to take on the British forces with conventional military methods. The proposal was immediately dismissed.
Martial law " and
Auxiliaries in Dublin, April 1921 The British increased the use of force; reluctant to deploy the regular British Army into the country in greater numbers, they set up two auxiliary police units to reinforce the RIC. The first of these, quickly nicknamed as the Black and Tans, were seven thousand strong and mainly ex-British soldiers demobilised after World War I. Deployed to Ireland in March 1920, most came from English and Scottish cities. While officially they were part of the RIC, in reality they were a paramilitary force. After their deployment in March 1920, they rapidly gained a reputation for drunkenness and poor discipline. The wartime experience of most Black and Tans did not suit them for police duties and their violent behavior antagonised many previously neutral civilians. In response to and retaliation for IRA actions, in the summer of 1920, the Tans burned and sacked numerous small towns throughout Ireland, including
Balbriggan,
Trim,
Templemore and others. In other acts of reprisal, between April and August 1920 over 100 mills, creameries and other economic targets were destroyed or burned. In July 1920, another quasi-military police body, the Auxiliaries, consisting of 2,215 former British army officers, arrived in Ireland. The Auxiliaries had a reputation just as bad as the Tans for their mistreatment of the civilian population but tended to be more effective and more willing to take on the IRA. The policy of reprisals, which involved public denunciation or denial and private approval, was famously satirised by Lord
Hugh Cecil when he said: "It seems to be agreed that there is no such thing as reprisals but they are having a good effect." On 9 August 1920, the British Parliament passed the
Restoration of Order in Ireland Act. It replaced the
trial by jury by
courts-martial by regulation for those areas where IRA activity was prevalent. On 10 December 1920,
martial law was proclaimed in Counties Cork, Kerry, Limerick and Tipperary in Munster; in January 1921 martial law was extended to the rest of Munster in Counties Clare and Waterford, as well as counties
Kilkenny and
Wexford in
Leinster. It also suspended all coroners' courts because of the large number of warrants served on members of the British forces and replaced them with "military courts of enquiry". The powers of military
courts-martial were extended to cover the whole population and were empowered to use the death penalty and
internment without trial; Government payments to local governments in Sinn Féin hands were suspended. This act has been interpreted by historians as a choice by Prime Minister David Lloyd George to put down the rebellion in Ireland rather than negotiate with the republican leadership. As a result, violence escalated steadily from that summer and sharply after November 1920 until July 1921. It was in this period that a
mutiny broke out among the
Connaught Rangers, stationed
in India. Two were killed whilst trying to storm an armoury and one was later executed.
Escalation: October–December 1920 during the military enquiry into the Bloody Sunday shootings at Croke Park A number of events dramatically escalated the conflict in late 1920. First the Lord Mayor of Cork,
Terence MacSwiney, died on
hunger strike in
Brixton Prison in London in October, while two other IRA prisoners on hunger strike,
Joe Murphy and
Michael Fitzgerald, died in Cork Jail. The killing of an unarmed pregnant mother
Eileen Quinn in County Galway on 1 November 1920 lead to public outrage inspiring two poems by
W. B. Yeats and prompting
Lady Gregory to write articles of condemnation. Sunday, 21 November 1920, was a day of dramatic bloodshed in Dublin that became known as
Bloody Sunday. In the early morning, Collins' Squad attempted to wipe out leading British intelligence operatives in the capital, in particular the
Cairo Gang, killing 16 men (including two cadets, one alleged informer, and one possible case of mistaken identity) and wounding five others. The attacks took place at different places (hotels and lodgings) in Dublin. In response, RIC men drove in trucks into
Croke Park (Dublin's
GAA football and hurling ground) during a football match, shooting into the crowd. Fourteen civilians were killed, including one of the players,
Michael Hogan, and a further 65 people were wounded. Later that day two republican prisoners,
Dick McKee,
Peadar Clancy and an unassociated friend,
Conor Clune who had been arrested with them, were killed in Dublin Castle. The official account was that the three men were shot "while trying to escape", which was rejected by Irish nationalists, who were certain the men had been tortured and then murdered. On 28 November 1920, one week later, the West Cork unit of the IRA, under Tom Barry,
ambushed a patrol of Auxiliaries at
Kilmichael, County Cork, killing all but one of the 18-man patrol. These actions marked a significant escalation of the conflict. In response, the counties of Cork, Kerry, Limerick, and Tipperary—all in the
province of Munster—were put under martial law on 10 December under the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act; this was followed on 5 January in the rest of Munster and in counties Kilkenny and Wexford in the province of Leinster. In December 1920 General
Nevil Macready (Commander-in-Chief British Forces in Ireland) informed the
Cabinet of the British Government that Military Governors in the martial law areas had been authorized to conduct reprisals. Shortly afterwards, on New Year's Day, January 1921, "authorized reprisals" were sanctioned by the British. General Macready signed an order permitting the destruction of houses belonging to persons implicated in attacks on Crown forces. Persons found to harbouring or aiding rebels were subject to the death penalty. The reprisals began with the burning of seven houses in
Midleton, County Cork. Questioned in the
House of Commons in June 1921,
Attorney-General for Ireland Denis Henry stated that he was informed by Macready that 191 houses were destroyed in official reprisals in the area under martial law since January of that year. On 11 December, the centre of Cork City was burnt out by the Black and Tans, who then shot at firefighters trying to tackle the blaze, in reprisal for an IRA ambush in the city on 11 December 1920 which killed one Auxiliary and wounded eleven. In May of that year, the IRA began a campaign of
big house burnings which totaled 26 in Cork alone.
