Yogācāra philosophy is primarily meant to aid in the practice of
yoga and
meditation and thus it also sets forth a systematic analysis of the
Mahayana path of
mental training (see
five paths pañcamārga). Yogācārins made use of ideas from previous traditions, such as
Prajñāpāramitā and the
Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma tradition, to develop a novel analysis of conscious experience and a corresponding schema for Mahāyāna spiritual practice. Yogācāra sutras such as the
Saṅdhinirmocana Sūtra developed various core concepts such as
vijñapti-mātra, the
ālaya-vijñāna (store consciousness), the turning of the basis (
āśraya-parāvṛtti), the three natures (
trisvabhāva), and
emptiness.
The doctrine of vijñapti-mātra One of the main features of Yogācāra philosophy is the concept of
vijñapti-mātra. It is often used interchangeably with the term
citta-mātra in modern and ancient Yogacara sources. The standard translation of both terms is "consciousness-only" or "mind-only." Several modern researchers object to this translation in favor of alternatives like
representation-only. The meaning of this term is at the heart of the modern scholarly disagreement about whether Yogācāra Buddhism can be said to be a form of
idealism (as supported by Garfield, Hopkins, and others) or whether it is definitely not idealist (Anacker, Lusthaus, Wayman).
Origins According to
Lambert Schmithausen, the earliest surviving appearance of this term is in chapter 8 of the
Saṅdhinirmocana Sūtra, which has only survived in Tibetan and Chinese translations that differ in syntax and meaning. The passage is depicted as a response by the Buddha to a question which asks "whether the images or replicas (
*pratibimba) which are the object (
*gocara) of meditative concentration (*
samadhi), are different/separate (
*bhinna) from the contemplating mind (
*citta) or not." The Buddha says they are not different, "Because these images are
vijñapti-mātra." The text goes on to affirm that the same is true for objects of ordinary perception. The term is sometimes used as a synonym with
cittamātra (mere
citta), a name for the school that suggests
idealism. Regarding existing
Sanskrit sources, the term appears in the first verse of Vasubandhu's
Vimśatikā (
Twenty Verses), which states, "This [world] is
vijñaptimātra, since it manifests itself as an unreal object (
artha), just like the case of those with cataracts seeing unreal hairs in the moon and the like (
vijñaptimātram evaitad asad arthāvabhāsanāt yathā taimirikasyāsat keśa candrādi darśanam)." According to Mark Siderits, what Vasubandhu means here is that we are only ever aware of mental images or impressions which manifest themselves as external objects, but "there is actually no such thing outside the mind."
Arguments for consciousness-only According to the contemporary philosopher Jan Westerhoff, Yogācāra philosophers came up with various arguments in defense of the consciousness-only view. He outlines three main arguments: the explanatory equivalence argument, the causation-resemblance argument, and the constant co-cognition argument.
Explanatory equivalence argument This argument is found in Vasubandhu's
Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (
Twenty Verses) and is an
inference to the best explanation. It argues that consciousness-only can provide an account of the same features of experience which the realist explains by appealing to the existence of mind-independent material objects. This is coupled with a principle of ontological
parsimony to argue in favor of idealism. • According to critics, the problem of spatio-temporal determination (or non-arbitrariness in regard to place and time) indicates that there must be some external basis for our experiences, since experiences of any particular object do not occur everywhere and at every time. Vasubandhu responds with the
dream argument, which shows how a world created by the mind can still
seem to have spatio-temporal localization. • The problem of
inter-subjective experience (multiple minds experiencing the same world). Vasubandhu counters that
mass hallucinations (such as those said to occur to
hungry ghosts) caused by the fact they share similar
karma (which is here understood as traces or seeds in the mind-stream), show that inter-subjective agreement is possible without positing real external objects. • Another criticism states that hallucinations have no pragmatic results, efficacy or causal function and thus can be determined to be unreal, but entities we generally accept as being "real" have actual causal results (such as the 'resistance' of external objects) that cannot be of the same class as hallucinations. Against this claim, Vasubandhu argues that waking life is the same as a dream, in which objects have pragmatic effects within the very rules of the dream. He also uses the example of a
wet dream to show that mental content can have causal efficacy even outside of a dream. According to Mark Siderits, after disposing of these objections, Vasubandhu believes he has shown that mere cognizance is just as good at explaining the relevant phenomena of experience as any theory of
realism that posits external objects. Therefore, he then applies the Indian philosophical principle termed the "Principle of Lightness" (Sanskrit:
lāghava, which is similar to
Occam's Razor) to rule out realism since
vijñapti-mātra is the simpler and "lighter" theory which "posits the least number of unobservable entities." Another objection that Vasubandhu answers is how one person can influence another's experiences if everything arises from mental karmic seeds in one's mindstream. Vasubandhu argues that "impressions can also be caused in a mental stream by the occurrence of a distinct impression in another suitably linked mental stream." As Siderits notes, this account can explain how it is possible to influence or even totally disrupt (murder) another mind, even if there is no physical medium or object in existence, since a suitably strong enough intention in one mind stream can have effects on another mind stream. Nevertheless, not all interpretations of Yogācāra's view of the external world rely on multiple relations between individual minds. Some interpretations in
Chinese Buddhism, such as in
Huayan, defended the view of a single shared external world (
bhājanaloka) which was still made of consciousness, while some later Indian thinkers like
Ratnakīrti (11th century CE) defended a type of
non-dual monism according to which the distinction between one's own and other mindstreams (
saṃtānāntara) is ultimately unreal.
