China–Philippines relations

President Manuel L. Quezon in Shanghai, 1937 and Benigno Aquino III, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, 2011. Imperial China and Precolonial Philippine States Before Spain colonized the Philippines, Imperial China acknowledged the existence of several Precolonial Philippine kingdoms and the Chinese Emperor received embassies from Filipino Datus, Rajahs, and Sultans. American occupation (1899 – 1946) During the Philippine-American War, Chinese nationalist figures such as Sun Yat-sen expressed support for the Philippine revolutionaries under Emilio Aguinaldo. In 1899, Sun arranged a stealthy shipment of Japanese arms to the Philippines. Between 1921 and 1934, relations between China and the Philippines were marked by cooperation. In 1927, Philippine Senate President Manuel L. Quezon urged the Filipinos to distance themselves from Chinese nationalists due to fears of offending the United States. He believed that having links with China would hinder the Philippines' independence campaign. By the 1930s, there were debates in the US government on granting the Philippines its independence. Newton W. Gilbert, who formerly served as the Philippine Vice Governor-General, sent a letter to the US Senate stating the importance of keeping the Philippines while also noting the consequences of a possible Chinese invasion. Cold War After the Philippines became independent in 1946, it established diplomatic relations with the Nationalist government of China and continued on after it lost the mainland to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Chinese Civil War that forced the Republic of China to retreat to the island of Taiwan in 1949, formerly a Japanese colony that the ROC received in 1945. During the Cold War, the two countries were part of the anti-communist camp that view the Chinese Communists as a security threat. During the Korean War, the Philippine Expeditionary Forces to Korea under the United Nations Command fought the PRC's People's Volunteer Army in multiple battles. Establishment of official diplomatic relations It began considering normalizing relations with the People's Republic at the start of the 1970s and the Philippines recognized the PRC on 9 June 1975, with the signing of the Joint Communiqué by leaders of the two countries. Major agreements In 2009, the Philippines and China signed the Joint Action Plan for Strategic Cooperation, a five-year agreement to increase cooperation in all areas. On 16 November 2017, the Philippines and China signed fourteen deals on a variety of issues, including transportation and military aid, worth approximately US$21.6 million. In July 2019, UN ambassadors of 37 countries, including Philippines, signed a joint letter to the United Nations Human Rights Council defending China's policies of persecution of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The Philippines was one of 16 countries that defended China's policies in Xinjiang in 2019 but did not do so in 2020. Belt and Road Initiative During the respective visits of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte to the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party general secretary Xi Jinping's visit to the Philippines, the two agreed to a significant increase of Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the People's Republic of China as part of Xi's Belt and Road Initiative. However, concerns were soon raised over the terms and conditions of the ODA funding and the lack of transparency into the details. As of 2018, the delivery of that aid had also stalled, with few firm commitments put in place by the Xi administration. Despite this, the Duterte administration continued to make the relationship a major part of its economic agenda. During the Marcos Jr. administration in 2023, the Philippines withdrew from the Belt and Road initiative. ==Trade and commerce==

Since Song dynasty times in China and precolonial times in the Philippines, evidence of trade contact can already be observed in the Chinese ceramics found in archaeological sites, like in Santa Ana, Manila. During Ming and Qing dynasty times in China and Spanish colonial era in the Philippines, the Philippines through Manila has had centuries-long trade contacts with cities such as Quanzhou, Zhangzhou, Xiamen in Fujian province and Guangzhou and Macau in Guangdong province, especially as part of the Maritime Silk Road trade, then connected with the Manila-Acapulco Galleon Trade that ensured the export of Chinese trade goods, such as chinaware, across Spanish America and Europe in the Spanish colonial empire and the constant supply of Spanish silver into the economy of China as observed in the later dominance and widespread use of the Spanish silver dollar coins in the Ming and Qing dynasty coinage and its general acceptance as a de facto standard of trade across the Far East around the 16th to 19th century. In 1567, the Spanish trade port in the city of Manila in the Philippines as part of the Spanish colonial