Background During the late 1990s, Boeing considered replacement aircraft programs due to slowing sales of the
767 and
747-400. Two new aircraft were proposed. The
747X would have lengthened the 747-400 and improved efficiency, and the
Sonic Cruiser would have achieved 15% higher speeds (approximately
Mach 0.98) while burning fuel at the same rate as the 767. Market interest for the 747X was tepid; several major American airlines, including
Continental Airlines, showed initial enthusiasm for the Sonic Cruiser, although concerns about the operating cost were also expressed. The global airline-market was disrupted by the
9/11 attacks and increased petroleum prices, making airlines more interested in efficiency than speed. The worst-affected airlines, those in the United States, had been considered the most likely customers of the Sonic Cruiser; thus the Sonic Cruiser was officially canceled on December 20, 2002. On January 29, 2003, Boeing announced an alternative product, the 7E7, using Sonic Cruiser technology in a more conventional configuration. The emphasis on a smaller midsize twinjet rather than a large 747-size aircraft represented a shift from the
hub-and-spoke theory toward the
point-to-point theory, in response to analysis of
focus groups. Randy Baseler, Boeing Commercial Airplanes VP Marketing stated that airport congestion comes from large numbers of
regional jets and small
single-aisles, flying to destinations where a 550-seat
Airbus A380 would be too large; to reduce the number of departures, smaller airplanes can increase by 20% in size and
airline hubs can be avoided with
point-to-point transit. In 2003, a recent addition to the Boeing board of directors,
James McNerney (who would become Boeing's Chairman and CEO in 2005), supported the need for a new aircraft to regain market share from Airbus. The directors on Boeing's board,
Harry Stonecipher (Boeing's President and CEO) and
John McDonnell issued an ultimatum to "develop the plane for less than 40 percent of what the
777 had cost to develop 13 years earlier, and build each plane out of the gate for less than 60 percent of the 777's unit costs in 2003", and approved a development budget estimated at US$7 billion as Boeing management claimed that they would "require subcontractors to foot the majority of costs." Boeing Commercial Airplanes president
Alan Mulally, who had previously served as general manager of the 777 programs contrasted the difference in the approval process by the board between the 777 and 787 saying "In the old days, you would go to the board and ask for X amount of money, and they'd counter with Y amount of money, and then you'd settle on a number, and that's what you'd use to develop the plane. These days, you go to the board, and they say, 'Here's the budget for this airplane, and we'll be taking this piece of it off the top, and you get what's left; don't fuck up.'" The replacement for the Sonic Cruiser project was named "7E7" (with a development code name of "Y2"). Technology from the Sonic Cruiser and 7E7 was to be used as part of Boeing's project to replace its entire airliner product line, an endeavor called the
Yellowstone Project (of which the 7E7 became the first stage). Early concept images of the 7E7 included rakish
cockpit windows, a dropped nose, and a distinctive "shark-fin"
tail. The "E" was said to stand for various things, such as "efficiency" or "environmentally friendly". In the end, Boeing said it stood for "Eight". Other names included
eLiner,
Global Cruiser, and
Stratoclimber. On April 26, 2004, Japanese airline All Nippon Airways (ANA) became the launch customer for the 787, announcing a firm order for 50 aircraft with deliveries to begin in late 2008. The ANA order was initially specified as 30 787-3, 290–330 seat, one-class domestic aircraft, and 20 787-8, long-haul, 210–250 seat, two-class aircraft for regional international routes such as
Tokyo-Narita to
Beijing-Capital, and could perform routes to cities not previously served, such as
Denver,
Moscow, and
New Delhi. The 787-3 and 787-8 were to be the initial variants, with the 787-9 entering service in 2010. Boeing would go on to use both the Everett and South Carolina plants to deliver the Dreamliner. The 787 was the first production airliner built with a fuselage comprising one-piece
composite barrel sections instead of aluminum-sheet assemblies using many fasteners. Boeing selected two new engines to power the 787, the
Rolls-Royce Trent 1000 and
General Electric GEnx. with approximately 40 percent of the efficiency gain from the engines, plus gains from aerodynamic improvements, increased use of lighter-weight composite materials, and advanced systems. The airframe underwent extensive structural testing during its design. The 787-8 and -9 were intended to have a certified 330-minute
ETOPS capability, but entered service with 180 minutes. 330-minute certification was delayed until 2014. During the design phase, the 787 underwent extensive
wind tunnel testing at Boeing's Transonic Wind Tunnel,
QinetiQ's five-meter wind tunnel at
Farnborough, United Kingdom, and
NASA Ames Research Center's wind tunnel, as well as at the French aerodynamics research agency,
ONERA. The final styling was more conservative than earlier proposals, with the fin, nose, and cockpit windows changed to a more conventional form. By 2005, customer-announced orders and commitments for the 787 reached 237 aircraft. Boeing initially priced the 787-8 variant at US$120 million, a low figure that surprised the industry. By 2007, the list price had increased to US$157–167 million, eventually exceeding US$200 million by the time the aircraft received type certification. Airlines and lessors do not pay the full list price, with market prices for the 787-8 being up to 46% lower.