Causation-resemblance argument This argument was famously defended in
Dignāga's Ālambanaparīkṣā (
Examination of the Object of Consciousness) and its main target is Indian
atomism, which was the main theory of matter in the 5th century. The argument is based on the premise that a perception must resemble the perceived object (
ālambana) and have been caused by the object. To make this point, Ratié distinguishes between the non-perception (
anupalabdhi) of objects which are imperceptible only sometimes and objects which are imperceptible by their very nature. Non-perception alone is not enough to establish the nonexistence of objects which are only imperceptible for some observers and under certain circumstances (the classical example being a
piśāca demon who is imperceptible to ordinary human beings, but can be perceived by another
piśāca, as well as by yogins). However, the point of the
sahopalambhaniyama argument is to show that external objects are never perceptible under any circumstance. Ratié writes, "this might make quite a difference: we can entertain doubts regarding the existence of an entity that is imperceptible to us and in some given circumstances, but is this attitude still an option when it comes to an entity that is by nature
absolutely and always unmanifest?" According to the interpretation which takes the
sahopalambhaniyama to be ontologically committed, "an absolutely imperceptible object can only be nonexistent."
Soteriological importance of mind-only Vasubandhu also explains why it is
soteriologically important to get rid of the idea of really existing external objects. According to Siderits, this is because:When we wrongly imagine there to be external objects we are led to think in terms of the duality of 'grasped and grasper', of what is 'out there' and what is 'in here' - in short, of external world and self. Coming to see that there is no external world is a means, Vasubandhu thinks, of overcoming a very subtle way of believing in an 'I'... once we see why physical objects can't exist we will lose all temptation to think there is a true 'me' within. There are really just impressions, but we superimpose on these the false constructions of object and subject. Seeing this will free us from the false conception of an 'I'.Siderits notes how
Kant had a similar notion, that is, without the idea of an objective mind-independent world, one cannot derive the concept of a subjective "I". But Kant drew the opposite conclusion to Vasubandhu, since he held that we must believe in an enduring subject, and thus, also believe in external objects. For Yogācāra, the seemingly external or dualistic world is merely a "by-product" (
adhipati-phala) of karma. The term
vāsanā ("perfuming") is also used when explaining karma. Yogācārins were divided on the issue of whether vāsāna and bija were essentially the same, whether the seeds were the effect of the perfuming, or whether the perfuming simply affected the seeds. The type, quantity, quality and strength of the seeds determine where and how a sentient being will be reborn: one's sex, social status, proclivities, bodily appearance and so forth. The conditioning of the mind resulting from karma is called
saṃskāra. Vasubandhu's
Treatise on Action (
Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa), treats the subject of karma in detail from the Yogācāra perspective.
