Supreme state organ of power All communist political systems practice
unified state power. This means that the
supreme state organ of power (SSOP) can interfere in the work of the
supreme executive and administrative organ,
supreme judicial organ, the
supreme procuratorial organ, as it deems necessary. This is because both Marx and Lenin abhorred the parliamentary systems of
bourgeois democracy, but neither sought to abolish the SSOP as an institution. Lenin wrote that it would be impossible to develop
proletarian democracy "without representative institutions." Both of them considered the governing model of the
Paris Commune of 1871, in which executive and legislative were combined in one body, to be ideal. More importantly, Marx applauded the election process by "universal suffrage in the various wards and towns." While the SSOP might not be important in itself, they "have a place in the literature and rhetoric of the ruling parties which cannot be ignored—in the language of the party's intimacy with working masses, of its alleged knowledge about interests of working people, of social justice and socialist democracy, of the
mass line and learning from the people." This reasoning gives communist SSOPs the right to interfere in every state institution unless the SSOP itself has made a law that bars it from it. This also means there are no limits to politicisation, unlike in liberal democracies, where politicians are legally barred from interfering in judicial work. This is a firm rejection of the
separation of powers found in liberal democracies since no institution can legally enforce checks and balances on the SSOP. The SSOP passes the constitution, which can only be amended by the SSOP. Soviet legal theorists denounced judicial review and extra-parliamentary review as bourgeoisie institutions. They also perceived it as a limitation of the people's supreme power. The SSOP, together with its , oversaw the constitutional order. Since the SSOP is the supreme judge of constitutionality, the SSOP's acts cannot be unconstitutional. Moreover, this means that
judicial independence in communist states does not mean the same as in liberal democracies. In communist states, judicial independence means stopping all interference not granted by law, but interference in itself is not barred. The
Supreme Soviet was the first SSOP, and the Soviet legislative system was introduced in all communist states. The Supreme Soviet convened twice a year, usually for two or three days each, making it one of the world's first frequently-convened SSOP during its existence. The same meeting frequency was the norm in the Eastern Bloc countries and modern-day China. China's SSOP, the
National People's Congress (NPC), is modelled on the Soviet one. As with the Soviet one, the NPC is the supreme organ of the state and elects a
permanent organ of the supreme state organ of power known as the
Standing Committee (the Soviets had a
Presidium), the
supreme executive and administrative organ (named the
State Council in China and the
Council of Ministers in the Soviet Union), the
supreme judicial organ (such as the
Supreme Court of East Germany), the
supreme procuratorial organ (such as the
Supreme People's Procuracy of Vietnam), the chair of the National Defence Council (for example, the Chairman of the
Council for National Defense and Security of Vietnam),
supreme supervisory organ (such as the Director of China's
National Supervisory Commission) and other institutions if they exist. Moreover, in all communist states, the ruling party has either had a clear majority, such as China or held every seat as they did in the Soviet Union, in their Supreme Soviet. A majority in the SSOP ensures the centralised and unified leadership of the central committee of the ruling Marxist–Leninist party over the state. By having SSOPs, the Marxist–Leninist parties try to keep ideological consistency between supporting representative institutions and safeguarding the party's leading role. They seek to use the SSOPs as a linkage between the rulers and the ruled. These institutions are representative and usually mirror the population in areas such as
ethnicity and
language, "yet with occupations distributed in a manner skewed towards government officials." Unlike in liberal democracies, SSOPs of communist states are not to act as a forum for conveying demands or interest articulation—they meet too infrequently for this to be the case. This might explain why communist states have not developed terms such as delegates and trustees to give SSOP representatives the power to vote according to their best judgement or in the interest of their constituency. Scholar Daniel Nelson has noted: "As with the British parliament before the seventeenth-century turmoil secured its supremacy, legislative organs in communist states physically portray the 'realm' ruled by (to stretch an analogy) 'kings'. Members of the assemblies 'represent' the population to whom the rulers speak and over whom they govern, convening a broader 'segment of society' [...] than the court itself." Despite this, it does not mean that the communist states use SSOPs to strengthen their communication with the populace—the party, rather than the SSOP, could take that function. Ideologically, it has another function, namely, to prove that communist states do not only represent the interests of the working class but all social strata. Communist states are committed to establishing a classless society and use SSOPs to show that all social strata, whether bureaucrat, worker, or intellectual, are committed and have interests in building such a society. As is the case in China, national institutions such as the SSOP "must exist which brings together representatives of all nationalities and geographic areas." It does not matter if the SSOPs only
rubber stamp decisions because by having them, it shows that communist states are committed to incorporating minorities and areas of the country by including them in the composition of the SSPÅ. In communist states, there is usually a high proportion of members who are government officials. In this instance, it might mean that it is less important what SSOPs do and more important who its representatives are. The members of such SSOPs at central and local levels are usually either government or party officials, leading figures in their community, or national figures outside the communist party. This shows that SSOPs are tools to garner popular support for the government in which leading figures campaign and spread information about the party's policies and ideological development. Furthermore, Western researchers have devoted little attention to SSOPs in communist states. The reason is that there are no significant organs of political socialisation compared to legislatures in liberal democracies. While political leaders in communist states are often elected as members of SSOPs, these posts are not relevant to political advancement. The role of SSOPs is different from country to country. In the Soviet Union, the
Supreme Soviet did "little more than listen to statements from Soviet political leaders and to legitimate decisions already made elsewhere" while in the SSOPs of Poland, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia it has been more active and had an impact on rule-making.
