Subsistence Due to the activity of the Allied air forces, few large German supply dumps were captured until Brussels was reached. Large quantities of food were found there, and for a time these made up a large part of the rations issued to the troops. These included what were for the British soldier unusual items such as pork and foods
impregnated with garlic, which served to relieve the monotony of the "compo" field ration augmented with
bully beef and biscuits. To bring the German rations up to Field Service (FS) ration scale, additional tea, sugar and milk were added. The advanced base supply organisation around Antwerp was dispersed in three locations, with four base supply depots at Antwerp, five in Ghent and three in Brussels. Large amounts of refrigeration storage were provided for fresh meat and vegetables, which were now routinely issued. Some ration items now arrived directly from the United States without the double handling inherent in being first landed in the UK. By the end of 1944, the base had of storage capacity, and held 29 million rations. There was sufficient cold storage in the base area to meet the needs of the 21st Army Group, and some storage in the UK was released for use in other theatres or war. Eighty
refrigerated railway wagons were acquired, but in the cold weather no problem was encountered with moving frozen meat in ordinary
covered goods wagons. For Christmas, of frozen pork was landed at Ostend in late November. To economise on bakers, who were in short supply, the 21st Army Group reorganised its eight field bakeries into fourteen mobile field bakeries. This provided a nominal increase in bread-making capacity of per day, while saving 200 bakers. The equipment for the reorganised units was shipped out from the UK.
POL A POL depot was opened in Brussels that was supplied by railway
tank cars until Antwerp was opened. Antwerp had of POL storage that was shared with the Americans. Ostend became the main port for POL, and it was linked by pipeline to the largest British POL installation at Ghent, where there was of storage capacity. During the advance in September and October, the Canadian First and British Second Armies had mobile refilling centres under their command, but these were transferred to 21st Army Group's control in November. Storage areas for packaged POL were located at Antwerp, where there was ; at Diest-
Hasselt, where were stored; at Ghent, where were kept; and at Brussels, where there was . During the rapid advance, jerrican discipline was sometimes lax, and it was often necessary to emphasise the importance of returning the cans. Discarded cans were soon appropriated by the civilian population, resulting in a shortage of jerricans that took months to remedy. Stocks in the UK were depleted, and shipments became limited to the production rate of per day. To alleviate the shortage, POL was issued to line of communications units in bulk. Refilling stations were established along the line of communications to service road convoys. A salvage drive to reclaim jerricans recovered over a million of them. By the end of 1944, the 21st Army Group held stocks of of packaged and bulk POL, representing 58 days' supply. More was held in the army roadheads and FMCs. The filling centre at Rouen was too far back, which meant mobile filling stations were established at the army roadheads. They were withdrawn from army control in November and placed under that of the 21st Army Group. The War Office held a reserve of of petrol in non-returnable
flimsy tins. To alleviate the September packaged fuel shortage, these were shipped to the 21st Army Group. Jerricans were issued in preference though, and were entirely used by the armies and in the forward areas because they were more than satisfactory for shipping and handling and loss through leakage was negligible. With jerrican discipline restored, there were concerns that this might be impaired by the circulation of non-returnable containers. The result was that by December, the 21st Army Group's entire stockpile of of packaged fuel was held in flimsies. During the German occupation of Belgium the Union Pétrolière Belge (UPB) had controlled the Belgian oil companies, and the 21st Army Group retained its services for the distribution of civilian petroleum products. Such activities were limited to essential services only, and demands were met from military stocks. In return, the oil companies allowed the Allies to use their plants and employees.