Eight consciousnesses A key innovation of the Yogācāra school was the doctrine of eight consciousnesses. Traditional Buddhist descriptions of consciousness taught just the first six
vijñānas, each corresponding to a sense base (
ayatana) and having their own sense objects (sounds etc). Five are based on the five senses, while the sixth (
mano-vijñāna), was seen as the surveyor of the content of the five senses as well as of mental content like thoughts and ideas. Standard Buddhist doctrine held that these
eighteen "elements" (dhatus), i.e. six external sense bases (smells, sounds etc.), six internal bases (sense organs like the eye, ear, etc.), and six consciousnesses "exhaust the full extent of everything in the universe, or more accurately, the
sensorium." Yogācāra expanded the six vijñāna schema into a new system with two new categories. The seventh consciousness developed from the early Buddhist concept of
manas, and was seen as the defiled mentation (
kliṣṭa-manas) which is obsessed with notions of "self". According to
Paul Williams, this consciousness "takes the substratum consciousness as its object and mistakenly considers the substratum consciousness to be a true Self." William S. Waldron sees this "simultaneity of all the modes of cognitive awareness" as the most significant departure of Yogācāra theory from traditional Buddhist models of
vijñāna, which were "thought to occur solely in conjunction with their respective sense bases and epistemic objects." Where Yogācāra posits simultaneity of cognitive modes, the traditional model accepted that these occurred only sequentially. As noted by
Schmithausen, the
ālaya-vijñāna, being a kind of vijñāna, has an object as well (as all vijñāna has
intentionality). That object is the sentient being's surrounding world, that is to say, the "receptable" or "container" (
bhājana) world. This is stated in the 8th chapter of the
Saṅdhinirmocana Sūtra, which states that the
ādānavijñāna is characterized by "an unconscious (or not fully conscious?) steady perception (or "representation") of the Receptacle (
*asaṃvidita-sthira-bhājana-vijñapti)." The
ālaya-vijñāna is also what experiences
rebirth into future lives and what descends into the womb to appropriate the fetal material. Therefore, the ''ālaya-vijñāna's'' holding on to the body's sense faculties and "profuse imaginings" (
prapañca) are the two appropriations which make up the "kindling" or "fuel" (lit.
upādāna) that
samsaric existence depends upon. Also, Asanga and Vasubandhu write that the
ālaya-vijñāna ‘ceases’ at awakening, becoming transformed into a pure consciousness. According to the
Mahāyānasaṃgraha, the
ālayavijñāna has both a common character and an uncommon character. The common character refers to those seeds which ripen into the
bhājanaloka, or container world, which is common to all. On the other hand, its uncommon character refers to those seeds which ripen as an individual's own sense faculties. The
Mahāyānasaṃgraha states that the remedies (i.e. those which comprise the Buddhist path) counteract the uncommon character of the
ālayavijñāna, but not that which is common. That is, although they lack any individual karma of their own, purified persons are nonetheless supported by a consciousness of common seeds and that which is sustained by the discriminations of others. And while buddhas have access to that which is shared in common, i.e. the container world, they nonetheless experience it as pure. The storehouse consciousness also serves as the basis for container worlds that are uninhabited by sentient beings. According to Buddhist cosmology, when a world is going to perish, beings no longer populate it. However, although there are no longer any beings to perceive it, that container world is nonetheless "mind only," as it still exists in the storehouse consciousnesses of the beings who have departed from it. Similarly, in the case of an uninhabited world in which beings are going to be reborn, such a world also exists in the storehouse consciousnesses of the beings who will be reborn there. As Thomas Wood explains, this means that a world may exist entirely within the minds of sentient beings even though those beings are not directly conscious of it. According to Waldron, while there were various similar concepts in other Buddhist Abhidharma schools which sought to explain karmic continuity, the
ālaya-vijñāna is the most comprehensive and systematic. Waldron notes that the
ālaya-vijñāna concept was probably influenced by these theories, particularly the
Sautrantika theory of seeds and
Vasumitra's theory of a subtle form of mind
(suksma-citta). Regarding the status of the seeds, according to the
Chengweishilun,
Sthiramati regarded the seeds to be merely nominal (i.e. conventional and not actually real); while on the other hand,
Xuanzang took them to be real.
Transformations of consciousness Yogācāra sources do not necessarily describe the eight consciousnesses as absolutely separate or substantial phenomena. For example, Kalupahana notes that the
Triṃśika describes the various forms of consciousness as transformations and functions of a being's stream of consciousness. These transformations are threefold according to Kalupahana. The first is the
ālaya and its seeds, which is the flow or stream of consciousness, without any of the usual projections on top of it. The second transformation is
manana, self-consciousness or "Self-view, self-confusion, self-esteem and self-love". It is "thinking" about the various perceptions occurring in the stream of consciousness". The
ālaya is defiled by this self-interest. The third transformation is
visaya-vijñapti, the "
concept of the object". In this transformation the
concept of objects is created. By creating these concepts human beings become "susceptible to grasping after the object" as if it were a real object (
sad artha) even though it is just a conception (
vijñapti). A similar perspective which emphasizes Yogācāra's continuity with
early Buddhism is given by
Walpola Rahula. According to Rahula, all the elements of this theory of consciousness with its three layers of
vijñāna are already found in the
Pāli Canon, corresponding to the terms
viññāna (sense cognition),
manas (mental function, thinking, reasoning, conception) and
citta (the deepest layer of the aggregate of consciousness which retains karmic impressions and the
defilements).
