Both the common law and the
Human Rights Act 1998 are domestic sources of rights. Since 1998, through judicial development, the two have increasingly converged as the dominant view is that the ordinary rules of tort, equity, contract or property can accommodate human rights. As
Lord Bingham put it in 2008, The modern law contrasts to the older view, represented by
A. V. Dicey that "at no time has there in England been any proclamation of the right to liberty of thought or to freedom of speech, [...] it can hardly be said that our constitution knows of such a thing as any specific right of public meeting".
Life The common law ensures the protection of the right to life and that no person is deprived of life intentionally. This is achieved primarily through the
criminal law and the crimes of
murder and
manslaughter. Some protection is also offered by the civil law where, for example, the
Fatal Accidents Act 1976 allows relatives of those killed by the wrongdoing of others to recover damages.
Capital punishment had by 1998 been abolished in respect of all offences. Under the Coroners Act 1988 there is a duty in certain circumstances for deaths to be investigated by a
coroner. The law also attaches importance to the preservation of life: aiding and abetting a
suicide is a criminal offence under the
Suicide Act 1961 and
euthanasia is unlawful (see the
Bland case). Furthermore, there is a duty upon medical professionals to keep patients alive unless to do so would be contrary to the patient's best interests based on professional medical opinion (the
Bolam Test), taking into account their quality of life in the event that treatment is continued. The
Abortion Act 1967 permits the termination of a pregnancy under certain conditions and the
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 requires the storage of embryos to be licensed. There is also an obligation on the state to prevent
destitution and
neglect by providing relief to persons who may otherwise
starve to death.
No forced labour Slavery was abolished throughout much of the
British Empire by the
Slavery Abolition Act 1833 but as early as 1706 the common law had recognised that as soon as a slave came to
England, he became free. The courts did not recognise contracts which were equivalent to slavery or servitude. The courts have been reluctant to force individuals to work and have declined to enforce
contracts of service.
Forced labour is however permitted in certain limited circumstances: the Crown can theoretically compel persons to undertake
naval service and
prisoners can be forced to work whilst serving their sentences. The
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom considered the forced labour prohibition in
Caitlin Reilly and Jamieson Wilson v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, where it ruled that the
Department for Work and Pensions'
workfare policy under which the
unemployed work in return for their
benefit payments were not forced labour but were nevertheless legally flawed.
Liberty The right to
liberty of the person, to be free from the domination or servitude of others, and only to lose one's liberty 'by lawful judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land' has been fundamental to UK and English law since the
Magna Carta. This said, slavery and serfdom took until the 16th century to break down in England, and was maintained at least until 1833 within the
British Empire, before full abolition of
forced labour was passed, extending the writ of
habeas corpus (the right to one's own body) to everyone.
Benjamin Franklin's
alleged adage, that people who sacrifice
liberty for
security will lose both and deserve neither, is reflected in human rights law. Like international law, the
European Convention on Human Rights article 5 states no 'one shall be deprived of [their] liberty' unless law expressly allows that person's detention after conviction, a lawful arrest or detention on suspicion of an offence, detention of a minor for education, detention for health or stopping infectious diseases spreading, or for lawful deportation or extradition. People must be told reasons for any detention, be put on trial in a reasonable time, or released immediately with compensation if detention was unlawful. In practice, every power of the police or the state to maintain order and security 'inevitably means a corresponding reduction in the liberty of the individual', and the UK has among the highest spending on policing in the world. For this reason the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and the limits to police powers, is a key legislative guardian of liberty in the UK today. including giving a fixed penalty notice, but not the wider search or arrest powers of police. Three main issues of police power and liberty are (1) powers of arrest, detention and questioning, (2) powers to enter, search or seize property, and (3) the accountability of the police for abuse of power. First, the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 section 1 allows a constable to stop and search people if a constable 'has reasonable grounds for suspecting' that they will 'find stolen or prohibited articles', they may seize the articles, and they may use reasonable force. The constable must give their name, police station, and grounds for the search. People cannot be made to remove clothing in public, except an outer coat, jacket or gloves. Because of the widespread problem of
race discrimination in stop and search, the Home Office Code A says that 'reasonable suspicion cannot be based on generalisations or stereotypical images' of people being involved in crime. It was formerly seen as 'contrary to constitutional principle' to search someone to find whether or not there are grounds for arrest. But since 1994, there is no need for police to show reasonable suspicion to search someone to prevent violence or the carrying of offensive weapons. In 2015 the Supreme Court held suspicionless searches were held to be compatible with