Constitution Role of constitutions Marxist–Leninists view the
constitution as a
fundamental law and as an instrument of force. The constitution is the source of law and legality. Unlike in
liberal democracies, the Marxist–Leninist constitution is not a framework to limit the power of the state. To the contrary, a Marxist–Leninist constitution seeks to empower the state—believing the state to be an organ of class domination and law to be the expression of the interests of the dominant class. Marxist–Leninists believe that all national constitutions do this to ensure that countries can strengthen and enforce their own class system. In this instance, it means that Marxist–Leninists conceive of constitutions as a tool to defend the socialist nature of the state and attack its enemies. This contrasts with the liberal conception of
constitutionalism that "law, rather than men, is supreme." Unlike the relatively constant (and, in some instances,
permanently fixed) nature of democratic constitutions, a Marxist–Leninist constitution is ever-changing.
Andrey Vyshinsky, a
Procurator General of the Soviet Union during the 1930s, notes that the "Soviet constitutions represent the total of the historical path along which the Soviet state has travelled. At the same time, they are the legislative basis of subsequent development of state life." That is, the constitution sums up what has already been achieved. This belief is also shared by the
Chinese Communist Party, which argued that "the Chinese Constitution blazes a path for China, recording what has been won in China and what is yet to be conquered." A constitution in a communist state has an end. The preamble of the
1954 Chinese constitution outlines the historical tasks of the Chinese communists, "step by step, to bring about the socialist industrialisation of the country and, step by step, to accomplish the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicraft and capitalist industry and commerce." In communist states, the constitution was a tool to analyse the development of society. The Marxist–Leninist party in question would have to study the correlation of forces, literally society's class structure, before enacting changes. Several terms were coined for different developmental states by Marxist–Leninist legal theorists, including
new democracy, ''
people's democracy,
and the primary stage of socialism''. This is also why amendments to constitutions are not enough and major societal changes need a novel constitution which corresponds with the reality of the new class structure. With
Nikita Khrushchev's repudiation of Stalin's practices in the "
Secret Speech" and the Chinese Communist Party's repudiation of certain
Maoist policies, Marxist–Leninist legal theories began to emphasise "the formal, formerly neglected constitutional order."
Deng Xiaoping, not long after
Chairman Mao Zedong's death, noted that "[d]emocracy has to be institutionalised and written into law, to make sure that institutions and laws do not change whenever the leadership changes or whenever the leaders change their views. [...] The trouble now is that our legal system is incomplete. [...] Very often what leaders say is taken as law and anyone who disagrees is called a lawbreaker." In 1986, Li Buyan wrote that "the policies of the Party usually are regulations and calls which to a certain extent are only principles. The law is different; it is rigorously standardised. It explicitly and concretely stipulates what the people should, can, or cannot do." These legal developments were echoed in later years in Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. This has led to the development of the communist concept of socialist rule of law, which runs parallel to, and is distinct from, the
liberal term of the same name. In the last years, this emphasis on the constitution as both a legal document and a paper which documents society's development has been noted by the Chinese Communist Party
general secretary Xi Jinping, who stated in 2013 that "[n]o organisation or individual has the privilege to overstep the Constitution and law."