Account of intersubjectivity Yogācāra has a complex account of
intersubjectivity. According to Yogācāra doctrine, sentient beings experience their own mental representations. This means each being, strictly speaking, occupies its own unique sensory world. As Ernest Billings Brewster points out, "every sentient being possesses a 'storehouse consciousness' that contains a sensory world unique to each being." Schmithausen observes that, according to the
Chengweishi lun, the sense of a surrounding world of things experienced in common by different beings is a result of their taking the images produced in each other's
ālayavijñāna as "remote objective supports." That is, on the basis of the remote objective support (i.e. the mental representation in another's mind), one's own mind develops a corresponding image. As the
Chengweishi lun states, "[the
ālaya- or
vipāka-vijñāna] invariably has also a remote objective support because it must rely on an ‘original’ (質) [consisting in an image] developed by [the consciousnesses of] others (他變): only then it develops its own [image]," and "one's own [body] and others' bodies as well as the earth (i.e. the surrounding world) can be mutually experienced [only] because the [corresponding image(s)] developed by [the minds of] others function as the original of one's own [mind, i.e.
ālayavijñāna, and vice-versa]." The remote objective support constitutes a specific type of condition, namely "the condition of dominance" (
adhipati-pratyaya). Regarding this, Zhizhou, a grand pupil of
Xuanzang’s disciple
Kuiji, states: "That which has been developed from [the consciousness of] a given sentient being serves directly (
sākṣāt) for him as a cognitive object. That which has been developed from [the consciousness of] another constitutes a condition of dominance (
adhipati-pratyaya) for that which has been developed from his own [consciousness]; it [thus] also serves remotely as a cognitive object." Zhizhou goes on to explain that what is developed from one's own consciousness is "that which is conformed to," while what is developed from another's consciousness is "that which conforms to." In the example of a person cutting down a tree, when the tree in that person's mind (that which is conformed to) is cut down, the tree in the consciousness of another (that which conforms to) is also cut down. In this way, "that which conforms to" exists in mutual relationship with "that which is conformed to." As such, when the latter is absent, so too is the former.
Dharmakīrti makes a distinction between two types of causes depending on whether one's mental impressions are caused by one's own mind or caused by another’s mind. In the former case, the cause is referred to as
upādāna kāraṇa (material cause), while in the latter case the cause is the
adhipati-pratyaya (dominant condition). The dominant condition is involved when "the impressions of one person's mind stream are causally related to the mind-cause of another person's mind stream." According to Dharmakīrti, one's perceptions of one's own bodily actions and speech are caused directly by one's own mind as the material cause. On the other hand, the image of one's body and speech in another person's consciousness, though directly caused by their mind, is simultaneously influenced by one's own mind serving as the dominant condition,
adhipati-pratyaya. In response to the problem of
solipsism, the assertion that other minds do not exist, Xuanzang maintained that other minds constituted remote objective supports, with Kuiji further incorporating remote objective supports under the category of
adhipati-pratyaya, or dominant conditions
. As such, the
alterity of other minds is preserved, since they are not asserted to be the products of one's own inner psyche. In this way, other minds are not negated. At the same time, although other minds exist and are perceived, they do not violate the principle of mind-only, since they are not extra-mental but depend on one's own consciousness to appear as phenomena for oneself. According to Jessica Zu, "In this framing of intersubjectivity, the problem of one world or many worlds is explained non-dualistically: these lifeworlds are neither the same nor different, neither one nor many, but karmically interconnected." This self-other interdependence also has soteriological implications, as it enables ordinary beings to learn from sages who in turn assist those who may purify their own minds by taking up the path to liberation. In his analysis of Yogācāra philosophy, Thomas Wood critiques the Yogācāra doctrine of the collective hallucination of the shared world, claiming that it is inconsistent with Yogācāra's rejection of a single infinite mind. Regarding the Yogācāra presentation of telepathic connections between many finite minds, Wood states, "the Vijñānavādin has to invoke so
much telepathy in order to explain the features of normal perception that he ends up, in effect, with a doctrine that is indistinguishable from
monistic idealism." In China, the
Huayan Buddhist school rejected the Yogācāra doctrine of many connected yet separate sensory worlds. During
Ming dynasty debates between Huayan and Yogācāra, the Huayan exegete Kongyin Zhencheng (1547–1617) appealed to the Huayan notion of an all-encompassing holistic
