World War II In July 1939, Philby returned to
The Times office in London. When Britain declared war on
Nazi Germany in September 1939, Philby's contact with his Soviet controllers was lost and he failed to attend the meetings that were necessary for his work. During the
Phoney War from September 1939 until the
Dunkirk evacuation, Philby worked as
The Times first-hand correspondent with the
British Expeditionary Force headquarters. After being evacuated from
Boulogne on 21 May, he returned to France in mid-June and began representing
The Daily Telegraph in addition to
The Times. He briefly reported from
Cherbourg and
Brest, sailing for
Plymouth less than 24 hours before France surrendered to Germany in June 1940. In 1940, on the recommendation of Burgess, Philby joined MI6's Section D, a secret organisation charged with investigating how enemies might be attacked through non-military means. Philby and Burgess ran a training course for would-be
saboteurs at
Brickendonbury Manor in
Hertfordshire. His time at Section D, however, was short-lived; the "tiny, ineffective, and slightly comic" section was soon absorbed by the
Special Operations Executive (SOE) in the summer of 1940. Burgess was arrested in September for
drunken driving and was subsequently fired, while Philby was appointed as an instructor on clandestine
propaganda at the SOE's finishing school for agents at the Estate of Lord Montagu in
Beaulieu,
Hampshire. Philby's role as an instructor of sabotage agents again brought him to the attention of the Soviet
Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU). This role allowed him to conduct sabotage and instruct agents on how to properly conduct sabotage. The new London
rezident, Ivan Chichayev (code-name Vadim), re-established contact and asked for a list of British agents being trained to enter the Soviet Union. Philby replied that none had been sent and that none was undergoing training at that time. This statement was underlined twice in red and marked with two question marks, clearly indicating confusion and questioning of this, by disbelieving staff at
Moscow Central in the Lubyanka, according to Genrikh Borovik, who saw the
telegrams much later in the KGB archives. Philby provided Stalin with advance warning of
Operation Barbarossa and of the
Japanese intention to strike into southeast Asia instead of attacking the Soviet Union as
Adolf Hitler had urged. The first was ignored as a provocation, but the second, when confirmed by the Russo-German journalist and spy
Richard Sorge in Tokyo, contributed to Stalin's decision to begin transporting troops from the
Far East in time for the
counteroffensive around Moscow. By September 1941, Philby began working for Section Five of MI6, a section responsible for offensive
counter-intelligence. On the strength of his knowledge and experience of Franco's Spain, he was put in charge of the subsection that dealt with Spain and Portugal. This entailed responsibility for a network of undercover operatives in several cities such as Madrid, Gibraltar,
Lisbon and
Tangier. At this time, the German
Abwehr was active in Spain, particularly around the British naval base of Gibraltar, which its agents hoped to watch with many detection stations to track
Allied supply ships in the Western Mediterranean. Thanks to British counter-intelligence efforts, of which Philby's Iberian subsection formed a significant part, the project (Abwehr code-name
Bodden) never came to fruition. During 1942–43, Philby's responsibilities were then expanded to include North Africa and Italy, and he was made the deputy head of Section Five under Major Felix Cowgill, an army officer seconded to SIS. In early 1944, as it became clear that the Soviet Union was likely to once more prove a significant adversary to Britain, SIS re-activated Section Nine, which dealt with anti-communist efforts. In late 1944 Philby, on instructions from his Soviet handler, maneuvered through the system successfully to replace Cowgill as head of Section Nine.
