Islamic Courts Union

Historical background Islamic law (Sharia) was used during the reign of the Somali Ajuran Sultanate. After existing for about 300 years, the Ajuran Sultanate declined during the 17th century after abandoning Sharia and becoming oppressive. During the 19th century, before the Scramble for Africa had arrived to Somali territories, Sharia courts headed by qadis (Islamic judges) operated all along the coast. During 1990, just before the full outbreak of the Somali Civil War, a group of sixty highly prominent members of Somali society under the banner of Islamic Call published a public manifesto addressed to President Mohammed Siad Barre. The manifesto warned that he had committed serious transgressions against the laws of Islam and unsuccessfully called on Barre to step down and peacefully transition power. First Sharia Courts The first appearance of Sharia courts to build local stability began immediately after the Somali state completely collapsed in January 1991. In the weeks following the toppling of the Somali Democratic Republic, militias that had routed the government began hunting down civilians based on their clan identity. Around this time, several well-known Somali scholars such as Sheikh Sharif Sharafow, Sheikh Ibrahim Suley and Sheikh Mohamed Moallin Hassan established Sharia courts to rescue civilians from these attacks and to address the general rising lawlessness. The first Shari'a courts were started on a small local neighborhood level by Somali religious leaders as a way to address issues in their communities. Most problems they dealt with were related to petty crimes and family disputes. In the chaotic political context of war torn Mogadishu the religious leaders were considered by most Somalis as some of the only people who could be trusted to impartially resolve disputes. Importantly, the courts also did not take positions on national-political or clan affairs, lending significant credence to their purported impartiality. Around the same time as the creation of the Mogadishu courts, Sheikh Mohamed Haji Yusuf and Sheikh Mohamud A. Nur established a new Islamic court in the Luuq District of Gedo region during 1992. The Gedo court had more success than its counterparts in Mogadishu. Order and security was established throughout Luuq district and consequently it became the safest area in Somalia during much of the 1990s. The court later dissolved in 1997 when the Somali National Front and Ethiopian military collaborated to topple it. During 1993, new courts emulating the Luuq judiciary opened in Mogadishu. Before the establishment of these courts, acts of rape had become commonplace in north Mogadishu since 1991. The establishment of the judiciary made a considerable impact on the security situation as the courts made a point of handing out the capital punishment of stoning to rapists. By 1997, there had been seven cases of execution by stoning in Somalia. It has been noted that suppression of war time sexual violence was a major underlying factor in Somali women's support for the Islamic Courts. The first court did not start in southern Mogadishu until after 1996, as the de facto ruler of the territory, General Mohammed Farah Aidid and his faction the Somali National Alliance opposed the Islamic courts as it was viewed a threat to his hold on power, and no progress occurred until after Aidids death. Ali Mahdi, Aidids prime rival controlling the northern part of the city, issued a decree to dismantle Ali Dheere's Court after perceiving the Sheikhs rising popularity as a threat to his own authority. As the years passed, with nothing but warlords offering to replace its authority, the rule of the sharia courts began to cement. By 1999, the Islamic courts had jurisdiction had expanded their influence over a large part of south Mogadishu as well. The courts were not an organized movement or a government, but represented the closest thing Somalia had to either. Their influence was enhanced by financial donors abroad who sought to bring any semblance of stability to the country. While some Somalis voiced disapproval of the more fundamentalist ways of the original Sharia courts, it was noted that most felt that they were well organized and effective civil administrators. == Consolidation of Islamic Courts ==