empire was opened which until the fall of the Ming dynasty brought over forty million Kuping Taels of silver to China with the annual Chinese imports numbering at 53,000,000 pesos (each peso being 8 real) or 300,000 Kuping Taels. During the Ming dynasty the average Chinese junk which took the voyage from the Spanish East Indies to the city of Guangzhou took with it eighty thousand pesos, a number which increased under the Qing dynasty as until the mid-18th century the volume of imported Spanish pesos had increased to 235,370,000 (or 169 460,000 Kuping Tael). The Spanish mention that around 12,000,000 pesos were shipped from Acapulco to Manila in the year 1597 as part of the Manila-Acapulco Galleon Trade while in other years this usually numbered between one and four million pesos. Bilateral trade volume in 2007 was US$30.62 billion. From January to October 2008, bilateral trade volume reached US$25.3 billion, an increase of 1.4% as compared with the same period last year. By the end of September 2008, the actually utilized value of accumulative investment from the Philippines to China reached US$2.5 billion. China's transformation into a major economic power in the 21st century has led to an increase of foreign investments in the bamboo network, a network of overseas Chinese businesses operating in the markets of Southeast Asia that share common family and cultural ties. The Philippines and China signed an air rights agreement in 2010, significantly increasing flights between the two countries. A 2024 study by AidData found that from 2000 to 2022, China's investments in the Philippines exceeded US$9 billion. Between 2010 and 2023, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Philippines reached US$21.9 billion. However, since 2024, the Philippines has been urging the US and its allies to increase their inward investments to the country in an attempt to counter China. ==Chinese Filipinos==

Chinese Filipinos constitute one group of overseas Chinese. Chinese Filipinos are present within several commerce and business sectors in the Philippines and a few sources estimate companies which comprise a majority of the Philippine economy are owned by Chinese Filipinos, if one includes Chinese mestizos. In view of the ongoing territorial dispute of China and the Philippines (such as Scarborough Shoal), Chinese-Filipinos prefer a peaceful solution through diplomatic talks while some view that China should not extend its claims to other parts of South China Sea. According to a 2023 report by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, Chinese Filipino tycoon George Siy's think tank, the Integrated Development Studies Institute, has been a major promoter of pro-Chinese government narratives in the Philippines. Sealight Foundation global security analyst Ray Powell took note of the recent attempts by the Chinese government to exploit the Chinese Filipino community. In a March 21, 2026 forum, he particularly mentioned the so-called "blood transfusion plan" for Chinese Filipino schools in the country. He clarified that their organization's research did not target the entire community as a whole. Instead, it sought to prevent the "hostile foreign state" from taking over these Chinese Filipino institutions. ==Sister city agreements==

There are 24 pairs of sister cities or sister provinces between China and the Philippines: • Hangzhou and Baguio • Guangzhou and Manila • Shanghai and Metro Manila • Xiamen and Cebu City • Shenyang and Quezon City • Fushun and Lipa • Hainan and Cebu province • Sanya and Lapu-Lapu • Shishi and Naga, Camarines Sur • Shandong and Ilocos Norte • Zibo and Mandaue • Anhui and Cavite • Liuzhou and Muntinlupa • Hezhou and San Fernando, • Harbin and Cagayan de Oro • Laibin and Laoag • Jiangxi and Bohol • Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and Davao City • Lanzhou and Albay • Beihai and Puerto Princesa • Fujian and Laguna • Wuxi and Puerto Princesa ==Territorial disputes==

Spratly Islands and the South China Sea in the South China Sea The two countries have disputes over the sovereignty of some islands and shoals in the Spratly Islands. These disputes are linked to other disputes in the South China Sea. China conducts grey-zone operations in these waters. Rising tensions has led the Philippines to invest further in its military forces, and to deepen cooperation with the United States and Japan. In 1734, the Spanish colonial government in the Philippines published the first edition of the Velarde map, detailing the territories under full sovereign control of Spanish Philippines, which included Scarborough Shoal (called Panacot in the indigenous language in the map) and the Spratly Islands (referred in the map as Los Bajos de Paragua). The 1734 Velarde map is the earliest map to showcase the sovereignty of a nation over Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands. In 1792, the Spanish colonial government of the territory of the Philippines launched the first ever survey of Scarborough Shoal on 4 May 1792. The