Portuguese forces The Portuguese forces engaged in the conflict included mainly the
Armed Forces, but also the security and paramilitary forces. Oil deposits found off the coast of
Cabinda in 1966 were used to fund the war by the Portuguese, as well as other wars against independence movements in their colonies.
Armed forces The
Portuguese Armed Forces in Angola included land, naval and air forces, which came under the joint command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Angola. Until 17 June 1961, there was no appointed Commander-in-Chief, with the joint command in the early stages of the conflict exercised by the commanders of the land forces, generals (until June 1961) and Silva Freire (from June to September 1961). From then on, the role of Commander-in-Chief was performed successively by the generals (1961–1962, also serving as Governor-General), Holbeche Fino (1962–1963), Andrade e Silva (1963–1965), Soares Pereira (1965–1970),
Costa Gomes (1970–1972), Luz Cunha (1972–1974) and Franco Pinheiro (1974), all of them from the Army, except Libório from the Air Force. The Commander-in-Chief served as the
theatre commander and coordinated the forces of the three branches stationed in the province, with the respective branch commanders serving as assistant commanders-in-chief. During the course of the conflict, the operational role of the Commander-in-Chief and of his staff was increasingly reinforced at the expense of branch commanders. In 1968, the Military Area 1 – responsible for the Dembos rebel area – was established under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief and, from 1970, the military zones were also put under his direct control, with the Eastern Military Zone becoming a joint command. When the conflict erupted, the Portuguese Armed Forces in Angola only included 6500 men, of whom 1500 were
metropolitan Europeans (23% of the total force) and the remainder locals. By the end of the conflict, the number had increased to more than 65,000, of whom 57.6% were metropolitans and the remainder locals. The land forces in Angola constituted the 3rd Military Region of the
Portuguese Army (renamed "Military Region of Angola, RMA" in 1962). The Military Region was foreseen to include five subordinate regional territorial commands, but these had not yet been activated. The disposition of the army units in the province at the beginning of the conflict had been established in 1953, at that a time when no internal conflicts were expected in Angola, and the major Portuguese military concern was the expected conventional war in Europe against the
Warsaw Pact. The previous organization of the former Colonial Military Forces, which had been based on
company-sized units scattered across Angola and tasked with internal security duties, was restructured along conventional lines.The new structure consisted of three infantry regiments and several battalion-sized units from various military branches, concentrated in major urban centers.This reorganization aimed to enable the rapid formation of an expeditionary field division that could be deployed from Angola to reinforce the Portuguese Army in Europe in the event of a conventional war. The regiments and other units were mostly maintained at
cadre strength, functioning primarily as training centers for
conscripts drafted within the province. During the conflict, these units were responsible for forming locally recruited field forces. In addition to these local units, the Army forces in Angola included reinforcement units raised and deployed from mainland Portugal. These reinforcement units were temporary formations, composed mainly of conscripts—including most
junior officers and
non-commissioned officers. They existed only for the standard two-year
tour of duty and were disbanded once their members completed service.The majority of these units consisted of light infantry
battalions and independent companies known as ''''. These formations were designed to operate autonomously, with minimal support from higher command levels, and were therefore equipped with robust service support components. They were deployed in a grid system () along the theatre of operations, with each one responsible for a given
area of responsibility. Usually, a
regiment-sized (
battlegroup) commanded a sector, divided into several sub-sectors, each constituting the area of responsibility of a battalion. Each battalion, in turn, had field companies distributed across the sub-sector, with each company responsible for a specific portion of it.From 1962, four intervention zones (Northern, Central, Southern and Eastern) were established – renamed "military zones" in 1967 – each consisting of several sectors. Due to the low scale guerrilla nature of the conflict, the company became the main tactical unit, with the standard organization in three rifle and one support platoons, being replaced by one based in four identical sub-units known as "combat groups". The Army also fielded regular units of artillery, armored reconnaissance, engineering, communications, signal intelligence, military police and service support. Army also fielded special forces units. Initially, these consisted of companies of , trained in guerrilla and counter-insurgency warfare. The Army tried to extend the training of the special to all the light infantry units, disbanding those companies in 1962. This proved impracticable and soon other special forces were created in the form of the