During April 1999, several Sharia courts united for the first time, seizing control of Mogadishu's Bakaara Market from local warlords. By the end of the year, their coordinated efforts had begun to weaken the warlords' dominance in the capital. By mid-1999, Islamic Courts operating in the central regions were securing roads from Galkayo to Guriel and providing the only functioning detention and prison services in much of southern Somalia. By the late 1990s, Mogadishu experienced growing optimism as the Islamic Courts, in collaboration with the business community, dismantled hundreds of illegal checkpoints and arrested thousands of militia members operating them. The chairman of the courts declared that these were the first step towards establishing an Islamic government in Somalia. At a June 1999 meeting, several Islamic Courts unanimously declared their refusal to participate in any "clannish armed confrontations." They appealed to warlord Hussein Aidid of the Somali National Alliance and the Rahanweyn Resistance Army, who were fighting in the Bay region at the time, to resolve their conflict peacefully through dialogue. The courts opposed Aidid's attempts to capture Bay and Bakool, asserting that the nations current problems could only be solved through the implementation of Sharia. Formation of Courts Council (2000) During 2000, having liberated a significant portion of the city from warlord control, eleven of the individual Sharia courts amalgamated to establish the Islamic Courts Council. This consolidation led to the unification of their militias into a single cohesive combat force. This development marked a pivotal moment in the civil war, as it signified the emergence of the first major non-warlord affiliated Somali armed force in the city. A 'Shari’ah Implementation Council' was created that same year, which began to consolidate resources and power on the basis of Islamic doctrine instead of clannism. Professor Mark Fathi Massoud draws a comparison between the Somalis' late 1990s and early 2000s turn towards local religious courts for self-governance and the historical patterns observed in early democratic Western Europe and colonial North America. In both cases, the establishment of courts and the invocation of the divine played crucial roles in state-building. Massoud highlights that the Sharia courts' use of religion to foster stability has parallels with those courts that significantly influenced the nascent phases of democratic states. During August 2000, Islamic Courts fighters were operating in the Banaadiir and Lower Shabelle regions. From Mogadishu south down to the port city of Baraawe, courts personnel were present attempting to establish security. Transitional National Government merger (2000–2004) When the Transitional National Government of Somalia (TNG) was established in Djibouti during the spring of 2000, the momentum of the Islamic Courts was slowed as they opted to back the first attempt since the collapse of the state at forming a government. The chairman of the Islamic Courts was elected as a member of the Transitional National Assembly. Openly threatened by warlords, the Courts protected the President Abdiqasim Salad Hassan during his return to the capital in August 2000, and soon handed over their heavy weaponry to the newly formed TNG. The expansion of the Islamic Courts resumed in 2004 following the TNG's failure and after Sharif Sheikh Ahmed was elected as chairman of the Islamic Courts. The previous year Ahmed had been a school teacher that had become frustrated with the return of insecurity in north Mogadishu and successfully pushed to rejuvenate the Islamic Courts system in the region. Following the failure of the TNG established in 2000, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) led by Abdullahi Yusuf was formed in 2004. Previously aligned closely with Ethiopia, Yusuf's leadership received significant support from the Ethiopian government. This support was believed to be pivotal in his electoral victory for the TFG leadership in an election held in Kenya. Before becoming president of the TFG during 2004, Abdullahi Yusuf was a member of an Ethiopian-backed coalition of warlords that had undermined the Transitional National Government formed in 2000 that the Islamic Courts had supported. Professor Jude Cocodia, a political science scholar from Niger Delta University, notes that Ethiopia's deep involvement in the formation of the TFG led many Somalis to view the government as inauthentic and essentially a puppet regime under Ethiopian influence. This sentiment was further amplified by historical events, such as the 1982 Border War, during which Yusuf led the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and collaborated with invading Ethiopian forces. == Rise of Islamic Courts Union ==

As the courts started to unify in the early 2000s, tensions further escalated with the warlords who were becoming increasingly marginalized. The ascendance of an Islamist political force in Somalia during this period was perceived as a threat to Western strategic interests in the Horn of Africa. Within the framework of the war on terror, the U.S. government also perceived the rise of an Islamic movement in Somalia as a potential terror risk. From 2003 onwards, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) initiated covert operations against the Islamic Courts Union, aiming to depose them from power. Though often compared to the Taliban during its rise, the ICU did not adopt similar practices or tendencies such as the strict/rigid enforcement of Sharia or the prohibition of women's employment. According to a report by Ted Dagne, an Africa Research Specialist for the Congressional Research Service,"...the leadership [of the ICU] was often referred to as jihadist, extremist, and