Manufacturing and suppliers On December 16, 2003, Boeing announced that the 787 would be assembled in its
factory in
Everett, Washington. Boeing assigned global subcontractors to do more assembly work, delivering completed subassemblies to Boeing for final assembly. This approach was intended to result in a leaner, simpler assembly line and lower inventory, with pre-installed systems reducing final assembly time by three-quarters to three days. Subcontractors had early difficulties procuring needed parts and finishing subassemblies on schedule, leaving remaining assembly work for Boeing to complete as "traveled work". In 2010, Boeing considered in-house construction of the 787-9 tail; the tail of the 787-8 is made by Alenia. The 787 was unprofitable for some subcontractors; Alenia's parent company, Finmeccanica, had a total loss of €750 million on the project. Subcontracted assemblies included wing and center wing box (
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Japan;
Subaru Corporation, Japan);
horizontal stabilizers (
Alenia Aeronautica, Italy;
Korea Aerospace Industries, South Korea); fuselage sections (Global Aeronautica, Italy; Boeing,
North Charleston, US;
Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Japan;
Spirit AeroSystems,
Wichita, US;
Korean Air, South Korea); passenger doors (
Latécoère, France); cargo doors, access doors, and crew escape door (
Saab AB, Sweden); software development (
HCL Enterprise, India); floor beams (
TAL Manufacturing Solutions Limited, India); wiring (
Labinal, France); landing gear (
Messier-Bugatti-Dowty, UK/France); and power distribution and management systems, air conditioning packs (
Hamilton Sundstrand,
Connecticut, US). To speed up deliveries, Boeing modified four used
747-400s into
747 Dreamlifters to transport 787 wings, fuselage sections, and other smaller parts. Japanese industrial participation was key to the project. Japanese companies co-designed and built 35% of the aircraft; the first time that outside firms played a key design role on Boeing airliner wings. The Japanese government supported development with an estimated US$2 billion in loans. On April 26, 2006, Japanese manufacturer
Toray Industries and Boeing signed a production agreement involving US$6 billion worth of
carbon fiber, extending a 2004 contract. From the outset, 787 chief engineer Walt Gillette and his colleagues realized that the "Working Together" approach to supplier coordination used for the 777 must substantially evolve for the 787. So they created the 787 Dreamliner Partner Council. The council evolved from the Sonic Cruiser effort and a similar approach used in Boeing's defense business unit. The partner council would make 787 decisions together, a departure from Boeing's more hierarchical approach to decision making for the 777. Boeing harnessed not only expertise from the Partner Council, but also benefited from cross-cultural collaboration, according to Walt Gillette, as quoted in
The Culture of Collaboration (2024, expanded and updated edition) by
Evan Rosen. Boeing worked to reduce excess weight since assembly of the first airframe began; in late 2006, the first six 787s were overweight, with the first aircraft heavier than required. The seventh and subsequent aircraft would be the first 787-8s expected to meet the weight requirement. Accordingly, some parts were redesigned to include more use of
titanium. In July 2015, Reuters reported that Boeing was considering reducing the use of titanium to reduce the construction cost. Early built 787s (line numbers under 20) were overweight, increasing their fuel burn and reducing their maximum range, and some carriers decided to take later aircraft. Boeing struggled to sell these aircraft, eventually offering significant discounts and scrapping one. Because of their line numbers, these aircraft were nicknamed the "Terrible Teens". Boeing planned the first flight by the end of August 2007 and premiered the first 787 (
registered N787BA) at a rollout ceremony on July 8, 2007. The 787 had 677 orders at this time, which is more orders from launch to roll-out than any previous wide-body airliner. The major systems were not installed at the time; many parts were attached with temporary non-aerospace