dharmadhātu to argue for a single sensory world which is shared by all beings
. The three natures Yogācāra works often define three basic modes or "natures" (
svabhāva) of experience. Jonathan Gold explains that "the three natures are all one reality viewed from three distinct angles. They are the appearance, the process, and the emptiness of that same apparent entity." The
Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa (
Exposition of the Three Natures) gives a brief definition of these three natures: What appears is the dependent. How it appears is the fabricated. Because of being dependent on conditions. Because of being only fabrication. The eternal non-existence of the appearance as it is appears: That is known to be the perfected nature, because of being always the same. What appears there? The unreal fabrication. How does it appear? As a dual self. What is its nonexistence? That by which the nondual reality is there. However, as Xuanzang notes, this nature is also empty in that there is an "absence of an existential nature in conditions that arise and perish" (
utpatti-niḥsvabhāvatā). That is, the events in this causal flow, while "seeming to have real existence of their own" are actually like magical illusions since "they are said to only be hypothetical and not really exist on their own." As Siderits writes "to the extent that we are thinking of it at all - even if only as the non-dual flow of impressions-only - we are still conceptualizing it." •
Pariniṣpanna-svabhāva (literally, "fully accomplished", "perfected", "consummated"): This is the true nature of things, the experience of Suchness or Thatness (
Tathātā) discovered in meditation unaffected by conceptualization, causality, or duality. It is defined as "
the complete absence, in the dependent nature, of objects – that is, the objects of the conceptualized nature" (see
Mahāyānasaṃgraha, 2:4). The "pivot" model, found in texts like the
Triṃśikā and the
Mahāyānasaṃgraha, presents the dependent nature as a kind of "ontological pivot" since it is the basis for conceptual construction (the imagined nature) and for the perfected nature (which is nothing but the absence of the imagined nature in the dependent nature). D'Amato explains that the
Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra and its
bhāṣya differ from what he calls the "standard interpretation," since according to the latter, the dependent nature ultimately exists, while according to the former, the dependent exists conventionally, though not ultimately. He says, "In the standard account offered above, the dependent nature is understood to be ultimately real since it is the basis or substratum of reality itself: although the dependent nature is empty of inherent nature, it does ultimately exist." On the other hand, in the view of the
Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra and its
bhāṣya, "it is not the dependent nature that is ultimately real or that functions as the substratum of reality; rather, it is the perfected nature that is ultimately real." Similarly, the
Trisvabhāvanirdeśa states: "The imputed and the other-dependent are to be known as having defiled characteristics. The perfected is asserted to have the characteristic of purity." These philosophers differed on the question of the relationship of the various divisions of consciousness to the
three natures (
trisvabhāva). For Nanda, the seeing part of consciousness belonged to the dependent nature (
paratantra-svabhāva), while the seen part belonged to the imagined (
parikalpita-svabhāva). According to Dharmapāla, the seeing part, seen part, and the self-cognizing part all belong to the dependent nature. For Dharmapāla, it is only when false notions are applied to them (such as existence, nonexistence, identity, difference, etc.) that the seeing and seen parts can be called imagined, but they are otherwise real. While
Sthiramati was influenced by Dignāga's three-bhāga theory, he held that the self-cognizing part alone belonged to the dependent nature (with the seeing and seen parts both belonging to the imagined). Thus, for Sthiramati, consciousness really only has one part, and in this he differed from Dharmapāla and
Xuanzang. According to Zhihua Yao, the one-bhāga theory is associated with the classical Nirākāravāda position according to which consciousness is not subject to any divisions.
Emptiness The central meaning of
emptiness (
śūnyatā) in Yogācāra is a twofold "
absence of duality." The first element of this is the unreality of any conceptual duality such as "physical" and "non-physical", "self" and "other". To define something conceptually is to divide the world into what it is and what it is not, but the world is a causal flux that does not accord with conceptual constructs. This is also an unreal superimposition, since there is really no such separation of inner and outer, but an interconnected causal stream of mentality which is falsely divided up. MN 121) and relies on this sutra in its explanations of emptiness. According to Gadjin Nagao, this sutra affirms that "emptiness includes both being and non-being, both negation and affirmation."