at times terrorist by some observers without much evidence to support the allegations. For example, the assessment of the Islamic Courts by U.S. officials was that less than 5% of the Islamic Courts leadership can be considered extremist, according to a senior State Department official." CIA intervention During 2003, the American Central Intelligence Agency began covert operations targeting the Courts. American support for the warlords extended to the point where, on numerous occasions, Nairobi-based CIA officers landed on warlord-controlled airstrips in Mogadishu with large amounts of money for distribution to Somali militias. The decision to support these warlords generated dissent within the CIA, the US State Department, and European states. Many officials expressed apprehensions that this backing could lead to a major anti-American backlash in Somalia and greatly empower Islamist factions. As fighting for the city was ongoing in March 2006, the courts succeeded in seizing critical roads and infrastructure from the ARPCT. Prominent locals had urged the ICU and the warlord alliance to agree to a ceasefire to prevent bloodshed in Mogadishu. The ICU pledged to abide by a ceasefire, but mediators between the two organizations reported that the warlord alliance had delayed and refused to commit themselves. The Americans approved greater funding for the Somali warlords and further encourage them to counter the ICU, a decision made by top officials in Washington which was later reaffirmed by the U.S. National security council during meeting about Somalia in March 2006. At the time of the meeting there was fierce fighting in between the warlords and the Islamic Courts around Mogadishu, and the decision was taken to make counter-terrorism the top policy priority for Somalia. Despite significant opposition in the government, several members of the CIA backed warlord alliance were holding senior posts within the TFG while fighting against the ICU was ongoing. By April 2006 much of Mogadishu had fallen under the control of the ICU after clashes with the warlord alliance. The cities air and seaports came under the organizations direct control for the first time. In May they seized the very building where the warlord alliance had been founded and established an Islamic Court in its place. According to Chatham House, "The Courts achieved the unthinkable, uniting Mogadishu for the first time in 16 years, and re-establishing peace and security". The Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism soon collapsed, with the majority of its commanders publicly resigning or expressing support for the ICU. ICU delegations later travelled to the United Kingdom raise funds from the Somali diaspora and held meetings with British government officials from the Foreign Office. The defeat of the warlords propelled the Islamic Courts Union onto the national stage and the pacification of Mogadishu during mid-2006 saw the ICU coalesce into a government in response to the void left by the corrupt and inept TFG. == Governance ==

Over the ensuing months, the eleven amalgamated Islamic Courts initiated a drive to establish stability in Mogadishu and the territories coming under its control. This period of the Somali Civil War, referred to as a 'Golden era' of Somali politics by top UN officials, saw the ICU undertake significant reformative and security measures. The organization was able to build legitimacy through religious solidarity, establishing security and demonstrating a commitment to rebuilding public order. The rule of the Courts was regarded by some observers as the most successful experiment at pacifying the war torn capital and at re-establishing order over large swathes of Somalia. In the view of political scientist Alexandra Magnólia Dias, the Courts "seemed to be the only viable alternative with regard to a political state building project". For many Somalis, the Islamic Courts Union rekindled aspirations for a return to the legacy of historic Islamic empires in the Horn of Africa, such as the Sultanate's of Adal and Ifat. The Islamic Courts Union, in effect, became one of the first post-1991 Somali armed organizations to seriously mobilize a support base across tribal lines and diverse interests, which some scholars have deemed notable given historic rivalries among some of the clans from which it recruited from. (Masjidka Isbahaysiga) in Mogadishu on 18 August 2006 Security and law After taking control of Mogadishu, the ICU revived 16 previously defunct police stations, deploying nearly 600 personnel and dozens of vehicles to bolster law enforcement. Community reintegration programs were offered to former militiamen, and formal military and police training was introduced to restructure the security wing. Training camps were established that offered rehabilitation and Islamic education to former members of warlord militias. The open possession of firearms was banned unless registered with a court, and foreign visitors were required to provide two weeks' notice for security