fasteners requiring replacement with flight fasteners later. In September 2007, Boeing announced a three-month delay, blaming a shortage of fasteners as well as incomplete software. On October 10, 2007, a second three-month delay to the first flight and a six-month delay to first deliveries were announced due to supply chain problems, a lack of documentation from overseas suppliers, and flight guidance software delays. Less than a week later, Mike Bair, the 787 program manager, was replaced. On January 16, 2008, Boeing announced a third three-month delay to the first flight of the 787, citing insufficient progress on "traveled work". On March 28, 2008, to gain more control over the supply chain, Boeing announced plans to buy
Vought Aircraft Industries' interest in Global Aeronautica; a later agreement was also made to buy Vought's factory in North Charleston. On April 9, 2008, a fourth delay was announced, shifting the
maiden flight to the fourth quarter of 2008, and delaying initial deliveries by around 15 months to the third quarter of 2009. The 787-9 variant was postponed to 2012 and the 787-3 variant was to follow at a later date. After assessing the program schedule with suppliers, in December 2008, Boeing stated that the first flight was delayed until the second quarter of 2009. Airlines, such as
United Airlines and
Air India, stated their intentions to seek
compensation from Boeing for the delays. A secondary factor in the delays faced by the 787 program was the lack of detailed specifications provided to partners and suppliers. In previous programs Boeing had supplied high level design data, but for the 787, decided to provide broad level specifications only, on the assumption that relevant partners had the competencies to perform the design and integration work with the limited data. This decision created several delays as suppliers struggled to work with the limited design data.
Pre-flight ground testing As Boeing worked with its suppliers toward production, the design proceeded through a series of test goals. On August 23, 2007, a crash test involving a vertical drop of a partial composite fuselage section from about onto a -thick steel plate occurred in
Mesa, Arizona; the results matched predictions, allowing modeling of various crash scenarios using computational analysis instead of further physical tests. While critics had expressed concerns that a composite fuselage could shatter and burn with toxic fumes during crash landings, test data indicated no greater toxicity than conventional metal airframes. The crash test was the third in a series of demonstrations conducted to match FAA requirements, including additional certification criteria due to the wide-scale use of composite materials. in November and December 2009. On August 7, 2007, on-time certification of the
Rolls-Royce Trent 1000 engine by European and US regulators was received. The alternative GE GEnx-1B engine achieved certification on March 31, 2008. On June 20, 2008, the first aircraft was powered up, for testing the electrical supply and distribution systems. A non-flightworthy static test airframe was built; on September 27, 2008, the fuselage was successfully tested to a differential pressure of , which is 150 percent of the maximum pressure expected in commercial service. In December 2008, the 787's maintenance program was passed by the FAA. On May 3, 2009, the first test 787 was moved to the flight line following extensive factory testing, including landing gear swings, systems integration verification, and a total run-through of the first flight. On May 4, 2009, a press report indicated a 10–15% range reduction, about instead of the originally promised , for early aircraft that were about 8% overweight. Substantial redesign work was expected to correct this, which would complicate increases in production rates; Boeing stated the early 787-8s would have a range of almost . As a result, some airlines reportedly delayed deliveries of 787s to take later planes that may be closer to the original estimates. Boeing expected to have the weight issues addressed by the 21st production model. On June 15, 2009, during the
Paris Air Show, Boeing said that the 787 would make its first flight within two weeks. On June 23, the first flight was postponed due to structural reasons. Boeing provided an updated 787 schedule on August 27, 2009, with the first flight planned to occur by the end of 2009 and deliveries to begin at the end of 2010. The company expected to write off US$2.5 billion because it considered the first three Dreamliners built unsellable and suitable only for flight tests. On October 28, 2009, Boeing selected Charleston, SC as the site for a second 787 production line, after soliciting bids from multiple states.