ECHR article 5. Under section 24, constables can arrest people without a warrant if they are committing an offence, or if there are reasonable grounds for suspecting they will. The meaning of 'reasonable grounds' is not exacting, but a police officer must not arrest someone in bad faith, or irrationally, or if a suspect is cooperating and arrest is therefore unnecessary. Otherwise, a justice of the peace may issue a warrant for arrest, require attendance at court, in writing, and it can be executed by a constable. With a warrant, a constable can enter and search premises to make an arrest, or enter and search after an arrest. In addition, any person can make a '
citizens' arrest of another person who is in the act of committing an
indictable offence. Anyone being arrested must be told the fact of arrest, and the reasons, or be told as soon as practicable, and if they are not the arrest is unlawful. People who are arrested must be brought to a police station as soon as practicable, and there must either be released, charged or detained for questioning. People can only be detained without charge for 24 hours, but this can be extended to 36 hours for an
indictable offence, or another 36 hours (i.e. 72 hours in total) but only with approval of a magistrate's court where the detainee has a right to legal representation. People can be searched at a police station with an
inspector's authority, but can only do intimate searches of orifices if there are reasonable grounds for thinking there is a class A drug or article that could cause injury. A detainee has the right to inform a friend or relative, and consult a solicitor, but this right can be delayed by 36 hours if arrested for an indictable offence or 48 hours for terrorism. Interviews should be recorded, people can be photographed and drug tested without their consent. 'Intimate' samples of bodily fluids, blood and swabs cannot be taken without consent, but courts may draw adverse inferences. When being questioned by police, it is acknowledged that the right to silence is ultimately 'at the heart' of a fair trial, and 'particular caution [is] required before a domestic court [should] invoke an accused's silence against him.' No statement or confession is admissible unless it is voluntarily given. A clear exception, however, is that a vehicle owner can be required to reveal the identity of a driver, and this does not breach
ECHR article 6. Second, police officers have no right to trespass upon property without a lawful warrant, because as
Lord Camden said in
Entick v Carrington by 'the law of England every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass.' Here a sheriff searched and seized property at the home of a journalist,
John Entick, but the 'warrant' used by the sheriff had no legal basis. The Court held that the sheriff had to pay damages. Today, under the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 section 8 enables officers to enter premises and search but only based on a warrant granted by a justice of the peace. There is no right to search communications between lawyer and a client, or confidential personal records, some medical materials, and confidential journalistic material, unless there is an order of a judge. A common law power to enter premises to stop a
breach of peace was held in
McLeod v UK to have unjustifiably violated the right to privacy under
ECHR article 8, because the police used it to help an ex-husband recover property when an ex-wife was absent from a home. Under section 19, an officer can seize material if they have reasonable grounds to believe it was obtained by committing an offence, or if it is evidence, but not if it is subject to legal privilege. Third, although 'the law does not encourage' someone to 'resist the authority of... an officer of the law', there is an inherent right to resist an unlawful arrest, but it is an offence to resist a lawful arrest. By contrast, before being formally arrested, in
R v Iqbal a man accused of drug offences was detained and handcuffed by police while attending a friend's trial, but before being arrested he broke free and escaped. He was caught again, and convicted for escaping lawful custody, but the Lord Chief Justice overturned the conviction because there was no lawful arrest, and the offence could not be widened 'by making it apply to those whose arrest has been deliberately postponed.' Anyone can bring a claim against police for unlawful conduct, the chief constable is vicariously liable for constables' conduct, and
exemplary damages are available for 'oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional actions'. Evidence illegally obtained, such as a confession, and certainly anything through 'torture, inhuman or degrading treatment and the use or threat of violence' must be excluded, and a court can refuse evidence if it would have an adverse effect on the fairness of proceedings. Since 2011, Police and Crime Commissioners are directly elected in England and Wales (on low turnouts) and have a duty to 'secure that the police force is efficient and effective'. The Home Secretary is meant to issue a 'strategic policing document' that chief constables pay regard to, but can intervene and require 'special measures' if there is mismanagement. This means the Home Secretary is ultimately politically responsible, but administration is largely local. Commissioners have a duty to enforce the law, but decisions about how to allocate scarce resources mean that police forces can choose to prioritise tackling some kinds of crime (e.g. violence) over others (e.g. drugs). Generally police forces will not be liable in tort for failing to stop criminal acts, but positive duties do exist to take preventative measures or properly investigate allegations. Other persons who may be detained include those in need of care and attention under the
National Assistance Act 1948 (
11 & 12 Geo. 6. c. 29), and children in the care of a
local authority in
secure accommodation, those suffering from infectious diseases under the Public Health Act of 1984 and those detained by the
British Armed Forces abroad. The courts have powers to
sentence offenders and deprive them of their liberty, as well as detain mental patients under the provisions of the
Mental Health Act 1983. They may also order the payment of compensation to persons who have been unlawfully detained and the Home Secretary may award payments to victims of
miscarriages of justice.