purposes. In one notable incident, after pirates hijacked a ship and demanded a $1,000,000 ransom, ICU forces recaptured the vessel following a gun battle, deploying dozens of fighters via speedboats. The courts also began issuing travel visas, resulting in significant influx of investors and former refugees. Another action that significantly increased the ICU's popularity was the restoration of proper ownership regarding land and homes that had been lost or stolen during the civil war. , appointed head of the Foreign Affairs department for the union. He had previously worked as an administrator at the American University in Washington, D.C., before returning to Somalia in 1999. |153x153px Social and economic After coming into power the Courts began delivering social services and openly pushed for resumption of democratic elections. After law and order, the restitution of education and healthcare were among the groups top priorities. As opposed to the strict enforcement of the Taliban, the ICU did not forcefully impose religious edicts on Somali society, defying international expectations. Commenting on the state of education in the wake of the takeover, The Economist observed that, "...school attendance is rising, particularly among girls." Hassan Dahir Aweys, head of the groups Shura Council, firmly supported the establishment of an Islamic government in Somalia but rejected comparisons to the Taliban. In an interview with The Telegraph, he stated, "We are not the Taliban, and we should be given some credit for what we have done... We don't want labels, we want help." While many of the initial Mogadishu courts were linked to the Hawiye clan, the ICU took deliberate measures to ensure clan bias did not influence legal proceedings. This approach ultimately earned them a reputation for impartiality. By 19 June 2006, the ICU founded several clinics and schools in the city. On August 25, the historic seaport, once one of the busiest in East Africa, was also reopened by the courts, marking a crucial step in revitalizing the region's economic infrastructure. The formation of a sanitation committee and the organization of a substantial clean-up campaign on 20 July 2006 resulted in the first clearing of war debris and rubbish from Mogadishu's streets in over a decade. This successful initiative was further expanded to regions surrounding the capital. Additionally, the courts focused on enhancing traffic flow in Mogadishu, deploying personnel to regulate traffic and dismantle roadblocks at major roads and junctions. Consequently, the following weeks witnessed a noteworthy decline in the prices of goods. Researchers conducting fieldwork in Somalia during May 2023 observed that some of the only banknotes still circulating in the country were ones issued by the ICU government over a decade and half earlier. == Islamic Courts expansion and Ethiopian invasion (June–September 2006) ==

British television station Channel 4 acquired a leaked document detailing a confidential meeting between senior American and Ethiopian officials in Addis Ababa six months prior to the full scale December 2006 invasion. Participants deliberated on various scenarios, with the 'worst-case scenario' being the potential takeover of Somalia by the Islamic Courts Union. The documents revealed that the US found the prospect unacceptable and would back Ethiopia in the event of an ICU takeover. Journalist Jon Snow reported that during the meeting ‘the blueprint for a very American supported Ethiopian invasion of Somalia was hatched’. No Somali officials were involved in the discussions. Pentagon officials and intelligence analysts reported that the invasion had been planned during the summer of 2006 and that US special forces were on the ground before the Ethiopians had intervened. According to Ted Dagne, an Africa specialist for the US Congressional Research Service, the Islamic Courts had committed no act or provocation to initiate the Ethiopian invasion. American historian William R. Polk observes that the invasion had been unprovoked. With its newfound position of authority, the ICU seized on its popularity and began pushing deep into the regions surrounding the city for the first time. Their offensive capability was greatly aided by new weaponry it had captured from the CIA backed warlord alliance. Several hundred men from Somaliland joined the Courts militia, while the contribution from ICU supporters in Puntland was primarily financial and logistical. During the summer of 2006, a UN report alleged the ICU was being given support by Eritrea, Djibouti, Iran, Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Ba'athist Syria. First Ethiopian incursions The Ethiopian invasion began with the dispatch of several thousands troops around Baidoa city located in Bay region, far inside Somalia, to build a bridgehead for a future large scale military operation. The following day on 17 June, local Somali officials and residents in Gedo region reported about 50 Ethiopian armored vehicles had passed through the border town