Flight testing On December 15, 2009, Boeing conducted the 787-8
maiden flight from
Paine Field in
Everett, Washington, at 10:27 am PST and landed three hours later at 1:33 p.m. at Seattle's
Boeing Field. During the flight the 787 reached a top speed of and maximum altitude of . Originally scheduled for hours, the test flight was shortened to three hours due to unfavorable weather conditions. The six-aircraft ground and
flight test program was scheduled to be done in eight and a half months and 6800 hours, which was the fastest certification campaign for a new Boeing commercial design. The flight test program comprised six aircraft, ZA001 through ZA006, four with
Rolls-Royce Trent 1000 engines and two with GE
GEnx-1B64 engines. The second 787, ZA002 in All Nippon Airways
livery, flew to
Boeing Field on December 22, 2009, to join the flight test program; the third 787, ZA004 made its first flight on February 24, 2010, followed by ZA003 on March 14, 2010. On March 28, 2010, the 787 completed the ultimate wing load test, which requires that the wings of a fully assembled aircraft be loaded to 150% of the design limit load and held for 3 seconds. The wings were flexed approximately upward during the test. Unlike past aircraft, the wings were not tested to failure. On April 7, data showed the test had been a success. On April 23, 2010, the newest 787, ZA003, arrived at the
McKinley Climatic Laboratory hangar at
Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, for extreme weather testing in temperatures ranging from , including takeoff preparations at both temperature extremes. ZA005, the fifth 787 and the first with GEnx engines, began ground engine tests in May 2010, and made its first flight on June 16, 2010. In June 2010, gaps were discovered in the horizontal stabilizers of test aircraft due to improperly installed shims; all aircraft were inspected and repaired. That same month, a 787 experienced its first in-flight lightning strike; inspections found no damage. As composites can have as little as 1/1,000th the
electrical conductivity of aluminum, conductive material is added to alleviate potential risks and to meet FAA requirements. The FAA also planned requirement changes to help the 787 show compliance. In December 2019, it was reported that Boeing had removed the copper foil that formed part of the protection against lightning strikes to the wings of the aircraft; it then worked with the FAA to override concerns raised. The 787 made its first appearance at an international air show at the
Farnborough Airshow, United Kingdom, on July 18, 2010. On August 2, 2010, a Trent 1000 engine suffered an uncontained failure at Rolls-Royce's test facility during ground testing. The failure changed the schedule for installing Trent 1000 engines; on August 27, 2010, Boeing stated that the first delivery to launch customer ANA would be delayed until early 2011. That same month, Boeing faced compensation claims from airlines owing to ongoing delivery delays. In September 2010, it was reported that two additional 787s might join the test fleet for a total of eight flight test aircraft. On September 10, 2010, a partial engine surge occurred in a Trent engine on ZA001 at Roswell. On October 4, 2010, the sixth 787, ZA006 joined the test program with its first flight. On November 9, 2010, the second 787, ZA002 made an emergency landing at
Laredo International Airport, Texas, after smoke and flames were detected in the main cabin during a test flight. The electrical fire caused some systems to fail before landing. Following this incident, Boeing suspended flight testing on November 10, 2010; ground testing continued. After investigation, the in-flight fire was primarily attributed to
foreign object debris (FOD) that was present in the electrical bay. After electrical system and software changes, the 787 resumed flight testing on December 23, 2010.
Test evaluation and certification On November 5, 2010, it was reported that some 787 deliveries would be delayed to address problems found during flight testing. In January 2011, the first 787 delivery was rescheduled to the third quarter of 2011 due to software and electrical updates following the in-flight fire. By February 24, 2011, the 787 had completed 80% of the test conditions for the Rolls-Royce Trent 1000 engine and 60% of the conditions for the General Electric GEnx-1B engine. In July 2011, ANA performed a week of operations testing using a 787 in Japan. The test aircraft had flown 4,828 hours in 1,707 flights combined by August 15, 2011. During testing, the 787 visited 14 countries in Asia, Europe, North America, and South America to test in extreme climates and conditions and for route testing. On August 13, 2011, certification testing of the Rolls-Royce powered 787-8 finished. The FAA and
European Aviation Safety Agency certified the 787 on August 26, 2011, at a ceremony in Everett, Washington.