Fair trial Article 6 of the Convention requires a
fair trial, with a presumption of innocence, and
legal aid if justice requires it, according to principles of
natural justice.
Article 7 prohibits criminal offences applying retroactively to acts done before something was made criminal. This follows the law since
Magna Carta that everyone has the right to "trial by one's Peers, or the law of the land". Several principles also combine to guarantee an individual a certain level of protection by law. These are often known as the rules of
natural justice and comprise the principles
nemo iudex in causa sua and
audi alteram partem. A fair
hearing implies that each party has the opportunity to present their own case to an impartial tribunal. Courts must generally sit in public and decisions may be challenged on the grounds of actual or apparent
bias. Although judges are under a common law duty to give reasons for their decisions, there is no such rule for non-judicial decision-makers. Certain specific rights apply in criminal cases. Persons in custody have the right to consult a solicitor by virtue of the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the
Access to Justice Act 1999 allows an individual to request confidential and
free legal advice. The prosecution is under a common law duty to disclose all relevant evidence including that which may assist the defendant. The accused also benefits from a limited
right to silence and the privilege against
self-incrimination.
Confessions are admissible as evidence under certain conditions laid down in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The accused additionally benefits from a
presumption of innocence. In discharging the
burden of proof, the onus is on the prosecution as established in
Woolmington v DPP. For example, in
R v Wang it was held that it was never permissible for a judge to direct a jury to find a defendant guilty. There is also a right to
jury trial, the accused should be able to follow proceedings and they have a right to be present during proceedings. The application of the
double jeopardy rule was limited by the
Criminal Justice Act 2003. Courts have jurisdiction to prevent
abuses of process if it would be unfair to try a defendant or a fair trial would not be possible.
Privacy The constitutional importance of privacy, of one's home, belongings, and correspondence, has been recognised since 1604, when
Sir Edward Coke wrote that the 'house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress'. Today it is clear that common law recognises "the tort of invasion of privacy". While rights to liberty and a fair trial also protect against unjustified search or seizure, the
European Convention on Human Rights article 8 enshrines the right to one's 'private and family life', 'home' and 'correspondence' unless interference is 'in accordance with the law' and '
necessary in a democratic society' for public security, safety, economic well-being, preventing crime, protecting health or morals or rights of others. The law of trespass, as in
Entick v Carrington, traditionally protected against unjustified physical violations of people's homes, but given extensive powers of entry, and with modern information technology the central concerns of privacy are electronic surveillance, both by the state and by private corporations aiming to profit from data or '
surveillance capitalism'. The four main fields of law relating to privacy concern (1) listening devices and interference with private property, (2) interception of mail, email or web communications by government, (3) mass data storage and processing by corporations or state bodies, and (4) other breaches of confidence and privacy, particularly by the press. , part of
UK intelligence, is among the public bodies which can apply for warrants to put people under surveillance to detect serious crime. With the
Investigatory Powers Act 2016 these powers have steadily grown. First, the
Police Act 1997 sections 92 prohibits 'interference with property or with wireless telegraphy' without authorisation by a chief constable or others. Such listening or bugging devices may only be used 'for the prevention or detection of serious crime' that could lead to over 3 years of jail. A judicial commissioner's approval is further needed if a dwelling, bedroom or office is being bugged, and if refused the police can appeal to the
Investigatory Powers Commissioner. On top of this, the
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 which also generally allows surveillance by police, intelligence,
HMRC and councils to obtain private information ('directed'), or surveillance of a residence or vehicle ('intrusive') if for the purpose of national security, preventing serious crime, or protecting UK economic well-being. Only 'intrusive' surveillance requires approval by a judicial commissioner. This has frequently led to abuse, for instance, in one case with a family being put under surveillance to see if they lived in a catchment area of an oversubscribed school, and in another an intelligence officer infiltrating a protest group and fathering a child, after taking a dead child's identity. Surveillance in public places does not engage the human right to privacy, according to
Kinloch v HM Advocate, where evidence of the defendant money laundering was gathered by police following the suspect in public spaces. Second, although the
Investigatory Powers Act 2016 section 2 creates a duty to consider whether means less intrusive to privacy could be used, warrants can be issue for targeted or bulk interception of any data, including to assist other governments, but only to detect serious crime, protect national security, or protect the UK's economic well-being, and this must be proportionate. Applications are made to the Home Secretary or other appropriate ministers, and must be approved by a judicial commissioner with written reasons for any refusal. Warrants can be issued against Members of Parliament with the consent of the