of Dolow and pushed 50 km inland near the town of Luuq. ICU head Sheik Sharif Ahmed claimed that hundreds of Ethiopian troops had entered the country through the border town of Dolow in Gedo region and that Ethiopian forces had also been probing Somali border towns. He threatened to fight Ethiopian troops if they continued intervening and declared, "We want the whole world to know what’s going on. The United States is encouraging Ethiopia to take over the area. Ethiopia has crossed our borders and are heading for us."'''' Sharif stated that the courts had no intention of attacking Ethiopia, but claimed that Ethiopian forces had 'brought war' by beginning an incursion into Somalia. The Ethiopian government would deny the deployment of its forces in Somalia and countered that the ICU was marching towards its borders. Khartoum ICU/TFG talks The TFG, overshadowed by the achievements of the ICU, was in dire need of the popularity and military capacity of the courts and the ICU in turn was in need of international recognition. In late June, the UN formally created a contact group to directly communicate with the Islamic Courts. The Associated Press reported that the development reflected a growing realization within the UN that the ICU was the first serious governing body to appear since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. The Arab League arranged a conference between the ICU and TFG in June 2006 to discuss merger proposals in Khartoum, Sudan. The talk initially began positively but rapidly collapsed over the issue of Ethiopian forces deployed to Somalia at the request of the TFG. The ICU insisted that the presence of Ethiopian forces was the priority and should be dealt with first, while the TFG insisted that an agreement on a unified government had to be made before removing the Ethiopian presence. Neither side was willing to compromise on the issue of Ethiopian troops, leading to the collapse of the talks. During the talks another significant deployment of Ethiopian troops occurred on July 20, 2006, when they moved into Somalia. Local witnesses reported 20 to 25 armored vehicles crossing the border. The Ethiopian government once again denied the presence of any troops inside Somalia. Reuters estimated that roughly 5,000 ENDF troops had built up inside Somalia by this point. This prompted an immediate warning from Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed that the organization would invoke a jihad against Ethiopian forces if they did not withdraw. The escalation of Ethiopian troop deployments into Somalia during July 2006 began raising fears of a possible 'all-out war' in the Horn of Africa. The TFG publicly denied the existence of Ethiopian forces in Baidoa and argued the claims were ICU propaganda. TFG minister of information Mohammed Abdi Hayir, claimed that sightings of Ethiopian forces in Somalia were a result of confused identity as Ethiopia had merely provided 4,000 uniforms to TFG forces."'' Two days later, another contingent of Ethiopian troops crossed into Somalia, leading to the collapse of the Khartoum peace talks between the ICU and TFG. Approximately 200 ENDF troops seized Wajid, taking control of the airport. Following the deployment at Wajid, the ICU walked out of talks with the TFG. Abdirahman Janaqow, the deputy leader of the ICU executive council, stated soon after that, "The Somali government has violated the accord and allowed Ethiopian troops to enter Somali soil." The TFG claimed that no Ethiopians were in Somalia and that only their troops were in Wajid. Soon after, residents reported two military helicopters landing at the town's airstrip. BBC News confirmed reports of Ethiopian troops in Wajid during interviews with local residents and aid workers. Following the towns seizure, the ICU pledged to wage a holy war to drive out ENDF forces in Somalia. The TFG insisted that the ICU withdraw to the territory it had occupied during the June conference, while the ICU demanded the withdrawal of Ethiopian military contingents in Somalia before discussions resumed. The two primary mediators, the Arab League and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) were both viewed as biased by the ICU and TFG. The ICU accused the IGAD of being partial to the TFG, while the TFG accused the Arab League of complicity with the ICU. Professor Abdi Ismail Samatar observes that the Ethiopians had complete control over the TFG headquarters and had begun arming warlords defeated by the ICU. The first clash between ICU and ENDF forces occurred on 9 October 2006. ICU positions at the town of Burhakaba were attacked, forcing the courts to retreat. AFP reported that residents in Baidoa had witnessed a large column of Ethiopian forces. The ICU claimed that the ENDF had also sent another large deployment across the Somali border. Following the battle, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed announced "This is clear aggression...Our forces will face them soon if they do not retreat from Somali territories" and declared Jihad against