Entry into service Certification cleared the way for deliveries and in 2011, Boeing prepared to increase 787 production rates from two to ten aircraft per month at assembly lines in Everett and Charleston over two years. In December 2011, the National Labor Relations Board dropped its lawsuit after the
Machinists' union withdrew its complaint as part of a new contract with Boeing. The first 787 assembled in
South Carolina was rolled out on April 27, 2012. The first 787 was officially delivered to All Nippon Airways (ANA) on September 25, 2011, at the Boeing Everett factory. A ceremony to mark the occasion was also held the next day. On September 27, it flew to Tokyo
Haneda Airport. The airline took delivery of the second 787 on October 13, 2011. On October 26, 2011, an ANA 787 flew the first commercial flight from Tokyo's
Narita International Airport to
Hong Kong International Airport. The Dreamliner entered service some three years later than originally planned. Tickets for the flight were sold in an online auction; the highest bidder had paid $34,000 for a seat. An ANA 787 flew its first long-haul flight to Europe on January 21, 2012, from Haneda to
Frankfurt Airport.
Proposed variants Freighter version Even after production of the 787 began, Boeing continued to produce the 767 as a
freighter. More stringent emissions and noise limits will go into effect in 2028 and prevent 767 sales in its current form. To address this concern, Boeing has widely reported to be working on a freighter version of the 787, showing proposals to customers including
FedEx Express. , production of the 787 Freighter is expected to begin between 2028 and 2033.
787-3 The 787-3 would have carried 290–330 passengers in two-class over range, limited by a
MTOW. In April 2008, to keep the -8 on track for delivery, the -9 stretch was postponed from 2010 to at least 2012 and prioritized before the 787-3 and its 43 orders to follow without a firm delivery date. It kept the -8 length but its 51.7 m wingspan would have fit in
ICAO Aerodrome Reference Code D. It was designed to operate on
Boeing 757-300/
Boeing 767-200 sized regional routes from airports with restricted gate spacing. The wingspan was decreased by using blended
winglets instead of
raked wingtips. By January 2010, all orders, from
Japan Airlines and All Nippon Airways, had been converted to the 787-8. As it was designed specifically for the Japanese market, Boeing would likely scrap it after they switched orders. The -8's longer wingspan makes it more efficient on stages longer than . In December 2010, Boeing withdrew the short-haul model as it struggled to produce the 787-8 after program delays of three years.
Market and costs ,
Norwegian Long Haul operated the 787 as a long-haul
low-cost carrier. The 787 Dreamliner program has reportedly cost Boeing $32 billion. In 2013, the 787 program was expected to be profitable after 1,100 aircraft have been sold. At the end of 2013, the cost of producing a 787 exceeded the purchase price. Boeing's accounting method books sales immediately and distributes estimated production costs over ten years for the 1,300 aircraft it expects to deliver during that time.