survey, Plano de la Navigacion, was taken by Alessandro Malaspina aboard the Sta. Lucia, with Filipino comrades. The official territories of the Philippines was again published in the 1808 Carita General del Archipelago Filipino and again in the 1875 Carita General del Archipelago Filipino. After the Spanish-American War, Spain lost and ceded the territory of the Philippines to the United States through the 1898 Treaty of Paris. The 1898 Treaty of Paris created a treaty line, where Scarborough Shoal, the Spratly Islands, and parts of Tawi-tawi continued to be under Spanish sovereignty. This led to talks between Spain and the United States, which ended upon the signing of the 1900 Treaty of Washington, which rectified retroactively the 1898 Treaty of Paris. Under the 1900 Treaty of Washington, "all islands belonging to the Philippine Archipelago, lying outside the lines described in Article III" were also ceded to the United States as part of the territory of the Philippines, where Scarborough Shoal, the Spratly Islands, and the rest of Tawi-tawi was included. From 1899 to 1902, the United States war department in the territory of the Philippines republished and reissued four times the 1875 Carita General del Archipelago Filipino with the addition of military telegraph lines, military cable lines, eastern cable company lines, and military department boundaries. The official map of the entire Philippine territory under Spanish rule was effectively adopted as the entire Philippine territory under American rule. During the 1928 Islas Palmas international case, the United States, as representative of the territory of the Philippines, reiterated in a court memorandum that the 1875 Carta General del Archipielago Filipino "is both an American official and a Spanish official map" of Philippine territory, bounding the United States on its recognition of the Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands as Philippine territory. In 1930, the United States and the United Kingdom signed a treaty, where the United Kingdom recognized the territory of Philippines which included Scarborough Shoal and the Spratlys, effectively bounding the United Kingdom's successor countries as well, such as Malaysia and Brunei but there has been disagreement with a Philippines view that the treaty covers the waters within the Treaty Limits by at least the United States and Britain. In 1932, China sent a Note Verbale to France, declaring that China's southernmost territory was the Paracels. After rounds of consultations to address territory disputes, both sides agreed to strive for a solution through bilateral friendly consultation. In October 2004, Chinese Maritime Safety Administration and Philippine Coast Guard conducted a joint sand table rescue exercise for the first time. China National Offshore Oil Corp. and Philippine National Oil Company signed the "Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking on Certain Areas in the South China Sea" on 1 September 2004. In May 2005, Vietnam agreed to join the Sino-Philippine cooperation. Oil companies from three countries signed the "Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking on Certain Areas in the South China Sea" in March 2005. Due to the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, relations between the two countries significantly worsened. On 8 April 2012, a Philippine navy vessel cornered several Chinese fishing vessels in the Scarborough Shoal lagoon, suspecting the fishing vessels of illegal fishing. An arbitration tribunal was constituted under Annex VII of UNCLOS and it was decided in July 2013 that the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) would function as registry and provide administrative duties in the proceedings. On 12 July 2016, the arbitrators agreed with the Philippines on most of its contentions. Accordingly, the PCA tribunal decision is ruled as final and non-appealable by either countries. The tribunal also criticized China's land reclamation projects and its construction of artificial islands in the Spratly Islands, saying that it had caused "severe harm to the coral reef environment". It also characterized Taiping Island and other features of the Spratly Islands as "rocks" under UNCLOS, and therefore are not entitled to a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone. China however rejected the ruling, calling it "ill-founded". Taiwan, which currently administers Taiping Island, the largest of the Spratly Islands, also rejected the ruling. China's response was to ignore the arbitration result and to continue pursuing bilateral discussions with the Philippines. The day after the ruling, China's Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin stated at a press conference that China had "taken note of the positive attitude of the new Philippine government under President Duterte toward resuming dialogue with China and progressing bilateral relationships from various aspects. We welcome this initiative with open arms." Later reports showed