Coal Bulk shipments of coal from the UK commenced in August 1944, and were increased from in September 1944 to per month in early 1945. This tied up of shipping. The coal sections of the G-4 (logistics) and G-5 (civil affairs) branches of SHAEF were amalgamated, with a US
colonel placed in charge and a British
lieutenant colonel as his deputy. The coal section swelled until it had over 400 personnel. Some collieries in France and Belgium resumed production in October. The first coal was received from France that month, but rail shipments from Belgium did not commence until November. A severe coal shortage developed in Belgium in December that threatened to bring the civilian economy and military railway traffic to a standstill. Coal was required for the trains and for many other military purposes, including steam
dredges,
tugs and
floating cranes, power stations, hospitals and bakeries. Units were given an allocation for per man per day, although this often had to be supplemented with firewood. These took priority over civilian purposes, such as electricity generation for heating and lighting. Luckily, both the US and British armies used oil for cooking. Severe restrictions were placed on electricity, but these also affected industrial facilities used for military purposes, such as steelworks, footwear, clothing factories and laundries. The price of a ton of coal at the pithead was 350
Belgian francs (), but on the
black market in Brussels it could fetch 5,000 francs (). This led to large quantities of coal being stolen and sold on the black market. For a time guards had to be posted on mines and trains hauling coal to prevent pilferage. The main bottleneck in Belgian coal production was the availability of wooden
pit props, which came from the
Ardennes. About of pit props was required for every of coal. Seven of the twelve British and Canadian forestry companies in the theatre were deployed to the Ardennes where there were good quantities of
Norway spruce. At first the problem was the railway link between the Ardennes and the mines. A movement control group was brought out from the UK to coordinate the traffic. No sooner was this resolved than the German
Ardennes offensive interrupted the supply, and four of the forestry companies had to be used as infantry. Efforts to locate another source of pit props in Belgium were to no avail, so arrangements were made for pit props to be shipped from the UK. By the time they arrived in January the crisis in the Ardennes had passed, and regular supply was resumed. The production target of of coal per day was met soon thereafter.
Supplies Until Antwerp was opened, ordnance stores arrived through Boulogne, Dieppe and Ostend. Each handled different types of stores, which simplified sorting and forwarding of ordnance stores, of which passed through these ports in the last three months of 1944. The 15th Advance Ordnance Depot (AOD) began its move to the advanced base in September, and requisitioned offices and storehouses in Antwerp. It was joined there by the 17th AOD. Stocking of the new 15th/17th AOD commenced in November, and it opened for issues to the First Canadian Army on 1 January 1945, and the British Second Army ten days later. Finally, on 22 January, it began servicing the whole line of communications. Until then, demands were met from the RMA. The 15th/17th AOD grew to employ 14,500 people, of whom 11,000 were civilians, and occupied of covered and of open space. Over 126,000 distinct items were stocked, and 191,000 items were demanded in January. The 2nd Base Ammunition Depot (BAD) opened in Brussels in October 1944, and after a slow start stocks rose to . The 17th BAD opened north of Antwerp towards the end of the year, but its stocking was hampered by V-weapon attacks. Although the tonnage of ammunition was impressive, there were still shortages of it for the
field and medium artillery. In late October 1943, stocks of ammunition seemed so high that cutbacks in production had been ordered; the labour saved in the UK had been diverted to aircraft production. On 14 October 1944, the
Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald Weeks, wrote to Montgomery, explaining that expenditure of 25-pounder ammunition was exceeding monthly production by 1.5 million rounds per month, and expenditure of medium artillery ammunition was 40 per cent higher than production. The War Office was therefore obliged to impose quotas on the armies in the field. This primarily affected the
Eighth Army in Italy, where major operations had to be postponed until the spring of 1945. An increase in the allotment of ammunition to Italy could only come at the expense of the 21st Army Group, and the War Office was unwilling to do this. The 21st Army Group largely escaped the effects of the shortage. On 7 November, the 21st Army Group restricted usage to 15 rounds per gun per day for field artillery ammunition and 8 rounds per gun per day for medium artillery ammunition, but Montgomery directed that this would apply only during quiet periods, and that stocking of the advanced base would continue until it held 14 days' reserves and 14 days' working margin prescribed by the War Office. The exigencies of the campaign took their toll on vehicles in wear and tear. A major fault was found with the engines of 1,400 4x4 3-ton