prime minister. Interception should not be disclosed in judicial proceedings. Local councils are able to carry out interceptions, albeit with authority of a justice of the peace. Journalists' material can be intercepted, though only with authority of a judicial commissioner. The government can also require internet service providers retain data, including bulk data, for up to a year. Judicial commissioners must have held high judicial office, while the
Investigatory Powers Commissioner audits, inspects and investigates the exercise of public body powers. In 2015, over 3059 warrants were granted, and it is argued by
MI5 that bulk data enables security services to 'make the right connections between disparate pieces of information'. The fact of bulk data collection, however, inevitably means people who have nothing to do with serious crime remain under state surveillance. ,
Google,
Amazon,
Microsoft and
Apple have vast databases on user behaviour. In 2016, a scandal broke as it was found Facebook and other data was illegally taken and used for psychologically targeted adverts in the
2016 Brexit poll. The
GDPR 2016 creates minimal data rights. Third, it has been recognised that the 'right to keep oneself to oneself, to tell other people that certain things are none of their business, is under technological threat' also from private corporations, as well as the state. Through standard form
contracts, tech corporations routinely appropriate users' private data for targeted advertising, particularly
Google (e.g. search and browsing history, email, locations),
Facebook (e.g. personal interactions, hobbies, messages), Microsoft (e.g. emails, or cloud documents) and others. Because people have no choice but to agree to the terms and conditions, consent is defective and contract terms are often unfair, legislation has been increasing in strength to reflect the fundamental 'right to the protection of personal data' in the
European Union. The
General Data Protection Regulation 2016 requires that all data is processed lawfully, fairly and transparently, and on the basis of 'consent' or a contract. The meaning of 'consent' requires more than the basic rules for commercial contracts, and must be clearly and distinctly identifiable, and revocable at any time. Contract terms may be subject to more protective rights contained in UK law. Whenever a 'data subject' has personal data processed or stored, they have basic rights to be provided with transparent information about the data stored including when they have not given that information themselves, to access the data and rectify any inaccuracies, and to demand that the data is erased when it is no longer necessary for the purpose for which it was originally given. There is a further right that data must be portable 'to another controller without hindrance', for instance in switching phone contacts. Data may be disclosed for legitimate reasons, so in
Rugby Football Union v Consolidated Information Services Ltd the Supreme Court held that a ticketing agency had no data protection defence against disclosing information to the Rugby Football Union about people who touted tickets against its rules, because the legitimate interest in stopping theft was stronger. Article 32 states a data controller must ensure the security of people's data, and notify supervisory authorities of any breach, including transfers to 'third countries' where the
rule of law is defective. However, during the
2016 Brexit referendum the House of Commons fake news committee found that Facebook enabled massive breaches of users' data, being sold onto third parties including
Cambridge Analytica, which psychologically targeted voters with political adverts, and this data spread into
Russia. The penalties for breach of GDPR rules, since it came into force in May 2018, can be up to 4% of a company's worldwide turnover, or €20m, whichever is higher. There are also databases kept by UK state bodies, including the
National Domestic Extremism Database, a
DNA Database, and a
Police National Computer, Related to this, the Supreme Court held in
R(L) v Metropolitan Police Commissioner that there was no breach of privacy when a primary school's enhanced criminal record check on an applicant for a teaching assistant job showed the applicant's son was put on a child protection register because of neglect, and she was refused a job. A planned NHS patients' database,
care.data, was abandoned because of protests about confidentiality and security of data. Finally, claimants may sue any private party on the grounds of
breach of confidence, an old
equitable action, although one that may be giving way to a tort of misuse of private information. For instance, it was held that it was an unlawful breach of privacy for the
Daily Mail to publish private journals of the
Prince of Wales about the handover of
Hong Kong to
China stolen and leaked by a former employee. It was also held to be unlawful for a newspaper to publish details of an applicant's private sexual life, even though in other countries the story had spread around the internet, because there was no 'public interest... in the disclosure or publication of purely private sexual encounters, even though they involve adultery or more than one person at the same time'. By contrast, the common law historically required punishment for "erroneous opinions concerning rites or modes of worship" to be provided for in legislation before it could be applied. There were a number of such laws in the 17th and 18th centuries, including the
Corporation Act 1661 requiring holders of civic office to be members of the
Church of England and the
Test Act 1673 requiring holders of military or civil functions to take the oaths of supremacy and allegiance and subscribe to a declaration against
transubstantiation. Both Acts were repealed by the
Roman Catholic Relief Act 1829 which admitted
Catholics into the legal profession and permitted Catholic schools and places of worship.