that endangered giant clams under Philippine law protection were illegally being harvested by Chinese ships. The swarming continued for the entirety of April, with the Philippine foreign affairs secretary, Teddy Locsin Jr., expressing dismay over the incident and calling it an intentional "embarrassment" aimed against the Philippines. A few days before the 2019 Philippine independence day, President Duterte stated that the country may go to war with China if China claims disputed resources. On 9 June 2019, a Chinese ship, Yuemaobinyu 42212, rammed and sank a Philippine fishing vessel, F/B Gem-Ver, near Reed Bank, west of Palawan. The fishermen were caught by surprise as they were asleep during the said event. The Chinese ship afterwards left the sank Philippine vessel, while the Filipino fishermen were adrift in the middle of sea and left to the elements, in violation of a rule under UNCLOS. The 22 Filipino fishermen were later rescued by a ship from Vietnam. The government responded a day later, stating that they may cut ties with China if the culprits are not punished by the Chinese. China has stated that the event was an ordinary maritime accident, which was later backed up by investigations from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Chinese crew was later criticized for failing to undertake measures to avoid colliding with the F/B Gem-Ver and abandoning the stricken boat's crew, in violation of maritime laws. In 2020, Facebook took down a Chinese network which was part of a disinformation campaign against the Philippines. The campaign used fake profiles in an attempt to influence public opinion, particularly related to politics and the South China Sea. Increasing escalations during the Marcos presidency The election of Philippine president Bongbong Marcos in 2022 saw the onset of worsening Philippine-China relations and frequent skirmishes in the South China Sea. Marcos made overt signals that the Philippines would inevitably get involved in the event of a Taiwan-China conflict, prompting China to warn the Philippines against "playing with fire". Under Marcos, the Philippine Coast Guard began a strategy of publicizing China's aggressive actions in the South China Sea by inviting journalists during territorial encounters and releasing the photographs and videos thereafter in an attempt to gain international support. Among the escalations since 2023 include China Coast Guard's firing on Philippine military ships in the Spratly Islands waters; the Philippines accusing China of parking its navy and coast guard vessels near Scarborough Shoal in an apparent attempt to block Philippine vessels from passing through the area; the Philippine Coast Guard accusing China Coast Guard ships of jamming their automatic identification system (AIS); and, amidst Chinese and Philippine military operations around the disputed Scarborough Shoal in August 2024, the Armed Forces of the Philippines accusing China of "dangerous and provocative actions" after two Chinese Air Force aircraft dropped flares in the path of a Philippines' plane that China claimed was "illegally intruding" into its airspace. Additionally, in May 2024, the Philippines' Department of Foreign Affairs said it would probe Chinese diplomats' activities around wiretapping after reports surfaced of a recording of an agreement between a Philippine military official and Chinese officials over the South China Sea. In April 2024, the Philippine Coast Guard deployed one of its key patrol ships, the BRP Teresa Magbanua, to the Sabina Shoal area after Filipino scientists discovered submerged piles of crushed corals in its shallows, raising suspicions that the Chinese may be preparing to build a structure on the site. In August 2024, two separate collisions involving ships from the Chinese Coast Guard and the Philippine Coast Guard occurred near the Sabina Shoal, resulting in significant damage to Philippine vessels, including the BRP Teresa Magbanua. In response, Commodore Jay Tarriela of the Philippine Coast Guard announced that the Magbanua would not withdraw from the Sabina Shoal area "despite the harassment, bullying activities, and escalatory action of the Chinese coast guard". Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning described the Philippines' anchoring of the vessel in the shoal as a strategy to "permanently occupy the area". The United States' deployment of the Typhon missile system in northern Philippines in April 2024 prompted condemnation from China and Russia, which respectively accused the US of threatening regional peace and stoking an arms race. Initially, the Philippine government reassured the public that the missile system shall remain only in the Philippines until September 2024; nearing the specified deadline, however, plans on extending its stay in the country were announced, with a senior Philippine government official remarking it would help deter China and "give them sleepless nights". On 18 February 2025, a Chinese military helicopter flew within 3 meters of a