Constitutional supervision After
Soviet Union general secretary Joseph Stalin's death, several communist states have experimented with some sort of constitutional supervision. These organs were designed to safeguard the supreme power of the
supreme state organ of power (SSOP) from circumvention by political leaders.
Romania was the first to experiment with constitutional supervision when it established a Constitutional Committee in 1965. It was elected by the SSOP, and leading jurists sat on the committee, but it was only empowered to advise the SSOP. Keith Hand has commented that "[i]t was not an effective institution in practice", being unable to prevent
Nicolae Ceausescu's emasculation of Romania's
Great National Assembly after the inauguration of the
July Theses.
Hungary and
Poland experimented with constitutional supervision in the early 1980s. Hungary established the Council of Constitutional Law, which was elected by the SSOP and consisted of several leading jurists. It was empowered to review the constitutionality and legality of statutes, administrative regulations, and other normative documents; however, if the agency in question failed to heed its advice, it needed to petition the SSOP. In 1989, the Soviets established the Constitutional Supervision Committee, which "was subordinate only to the USSR constitution." It was empowered "to review the constitutionality and legality of a range of state acts of the USSR and its republics. Its jurisdiction included laws [passed by the SSOP], decrees of the Supreme Soviet's Presidium, union republic constitutions and laws, some central administrative decrees, Supreme Court explanations, and other central normative documents." If the committee deemed the SSOP to have breached legality, the SSOP was obliged to discuss the issue, but it could reject it if more than two-thirds voted against the findings of the Constitutional Supervision Committee. While it was constitutionally powerful, it lacked enforcement powers, it was often ignored, and it failed to defend the constitution during the
coup against
Mikhail Gorbachev. The
Chinese leadership has argued against establishing any corresponding constitutional supervisory committee due to their association with the failed communist states of Europe. None of the surviving communist states (China, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam) have experimented with constitutional supervision committees or constitutional supervision of any kind outside the existing framework until 2018, when the
Constitution and Law Committee of the National People's Congress was bestowed the right of constitutional review.
Government as the highest administrative agency of state power The government of communist states is usually defined as the "executive organ of the highest state organ of power" or as the "highest administrative agency of state power". It functions as the executive organ of the SSOP. This model has been introduced with variations in all communist states. For most of its existence, the Soviet government was known as the
Council of Ministers and identical names were used for the governments of
Albania,
East Germany,
Hungary,
Poland, and
Romania. It was independent of the other central agencies such as the supreme state organ of power and its
permanent organ, but the Supreme Soviet was empowered to decide on all questions it wished. The Soviet government was responsible to the supreme state organ of power, and in between sessions of the supreme state organ of power, it reported to the SSOP's permanent organ. The permanent organ could reorganise and hold the Soviet government accountable, but it could not instruct the government. In communist states, the government was responsible for the overall economic system, public order, foreign relations, and defence. The Soviet model was more or less identically implemented in
Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, with few exceptions. One exception was Czechoslovakia, where it had a
president and not a collective head of state. Another exception was in Bulgaria, where the State Council was empowered to instruct the Council of Ministers.