Jews were allowed to enter Parliament under the
Jews Relief Act 1858. The
Succession to the Crown Act 2013 amended the
Act of Settlement 1701 to remove the exclusion from the
line of succession of those who married Catholics. However, it remains the case that the Sovereign must be a member of the Church of England. Unlike the
Church of Scotland and
Church in Wales, the Church of England is the
established church in
England and enjoys certain privileges and rights in law. However, the promotion of
anti-Christian views is no longer illegal and the law places no formal restrictions on the freedom of worship. There is no formal legal definition of religion and courts generally abstain from deciding issues of religious
doctrine. The common law offences of
blasphemy and
blasphemous libel were abolished by the
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. A new offence of
incitement to religious hatred was created by the
Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 and discrimination on the grounds of religion is regulated by the
Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003. The
Military Service Act 1916 and the
National Service (Armed Forces) Act 1939 both provided for the possibility of exemption from military service on the basis of
conscientious objection, although the House of Lords has held that there would be no breach of human rights if such a possibility was not provided for.
Expression The right to freedom of expression is generally seen as being the 'lifeblood of democracy.' After the
English Civil War, it was established that a jury could acquit a
Quaker who preached to a crowd even against the judge's direction and 'against full and manifest evidence'. The
Bill of Rights 1689 article 9 guaranteed the 'freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament' and stated they were 'not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament', but the first full, legal guarantees for free speech came from the
American Revolution, when the
First Amendment to the US Constitution guaranteed 'freedom of speech'. The government and employers suppressed free speech through the French revolution and after the Napoleonic wars, until the repeal of the anti-Catholic laws, and the abolition of restraints on trade union organising, as well as throughout the
British Empire. After
World War II, the UK signed the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and joined the
European Convention.
Article 10 enshrines the right to freedom of expression which includes the rights 'to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.' This does not prevent 'the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.' Like all other rights these are subject to restrictions set out in law, and as necessary in a democratic society, to stop crime, or protect security, territorial integrity, safety, health, morals, the rights of others, and to maintain the judiciary's impartiality. of
Hyde Park, London, here in 1944, people traditionally gather to exchange views, debate, and listen. Debating and free speech societies are found throughout the UK and make a regular part of TV. The practical right to free expression is limited by (1) unaccountable ownership in the media, (2) censorship and obscenity laws, (3) public order offences, and (4) the law of defamation and breach of confidence. First, although anybody can stand on
Speakers’ Corner, in
Parliament Square, or in
Trafalgar Square and speak freely to a crowd, the communication channels with the biggest audiences are owned by large corporate entities: three internet media networks, five television networks, and six corporate owned newspaper groups, almost all of which aim have shareholders that demand to make a profit. This means that most speech, with most reach, is designed to be compatible with generating advertising revenue and shareholder profit for the newspaper, TV, or internet corporation, and controllers choose which speech or images are acceptable, unless the law creates different rights. While there are loose limits on cross-ownership of TV and newspapers, there is no regulation yet separate advertising business and internet media platforms where their interests conflict with public goals. The
Communications Act 2003 sections 319–321, regulates television (but not explicitly internet broadcasts, or newspapers) to ensure that diverse views are heard, and to restrict discriminatory viewing, or the stop misleading information, and allows a complaints procedure. The UK's transparent, and publicly accountable system of TV media regulation is consistently held to be compatible with freedom of expression. Two of the UK's TV networks, the BBC and Channel 4, are publicly owned and accountable, through an arm's length appointment process overseen by the government. However most television channels are funded through advertising revenue. There is also effectively no regulation of standards on internet media, although the
House of Commons committee on fake news called for the same regulation as on TV to be applied after Facebook data theft and psychologically targeted political ads were used by ‘Vote Leave’ in the
2016 Brexit poll. have been banned although the idea of what is 'obscene' has changed from Victorian values. The
Obscene Publications Act 1959 defines 'obscene' as having the effect to 'deprave and corrupt' people, and allows police or the
Director of Public Prosecutions to search and seize obscene material, subject to a defence for literary, artistic, scientific or other merit. Pornography, but also non-sexual gay literature, was suppressed until the 1990s, There are around 70 cases each year, but today the
Criminal Prosecution Service Guidelines only recommend charges for 'extreme' cases. The controversial