JPMorgan Chase analyst Joseph Nadol estimated the program's cash loss to be $45 million per airplane, decreasing as the program moves forward. The actual cash flow reflects Boeing collecting most of the purchase price upon delivery; Boeing expects deferred costs to total $25 billion before the company begins to
break even on production; the comparable number for the
Boeing 777, adjusted for inflation, is $3.7 billion. The accumulated losses for the 787 totaled almost $27 billion (~$ in ) by May 2015. The cost of producing the fuselage may increase because of a tentative deal reached with Spirit Aerosystems of
Wichita, Kansas, wherein severe price cuts demanded by Boeing would be eased, in return for a comprehensive agreement that lowers the cost of fuselages for other jetliners that Spirit helps Boeing manufacture. In the second quarter of 2015, Boeing lost $25 million (~$ in ) on each 787 delivered but was planning to break even per plane before the year-end. After that Boeing hoped to build 900 Dreamliners over six years at an average profit of more than $35 million each. But with
deferred costs peaking in 2016 at $33 billion, (~$ in ) Leeham analyst Bjorn Fehrm believes Boeing cannot make an overall profit on the program. Ted Piepenbrock, an academic affiliated with
MIT and the
University of Oxford, projects losses decreasing through the first 700 airliners and forecasts the cumulative deferred costs to peak beyond $34 billion. The model most favorable to Boeing projects a program loss of $5 billion after delivering 2,000 Dreamliners. Boeing's original development investment, estimated at least at a further $20 billion, is not included in these costs. On July 21, 2016, Boeing reported charges of $847 million against two flight-test 787s built in 2009. Boeing had planned to refurbish and sell them but instead wrote them off as research and development expense. In 2017, Boeing's
Jim Albaugh said that the requested
return on net assets (RONA) led to
outsourcing systems reducing investment, but improving RONA had to be balanced against the risk of loss of control. From 2019, Boeing was to build 14 787s per month (168 per year), helping to offset the $28 billion in deferred production costs accumulated through 2015 and would add 100 aircraft to the current accounting block of 1,300 at the end of 2017 third quarter. In 2019, the list price for a 787-8 was US$248.3M, $292.5M for a 787-9, and $338.4M for a 787-10. The valuation for a new 787-9 is $145 million in 2018, up from $135 million in 2014, but it may have been sold for $110–115 million to prevent A330neo sales while an A330-900 is worth $115 million. In February 2018, Boeing priced six 787-9s for less than $100–115m each to
Hawaiian Airlines, close to their production cost of $80–90m, to overcome its A330-800 order. By late 2018, deferred production costs were reduced from a peak of $27.6 billion in early 2016 to $23.5 billion as assembly efficiency improved and the 800th production started.
Production rate By 2014, Boeing planned to improve financial return by reorganizing the production line, renegotiating contracts with suppliers and labor unions, and increasing the 787 production rate, stepwise, to 12 airplanes per month by the end of 2016 and 14 airplanes per month by the end of the decade. By April 2015, the production rate was 10 per month. From late 2020, the production rate is to be reduced from 14 to 12 airplanes per month due to the
China-United States trade war. Production could be trimmed to 10 planes per month as demand for wide-body aircraft falters. On October 1, 2020, Boeing announced the 787 would be produced only in North Charleston from mid-2021 due to the
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on aviation, as the production rate fell to six per month. In December, the monthly rate was further reduced to five.
Quality-control issues (2019–2025) 2019 In 2019, reports began to emerge about quality-control issues at the North Charleston plant leading to questions about the jet's safety; and later that same year
KLM, which had discovered loose seats, missing and incorrectly installed pins, nuts and bolts not fully tightened and a fuel-line clamp left unsecured on its jet, complained that the standard of manufacture was "way below acceptable standards."
2020 Early in 2020, Boeing engineers complained about depressions in the 787's vertical tail fin, affecting hundreds of planes or the vast majority of the fleet. Workers in Charleston and Everett had improperly discarded shims before the final installation of fasteners, which could lead to structural failure under limited loads. In late August 2020, Boeing grounded eight 787s due to such improper fuselage shimming and inner skin surfacing issues—issues which proved to have been discovered in August 2019 at
Boeing South Carolina. The different composite fuselage components on the 787 are joined together around the circumference using splice plates. Small variations in the thickness of the fuselage skin may leave gaps between the splice plate and the inner skin of the fuselage. While most of the gaps are closed by fastener force during the joining process, any gaps that remain must be filled using
shims, usually made of fiberglass. Issues with this shimming process plagued numerous 787s and required expensive rework of assembled planes before delivery. The following month, Boeing admitted that "nonconforming" sections of the rear fuselage did not meet engineering standards, and the FAA was investigating quality-control lapses dating back to the introduction of the 787 in 2011 and considering requiring additional inspections for up to 900 of the roughly 1,000 Dreamliners in service. A third quality-control issue then emerged, this time with the 787's horizontal stabilizers, and affecting as many as 893 Dreamliners: workers in Salt Lake City had clamped portions of the tail section too tightly, which could lead to premature material fatigue. At this point Boeing expected a one-time inspection during regularly scheduled maintenance to address the issues and expected merely to slow 787 deliveries "in the near term".