Judicial organs and socialist law In every communist state, the
supreme judicial organ and the
supreme procuratorial organs are either internal organs of the
supreme state organ of power (SSOP) or, most commonly, make up parts of the
unified state apparatus and are directly accountable to the SSOP. For instance, China's
Supreme People's Court is the "legislative organ of governance that manages the judicial system in the name of the"
National People's Congress, and through it, the
Chinese Communist Party. These organs are responsible to and report on their work to the SSOP. For instance, the
Prosecutor-General of Vietnam's
Supreme People's Procuracy delivers an annual Work Report to the SSOP, the
National Assembly, every year. Moreover, all communist states have been established in countries with a
civil law system. The countries of Eastern Europe had formally been governed by the
Austro-Hungarian Empire,
German Empire, and
Russian Empire—all of whom had a civil law legal system. Cuba had a civil law system imposed on them by Spain, while China introduced civil law to overlay with Confucian elements, and Vietnam used French law. Since the establishment of the Soviet Union, there has been a scholarly debate on whether
socialist law is a separate legal system or is a part of the civil law tradition. Legal scholar Renè David wrote that the socialist legal system "possesses, in relation to our French law, particular features that give it a complete originality, to the extent that it is no longer possible to connect it, like the former Russian law, to the system of
Roman law." Similarly, Christopher Osakwe concludes that socialist law is "an autonomous legal system to be essentially distinguished from the other contemporary families of law." Proponents of socialist law as a separate legal system have identified the following features: • The socialist law is to disappear with the withering away of the state. • The rule of the Marxist–Leninist party. • The socialist law is subordinate and reflects changes to the economic order (the absorption of
private law by
public law). • The socialist law has a religious character. • The socialist law is
prerogative rather than
normative. Legal officials argue differently for their cases compared to Westerners. For instance, "[t]he predominant view among Soviet jurists in the 1920s was that Soviet law of that period was Western-style law appropriate for a
Soviet economy that
remained capitalist to a significant degree." This changed with the
introduction of the
command economy, and the term socialist law was conceived to reflect this in the 1930s. Hungarian legal theorist Imre Szabó acknowledged similarities between socialist law and civil law, but he noted that "four basic types of law may be distinguished: the laws of the slave, feudal, capitalist, and socialist societies." Using the Marxist theory of
historical materialism, Szabó argues that socialist law cannot belong to the same law family since the material structure is different from the capitalist countries as their superstructure (state) has to reflect these differences. In other words, law is a tool by the
ruling class to govern. As Renè David notes, socialist jurists "isolate their law, to put into another category, a reprobate category, the Romanist laws and the common law, is the fact that they reason less as jurists and more as philosophers and Marxists; it is in taking a not strictly legal viewpoint that they affirm the originality of their socialist law." However, some socialist legal theorists, such as Romanian jurist Victor Zlatescu differentiated between type of law and family of law. According to Zlatescu, "[t]he distinction between the law of the socialist countries and the law of the capitalist countries is not of the same nature as the difference between Roman-German law and the common law, for example. Socialist law is not a third family among the others, as in certain writings of Western comparatists." In other words, socialist law is civil law, but it is a different type of law for a different society. Yugoslav jurist noted that a "great number of legal institutions and legal relations remain the same in socialist law", further stating that it is "necessary and justified" to put them to use if they are "in
conformity with the corresponding interests of the ruling class in the state in question." Importantly, socialist law had retained civil law institutions, methodology, and organisation. This can be discerned by the fact that
East Germany retained the
1896 German civil code until 1976 while
Poland used existing Austrian, French, German, and Russian civil codes until adoption of its own civil code in 1964. Scholar John Quigley wrote that "[s]ocialist law retains the inquisitorial style of trial, law-creation predominantly by SSOPs rather than courts, and a significant role for legal scholarship in construing codes."
Military Control raising the
flag of the Chinese Communist Party during a military parade marking the
70th anniversary of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 2019. Communist states have established two types of civil-military systems. The armed forces of most socialist states have historically been state institutions based on the Soviet model, but in China, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam, the armed forces are party-state institutions. However, several differences exist between the statist (Soviet) and the party-state models (China). In the Soviet model, the
Soviet armed forces was led by the Council of Defense (an organ formed by the
Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union) while the Council of Ministers was responsible for formulating defence policies. The party leader was
ex officio the Chairman of the Council of Defense. Below the Council of Defense, there was the Main Military Council which was responsible for the strategic direction and leadership of the Soviet armed forces. The working organ of the Council of Defense was the General Staff tasked with analysing military and political situations as they developed. The party controlled the armed forces through the Main Political Directorate (MPD) of the
Ministry of Defense, a state organ that functioned "with the authority of a department of the
CPSU Central Committee." The MPD organised political indoctrination and created political control mechanisms at the centre to the company level in the field. Formally, the MPD was responsible for organising party and
Komsomol organs as well as subordinate organs within the armed forces; ensuring that the party and state retain control over the armed forces; evaluates the political performance of officers; supervising the ideological content of the military press; and supervising the political-military training institutes and their ideological content. The head of the MPD was ranked fourth in military protocol, but it was not a member of the Council of Defense. The Administrative Organs Department of the CPSU Central Committee was responsible for implementing the party personnel policies and supervised the
KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. In the Chinese party-state model, the
People's Liberation Army (PLA) is a party institution. In the preamble of the
Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party, it is stated: "The
Communist Party of China (CPC) shall uphold its absolute leadership over the People's Liberation Army and other people's armed forces." The PLA carries out its work in accordance with the instructions of the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
Mao Zedong described the PLA's institutional situation as follows: "Every communist must grasp the truth, '
Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.' Our principle is that
the party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party." The
Central Military Commission (CMC) is both an organ of the state and the party—it is an organ of the CCP Central Committee and an organ of the national SSOP, the National People's Congress. The
CCP General Secretary is
ex officio party CMC Chairman and the
President of the People's Republic of China is by right state CMC Chairman. The composition of the party CMC and the state CMC are identical. The CMC is responsible for the command of the PLA and determines national defence policies. fifteen departments report directly to the CMC and that are responsible for everything from political work to administration of the PLA. Of significance is that the CMC eclipses by far the prerogatives of the CPSU Administrative Organs Department while the Chinese counterpart to the Main Political Directorate supervises not only the military, but also intelligence, the security services, and counterespionage work.