Digital Economy Act 2017, which would have required age verification on the basis of protecting children to access all pornographic websites, by requiring companies take bank card details, has been repeatedly delayed. Third, there are three main public order offences, based on incitement to disaffection, racial hatred, and terrorism. Disaffection means attempting to persuade the armed forces, police, or others, to revolt or even withhold services. Racial hatred means 'hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to colour, race, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins', and it is an offence to threaten, abuse or insult anyone, including through displays, to stir up racial hatred. The same idea extends to religious hatred, sexual orientation and in practice disability. In international law, it is also explicit, that advocacy of hatred includes 'incitement to discrimination' (as well as hostility or violence). The
Terrorism Act 2006 defines incitement to terrorism as 'direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement' for 'commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism', as well as glorifying terrorist acts (that is 'any form of praise or celebration') punishable with 7 years in prison. Fourth, the laws of
defamation and
breach of confidence are designed to balance people's reputations and rights to privacy. The
Defamation Act 2013 states that defamation means a statement that has or would 'cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant', and if that claimant is a profit making body this requires 'serious financial loss'. The truth is always a defence for stating something factual, and a defendant may always show their statement 'is substantially true', or that they made a statement of honest opinion, rather than an assertion of fact. Further, of the statement is in the public interest, it will not be unlawful. Connected to this, news outlets should ask someone who is a subject of a story for their side. Internet operators are liable for statements on their websites that are defamatory if the poster is hard to identify, and they fail on a notice by the claimant to remove the statement within 48 hours. There can be no claim for defamation if a defendant has the 'absolute privilege' of making a statement in Parliament or reports, in the course of high state duty, internal documents or a foreign embassy, or reports of courts' proceedings. There is also 'qualified privilege' which gives a defence to defamation, but only if the writer asks the subject for an explanation or contradiction, for any legislative proceedings outside the UK, public enquiries, non-UK government documents, and matters of an international organisation. Given the global nature of media, a claim in the UK must ensure that the UK is the 'most appropriate place', there is no long trial by jury, and courts can order removal of claims from many websites if it has spread. Claims for breach of confidence are meant to protect the right to privacy. Examples have included an
injunction against a retired security service officer who wrote a book called
Spycatcher that revealed official secrets. But the government lost its claim to have an injunction against a newspaper on the effects of
thalidomide on new births. The courts have stated that there is no difference between the protection offered by the common law, and that guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights.
Association and assembly The rights to
freedom of association and
freedom of assembly are central to the functioning of
democracy because they are the basis for
political organisation and discourse.
Political parties,
trade unions, social campaign groups, and businesses all associate freely in democratic societies, and take action upon that freedom, including through assemblies, strikes, or protests. Also protected in
international law, the
European Convention on Human Rights article 11 states: 'Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others' including joining 'trade unions for the protection of' their interests. Like with other rights, this cannot be restricted without a lawful justification, that goes no further than necessary in a democratic society, to protect security, safety, health or other people's rights. Generally, the right to freedom of association involves three main principles. First, there is a right to suffer no disadvantage for associating with others, for instance, because if an employer penalises workers for joining a trade union. Second, one must be able to associate with others on the terms one wishes so that, for example, a political party or a trade union must be able to admit or expel members based on their political values and actions. The flip side of this is that common law recognises a right not to be unjustly excluded from an association. For instance in
Nagle v Feilden a horse trainer,
Florence Nagle successfully claimed that the
Jockey Club's refusal to grant her a training licence on grounds of her sex was unlawful. Third, there is a right to act upon the goals of the association, for instance by campaigning for election as a political party, or as a trade union collectively bargaining with an employer for better wages or if necessary going on strike. UK law generally imposes no restriction on people forming groups for political purposes, with the significant exception of organisations banned under the
Terrorism Act 2000, such as the neo-Nazi white hate group
National Action,
Jihadi fundamentalists in
Al Qaeda,
Irish republican and
Ulster loyalist paramilitaries, and the protest group
Palestine Action. protests in
London, 2019 Like freedom of association, the right of peaceful assembly was recognised at
common law. For instance, in
Beatty v Gillbanks the
Salvation Army wanted to march against alcohol but was stopped by the police over concerns that a rival 'skeleton army' of local brewers would violently disrupt them and so breach the beach. The court held that nobody could 'say that such an assembly [was] in itself an unlawful one' and said there was 'no authority' for saying anyone 'may be convicted for doing a lawful act'. As