Philippine patrol plane over Scarborough Shoal, leading to a 30-minute standoff. The Philippines warned the helicopter pilot of the danger posed to the crew. On June 7, 2025, a Chinese maritime militia vessel with hull number 16838 deployed a nylon parachute anchor during a period of 3 hours when apparently stuck over Pag-asa Reef 1, about from Pag-asa Island within Philippine territorial waters. The vessel was escorted away by China Coast Guard ships. About 30% of the area of the reef, being over of coral was damaged, with broken hard and soft coral fragments, that was attributed to the anchor's drag rather than a hull impact upon a later joint assessment by the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development, Western Philippines University, and the Philippine Coast Guard. The anchor was still present at underwater, blocking sunlight to the reef so threatening further damage. The environmental loss was estimated to be ₱11.1 million, within a maximum protection zone under Republic Act No. 7611, where all human activity is banned. These findings may result in legal and diplomatic action under the Philippine Fisheries Code. This is the first well documented case of such damage by a parachute anchor from a Chinese militia vessel. On 12 July 2025, the Philippine Coast Guard cutter BRP Teresa Magbanua (MRRV-9701) intercepted the Chinese Type 815G-class electronic surveillance ship Tianwangxing (793), accompanied by the China Coast Guard Zhaojun-class cutter 4203, approximately 70 nautical miles west of the Philippine archipelago within the country's exclusive economic zone. The Philippine vessel issued radio challenges, which were ignored by the Chinese Navy ship, while the escorting cutter responded with a counter-challenge asserting China's jurisdiction over the disputed waters. Philippine Coast Guard spokesperson Commodore Jay Tarriela described the interception as a “proactive response” and urged Chinese vessels to respect Philippine jurisdiction, respond to communications, and cease unauthorized activities in the EEZ. The PLA Navy later deployed the 052D-class destroyer Guilin (164) to escort the spy ship, which was observed conducting flight operations with a Z-9 utility helicopter. The incident, which took place during the U.S.-Philippines Cope Thunder military exercises, underscored continuing tensions in China–Philippines maritime relations and followed similar encounters involving Chinese military and civilian vessels operating near or within Philippine-claimed waters. In September 2025, China announced plans to establish a nature reserve on the disputed Scarborough Shoal, known as Huangyan Island in China and Bajo de Masinloc in the Philippines, prompting Manila to condemn it as a "pretext for occupation" that violates Philippine sovereignty, amid ongoing South China Sea territorial disputes and overlapping claims with several Southeast Asian nations. Ayungin Shoal incident August 2025 collision of Chinese Coast Guard and Chinese Navy On 11 August 2025, Chinese ships had chased a ship of the Philippines Coast Guard, BRP Suluan, near Scarborough Shoal, according to media; During the incident, one Chinese ship rammed into the bow section, of another Chinese ship. 2026 public statements and diplomatic exchanges On 21 January 2026, the Chinese Embassy in Manila issued a series of public statements and social media posts responding to remarks by Philippine government officials and lawmakers concerning disputes in the West Philippine Sea. The embassy published multiple posts on its official platforms disputing statements made by Philippine officials and asserting China's position on maritime and legal issues related to the dispute. The statements named several Philippine officials, including Commodore Jay Tarriela of the Philippine Coast Guard, Senators Risa Hontiveros and Kiko Pangilinan, and Representatives Leila de Lima and Chel Diokno. Embassy posts accused these officials of spreading misinformation, misinterpreting international law, or politicizing maritime issues. In particular, the embassy's deputy spokesperson publicly responded to remarks by Hontiveros, describing them as political rhetoric and stating that freedom of expression should not be used to defame foreign leaders. On 23 January 2026, 1Sambayan called on the Philippine government to take a stronger approach against what it described as problematic rhetoric from the Chinese Embassy in Manila, including considering the declaration of certain embassy personnel persona non grata. Philippine officials and lawmakers reacted by criticizing the embassy's statements. Senator Hontiveros urged the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to address what she described as attacks by the Chinese mission, while other lawmakers defended their statements as part of their constitutional duties and expressions of concern over national sovereignty. Senator Pangilinan also publicly condemned the tone of the embassy's responses and called on the DFA to lodge formal diplomatic