Representation Unlike in liberal democracies, active military personnel are members and partake in civilian institutions of governance. This is the case in all communist states. The
Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has elected at least one active military figure to its
CPV Politburo since 1986. In the 1986–2006 period, active military figures sitting in the
CPV Central Committee stood at an average of 9,2 per cent. Military figures are also represented in the SSOP (the
National Assembly) and other representative institutions. In China, the two
CMC vice chairmen have had by right office seats in the
CCP Politburo since 1987.
Ruling party Leading role A Marxist–Leninist party has led every communist state. This party seeks to represent and articulate the interests of the classes exploited by
capitalism. It seeks to lead the exploited classes to achieve communism. However, the party cannot be identified with the exploited class in general. Its membership comprises members with advanced consciousness above sectional interests. Therefore, the party represents the advanced section of the exploited classes and, through them, leads the exploited classes by interpreting the universal laws governing human history towards communism. In
Foundations of Leninism (1924),
Joseph Stalin wrote that "the proletariat [working class] needs the Party first of all as its General Staff, which it must have for the successful seizure of power. [...] But the proletariat needs the Party not only to achieve the [class] dictatorship; it needs it still more to maintain the [class] dictatorship." The current
Constitution of Vietnam states in Article 4 that "[t]he
Communist Party of Vietnam, the vanguard of the Vietnamese working class, simultaneously the vanguard of the toiling people and of the Vietnamese nation, the faithful representative of the interests of the working class, the toiling people, and the whole nation, acting upon the Marxist–Leninist doctrine and
Ho Chi Minh's thought, is the leading force of the state and society." In a similar form, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) describes itself as "the vanguard of the Chinese working class, the Chinese people, and the Chinese nation." As noted by both communist parties, the ruling parties of communist states are
vanguard parties.
Vladimir Lenin theorised that vanguard parties were "capable of assuming power and leading the whole people to socialism, of directing and organising the new system, of being the teacher, the guide, the leader of all the working and exploited people in organising their social life without the bourgeoisie." This idea eventually evolved into the concept of the party's leading role in leading the state as seen in the CCP's self-description and Vietnam's constitution.
Internal organisation The Marxist–Leninist governing party organises itself around the principle of
democratic centralism and through it, the state too. It means that all directing organs of the party, from top to bottom, shall be elected; that party organs shall give periodical accounts of their activities to their respective party organisations; that there shall be strict party discipline and the subordination of the minority to the majority; and that all decisions of higher organs shall be absolutely binding on lower organs and on all party members. The supreme organ of a Marxist–Leninist governing party is the party congress. The congress elects the central committee and either an auditing commission and a control commission, or both, although not always. The central committee is the party's highest decision-making organ in-between party congresses and elects a politburo and a secretariat amongst its members and the party's leader. When the central committee is not in session, the politburo is the highest decision-making organ of the party and the secretariat is the highest administrative organ. In certain parties, either the central committee or the politburo elects amongst its members a standing committee of the politburo which acts as the highest decision-making organ in between sessions of the politburo, central committee, and the Congress. This leadership structure is identical all the way down to the primary party organisation of the ruling party. == Economic system ==