Commandos. The Commandos and a few specially selected units were not deployed in a grid, but served instead as mobile intervention units under the direct control of the higher echelons of command. An unconventional force also fielded by the army was the
Dragoons of Angola, a special counterinsurgency horse unit created in the mid-1960s. The
Portuguese Navy forces were under the command of the Naval Command of Angola. These forces included the Zaire Flotilla (
operating on the
river Zaire), naval assets (including
frigates and
corvettes deployed to Angola in rotation), Marine companies and Special Marine detachments. While the Marine companies served as regular naval infantry with the role of protecting the Navy's installations and vessels, the Special Marines were special forces, serving as mobile intervention units, specialized in amphibious assaults. The initial focus of the navy was mainly the river Zaire, with the mission of interdicting the infiltration of guerrillas in Northern Angola from the bordering Republic of Zaire. Later, the navy also operated in the rivers of Eastern Angola, despite it being a remote interior region at around 1000 km distance from the Ocean. . The Portuguese air assets in Angola were under the command of the 2nd Air Region of the
Portuguese Air Force, with headquarters in Luanda. They included a central air base (the Air Base 9 at Luanda) and two sector air bases (the
Base-Aerodrome 3 at Negage, Uíge and the
Base-Aerodrome 4 at Henrique de Carvalho, Lunda). A fourth air base was being built (
Base-Aerodrome 10 at Serpa Pinto, Cuando-Cubando), but it was not completed before the end of the conflict. These bases controlled a number of satellite air fields, including maneuver and alternate aerodromes. Besides these, the Air Force also could count with a number of additional airfields, including those of some of the Army garrisons, in some of which air detachments were permanently deployed. The Air Force also maintained in Angola, the
Paratrooper Battalion 21, which served as a mobile intervention unit, with its forces initially being deployed by parachute, but later being mainly used in air assaults by helicopter. The Air Force was supported by the voluntary air formations, composed of civil pilots, mainly from local flying clubs, who operated light aircraft mainly in air logistics support missions. In the beginning of the conflict, the Air Force had only a few aircraft stationed in Angola, including 25
F-84G jet fighter-bombers, six
PV-2 Harpoon bombers, six
Nord Noratlas transport aircraft, six
Alouette II helicopters, eight
T-6 light attack aircraft and eight
Auster light observation aircraft. By the early 1970s, it had available four F-84G, six PV-2 Harpoon, 13 Nord Noratlas,
C-47 and
C-57 transport aircraft, 30
Alouette III and
Puma helicopters, 18 T-6 and 26
Dornier Do 27 observation aircraft. Despite the increase, the number of aircraft was always too few to cover the enormous Angolan territory, besides many being old aircraft difficult to maintain in flying conditions. From the late 1960s, the Portuguese forces in southern Angola were able to count on the support of helicopters and some other air assets of the
South African Air Force, with two Portuguese-South African joint air support centers being established.
Security forces The security forces in Angola were under the control of the civil authorities, headed by the Governor-General of the province. The forces engaged in the war were the Public Security Police (PSP) and the
PIDE (International and State Defense Police which was renamed DGS in 1969). By the middle of the 1960s, these forces included 10,000 PSP constables and 1,100 PIDE agents. The PSP was the uniformed
preventive police of Angola. It was modeled after the
European Portuguese PSP. It covered the whole territory of the province, including its rural areas and not only the major urban areas as in European Portugal. The PSP of Angola included a general-command in Luanda and district commands in each of the several district capitals, with a network of police stations and posts scattered along the territory. The Angolan PSP was reinforced with mobile police companies deployed by the European Portuguese PSP. The PSP also included the Rural Guard, which was responsible for the protection of farms and other agricultural companies. In addition, the PSP was responsible for organizing the district militias, which were primarily employed in the self-defense of villages and other settlements. The PIDE was the Portuguese secret and border police. The PIDE Delegation of Angola included a number of sub-delegations, border posts and surveillance posts. In the war it operated as an intelligence service. The PIDE created and controlled the
Flechas, a paramilitary unit of special forces made up of natives. The
Flechas were initially intended to serve mostly as trackers, but due to their effectiveness were increasingly employed in more offensive operations, including pseudo-terrorist operations.