protests. Other Philippine officials similarly criticized the embassy's remarks. Senator Erwin Tulfo stated that foreign diplomatic missions should respect freedom of speech in the Philippines and refrain from publicly admonishing Philippine officials for statements made in defense of national interests. The DFA reiterated support for Philippine officials defending the country's sovereignty and stated that differences between states are best addressed through established diplomatic channels rather than public exchanges. On 14 March 2026, in response to recent remarks by Jay Tarriela, the Chinese Embassy in Manila presented a 1990 letter from Bienvenido Tan Jr., former Philippine ambassador to Germany, addressed to German radio operator Dieter Löffler, which it said supports China's claims on the Scarborough Shoal. According to the embassy, the letter stated that "According to the Philippine National Mapping and Resource Information Authority, the Scarborough Reef or Huangyan Dao does not fall within the territorial sovereignty of the Philippines." Two days later, the Foreign Ministry of the Philippines spokesperson, Rogelio Villanueva, rejected the assertion of the Chinese embassy that the then-diplomat Tan admitted that Scarborough Shoal was not part of Philippine territory. In April 2026, the Philippines discovered cyanide on Chinese boats seized near Second Thomas Shoal, which they believe was used to kill local fish populations. Benham Rise In March 2017, Chinese ships were spotted in the Benham Rise, a protected food supply exclusive zone of the Philippines. The Philippines, through its ambassador to Beijing has officially asked China to explain the reported presence of one of its vessels in Benham Rise in the Pacific. A week later, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement saying that China is honoring the Philippines' sovereign rights over Benham Rise, and that the ship was passing by. However, the ship was revealed to have been on the area for about three months. In May 2017, Philippine president Duterte revealed that the Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping made an unveiled threat of war against the Philippines over the islands in the South China Sea during a meeting in Beijing. In January 2018, the Department of Foreign Affairs approved the Chinese Institute of Oceanology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences to perform a scientific survey of the Rise, with the approval of President Rodrigo Duterte. In February, Duterte ordered the halting of all foreign researches in the Benham Rise; however, the research being conducted by the Chinese Academy of Sciences was already finished before the halt order. Duterte later signed an executive order renaming the Benham Rise to Philippine Rise and stressing that the rise is subject to sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Philippines. The International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) and the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) of the UNESCO have rules wherein the entity that first discovers unnamed features underwater have the right to name those features, prompting Filipino officials to realize that China was after, not just research, but also the naming rights over the underwater features of the Philippine Rise which will be internationally recognized through UNESCO. It was later clarified by the Philippine government that all researches ongoing at the time the halting was made were officially cancelled, but the government still allows research activities in the Rise. Foreign researchers may still do research within the Rise if they apply for research activities through the Philippine government. The government is also maintaining that the Rise belongs to the Philippines. On 12 February 2018, the International Hydrographic Organization approved the names proposed by China for five features in the Philippine Rise after China submitted to the organization its research findings on the area. The Chinese naming of the features met public protests in the Philippines. Palawan The government of the People's Republic of China does not officially claim Palawan. Agencies of the Philippine government have denounced claims that Palawan was once part of Greater China, made from early 2025 on Chinese social media. Censorship In July 2025, tensions between China and the Philippines deepened after China attempted to block the screening of Food Delivery: Fresh from the West Philippine Sea, a documentary highlighting the challenges faced by Filipino fishermen and the Philippine Coast Guard amid Chinese interference in the West Philippine Sea. Originally set to premiere in the Philippines, the film was reportedly withdrawn due to "external forces" and later debuted at the Doc Edge Festival in Auckland, where China's embassy and consulate requested the cancellation of future screenings, calling the film a distortion of facts and a tool of "Philippine propaganda". The Philippine government condemned the move, viewing it as an act of censorship. ==COVID-19 pandemic==