Disagreement with Madhyamaka Indian sources indicate that Yogācāra thinkers sometimes debated with the defenders of the
Madhyamaka tradition. However, there is disagreement among contemporary Western and traditional Buddhist scholars about the degree to which they were opposed, if at all. The main difference between these schools was related to issues of existence and the nature of emptiness. The Chinese pilgrim
Yijing (635–713) concisely summarized the differences thus: “For Yogācāra the real exists, but the conventional does not exist; and [Yogācāra] takes the three natures as foundational. For Madhyamaka the real does not exist, but the conventional does exist; and actually the two truths are primary". Garfield and Westerhoff write that "Yogācāra is both ontologically and epistemologically
foundationalist; Madhyamaka is
antifoundationalist in both senses." In a similar fashion, Asaṅga states "that of which it is empty does not truly exist; that which is empty truly exists: emptiness makes sense in this way". He also describes emptiness as "the non-existence of the self, and the existence of the
no-self." Against the radically anti-foundationalist interpretation of
Madhyamaka, the classic Yogācāra position is that there is something (the dependent nature which is mere-consciousness) that "
exists" (sat) independently of conceptual designation (prajñapti), and that it is this real thing (vāstu) which is said to be empty of duality and yet is a basis for all dualistic conceptions. Furthermore, Yogācāra thinkers like Asaṅga and Vasubandhu critiqued those who "adhere to non-existence" (
nāstikas, vaināśkas, likely referring to certain Madhyamikas) because they saw them as straying into metaphysical
nihilism (
abhāvānta, see
Vimśatikā v. 10). Sthiramati argues that we cannot say that everything exists conventionally (
saṁvṛtisat) or nominally (prajñaptisat) and that nothing truly exists in an ultimate fashion (which would entail a global
conventionalism and
nominalism without any
metaphysical ground). For Sthiramati, this view is false because "what would follow is non-existence even conventionally. That is because conventions are not possible without something to depend upon (or, “without taking up something”—
upādāna)." Thus, for Sthiramati, consciousness (vijñana) "since it is dependently arisen, exists as
dravya (
substance)." The
Yogācārabhūmi's Viniścayasaṃgrahanī states that either Madhyamakas see conventional reality as produced by linguistic expressions and also by causal forces, or they see it as produced merely by linguistic expressions and convention. If the former, then Madhyamikas must accept the reality of causal efficacy, which is a kind of existence (since things which are causally produced can be said to exist in some way). If the latter, then without any basis for linguistic expression and convention, it makes no sense to even use these terms (for Yogācāra these conventions must have some kind of referential basis). Yogācārins further held that if all phenomena are equally conventional and unreal in the same way this would lead to laxity in ethics and in following the path, in other words to
moral relativism. The basic idea behind this critique is that if only convention exists (as Madhyamaka claims) and there are no truths that are independent of convention and linguistic expression, there would be no epistemic foundations for critiquing worldly (non-buddhist) conventions and affirming other conventions as closer to the truth (like the conventions used by Buddhists to establish their ethics and their teachings).
Mental images: true vs false An important debate about the reality of mental appearances within Yogācāra led to its later subdivision into two systems of Satyākāravāda (True Aspectarians, also known as Sākāravāda) and Alīkākāravāda (False Aspectarians, also known as Nirākāravāda). They are also termed "Aspectarians" (
ākāra) and "Non-Aspectarians" (
anākāra). The core issue is whether appearances or “aspects” (
rnam pa, ākāra) of objects in the mind are treated as true (
bden pa, satya) or false (
rdzun pa, alīka). While this division did not exist in the works of the early Yogācāra philosophers, tendencies similar to these views can be discerned in the works of Yogācāra thinkers like
Dharmapāla (c. 530–561?) and
Sthiramati (c. 510–570?). According to Zhihua Yao, Dharmapāla was a Sākāravādin, while Sthiramati was a Nirākāravādin. Davey K. Tomlinson describes the difference between the Nirākāravāda and Sākāravāda with reference to later Yogācāra scholars from
Vikramaśilā as follows:On one hand is the Nirākāravāda, typified by
Ratnākaraśānti (ca. 970–1045); on the other, the Sākāravāda, articulated by his colleague and critic
Jñānaśrīmitra (ca. 980–1040). The Nirākāravādin argues that all appearances do not really exist. They are ersatz or false (
alīka). Ephemeral forms appear to us but are the erroneous construction of ignorance, which fundamentally characterizes our existence as suffering beings in saṃsāra. In the ultimately real experience of an awakened buddha, no appearances show up at all. Pure experience, unstained by false appearance (which is
nirākāra, “without appearance”), is possible. The Sākāravādin, on the other hand, defends the view that all conscious experience is necessarily the experience of a manifest appearance (consciousness is