the ENDF forces. Meles Zenawis government denied that ENDF troops were in Somalia, but local residents in Burhakaba confirmed their presence. The Economist reported that the Ethiopian military incursion had set off a fierce reaction even among the most moderate of the ICU, and a recruitment mobilization began to raise a force to take back Burhakaba. Several weeks later after intense local pressure, Puntland declared it would move towards adopting Sharia following a meeting between committee of religious heads and leader of the state, Mohamud Muse Hersi. High ranking Somaliland military officers defected to the ICU. Islamic Courts officials reported around 100 fighters from Puntland had defected to join their ranks in mid-November. On 29 November 2006, the courts claimed Ethiopian forces had shelled Bandiradley. The next day ICU forces ambushed an ENDF convoy outside of Baidoa. The most significant event to immediately prelude the full scale 2006 invasion was the passing of United Nations Security Council 1725 on 6 December 2006. The resolution called for the deployment of foreign troops and the lifting of the arms embargo. The Islamic Courts and Muslim Somali leaders had in the months prior to the resolution firmly rejected the deployment of any international military forces in Somalia as an act of war. While the resolution explicitly dictated no neighbouring states would be permitted to participate, Ethiopia had already breached a prior UN resolution by deploying thousands of troops into Somalia. The resolution was widely viewed by the Courts as the UN Security Council unjustly legitimizing an Ethiopian invasion, considering the UNSCR had refused to make any commentary or statement on the troops already deployed inside of Somalia. Herman Cohen, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, noted the US decision to back resolution had been influenced by false Ethiopian intelligence. The ICU viewed the passing of UNSCR 1725 as effectively a declaration of war and an international endorsement of the invasion. Reuters reported American and British Special Forces, along with US-hired mercenaries, had been laying the ground work for the invasion within and outside Somalia since late 2005. During the invasion the United States provided satellite surveillance of ICU forces to the ENDF, along with extensive military and logistical support extending to the provision of spare parts. The European Union was reportedly 'exceptionally unhappy' about the heavy US support for the invasion, and held back funds for the newly created AMISOM mission for several months. The top leaders of the ICU, including Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Sheikh Abdirahman Janaqow, resigned the next day. == Insurgency (2007–2009) ==

In the last days of December 2006, Ethiopian and TFG troops entered Mogadishu. Following the Ethiopian invasion and subsequent occupation, Somalia once again began slipping into a state of chaos. Between 2007 and 2008 approximately two-thirds of Mogadishu's residents were forced to flee the growing violence in the city, and Somalia began to experience one of the worst humanitarian crises in its history. The organizations Foreign Affairs minister Ibrahim Hassan Adow announced that the Islamic Courts movements was still intact and operating in Somalia. Despite much of the leadership seeking refugee in Eritrea, vice-chairman Sheikh Abdilqadir Ali Omar remained in Somalia to lead the ICU. The invasion resulted in the deaths of many Islamic Courts Union affiliates, leaving a vacuum for the small group of several hundred youth that served as the ICU's Shabaab militia to gain prominence, though Al-Shabaab did not heavily participate in the insurgency or large scale fighting for much of early 2007, opting instead to carry out bombings and assassinations while further establishing itself. Prior to the invasion, Al-Shabaab was largely kept in check and ideologically moderated under the oversight of the ICU. However, with the collapse of ICU leadership, Al-Shabaab fell increasingly under the sway of militant extremists, leading to a hardened ideological stances. The group began enforcing a far stricter understanding of the Sharia than the courts had previously implemented. As fighting in Mogadishu escalated, ICU insurgents in southern Somalia found a window of opportunity and peacefully captured the town of Dhobley near the Kenyan border in mid October. At the end of October 2007, some of the heaviest fighting in months broke out between the ENDF and ICU insurgents in the capital when Ethiopian troops launched an offensive on ICU positions. By November, small pockets of Islamic Courts Union control were appearing in various places across the country. The Ethiopian government also accused ICU fighters of fighting alongside the ONLF during 2007. Creation of the ARS party In September 2007 the successor to the Islamic Courts Union, the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), was founded by numerous high ranking ICU officials who had south refuge in