Austin K5 lorries, which developed piston trouble. A combination of early frosts and heavy military traffic created numerous potholes in the Dutch and Belgian roads and caused widespread suspension damage to vehicles. Repair work conducted in the advanced base workshops in Brussels and later Antwerp, which were able to take advantage of the static front line and the availability of civilian factories for military workshop spaces to increase their throughput. Civilian garages were also employed to perform repairs. s at the No. 8 Army Roadhead ordnance dump So many
armoured fighting vehicles broke down during the advance in September that the stocks at the RMA and the Armoured Replacement Group (ARG) were almost exhausted. By 27 September, no replacement tanks had arrived for three weeks. Armoured units had only 70 per cent of their unit equipment, and the RMA held only 15 and 5 per cent respectively in stock. Many repairable tanks lay broken down along the road sides awaiting collection by the recovery teams, but these had to move so frequently that it would be some time before repairs could be completed. It was arranged for forty armoured vehicles a day to be shipped to Boulogne in October. The following month LSTs began arriving with tanks at Ostend, and deliveries were split between the two ports, with thirty armoured vehicles arriving at Ostend and twenty at Boulogne each every day. Port clearance presented a problem as there was no railway link at Boulogne, so hard-pressed tank transporters had to be used. By October there were nine tank transporter companies, of which one was allotted to the Canadian First Army, three to the British Second Army, and five were retained under 21st Army Group control. The average tank transporter travelled about per day. In December a shortage of heavy truck tyres caused four of the companies to be taken off the road and used only in emergencies. At Ostend, there was a rail link, but also a shortage of
warflat wagons suitable for carrying tanks. The tank shipments absorbed all the available motor transport shipping to forward ports, so other vehicles were shipped to the RMA at the rate of about 250 per day. After Antwerp was opened, shipments through it averaged 30 armoured vehicles and 200 to 300 other vehicles per day. It was found that the two armoured fighting vehicle servicing units were insufficient to cope with the numbers of replacement tanks, so the brigade workshop of the disbanded
27th Armoured Brigade was employed to service tanks alongside the Second Army Delivery Squadron. In December, the establishment of the armoured
troops was changed to two
Sherman Firefly tanks armed with the more effective 17-pounder and one
Sherman tank armed with the old
75 mm gun; previously the ratio had been the reverse. Two new armoured vehicles were received during the campaign, the American
Landing Vehicle Tracked, which was used to equip the 5th Assault Regiment of the
79th Armoured Division in September, and was employed in the amphibious operations on the Scheldt and the British
Comet tank, which was issued to the
29th Armoured Brigade of the 11th Armoured Division in December. A reversion to using British tanks was prompted by a critical shortage of Sherman tanks in the US Army, which caused deliveries to the British Army to be cut back severely in September and October, and then suspended entirely in November and December. The re-equipment of the 29th Armoured Brigade was interrupted by the German Ardennes offensive, and the brigade was hastily issued with its old Shermans and sent to hold the crossings on the Meuse between Namur and Dinant. The re-equipment process was carried out in January 1945, and the surplus Sherman Fireflies were issued to other units, further reducing the number of Shermans armed with the 75 mm gun. During the German Ardennes offensive, the American depots ceased accepting shipments from Antwerp, as they were threatened by the German advance and might have to relocate at short notice, but the ships continued to arrive. With no depots in the Antwerp area, American stores piled up on the quays. By Christmas, railway traffic had come to a standstill, with trains held up as far back as Paris and Le Havre. An emergency administrative area was created around Lille, where American traffic would not interfere with the British line of communications. The German offensive also raised fears for Brussels' water supply, which would have fallen into German hands had they reached the
Meuse between
Huy and
Dinant. The German Ardennes offensive prompted a request from the US Communications Zone on 26 December for an emergency delivery of 351 Sherman tanks to the US 12th Army Group. These were drawn from the depots and the radios replaced with US patterns. Tank transporters were used to move 217 tanks, with the other 134 despatched by rail. The US forces were also loaned a hundred and six 25-pounders, 78 artillery trailers and thirty
6-pounder anti-tank guns, along with stocks of ammunition.