sākāra, or constitutively “has appearance”). Manifest appearances, properly understood, are really real. A buddha's experience has appearances, and there is nothing about this fact that makes a buddha's experience mistaken. According to Bodhibhadra, the difference between the Sākāravāda and Nirākāravāda is that where the former regards images (
ākāra) as belonging to the dependent nature (
paratantrasvabhāva), the latter takes images to belong to the imagined nature (
parikalpitasvabhāva). Thus, according to the Nirākāravāda, images are "[as much false as] the hair seen by one suffering from partial blindness." Furthermore, Bodhibhadra explains that where the Sākāravādins argue that knowledge is always endowed with images, the Nirākāravādins maintain that in non-conceptual knowledge (
nirvikalpajñāna) "all objects never appear." Similarly, Mokṣākaragupta states that for Sākāravāda, "All this that is commonly known to be existent as the body or object [of its activity] is none other than knowledge." As such, for the Sākāravādin, although free of the imaginary relation of cognitum and cognizer, which is the product of logical construction (
kalpanā), knowledge is nonetheless endowed with various images. On the other hand, Mokṣākaragupta explains that in the Nirākāravāda view, "The essence of knowledge is not stained by the specks of any images and resembles a pure crystal [or the clear sky of an autumnal midday]. Those images of cognition (
ākāra) are indeed not real, and become perceptible being shown by nescience (
avidyā). Therefore, the cognized is not existent in reality; and since the cognized is inexistent, the quality of cognizer which is ascribed to knowledge in relation to the (cognized) is also inexistent." According to Yaroslav Komarovski the distinction is as follows:Although Yogācāras in general do not accept the existence of an external material world, according to Satyākāravāda its appearances or “aspects” (
rnam pa, ākāra) reflected in consciousness have a real existence, because they are of one nature with the really existent consciousness, their creator. According to Alīkākāravāda, neither external phenomena nor their appearances and/in the minds that reflect them really exist. What exists in reality is only primordial mind (
ye shes, jñāna), described as self-cognition (
rang rig, svasaṃvedana/ svasaṃvitti) or individually self-cognizing primordial mind (
so so(r) rang gis rig pa’i ye shes).
Two types of Alīkākāravāda The Alīkākāravāda was divided into two camps: [1] the Samala-Alīkākāravāda and [2] the Nirmala-Alīkākāravāda. While both, against the Satyākāravāda position, agreed that images (
ākāra) are false, the Samala-Alīkākāravādins nonetheless maintained that buddhas still experience images, but knowing them to be false, remain free of delusion. On the other hand, according to Nirmala-Alīkākāravādins, buddhas experience no images whatsoever. For those who accepted that buddhas still experience unreal images, a buddha possesses two types of gnosis: [1] non-conceptual gnosis, which knows the ultimate truth, and [2] a pure mundane gnosis, which is connected with conventional truth and knows the multiplicity of phenomena. Those who upheld that a buddha experiences no images at all argued that a buddha has only non-conceptual gnosis. According to this latter view, while a buddha experiences no images, appearances of a buddha's qualities, such as the buddha's form-bodies, arise in the mental continua of disciples in the manner of a wish-granting jewel spontaneously fulfilling all wishes (on the basis of non-conceptual gnosis, compassion, and a buddha's former aspirations). Regarding the view of the famous Nirākāravāda proponent
Ratnākaraśānti, although reality is free of images, in order to interact with and benefit sentient beings in saṃsāra, a buddha deliberately retains a small amount of error, and thus continues to experience images while knowing them to be false.
Meditation and awakening As the name of the school suggests, meditation practice is central to the Yogācāra tradition. Yogācāra texts prescribe various yogic practices such as
mindfulness and the four investigations, out of which a revolutionary and radically transformative understanding of the non-duality of self and other is said to arise. This process is referred to as
āśraya-parāvṛtti ("overturning the cognitive basis", or "revolution of the basis"), which refers to "overturning the conceptual projections and imaginings which act as the base of our cognitive actions." Roger R. Jackson describes this as a "'fundamental unconstructed awareness' (
mūla-nirvikalpa-jñāna)". When this knowledge arises, the eight consciousnesses come to an end and are replaced by direct knowings. According to Lusthaus:Overturning the Basis turns the five sense consciousnesses into immediate cognitions that accomplish what needs to be done (
kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna). The sixth consciousness becomes immediate cognitive mastery (
pratyavekṣaṇa-jñāna), in which the general and particular characteristics of things are discerned just as they are. This discernment is considered nonconceptual (
nirvikalpa-jñāna).