(center) with Chinese Ambassador Huang Xilian during the ceremonial turnover of CoronaVac vaccines in Villamor Air Base, Pasay City on 28 February 2021. China played an important role in the early months of the Philippines' response to COVID-19. In February 2021, China became the first country to send the Philippines COVID-19 vaccines, following President Rodrigo Duterte's request for assistance from Chinese leader Xi Jinping in securing vaccines. A June 2024 Reuters investigative report later revealed that the United States allegedly launched at the height of the pandemic a clandestine campaign to undermine China's growing influence in the Philippines and to erode Filipinos' public trust on China's Sinovac vaccine, face masks, and testing kits, thereby causing economic damage and putting innocent lives at risk. ==National security concerns in the Philippines==

Amid escalating tensions in the South China Sea during the Bongbong Marcos administration in April 2024, the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency and the National Bureau of Investigation announced that they would investigate an influx of over a thousand Chinese students enrolled in private universities in Cagayan, a province facing Taiwan, most of whom were not attending classes, according to the Bureau of Immigration. Several universities and colleges in Cagayan rejected the allegations, and called the national security concerns regarding the Chinese students influx as a "blatant display of racism and Sinophobia". The Commission on Higher Education later stated that most foreign students in the Philippines were Indians and not Chinese, adding that most Chinese students in the country as of Academic Year 2022–2023 were in the National Capital Region, followed by Cagayan Valley. Bloomberg News reported that the Chinese government has invested heavily in Cagayan and attempted to woo local political elites. In May 2024, the mayor of Bamban, Tarlac, Alice Guo, faced a senate inquiry after she was linked to an earlier Philippine Offshore Gaming Operator (POGO) raid; she was also suspected by Senator Risa Hontiveros of being a "Chinese asset", and was described by President Bongbong Marcos as not being known to most politicians in Tarlac. In June 2024, the National Bureau of Investigation confirmed that the fingerprints of Alice Guo matches with Chinese national Guo Hua Ping. In July 2024, the Senate of the Philippines issued an arrest order for Guo and some of her family members for failing to attend a second consecutive hearing. Guo subsequently fled the country, but was subsequently captured in Indonesia and returned to the Philippines. The same month, Romeo Brawner Jr. stated that China is using a united front strategy to attempt to "influence various sectors in our society, including the education sector, business, even the media, and local government units." He cited POGOs as an aspect of that strategy. In August 2024, Rappler reported that the Manila bureau chief of Wenhui Bao from 2021 until 2024, Zhang "Steve" Song, was an undercover Ministry of State Security (MSS) operative who worked closely with Huawei and gathered intelligence about the internal dynamics and politics of key personalities in the country's defense and security sectors. In January 2025, Philippine police arrested Deng Yuanqing, a Chinese national affiliated with the Army Engineering University of the People's Liberation Army on suspicion of espionage. China's foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning responded to the allegations of Chinese spies saying that the Philippines should make statements "based on facts" and to stop "making false claims and hyping up so-called Chinese spies". She then urged the country to protect the rights of Chinese citizens in the Philippines. The same month, Philippine authorities arrested suspected Chinese spies posing as Taiwanese tourists, recording the activities of Philippine Coast Guard ships in Palawan. In February 2025, the National Bureau of Investigation arrested two Chinese nationals for allegedly spying on Malacañang Palace. In March 2025, Philippine authorities announced they had uncovered an alleged spy ring involving hundreds of Chinese nationals in the country. In April 2025, the Philippines expressed concern over China's arrest of three Filipinos on espionage charges, calling the accusations retaliatory and baseless. Chinese authorities alleged the individuals were working for Philippine intelligence to gather military information, claiming they had confessed. However, the Philippines' National Security Council stated the three were former scholars who had studied in Hainan under a bilateral program with Palawan, and denied any military ties. In April 2025, Senator Francis Tolentino presented evidence in a Senate hearing linking the Chinese Embassy in Manila to the operation of troll farms through a contract with Infinitus Marketing Solutions. He revealed a signed service agreement and a