Services Civilian labour was employed to enable military personnel to be released for service in forward areas. By the end of 1944, some 90,000 civilians were employed by the 21st Army Group, half of them by the Royal Engineers or in the
Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers workshops in the advanced base. Assistance from the Belgian government came from its Office of Mutual Aid (OMA). Similar arrangements were made with the governments of France and the Netherlands. Local purchasing and production saved both time and shipping space. Locally-produced items included 350,000 extended end connectors ("duckbills") for tank tracks to improve the mobility of tanks on soft ground and in the snow. The OMA also established a tyre repair organisation. Civilian workers were paid by their national governments under mutual aid, but the offer of a free British Army meal proved to be the greatest attraction. A reluctance to undertake outdoor activities was overcome by issues of surplus military clothing and footwear, but by far the biggest disincentive was the German V-weapons. In addition to civilian labour, the Dutch and Belgian governments organised 24 Belgian and 12 Dutch labour units to assist the
Royal Pioneer Corps. The first six Belgian units joined the 21st Army Group in December. These units were equipped and clothed by the British Army, and their national governments granted permission for their employment in Germany when the time came. Another potential source of labour were the vast numbers of prisoners of war, and there were more of them than could be gainfully employed. By the end of December, the 21st Army Group had captured approximately 240,000 prisoners, of whom 170,000 had been moved to the UK. Due to an agreement between the US and UK dating back to the
North African campaign, prisoners of war were divided evenly between the US and UK and 100,000 prisoners were transferred from US to British control. In October the War Office announced that it was cutting back on the numbers of prisoners that it would accept in the UK, and prisoner of war camps in north-west Europe then became overcrowded. Two more camps were established, which were staffed by personnel sent by the War Office. Still, the overcrowding persisted, and it was anticipated that large numbers of prisoners would be captured when major offensive operations resumed in February 1945. Once it became clear that a rapid advance into Germany would not occur and that the 21st Army Group would remain in northern Belgium and the southern Netherlands for a considerable period of time, work commenced on preparations for the winter. Winterisation, which included the supply of warm clothing for the troops, the establishment of covered storage for supplies, and the improvement of airfields to handle the conditions, absorbed of import tonnage. Huts were required to accommodate 200,000 personnel, and of covered space was needed for other purposes. Camps were established for 100,000 refugees and prisoners of war, and a transit camp for 2,600 troops was created at Calais. Large numbers of anti-aircraft units were based around Antwerp to protect the port and installations and over 1,000 camps were built for anti-aircraft battery and searchlight positions.
No. 83 Group RAF alone required nearly 700 huts to accommodate 12,000 personnel. Orders were placed with civilian firms for 1,000
Nissen huts in November and 5,000 per month thereafter, but their work was hampered by the shortage of coal and the availability of timber. Air bases were constructed and improved by four airfield construction wings of the
Airfield Construction Branch RAF. Getting them ready for winter involved the repair of concrete runways, the erection of hangars, the construction of accommodation, and the preparation of of hard standings where stores could be unloaded from aircraft onto lorries. From December, considerable effort was devoted to keeping the runways and taxiways clear of snow and ice, for which local rock salt was used. The first
Fog Investigation and Dispersal Operation (FIDO) system outside the UK was installed at
Épinoy. This consumed of petrol each night.
Medical It was highly undesirable for hospitals to be under canvas during winter. Six general hospitals in the RMA that had become redundant were shipped back to the UK until adequate accommodation could be provided for them in the advanced base area. This was accomplished by taking over existing civilian and German military hospitals, and converting schools and convents into hospitals. Hospitals were built at Antwerp,
Louvain (Leuven), Ostend,
Bruges and Dieppe. By 7 January there were 29,000 hospital beds in the 21st Army Group. The move of troops from bivouacs to billets and buildings was accompanied by a rise in the incidence of
colds and respiratory diseases. The rate of
trench foot was low, with just twelve cases in November and fourteen in December. In all, 206 cases of trench foot or
frostbite were recorded among the British and Canadian armies during the winter of 1944, compared with 71,000 in the American armies. This was attributed to awareness and good man management by regimental officers. The wet and cold climate of winter in the British Isles, and the experience of the
Great War had made the British Army extremely conscious of the importance of taking care of feet, and it was incorporated into the training regimen. American observers noted that when the British soldier was told to do something, he did it. A policy was laid down that no soldier should be kept in the front line for more than 48 hours at a time in the winter, and efforts were made to find warm and dry billets when they were out of the line. The
British Battledress was warmer than the American equivalent, and each soldier had a warm sleeveless leather
jerkin. There was an issue of additional pairs of socks to the troops, and the design of the boots allowed for two pairs of socks to be worn in cold weather. The construction of the soles of the boots made them more waterproof than American boots. Contact with the civilian population, especially after the leave in Belgium and the Netherlands began, led to a rise in
venereal disease cases from 1.08 per thousand troops in October to 3.06 per thousand in December. There was also an increase in cases of
scabies and
pediculosis. The rate of hospital admissions rose from 22.4 per 1,000 personnel in October to 24.3 in November, and 28.0 in December. ==Outcome and legacy==