Para-military and irregular forces Besides the regular armed and security forces, there were a number of para-military and irregular forces, some of them under the control of the military and other controlled by the civil authorities. The OPVDCA (
Provincial Organization of Volunteers and Civil Defense of Angola) was a militia-type corps responsible for internal security and
civil defense roles, with similar characteristics to those of the
Portuguese Legion of European Portugal. It was under the direct control of the Governor-General of the province. Its origin was the Corps of Volunteers organized in the beginning of the conflict, which became the Provincial Organization of Volunteers in 1962, also assuming the role of civil defense in 1964, when it became the OPVDCA. It was made up of volunteers that served part-time, most of these being initially whites, but latter becoming increasingly multi-racial. In the conflict, the OPVDCA was mainly employed in the defense of people, lines of communications and sensitive installations. It included a central provincial command and a district command in each of the Angolan districts. It is estimated that by the end of the conflict there were 20,000 OPVDCA volunteers. The irregular paramilitary forces, included a number of different types of units, with different characteristics. Under military control, were the
Special Groups (GE) and the Special Troops (TE). The GE were platoon-sized combat groups of special forces made up of native volunteers, which operated in Eastern Angola, usually attached to Army units. The TE had similar characteristics, but were made up of defectors from FNLA, operating in Cabinda and Northern Angola. Under the control of the civil authorities were the (Faithfuls) and the (Loyals). The was a force made up mostly of exiled
Katangese gendarmes from the
Front for Congolese National Liberation, which opposed
Mobutu regime, being organized in three battalions. The was a force made up of political exiles from Zambia.
Race and ethnicity in the Portuguese Armed Forces From 1900 to the early 1950s, the Portuguese maintained a separate colonial army in their African possessions, consisting mainly of a limited number of (native companies). Officers and senior NCOs were seconded from the metropolitan army, while junior NCOs were mainly drawn from Portuguese settlers of the overseas territories. The rank and file were a mixture of black African volunteers and white conscripts from the settler community doing their obligatory military service. Black were in theory also liable to conscription but in practice only a limited number were called on to serve. With the change in official status of the African territories from colonies to overseas provinces in 1951, the colonial army lost its separate status and was integrated into the regular forces of Portugal itself. The basis of recruitment for the overseas units remained essentially unchanged. According to the Mozambican historian
João Paulo Borges Coelho, the Portuguese colonial army was segregated along lines of race and ethnicity. Until 1960, there were three classes of soldiers: commissioned soldiers (European and African whites), overseas soldiers (black African or ), and native soldiers (Africans who were part of the regime). These categories were renamed to 1st, 2nd and 3rd class in 1960—which effectively corresponded to the same classification. Later, although skin colour ceased to be an official discriminator, in practice the system changed little—although from the late 1960s onward, blacks were admitted as ensigns (), the lowest rank in the hierarchy of commissioned officers. Numerically, black soldiers never amounted to more than 41% of the Colonial army, an increase from just 18% at the outbreak of the war. Coelho noted that perceptions of African soldiers varied a good deal among senior Portuguese commanders during the conflict in Angola, Guinea and Mozambique. General Costa Gomes, perhaps the most successful counterinsurgency commander, sought good relations with local civilians and employed African units within the framework of an organized counter-insurgency plan. General Spínola, by contrast, appealed for a more political and psycho-social use of African soldiers. General Kaúlza, the most conservative of the three, feared African forces outside his strict control and seems not to have progressed beyond his initial racist perception of the Africans as inferior beings. Native African troops, although widely deployed, were initially employed only in subordinate roles as enlisted troops or noncommissioned officers. As the war went on, an increasing number of native Angolans rose to positions of command, although of junior rank. After 500 years of colonial rule, Portugal had failed to appoint any native black governors, headmasters, police inspectors, or professors, nor a single commander of senior commissioned rank in the overseas Army. Here Portuguese colonial administrators fell victim to the legacy of their own discriminatory and limited policies in education, which largely barred indigenous Angolans from an equal and adequate education until well after the outbreak off the insurgency. By the early 1970s, the Portuguese authorities had fully perceived these flaws as wrong and contrary to their overseas ambitions in Portuguese Africa, and willingly accepted a true
color blindness policy with more spending in education and training opportunities, which started to produce a larger number of black high-ranked professionals, including military personnel.
