In August 1914,
The Independent magazine described the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and his wife in June as a "deplorable but relatively insignificant" reason for which "It may be doubted whether the Archduke [is] worth all this carnage", the magazine added. It discussed and dismissed ethnicity, race, religion, and national interests as motivations for war.
The Independent concluded that "such is the ridiculous and tragical situation resulting from the survival of the antiquated superstition of the '
balance of power,' that is, the theory that the prosperity of one nation was an injury to others": "The only unexpected thing about the present European war is the date of it", the magazine added later that month: To understand the long-term origins of the war in 1914, it is essential to understand how the powers formed into two competing sets that shared common aims and enemies. Both sets became, by August 1914, Germany and Austria-Hungary on one side and Russia, France, and Britain on the other side.
German realignment to Austria-Hungary and Russian realignment to France, 1887–1892 In 1887, German and Russian alignment was secured by means of a secret
Reinsurance Treaty arranged by
Otto von Bismarck. However, in 1890, Bismarck fell from power, and the treaty was allowed to lapse in favor of the
Dual Alliance (1879) between Germany and Austria-Hungary. That development was attributed to Count
Leo von Caprivi, the Prussian general who replaced Bismarck as chancellor. It is claimed that Caprivi recognized a personal inability to manage the European system as his predecessor had and so was counseled by contemporary figures such as
Friedrich von Holstein to follow a more logical approach, as opposed to Bismarck's complex and even duplicitous strategy. Thus, the treaty with Austria-Hungary was concluded despite the Russian willingness to amend the Reinsurance Treaty and to sacrifice a provision referred to as the "very secret additions" Caprivi's decision was also driven by the belief that the Reinsurance Treaty was no longer needed to ensure Russian neutrality if France attacked Germany, and the treaty would even preclude an offensive against France. Lacking the capacity for Bismarck's strategic ambiguity, Caprivi pursued a policy that was oriented towards "getting Russia to accept Berlin's promises on good faith and to encourage
St. Petersburg to engage in a direct understanding with Vienna, without a written accord." In response, Russia secured in the same year the
Franco-Russian Alliance, a strong military relationship that was to last until 1917. That move was prompted by Russia's need for an ally since it was experiencing a major famine and a rise in antigovernment revolutionary activities. That began the expansion of Russian and French financial ties, which eventually helped elevate the Franco-Russian entente to the diplomatic and military arenas. Caprivi's strategy appeared to work when, during the outbreak of the
Bosnian crisis of 1908, Germany successfully demanded that Russia step back and demobilize. When Germany asked Russia the same thing later, Russia refused, which finally helped precipitate the war.
French distrust of Germany , 1898 Some of the distant origins of World War I can be seen in the results and consequences of the
Franco-Prussian War in 1870 and 1871 and the concurrent
unification of Germany. Germany had won decisively and established a powerful empire, but France fell into chaos and experienced a years-long decline in its military power. A
legacy of animosity grew between France and Germany after the German annexation of
Alsace-Lorraine. The annexation caused widespread resentment in France, giving rise to the desire for revenge that was known as
revanchism. French sentiment was based on a desire to avenge military and territorial losses and the displacement of France as the pre-eminent continental military power. Bismarck was wary of the French desire for revenge and achieved peace by isolating France and by balancing the ambitions of Austria-Hungary and Russia in the Balkans. During his later years, he tried to placate the French by encouraging their overseas expansion. However, anti-German sentiment remained. France eventually recovered from its defeat, paid its war indemnity, and rebuilt its military strength. However, France was smaller than Germany in terms of population and industry and therefore many French felt insecure next to a more powerful neighbor. By the 1890s, the desire for revenge over Alsace-Lorraine was no longer a major factor for the leaders of France but remained a force in public opinion.
Jules Cambon, the French ambassador to Berlin (1907–1914), worked hard to secure a détente, but the French government realized that Berlin was trying to weaken the Triple Entente and at the best, was not sincere in seeking peace. The French consensus was that war was inevitable.