Lord Denning summarised in 1981, freedom of assembly "is the right for everyone to meet and assemble with his fellows to discuss their affairs and to promote their views". Any procession in the streets or highways is lawful, although there is a duty to inform police 6 days in advance if it is to demonstrate for a cause. This said, in
Kay v Metropolitan Police Commissioner the House of Lords held that a regular cycling protest called
Critical Mass required no notification because under the
Public Order Act 1986 section 11(2) it was "commonly or customarily held" and it did not have a planned route. Although the
Highways Act 1980 section 137 makes it an offence to obstruct a highway, in
DPP v Jones the House of Lords held that protestors who assembled on roads around
Stonehenge despite police ordering them to disperse from a four-mile radius, could not be lawfully arrested or convicted, because their occupation was 'not inconsistent with the primary right of the public to pass and repass.' This established that peaceful meetings may be held on a
highway so long as they do not restrict access by other road users. As well as rights to use public spaces, the law creates positive rights to use public property, such as school halls, for public political meetings. Universities have a special duty, imposed in 1986, to 'ensure that freedom of speech within the law is secured for members... and for visiting speakers' and not denied use of premises based on their views or objectives. This does not mean, however, that student societies cannot protest or that universities cannot prohibit speakers based on likely threats to property or good order. Anomalously it was held in
Hubbard v Pitt that an estate agent might be able to sue a group of protestors in the tort of
private nuisance for giving out leaflets and displaying placards opposed to it, on the ground that frustrated its business. Lord Denning MR dissented, and would have held the protestors used the highway reasonably, there was no nuisance at common law, and any picket was lawful if to obtain or communicate information for peaceful persuasion. Whenever a picket is made in the "contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute" it is lawful, so mushroom workers leafleting customers outside a supermarket to boycott their employers' mushrooms acted lawfully even though it caused the employers economic loss. The right to assembly does not yet extend to private property. In
Appleby v UK the Court of Human Rights held there was no interference in
ECHR article 11 when the owners of a private shopping mall in
Washington, Tyne and Wear excluded protestors collecting signatures to stop the loss of open space from their mall. Although UK law could provide more protection than the minimum European level, it does not, and makes it an offence under the
Criminal Law Act 1977 to enter 'any premises' without leave, or threaten violence to secure entry. For 'residential premises' it is also an offence to remain as a trespasser after being required to leave. Further, a law dating from 1875, still makes it an offence to 'wrongfully and without legal authority... watch and beset' premises. In
R v Jones, Jones entered a
Royal Air Force base intending to damage military equipment during the
2003 invasion of Iraq, which was itself a
violation of
international law. The House of Lords held that it was no defence even if the invasion was itself unlawful in international law, and there was still a conspiracy to cause criminal damage in violation of the
Criminal Law Act 1977 section 1. protest in London, 6 September 2025 The
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 also makes it an offence to trespass and reside, disrupt or quat on premises without the owner's consent. Genuine belief in the importance of the cause is no defence, and an injunction can be obtained for violations. however, in all of these offences the human right of freedom of assembly or expression of the protesters must be taken into account. There are four further significant public order offences. First, it is unlawful to
riot, where 12 or more people use or threaten unlawful violence. Second, using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, including on signs, is an offence if this could make people believe they will suffer immediate unlawful violence, or if it causes or is likely to cause "harassment, alarm or distress." Insults did not include anti-apartheid protests at
Wimbledon that spectators resented, and did not include books, such as
Salman Rushdie's
The Satanic Verses where the immediacy of any result is lacking. Third, harassment is an offence under the
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 section 4 if it causes someone to fear on two or more occasions that violence will be used against them. Fourth, while
breach of peace is not an offence itself, apprehension is grounds for arrest. This has included selling a
National Front paper outside a football ground, and a homophobic preacher holding signs in Bournemouth saying 'Stop Immorality', 'Stop Homosexuality' and 'Stop Lesbianism'. Generally the police may arrest people who they honestly and reasonably think will risk a breach of the peace, but in
R (Laporte) v Gloucestershire Chief Constable the House of Lords held it was unlawful for police to stop a coach of demonstrators from travelling to
RAF Fairford and turn it back to London. There was no evidence a breach of peace was imminent. It regarded freedom of assembly as a residual right which individuals are free to exercise so long as the law does not preclude them from doing so. By contrast, in
Austin v United Kingdom the European Court of Human Rights held there was no breach of article 5, the right to liberty, when protestors were kettled in Oxford Circus without food or drink for 7 hours. They were held not to have been falsely imprisoned and the conduct was justified to stop breach of the peace. Arguments were not, however, made under article 11. This said, the police must use their 'operational discretion' at all times with regard to human rights.