Eritrea. Sheikh Sharif Ahmed was elected head of the organization and promptly declared war on Ethiopian forces. The ARS further announced its refusal to hold talks with the TFG until an Ethiopian withdrawal. In June 2008 the ARS and TFG signed a peace accord agreeing to the cessation of all hostilities between the two parties. Though successful, the talks were once again threatened by the issue of Ethiopian military forces deployed in Somalia. Escalation of insurgency By mid-2008 Islamic Courts Union loyalists, Al-Shabaab and supporters of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) were the primary insurgent forces operating in Somalia. During June 2008 the ICU publicly declared it would continue its attacks on ENDF/TFG bases and a new Islamic court was opened in Jowhar. According to Voice of America, the insurgency in 2008 was effectively being waged by two distinct groups, the nationalist leaning ICU insurgents and the increasingly international jihadist oriented Al-Shabaab. Residents reported that Islamic Courts insurgents had far more popular support than Al-Shabaab and receiving significant funds from both the local business communities and the Somali diaspora. By July, ICU forces controlled the cities of Beledweyne and Wajid. In late July, forces loyal to the ICU engaged in a battle with Ethiopian troops in Beledweyne. The ENDF shelled the western part of Beledweyne with rocket and mortar fire, resulting in an exodus of civilians. By November 2008, ICU insurgents once again controlled the cities of Jowhar and Beledweyne. Ethiopian withdrawal and ARS–TFG merger officer and TFG soldiers defecting to ICU fighters in Mogadishu (7 Sep 2008)By November 2008, insurgency had effectively won. The majority of south and central Somalia, along with the capital was now under the control of Islamist factions. Ethiopia had redeployed much of its army out of Somalia by the end of the year. By the end of 2008, Al-Shabaab had emerged as one Somalia's most dominant insurgent factions, eclipsing the influence of the Islamic Courts. Some foreign diplomats feared that Al-Shabaab would wage an all out war against other insurgents following the Ethiopian withdrawal. In January 2009, fighters who claimed loyalty to Islamic Courts Union engaged in a large military confrontation in Balad, Middle Shabeelle, against Al-Shabaab resulting in several deaths. Al-Shabaab put out a statement announcing that it was 'saddened' by the hostilities. As ENDF forces withdrew from Somalia, tensions between the differing resistance factions exacerbated. By the end of 2008, most elements of the pre-invasion Islamic Courts had merged into one of the two wings of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia or had joined Al-Shabaab. Some Islamic factions continued operating under the ICU banner into 2009 and tended to support the new TFG government led by Sharif Ahmed, which described the ICU groups as the governments 'paramilitary'. Post–ICU rule In the wake of the ICU's disintegration, fringe Islamic groups began empowering themselves as Somalis from many walks of life rallied against the Ethiopian invasion and violence greatly escalated over the following years. During the period of the Courts governance, the number of militia road checkpoints in Somalia (along with the cost of passing them) drastically fell. After the invasion, militia checkpoints once again proliferated in large parts of southern Somalia in early 2007. The locations of these checkpoints on the road from Kismayo to Dhobley have remained relatively the same as of late 2023. == Criticism and allegations ==

During the period of its governance, the ICU in general did not exhibit hardline tendencies or interpretations. There was ideological friction between the ‘moderate’ wing of the Islamic Courts led by the Chairman of the Executive Council, Sheikh Sharif, and the 'hardline' wing led by the Chairman of the Courts Shura (Consultative Council), Sheikh Aweys, manifested when some wings of the Courts started making policies and statements without reference to the collective leadership. Many of these were conservative social policies which were not widely popular. and that the ICU was also giving Iran access to uranium deposits within Somalia. The ICU was also accused of enacting extremist policies such as banning television, shutting down cinemas and preventing women from working. A US Congressional Research Service report on Somalia investigating the allegations found no evidence to support to the assertion that women had ever been banned from working by the Islamic Courts. It was further revealed in interviews with local residents and courts officials that there had been some prohibitions on watching soccer games on television late at night, but merely due to disturbances and fighting. Cinemas had also been restricted, though only in the mornings at the direct request of Mogadishu parents who were frustrated with the issue of children skipping school to see films or because they had been playing pornographic content. == See also ==