British alignment towards France and Russia, 1898–1907: The Triple Entente After Bismarck's removal in 1890, French efforts to isolate Germany became successful. With the formation of the informal
Triple Entente, Germany began to feel encircled. French Foreign Minister
Théophile Delcassé went to great pains to woo Russia and Britain. Key markers were the 1894 Franco-Russian Alliance, the 1904
Entente Cordiale with Britain, and the 1907
Anglo-Russian Convention, which led to the Triple Entente. France's informal alignment with Britain and its formal alliance with Russia against Germany and Austria eventually led Russia and Britain to enter World War I as France's allies. Britain abandoned its policy of
splendid isolation in the 1900s, after it had been isolated during the
Second Boer War. Britain concluded agreements, limited to colonial affairs, with its two major colonial rivals: the Entente Cordiale with France in 1904 and the Anglo-Russian Entente in 1907. Some historians see Britain's alignment as principally a reaction to an assertive German foreign policy and the buildup of its navy from 1898 that led to the
Anglo-German naval arms race. Other scholars, most notably
Niall Ferguson, argue that Britain chose France and Russia over Germany because Germany was too weak an ally to provide an effective counterbalance to the other powers and could not provide Britain with the imperial security that was achieved by the Entente agreements. In the words of the British diplomat
Arthur Nicolson, it was "far more disadvantageous to us to have an unfriendly France and Russia than an unfriendly Germany." Ferguson argues that the British government rejected German alliance overtures "not because Germany began to pose a threat to Britain, but, on the contrary because they realized she did not pose a threat." The impact of the Triple Entente was therefore twofold by improving British relations with France and its ally, Russia, and showing the importance to Britain of good relations with Germany. It was "not that antagonism toward Germany caused its isolation, but rather that the new system itself channeled and intensified hostility towards the German Empire." The Triple Entente between Britain, France, and Russia is often compared to the
Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria–Hungary and Italy, but historians caution against that comparison as simplistic. The Entente, in contrast to the Triple Alliance and the Franco-Russian Alliance, was not an alliance of mutual defence, and so in 1914 Britain felt free to make its own foreign policy decisions. As the
British Foreign Office official
Eyre Crowe minuted: "The fundamental fact of course is that the
Entente is not an alliance. For purposes of ultimate emergencies it may be found to have no substance at all. For the
Entente is nothing more than a frame of mind, a view of general policy which is shared by the governments of two countries, but which may be, or become, so vague as to lose all content." A series of diplomatic incidents between 1905 and 1914 heightened tensions between the Great Powers and reinforced the existing alignments, beginning with the First Moroccan Crisis.
First Moroccan Crisis, 1905–06: Strengthening the Entente The
First Moroccan Crisis was an international dispute between March 1905 and May 1906 over the status of Morocco. The crisis worsened German relations with both France and Britain, and helped ensure the success of the new Entente Cordiale. In the words of the historian
Christopher Clark, "The Anglo-French Entente was strengthened rather than weakened by the German challenge to France in Morocco." Due to this crisis,
Spain turned to the United Kingdom and France, and signed the
Pact of Cartagena of 1907. Spain received British help to build the new
España-class battleship.
Bosnian Crisis, 1908: Worsening relations of Russia and Serbia with Austria-Hungary In 1908, Austria-Hungary announced its
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, provinces in the
Balkans. Bosnia and Herzegovina had been nominally under the sovereignty of the
Ottoman Empire but administered by Austria-Hungary since the
Congress of Berlin in 1878. The announcement upset the fragile balance of power in the Balkans and enraged Serbia and
pan-Slavic nationalists throughout Europe. The weakened Russia was forced to submit to its humiliation, but its foreign office still viewed Austria-Hungary's actions as overly aggressive and threatening. Russia's response was to encourage pro-Russian and
anti-Austrian sentiment in Serbia and other Balkan provinces, provoking Austrian fears of Slavic expansionism in the region.
Agadir crisis in Morocco, 1911 Imperial rivalries pushed France, Germany, and Britain to compete for control of Morocco, leading to a short-lived war scare in 1911. In the end, France established a
protectorate over Morocco that increased European tensions. The
Agadir Crisis resulted from the deployment of a substantial force of French troops into the interior of Morocco in April 1911. Germany reacted by sending the gunboat to the Moroccan port of
Agadir on 1 July 1911. The main result was deeper suspicion between London and Berlin and closer military ties between London and Paris. British backing of France during the crisis reinforced the Entente between the two countries and with Russia, increased Anglo-German estrangement, and deepened the divisions that would erupt in 1914. In terms of internal British jousting, the crisis was part of a five-year struggle inside the British cabinet between Radical isolationists and the
Liberal Party's imperialist interventionists. The interventionists sought to use the Triple Entente to contain German expansion. The Radical isolationists obtained an agreement for official cabinet approval of all initiatives that might lead to war. However, the interventionists were joined by the two leading Radicals,
David Lloyd George and
Winston Churchill. Lloyd George's famous
Mansion House speech of 21 July 1911 angered the Germans and encouraged the French. The crisis led British Foreign Secretary
Edward Grey, a Liberal, and French leaders to make a secret naval agreement by which the Royal Navy would protect the northern coast of France from German attack, and France agreed to concentrate the
French Navy in the
western Mediterranean and to protect British interests there. France was thus able to guard its communications with its
North African colonies, and Britain to concentrate more force in
home waters to oppose the
German High Seas Fleet. The British cabinet was not informed of the agreement until August 1914. Meanwhile, the episode strengthened the hand of German Admiral
Alfred von Tirpitz, who was calling for a greatly-increased navy and obtained it in 1912. The American historian
Raymond James Sontag argues that Agadir was a comedy of errors that became a tragic prelude to the World War I: The crisis seems comic—its obscure origin, the questions at stake, the conduct of the actors—all comic. The results were tragic. Tension between France and Germany and between Germany and England have been increased; the armaments race receive new impetus; the conviction that an early war was inevitable spread through the governing class of Europe.