Charles Arnold-Baker, an officer of German birth (born Wolfgang von Blumenthal) working for Richard Gatty in Belgium and later transferred to the Norwegian/Swedish border, voiced many suspicions of Philby and his intentions but was repeatedly ignored. It later emerged that the agent—known as Schmidt—had also worked as an informant for the
Rote Kapelle organisation, which sent information to both London and Moscow. Nevertheless, Angleton's suspicions went unheard. In late summer 1943, the SIS provided the GRU an official report on the activities of German agents in
Bulgaria and
Romania, soon to be liberated by the Soviet Union. The NKVD complained to Cecil Barclay, the SIS representative in Moscow, that information had been withheld. Barclay reported the complaint to London. Philby claimed to have overheard discussion of this by chance and sent a report to his controller. This turned out to be identical with Barclay's dispatch, convincing the NKVD that Philby had seen the full Barclay report. A similar lapse occurred with a report from the Japanese embassy in Moscow sent to Tokyo. The NKVD received the same report from Sorge but with an extra paragraph claiming that Hitler might seek a separate peace with the Soviet Union. These lapses by Philby aroused intense suspicion in Moscow. Of the five spies known as the Cambridge Five, Philby is widely considered to have been the most successful in providing secret information to the Soviets.
Istanbul In February 1947, Philby was appointed head of British intelligence for Turkey and posted to Istanbul with his second wife, Aileen, and their family. His public position was that of First Secretary at the British Consulate; in reality, his intelligence work required overseeing British agents and working with the Turkish
National Security Service. Philby planned to infiltrate five or six groups of émigrés into
Soviet Armenia or
Soviet Georgia, but efforts among the
expatriate community in Paris produced just two recruits. Turkish intelligence took them to a border crossing into Georgia but soon afterwards shots were heard. Another effort was made using a Turkish
gulet for a seaborne landing, but it never left port. Philby was implicated in a similar campaign in
Communist Albania. Colonel
David Smiley, an aristocratic Guards officer who had helped
Enver Hoxha and his communist guerillas to liberate Albania, now prepared to remove Hoxha. He trained Albanian commandos—some of whom were former Nazi collaborators—in Libya or Malta. From 1947, they infiltrated the southern mountains to build support for former
King Zog. The first three missions, overland from Greece, were trouble-free. Larger numbers were landed by sea and air under
Operation Valuable, which continued until 1951, increasingly under the influence of the newly formed CIA.
Stewart Menzies, head of SIS, disliked the idea, which was promoted by former SOE men now in SIS. Most infiltrators were caught by the
Sigurimi, the Albanian Security Service. Clearly there had been leaks and Philby was later suspected as one of the leakers. His own comment was, "I do not say that people were happy under the regime but the CIA underestimated the degree of control that the Authorities had over the country." Philby later wrote of his attitude towards the operation in Albania: The agents we sent into Albania were armed men intent on murder, sabotage and assassination ... They knew the risks they were running. I was serving the interests of the Soviet Union and those interests required that these men were defeated. To the extent that I helped defeat them, even if it caused their deaths, I have no regrets. Philby's wife had suffered from psychological problems since childhood which caused her to
inflict injuries upon herself. In 1948, troubled by Philby's heavy drinking and frequent
depressions and his life in Istanbul, she experienced a breakdown, staging an accident and injecting herself with urine and
insulin to cause skin disfigurations. She was sent to a clinic in Switzerland to recover. Upon her return to Istanbul in late 1948, she was badly burned in an incident with a charcoal stove and returned to Switzerland. Shortly afterward, Philby was moved to the job as chief SIS representative in Washington, with his family.