Manas becomes the immediate cognition of equality (
samatā-jñāna), equalizing self and other. When the Warehouse Consciousness finally ceases it is replaced by the Great Mirror Cognition (
Mahādarśa-jñāna) that sees and reflects things just as they are, impartially, without exclusion, prejudice, anticipation, attachment, or distortion. The grasper-grasped relation has ceased. ..."purified" cognitions all engage the world in immediate and effective ways by removing the self-bias, prejudice, and obstructions that had prevented one previously from perceiving beyond one's own narcissistic consciousness. When consciousness ends, true knowledge begins. Since enlightened cognition is nonconceptual its objects cannot be described. • Beings whose innate seeds gave them the capacity to practice the bodhisattva path and achieve full
Buddhahood • Beings whose innate seeds gave them the capacity to achieve the state of a
pratyekabuddha (private Buddha) • Beings whose innate seeds gave them the capacity to achieve the state of an
arhat • Beings whose innate seeds had an indeterminate nature, and could potentially be any of the above • Beings whose innate seeds were incapable of achieving enlightenment ever because they lacked any wholesome seeds The fifth class of beings, the
icchantika, were described in various Mahayana sutras as being incapable of achieving enlightenment, unless in some cases through the aid of a Buddha or Bodhisattva. Nevertheless, the notion was highly criticized by later Mahayanists who supported the universalist doctrine of
ekayana. This tension is important in East Asian Buddhist history and later East Asian Yogācārins attempted to resolve the dispute by softening their stance on the five categories.
Modern disagreement on the meaning of vijñapti-mātra There is a lively debate over how exactly Yogācāra, and specifically the concept of
vijñapti-mātra, should be understood in the context of Western philosophy. In earlier Western scholarship, and among some contemporaries, Yogācāra is understood as a form of
idealism, such as Berkeley's
subjective idealism that denies the existence of an external, objective world and asserts that reality consists solely of minds and their ideas. However, there is also a camp of authors who assert that Yogācāra is best understood as a form of soteriological
phenomenology. Under this interpretation, Yogācāra is not making claims about what "ultimately exists", but is an epistemic and therapeutic project aimed at understanding how experience is cognitively constructed, interpreted, and reified (i.e. how the mind mistakenly treats these experiences as independent realities, thus causing suffering).
Idealism According to Bruce Cameron Hall, the interpretation of this doctrine as a form of
subjective or
absolute idealism has been "the most common 'outside' interpretation of
Vijñānavāda, not only by modern writers, but by its ancient opponents, both Hindu and Buddhist." Scholars such as
Jay Garfield, Saam Trivedi, Nobuyoshi Yamabe, Paul Williams, and Sean Butler argue that Yogācāra is similar to idealism (and they compare it to the idealisms of
Kant and
Berkeley), though they note that it is its own unique form and that it might be confusing to categorize it as such. The German scholar and philologist
Lambert Schmithausen affirms that Yogācāra sources teach a type of idealism which is supposed to be a middle way between Abhidharma realism and what it often considered a nihilistic position which only affirms emptiness as the ultimate. Schmithausen notes that philological study of Yogācāra texts shows that they clearly reject the independent existence of mind and the external world. He also notes that the current trend in rejecting the idealistic interpretation might be related to the unpopularity of idealism among Western academics. Powers, and
Wayman. Some scholars like
David Kalupahana argue that it is a mistake to conflate the terms
citta-mātra (which is sometimes seen as a different, more metaphysical position) with
vijñapti-mātra (which need not be idealist). However, Deleanu points out that Vasubandhu clearly states in his
Twenty Verses and
Abhidharmakosha that
vijñapti and
citta are synonymous. Nevertheless, different alternative translations for
vijñapti-mātra have been proposed, such as
representation-only, ideation-only, impressions-only and
perception-only. According to Thomas Kochumuttom, Yogācāra is a
realistic pluralism which does not deny the existence of individual beings. Kochumuttom argues that Yogācāra is not idealism since it denies that absolute reality is a consciousness, that individual beings are transformations or illusory appearances of an absolute consciousness. Thus, for Kochumuttom,
vijñapti-mātra means "mere representation of consciousness," a view which states "that the world
as it appears to the unenlightened ones is mere representation of consciousness". Furthermore, according to Kochumuttom, in Yogācāra "the absolute state is defined simply as emptiness, namely the emptiness of subject-object distinction. Once thus defined as emptiness (
sunyata), it receives a number of synonyms, none of which betray idealism."
Soteriological phenomenology According to
Dan Lusthaus, the
vijñapti-mātra theory is closer in some ways to Western
Phenomenological theories and
Epistemological Idealism. However, it is not a form of metaphysical idealism because Yogācāra rejects the construction of any type of
metaphysical or
ontological theories. == Practice ==