Nationalist and separatist forces UPA/FNLA UPA was created on 7 July 1954, as the Union of the Peoples of Northern Angola, by
Holden Roberto, a descendant of the old
Kongo Royal House, who was born in northern Angola but had lived since his early childhood in the
Belgian Congo, where he came to work for the local colonial authorities. In 1958, the movement adopted a more embracing designation, becoming the Union of the Peoples of Angola (UPA). In 1960, Holden Roberto signed an agreement with the MPLA for the two movements to fight together against the Portuguese forces, but he ended up fighting alone. In 1962, UPA merged with the Democratic Party of Angola, becoming the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), positioning itself as a pro-American and anti-Soviet organization. In the same year, it created the
Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE). UPA and later the FNLA were mainly supported by the
Bakongo ethnic group of the old
Kingdom of Kongo, including the Northwestern and Northern Angola, as well as parts of the
French and Belgian Congos. It had always had strong connections with the former Belgian Congo (named
Zaire since 1971), because Holden Roberto was the friend and brother-in-law of
Mobutu Sese Seko among other reasons. The armed branch of the FNLA was the National Liberation Army of Angola (ELNA). It was mainly supported by Congo/Zaire—where its troops were based and trained—and by Algeria. They were financed by the US and—despite considering themselves anti-communists—received weapons from Eastern European countries.
MPLA The People's Movement of Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was founded in 1956, by the merging of the
Party of the United Struggle for Africans in Angola (PLUAA) and the
Angolan Communist Party (PCA). The MPLA was an organization of the
left-wing politics, which included mixed race and white members of the Angolan
intelligentsia and urban elites, supported by the
Ambundu and other ethnic groups of the Luanda, Bengo, Cuanza Norte, Cuanza Sul and Mallange districts. It was headed by
Agostinho Neto (president) and
Viriato da Cruz (secretary-general), both Portuguese-educated urban intellectuals. It was mainly externally supported by the
Soviet Union and
Cuba, with its tentative to receive support from the United States failing, as these were already supporting UPA/FNLA. The armed wing of the MPLA was the People's Army of Liberation of Angola (EPLA). In its peak, the EPLA included around 4500 fighters, being organized in military regions. It was mainly equipped with Soviet weapons, mostly received through Zambia, which included
Tokarev pistol,
PPS submachine guns,
Simonov automatic rifles,
Kalashnikov assault rifles, machine-guns, mortars,
rocket-propelled grenades,
anti-tank mines and
anti-personnel mines
UNITA The Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) was created in 1966 by
Jonas Savimbi, a dissident of FNLA. Jonas Savimbi was the Foreign Minister of the GRAE but in the course of time clashed with Holden Roberto, accusing him of having complicity with the US and of following an
imperialist policy. Savimbi was a member of the
Ovimbundu tribe of Central and Southern Angola, son of an Evangelic pastor, who went to study medicine in European Portugal, although he never graduated. The group followed a
Maoist ideology initially and received support from the
People's Republic of China, although they switched to a more broad anti-communist platform after 1975. The
Armed Forces of Liberation of Angola (FALA) constituted the armed branch of UNITA. They had few fighters and were not well equipped. Its difficulties led Savimbi to make agreements with the Portuguese authorities, focusing more on fighting MPLA. When the war ended, UNITA was the only one of the nationalist movements that was able to maintain forces operating inside the Angolan territory, while the forces of the remaining movements were eliminated or expelled by Portuguese forces.
FLEC The Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) was founded in 1963, by the merging of the
Movement for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (MLEC), the
Action Committee of the Cabinda National Union (CAUNC) and the
Mayombe National Alliance (ALLIAMA). On the contrary of the remaining three movements, FLEC did not fight for the independence of the whole Angola, but only for the independence of
Cabinda, which it considered a separate country. Although its activities started still before the withdrawal of Portugal from Angola, the military actions of FLEC occurred mainly after, being aimed against the Angolan armed and security forces. FLEC is the only of the nationalist and separatist movements that still maintains a guerrilla warfare until today.
RDL The Eastern Revolt (RDL) was a dissident wing of the MPLA, created in 1973, under the leadership of
Daniel Chipenda, in opposition to the line of
Agostinho Neto. A second dissident wing was the Active Revolt, created at the same time. ==Pre-war events==