Peak of violence: December 1920 – July 1921 During the following eight months until the Truce of July 1921, there was a spiralling of the death toll in the conflict, with 1,000 people including the RIC police, army, IRA volunteers and civilians, being killed in the months between January and July 1921 alone. This represents about 70% of the total casualties for the entire three-year conflict. In addition, 4,500 IRA personnel (or suspected sympathisers) were interned in this time. In the middle of this violence, de Valera (as
President of Dáil Éireann) acknowledged the state of war with Britain in March 1921. Between 1 November 1920 and 7 June 1921 twenty-four men were executed by the British. The first IRA volunteer to be executed was
Kevin Barry, one of
The Forgotten Ten who were buried in unmarked graves in
unconsecrated ground inside
Mountjoy Prison until 2001. On 1 February, the first execution under martial law of an IRA man took place: Cornelius Murphy, of
Millstreet in County Cork, was shot in Cork City. On 28 February, six more were executed, again in Cork. On 19 March 1921, Tom Barry's 100-strong West Cork IRA unit fought an action against 1,200 British troops—the
Crossbarry Ambush. Barry's men narrowly avoided being trapped by converging British columns and inflicted between ten and thirty killed on the British side. Just two days later, on 21 March, the Kerry IRA
attacked a train at the Headford junction near
Killarney. Twenty British soldiers were killed or injured, as well as two IRA men and three civilians. Most of the actions in the war were on a smaller scale than this, but the IRA did have other significant victories in ambushes, for example at Millstreet in Cork and at
Scramogue in Roscommon, also in March 1921 and at
Tourmakeady and
Carrowkennedy in Mayo in May and June. Equally common, however, were failed ambushes, the worst of which, for example at
Mourneabbey,
Upton and
Clonmult in Cork in February 1921, saw six, three, and twelve IRA men killed respectively and more captured. The IRA in Mayo suffered a comparable reverse at
Kilmeena, while the Leitrim flying column was almost wiped out at
Selton Hill. Fears of informers after such failed ambushes often led to a spate of IRA shootings of informers, real and imagined. The biggest single loss for the IRA, however, came in Dublin. On 25 May 1921, several hundred IRA men from the Dublin Brigade
occupied and burned the Custom House (the centre of local government in Ireland) in Dublin city centre. Symbolically, this was intended to show that
British rule in Ireland was untenable. However, from a military point of view, it was a heavy defeat in which five IRA men were killed and over eighty captured. This showed the IRA was not well enough equipped or trained to take on British forces in a conventional manner. However, it did not, as is sometimes claimed, cripple the IRA in Dublin. The Dublin Brigade carried out 107 attacks in the city in May and 93 in June, showing a falloff in activity, but not a dramatic one. However, by July 1921, most IRA units were chronically short of both weapons and ammunition, with over 3,000 prisoners interned. Also, for all their effectiveness at
guerrilla warfare, they had, as Richard Mulcahy recalled, "as yet not been able to drive the enemy out of anything but a fairly good sized police barracks". Still, many military historians have concluded that the IRA fought a largely successful and lethal guerrilla war, which forced the British government to conclude that the IRA could not be defeated militarily. The failure of the British efforts to put down the guerrillas was illustrated by the events of "Black Whitsun" on 13–15 May 1921. A general election for the
Parliament of Southern Ireland was held on 13 May. Sinn Féin won 124 of the new parliament's 128 seats unopposed, but its elected members refused to take their seats. Under the terms of the
Government of Ireland Act 1920, the Parliament of Southern Ireland was therefore dissolved, and executive and legislative authority over
Southern Ireland was effectively transferred to the Lord Lieutenant (assisted by Crown appointees). Over the next two days (14–15 May), the IRA killed fifteen policemen. These events marked the complete failure of the British Coalition Government's Irish policy—both the failure to enforce a settlement without negotiating with Sinn Féin and a failure to defeat the IRA. By the time of the truce, however, many republican leaders, including Collins, were convinced that if the war went on for much longer, there was a chance that the IRA campaign as it was then organised could be brought to a standstill. Because of this, plans were drawn up to "bring the war to England". The IRA did take the campaign to the streets of Glasgow. It was decided that key economic targets, such as the
Liverpool docks, would be bombed. The units charged with these missions would more easily evade capture because England was not under, and British public opinion was unlikely to accept, martial law. These plans were abandoned because of the truce. == Aftermath ==