Marriage There is no general right to marry. The necessary formalities in the
Marriage Act 1949 must be observed if the marriage is to be valid and parties who are less than 18 years of age must obtain consent under the
Children Act 1989. The
Civil Partnership Act 2004 introduced the concept of
civil partnerships and the
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 provides for
same-sex marriage. The right to obtain a
divorce is contained in the
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. The
Gender Recognition Act 2004 allows
transsexuals to change their legal
gender. The right to respect for family life, for which there is no general right at common law, is qualified by the broad principle that the welfare of the child is paramount and
parental rights must take second place. In
Gillick v West Norfolk Area Health Authority, Lord Scarman stated that "parental rights are derived from parental duty and exist only so long as they are needed for the protection of the person and property of the child", while
Lord Fraser said that "parental rights to control a child do not exist for the benefit of the parent". The effect of this is to allow state intervention in family life where justified in the interests of the child in question, and the
Children Act 1989 gives effect to this by providing a basis on which decisions relating to a child's welfare are made. Section 1 of the Act provides that a court must, when taking a decision with regard to a child, take into account the child's wishes and feelings. Adoption is regulated by the
Adoption and Children Act 2002. Local authorities have a duty to act in a way to facilitate the right to family life, for example in providing travel arrangements for the elderly under the Health Services and Public Health Act 1968. The right to education is guaranteed by the
Education Act 1944, and the right to housing is enshrined in the
Housing Act 1985. The enactment of the
National Minimum Wage Act 1998 installed a
minimum wage and the
Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 provides access to
social security benefits. There is no positive right to healthcare. The
National Health Service Act 1977 imposes a duty on the
Secretary of State to provide "adequate" healthcare but the courts have not thus far been willing to enforce this duty.
Torture and degrading treatment The common law recognises that every person's body is "inviolate". Interference will constitute the offence of
common assault and the tort of
battery. Under the criminal law, an individual cannot consent to actual bodily harm and the House of Lords held in
R v Brown that acts of
sado-masochism committed in private between
consenting adults did not give the author of the harm a valid defence in respect of his acts. The
Children Act 2004 removed the defence of reasonable chastisement in respect of acts committed against children and
corporal punishment in schools was outlawed in the
Education Act 1996. The
Criminal Justice Act 1988 prohibits
torture carried out by public officials in the performance of their duties and evidence obtained by torture is excluded by the common law. The
Bill of Rights 1689 outlawed
cruel and unusual punishment and provided that an action for damages could be brought by victims. The
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 allows police to carry out "intimate searches" of suspects in custody without the person's consent.
Enjoyment of possessions Protection against the arbitrary deprivation of property was recognised in the
Magna Carta and is of key importance in the common law. Protection of the right to own and enjoy property is found in the offence of
theft, by
intellectual property laws and by the principle that there can be no
taxation except that which is authorised by Parliament. The right to property is qualified by
compulsory purchase laws. In civil cases, a judge may grant an
Anton Piller order authorising the search of premises and seizure of evidence without prior warning. The order's purpose is to prevent the destruction of incriminating evidence, particularly in cases of alleged
intellectual property infringement.
Freedom from discrimination The common law has not traditionally provided effective protection against
discrimination, refusing to find that slavery in the colonies was contrary to public policy and not interpreting the word "person" to include women. Due to the inadequacies of the common law in this area, Parliament enacted the
Race Relations Act 1965 and
Race Relations Act 1968. The
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 was the first legislation to protect against discrimination on the grounds of sex or marital status, while dismissal for pregnancy-related reasons is qualified as automatically
unfair dismissal under the
Employment Rights Act 1996. The principle of
equal pay was brought in under the
Equal Pay Act 1970.
Racial discrimination was prohibited by the
Race Relations Act 1976 and
disability discrimination by the
Disability Discrimination Act 1995. Discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief in the workplace and tertiary education was first regulated by the
Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003. Sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace was prohibited by the
Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003.
Age discrimination in employment was prohibited by the
Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006. Much of this legislation was consolidated into the
Equality Act 2010, the bulk of which entered into force in October 2010, which introduces an "equality duty" requiring public bodies to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, to advance equality of opportunity and to foster good relations between people. It imposes a duty on public bodies to publish information about compliance with the equality duty and to set equality objectives. It gives
employment tribunals new powers to make recommendations to employers.
Electoral rights The
Representation of the People Acts 1983 and
2000 confer the
franchise on
British subjects and citizens of the
Commonwealth and
Ireland who are resident in the UK. Nationals of other
Member States of the European Union have the right to vote in
local elections and
elections to the European Parliament. The right to vote includes the right to a
secret ballot and the right to stand as a candidate in elections. Certain persons are excluded from participation including
peers,
aliens, infants, persons of unsound mind, holders of judicial office,
civil servants, members of the regular armed forces or police, members of any non-Commonwealth legislature, members of various commissions, boards and tribunals, persons imprisoned for more than one year,
bankrupts and persons convicted of corrupt or illegal election practices. The restriction on the participation of
clergy was removed by the
House of Commons (Removal of Clergy Disqualification) Act 2001. The
Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 deals with the registration of
political parties, while
electoral boundaries are determined by four
Boundary Committees established under the
Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986. Electoral campaigns and electoral publicity, including expenditure rules per candidate, are regulated by the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. == European Union law ==