Italo-Turkish War: Isolation of the Ottomans, 1911–1912 (left) with an Ottoman military officer and
Bedouin forces in
Derna,
Tripolitania Vilayet, 1912 In the
Italo-Turkish War, the
Kingdom of Italy defeated the Ottoman Empire in North Africa in 1911–1912. Italy easily captured the important coastal cities, but
its army failed to advance far into the interior. Italy captured the Ottoman
Tripolitania Vilayet, a province whose most notable subprovinces, or sanjaks, were
Fezzan,
Cyrenaica, and
Tripoli itself. The territories together formed what was later known as
Italian Libya. The main significance for World War I was that it was now clear that no Great Power still appeared to wish to support the Ottoman Empire, which paved the way for the
Balkan Wars. Christopher Clark stated, "Italy launched a war of conquest on an African province of the Ottoman Empire, triggering a chain of opportunistic assaults on Ottoman territories across the Balkans. The system of geographical balances that had enabled local conflicts to be contained was swept away."
Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Growth of Serbian and Russian power The Balkan Wars were two conflicts that took place in the
Balkan Peninsula in southeastern Europe in 1912 and 1913. Four Balkan states defeated the Ottoman Empire in the
first war; one of them, Bulgaria, was defeated in the
second war. The Ottoman Empire lost nearly all of its territory in Europe. Austria-Hungary, although not a combatant, was weakened, as a much-enlarged
Kingdom of Serbia pushed for union of all
South Slavs. The Balkan Wars in 1912–1913 increased international tension between Russia and Austria-Hungary. It also led to a strengthening of Serbia and a weakening of the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria, which might otherwise have kept Serbia under control, thus disrupting the balance of power in Europe toward Russia. Russia initially agreed to avoid territorial changes, but later in 1912, it supported Serbia's demand for an Albanian port. The
London Conference of 1912–13 agreed to create an independent
Albania, but both Serbia and Montenegro refused to comply. After an Austrian and then an international naval demonstration in early 1912 and Russia's withdrawal of support, Serbia backed down. Montenegro was not as compliant, and on May 2, the Austrian council of ministers met and decided to give Montenegro a last chance to comply, or it would resort to military action. However, seeing the Austro-Hungarian military preparations, the Montenegrins requested for the ultimatum to be delayed, and they complied. The Serbian government, having failed to get Albania, now demanded for the other spoils of the
First Balkan War to be reapportioned, and Russia failed to pressure Serbia to back down. Serbia and Greece allied against Bulgaria, which responded with a pre-emptive strike against their forces and so began the
Second Balkan War. The Bulgarian army crumbled quickly after the Ottoman Empire and Romania joined the war. The Balkan Wars strained the German alliance with Austria-Hungary. The attitude of the German government to Austro-Hungarian requests of support against Serbia was initially divided and inconsistent. After the German
Imperial War Council of 8 December 1912, it was clear that Germany was not ready to support Austria-Hungary in a war against Serbia and its likely allies. In addition, German diplomacy before, during, and after the Second Balkan War was pro-Greek and pro-Romanian and against Austria-Hungary's increasing pro-Bulgarian sympathies. The result was tremendous damage to relations between both empires. Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister
Leopold von Berchtold remarked to the German ambassador,
Heinrich von Tschirschky in July 1913, "Austria-Hungary might as well belong 'to the other grouping' for all the good Berlin had been." In September 1913, it was learned that Serbia was moving into Albania, and Russia was doing nothing to restrain it, and the Serbian government would not guarantee to respect Albania's territorial integrity and suggested that some frontier modifications would occur. In October 1913, the council of ministers decided to send Serbia a warning followed by an ultimatum for Germany and Italy to be notified of some action and asked for support and for spies to be sent to report if there was an actual withdrawal. Serbia responded to the warning with defiance, and the ultimatum was dispatched on October 17 and received the following day. It demanded for Serbia to evacuate from Albania within eight days. After Serbia complied, the Kaiser made a congratulatory visit to Vienna to try to fix some of the damage done earlier in the year. By then, Russia had mostly recovered from its defeat in the
Russo-Japanese War, and the calculations of Germany and Austria were driven by a fear that Russia would eventually become too strong to be challenged. The conclusion was that any war with Russia had to occur within the next few years to have any chance of success.