corresponding payment, alleging the effort was part of a covert disinformation campaign targeting the Philippine government and public. On July 1, 2025, China sanctioned former Philippine senator Francis Tolentino, barring him from mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau over his stance on South China Sea issues. Beijing cited his “egregious conduct” and opposition to Chinese interests, including authoring the Philippine Maritime Zones Act and leading a probe into alleged Chinese espionage. The move, announced a day after his term ended, is the first of its kind against a Philippine political figure. Tolentino dismissed the sanction as a “badge of honour” and reaffirmed his commitment to national sovereignty. In March 2026, Philippine authorities arrested three Filipino nationals, suspected of spying for China. On 15 April 2026, satellite imagery showed that China had deployed vessels and installed a floating barrier at the entrance to Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, a disputed area also claimed by the Philippines. Philippine authorities stated that the move restricted access for their fishermen, amid ongoing tensions over control of the shoal. Cyber crime On February 27, 2025, Philippine authorities arrested over 400 people, including 207 Chinese nationals, in a raid on a suspected cybercrime hub in Pasay. The individuals were accused of involvement in illegal online gambling and various scams, including cryptocurrency, romance, and investment frauds. Despite a crackdown ordered by Philippine President Bongbong Marcos in 2024, these operations have continued, with many relocating to other Southeast Asian countries. The arrests highlight the ongoing issue of cybercrime in the region, with China's strict anti-gambling laws fueling some of these illicit operations. Election interference In 2025, allegations of election interference by the Chinese government were widely reported. During a hearing of the Senate's special panel on maritime and admiralty zones in April 2025, the National Security Council said that there are indicators that the Chinese government is interfering in the 2025 Philippine general election including discrediting candidates critical of it and supporting candidates who sympathize with China. China's foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun dismissed these reports. The National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) also claimed that Chinese agents were "amplifying divisive political discourse" in the Philippines in coordination with local proxies. NICA alleged that the Chinese embassy in Manila have paid InfinitUs Marketing Solutions in 2023 for a troll farm on Facebook and Twitter to spread disinformation and promote Chinese state interests. ==Safety concerns from China==

In 2025, China had made four travel advisories about the Philippines over the course of five months since April. In April 2025, Anson Que, Chinese-Filipino businessman and CEO of Elison Steel was kidnapped and murdered, with his body being found in Rizal province. The Chinese embassy, that same month, made a safety warning citing "harassment of Chinese individuals and businesses," however, did not specify cases for the advisory. The safety advisory from the embassy also came at a time during arrests made against Chinese nationals for espionage cases. The Malacañang Palace later denied the embassy's harassment claims. The Education Ministry also issued travel advisories for Chinese students in April and August citing security concerns. Carl Baker of the Pacific Forum stated that China's travel advisories on the Philippines "overstate the risk associated with ordinary tourist and business travel." == Public opinions ==

Chinese public opinion According to a 2026 feeling thermometer poll by the Carter Center and Emory University, Chinese opinion of the Philippines was on average 27 out of 100. The same poll also showed 43% of the Chinese respondents agreed to China "ceding" the South China Sea territories to the Philippines "if Manila ended its mutual defense treaty with the United States in favor of non-alignment". Filipino public opinion China remains not trustworthy among the majority of the Filipinos. A December 2025 OCTA Research survey showed 60% of the respondents did not trust China, as opposed to 13% who answered they did. 79% of the respondents selected China as "the greatest threat to the Philippines", which the polling firm said was "a five-percentage point increase from 74 percent in July 2025". In a Pulse Asia survey conducted in late February 2026, only 3% of the Filipino respondents supported a prospective state visit of Chinese leader Xi Jinping to the Philippines. 68% of the respondents supported the continuation of the transparency initiative against Chinese harassment of the Filipino fishermen and authorities, while 28% opposed it. Support for the initiative was highest among respondents in both Luzon and Metro Manila and lowest among the respondents in the Visayas. == See also ==