Washington, D.C. In September 1949, the Philbys arrived in the United States. Officially, his post was that of First Secretary to the British Embassy; in reality, he served as chief British intelligence representative in Washington. His office oversaw a large amount of urgent and
top secret communications between Washington and London. Philby was also responsible for liaising with the CIA and promoting "more aggressive Anglo-American intelligence operations". A leading figure within the CIA was Philby's wary former colleague, James Jesus Angleton, with whom he once again found himself working closely. Angleton remained suspicious of Philby but lunched with him every week in Washington. A more serious threat to Philby's position had come to light. During the summer of 1945, a Soviet
cipher clerk had reused a
one-time pad to transmit intelligence traffic. This mistake made it possible to break the normally impregnable code. Contained in the traffic (intercepted and decrypted as part of the
Venona project) was information that documents had been sent to Moscow from the British embassy in Washington. The intercepted messages revealed that the embassy source (identified as "Homer") travelled to New York City to meet his Soviet contact twice a week. Philby had been briefed on the situation shortly before reaching Washington in 1949; it was clear to Philby that the agent was Maclean, who worked in the embassy at the time and whose wife, Melinda, lived in New York. Philby had to help discover the identity of "Homer", but also wished to protect Maclean. In January 1950, on evidence provided by the Venona intercepts, Soviet atomic spy
Klaus Fuchs was arrested. His arrest led to others:
Harry Gold, a courier with whom Fuchs had worked,
David Greenglass, and
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. The investigation into the embassy leak continued and the stress of it was exacerbated by the arrival in Washington, in October 1950, of Burgess—Philby's unstable and dangerously alcoholic fellow spy. Burgess, who had been given a post as Second Secretary at the British Embassy, took up residence in the Philby family home and rapidly set about causing offence to all and sundry. Philby's wife resented him and disliked his presence; Americans were offended by his "natural superciliousness" and "utter contempt for the whole pyramid of values, attitudes, and courtesies of the American way of life".
J. Edgar Hoover complained that Burgess used British embassy automobiles to avoid arrest when he cruised Washington in pursuit of
homosexual encounters. His dissolution had a troubling effect on Philby; the morning after a particularly disastrous and drunken party, a guest returning to collect his car heard voices upstairs and found "Kim and Guy in the bedroom drinking champagne. They had already been down to the Embassy but being unable to work had come back". Burgess' presence was awkward for Philby, yet it was potentially dangerous for Philby to leave him unsupervised. The situation in Washington was tense. From April 1950, Maclean had been the
prime suspect in the investigation into the embassy leak. Philby had undertaken to devise an escape plan that would warn Maclean, in England, of the intense suspicion he was under and arrange for him to flee. Burgess had to get to London to warn Maclean, who was under surveillance. In early May 1951, Burgess got three speeding tickets in a single day—then pleaded
diplomatic immunity, causing an official complaint to be made to the British ambassador. Burgess was sent back to England, where he met Maclean in his London club. The SIS planned to interrogate Maclean on 28 May 1951. On 23 May, concerned that Maclean had not yet fled, Philby wired Burgess, ostensibly about his
Lincoln convertible that had been abandoned in the embassy car park. "If he did not act at once it would be too late", the telegram read, "because [Philby] would send his car to the scrap heap. There was nothing more [he] could do." On 25 May, Burgess drove Maclean from his home at
Tatsfield, Surrey, to
Southampton, where both boarded the steamship
Falaise to France and then proceeded to Moscow.
Public denials Burgess had intended to aid Maclean in his escape, not accompany him in it. The "affair of the missing diplomats", as it was referred to before Burgess and Maclean surfaced in Moscow, attracted a great deal of public attention, and Burgess' disappearance, which identified him as complicit in Maclean's espionage, deeply compromised Philby's position. Under a cloud of suspicion raised by his highly visible and intimate association with Burgess, Philby returned to London. There, he underwent MI5 interrogation aimed at ascertaining whether he had acted as a "third man" in Burgess and Maclean's spy ring. In July 1951, Philby resigned from MI6, preempting his all-but-inevitable dismissal. Even after his departure from MI6, suspicion towards Philby continued. Interrogated repeatedly regarding his intelligence work and his connection with Burgess, he continued to deny that he had acted as a Soviet agent. From 1952, Philby struggled to find work as a journalist, eventually—in August 1954—accepting a position with a diplomatic newsletter called the
Fleet Street Letter. Lacking access to material of value and out of touch with Soviet intelligence, he all but ceased to operate as a Soviet agent. On 25 October 1955, following revelations in
The New York Times,
Labour MP Marcus Lipton used
parliamentary privilege to ask
Prime Minister Anthony Eden if he was determined "to cover up at all costs the dubious third man activities of Mr Harold Philby..." This was reported in the British press, leading Philby to threaten legal action against Lipton if he repeated his accusations outside
Parliament. Lipton later withdrew his comments. ==Return to journalism==