Franco-Russian Alliance changes to Balkan inception scenario, 1911–1913 The original Franco-Russian alliance was formed to protect both France and Russia from a German attack. In the event of such an attack, both states would mobilize in tandem, placing Germany under the threat of a
two-front war. However, there were limits placed on the alliance so that it was essentially defensive in character. Throughout the 1890s and the 1900s, the French and the Russians made clear the limits of the alliance did not extend to provocations caused by each other's adventurous foreign policy. For example, Russia warned France that the alliance would not operate if the French provoked the Germans in North Africa. Equally, the French insisted that the Russians should not use the alliance to provoke Austria-Hungary or Germany in the Balkans and that France did not recognize in the Balkans a vital strategic interest for France or Russia. That changed in the last 18 to 24 months before the outbreak of the war. At the end of 1911, particularly during the
Balkan Wars in 1912–1913, the French view changed to accept the importance of the Balkans to Russia. Moreover, France clearly stated that if, as a result of a conflict in the Balkans, war broke out between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, France would stand by Russia. Thus, the alliance changed in character and Serbia now became a security salient for Russia and France. A war of Balkan inception, regardless of who started such a war, would cause the alliance to respond by viewing the conflict as a
casus foederis, a trigger for the alliance.
Christopher Clark described that change as "a very important development in the pre-war system which made the events of 1914 possible." Otte also agrees that France became significantly less keen on restraining Russia after the Austro-Serbian crisis of 1912, and sought to embolden Russia against Austria. The Russian ambassador conveyed Poincare's message as saying that "if Russia wages war, France also wages war."
Liman von Sanders Affair: 1913-14 This was a crisis caused by the appointment of an
Imperial German Army officer,
Otto Liman von Sanders, to command the
Ottoman First Army Corps guarding
Constantinople and the subsequent Russian objections. In November, 1913, Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Sazonov complained to Berlin that the Sanders mission was an "openly hostile act." In addition to threatening Russia's foreign trade, half of which flowed through the Turkish Straits, the mission raised the possibility of a German-led Ottoman assault on Russia's
Black Sea ports, and it imperiled Russian plans for expansion in eastern
Anatolia. A compromise arrangement was agreed for Sanders to be appointed to the rather less senior and less influential position of Inspector General in January 1914. When the war came Sanders provided only limited help to the Ottoman forces.
Anglo-German détente, 1912–14 Historians have cautioned that taken together, the preceding crises should not be seen as an argument that a European war was inevitable in 1914. became a considerable source of tension between Germany and Britain prior to World War I. Royal Navy warships pictured above in battle formation. Although the
Haldane Mission of February 1912 failed to halt the
Anglo-German naval arms race, the race suddenly paused in late 1912 as Germany cut its naval budget. In April 1913, Britain and Germany signed an agreement over the
African territories of the
Portuguese Empire, which was expected to collapse imminently. (That empire lasted into the 1970s.) Moreover, the Russians were again threatening British interests in
Persia and
India. The British were "deeply annoyed by St Petersburg's failure to observe the terms of the agreement struck in 1907 and began to feel an arrangement of some kind with Germany might serve as a useful corrective." Despite the 1908 interview in
The Daily Telegraph, which implied that Kaiser Wilhelm wanted war, he came to be regarded as a guardian of peace. After the Moroccan Crisis, in the Anglo-German press wars, previously an important feature of international politics during the first decade of the century, virtually ceased. In early 1913,
H. H. Asquith stated, "Public opinion in both countries seems to point to an intimate and friendly understanding." The end of the naval arms race, the relaxation of colonial rivalries, and the increased diplomatic co-operation in the Balkans all resulted in an improvement in Germany's image in Britain by the eve of the war. The British diplomat Arthur Nicolson wrote in May 1914, "Since I have been at the Foreign Office I have not seen such calm waters." The Anglophile German Ambassador
Karl Max, Prince Lichnowsky, deplored that Germany had acted hastily without waiting for the British offer of mediation in July 1914 to be given a chance. == Domestic political factors ==