2021 By January 2021, Boeing had halted 787 deliveries to complete the inspection relating to poor quality control, then in March the FAA withdrew Boeing's
delegated authority to inspect and sign off on four new 787s, saying that it would extend this withdrawal to further aircraft if needed. Boeing briefly resumed deliveries on March 26, 2021, handing over one 787-9 to
United Airlines, but deliveries ceased again in May 2021; meaning that almost all deliveries had been paused for nearly a year. The delay generated $1 billion in abnormal costs and caused the company to cut production to around two planes a month. On July 13, Boeing discovered gaps at joints in the forward pressure bulkhead and again reduced production; the company also investigated whether the issue affected 787s already in service. Questions were asked about the inspection process used to check the work, and Boeing worked with the FAA to fix the problem, which was said to pose "no immediate threat to flight safety" and did not require 787s already in service to be grounded. On September 4, the
Wall Street Journal reported that the FAA would not accept Boeing's proposed new inspection method, aiming to speed deliveries with targeted checks rather than nose-to-tail teardowns, until at least late October; and in late November it was reported that the FAA had discovered further problems, including additional out of tolerance gaps and contamination and associated weakening of fuselage composites. The rectification process for existing aircraft was made more complex by a lack of detailed configuration data on each aircraft. The new problems and the extension of the 13 month long disruption to 787 deliveries led to anger from buyers; a slide in the company's stock price; and demands by a subcommittee of the US House of Representatives for a review of the FAA's oversight of the plane.
2022 In January 2022, it was reported that deliveries were not anticipated to restart until April 2022. In February, the FAA announced that it would withdraw Boeing's delegated authority to issue
airworthiness certificates for individual 787 aircraft until Boeing can demonstrate consistent quality, stable delivery processes, and a robust plan for the rework needed on the undelivered aircraft in storage. In late March Boeing began sounding out suppliers about their ability to support the production of up to seven aircraft a month by late 2023.
Vistara, which had been expecting delivery of four Dreamliners in 2022, indicated a lack of confidence in Boeing meeting its delivery aims by arranging to lease aircraft instead. Later in April reports began to emerge of a further delay of at least two months, and it was only in late April that Boeing submitted the necessary certification package laying out the inspections and repairs to be undertaken on already constructed planes. The FAA rejected portions of the package as incomplete and returned it to Boeing, indicating a further delay before the resumption of deliveries. In late July, the FAA approved Boeing's revised certification package, leading the company to anticipate resuming deliveries "within days". Deliveries resumed on August 10, 2022, after the FAA granted clearance. Between November 2020 and August 2022, only 14 787s were delivered. On March 10, the FAA approved the resumption of the deliveries.
2024 In April 2024, Boeing engineer Sam Salehpour alleged that the 787's (as well as the 777's) fuselage had been improperly assembled and that it could cause individual aircraft to break apart in mid-air. Salehpour also claimed that he tried to raise these concerns to Boeing but was reprimanded by the company. The FAA is investigating Salehpour's allegations. Boeing released a statement rejecting these claims.
2025 In early 2025, Italian authorities discovered a fraud scheme involving over 4,800 parts. The investigation indicated that Manufacturing Process Specification (MPS), an Italian supplier, and its subcontractors had falsified quality certifications for the components used in the Dreamliner. MPS, however, no longer exists as a company. Boeing announced in February 2025 that it had completed rework on the 122 787s that had to be stored long-term until the structural issues discovered in 2020 - shimming issues with the small gaps at the fuselage joins - could be repaired. The last jet that exited the rework program in February 2025 was a 787-10 built in South Carolina in December 2020. The "shadow factory" rework program had pulled hundreds of mechanics away from regular production work.. On the 787-9, MTOW would increase by approximately , enabling about additional payload or more than of additional range. On the 787-10, MTOW would increase by approximately , enabling about additional payload or more than of additional range. These MTOW increases were approved by the FAA in March 2026. All 787-9s and 787-10s produced since December 2025 are structurally capable of the higher MTOW rating, though airlines may choose a lower MTOW certification as the certified operating weights may affect airport fees and route planning. ==Design==