The relationship between Perón,
Peronism, and
fascism has been widely discussed. Historian Federico Finchelstein writes: "If the question is asked if Perón was a fascist, the answer is no. But, did fascism play an important role in the ideological genesis of Peronism? Although Fascism was a central genealogy of Peronism, Perón's coming to power signaled a break from diverse traditional precedents, including fascist nacionalismo. However, the ideological continuities between Argentine fascism and Italian fascism are notable in Perón's military junta between 1943 and 1946 and the first Peronist regime (1946–1955)." Assessments of Peronism as a fascist movement emerged during the 1946 Argentine general election amongst political opposition to Perón. Richard Gillespie writes:
Carlos Fayt states that Peronism was just "an Argentine implementation of
Italian fascism". Paul M. Hayes similarly concludes that "the Peronist movement produced a form of fascism that was distinctively Latin American". Instead,
Felipe Pigna believes that no researcher who has deeply studied Perón should consider him a fascist. Pigna argues that Perón was only a pragmatist who took useful elements from all modern ideologies of the time; this included not only fascism but also the
New Deal policies of U.S. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt. To Pigna, Perón was neither fascist nor anti-fascist but simply a realist; the active intervention of the working class in politics, as he saw in those countries, was a "definitive phenomenon". philosopher
Donald C. Hodges, and historian
Daniel James. Argentine historian
Cristian Buchrucker outlines main reasons why Peronism cannot be characterized fascist: Hodges remarked that it is a "cheap academic trick to lump together fascism (...) and Peronism". According to Hodges, Perón embraced the concept of the state as the juridical instrument that can only function within and serve the nation, but rejected the organic notions of the state assuming the dominating role by organizing the nation. Perón also prided himself in his doctrinal flexibility and elasticity, and agreed with national syndicalism of
Primo de Rivera in principle, although he ultimately pursued a different political path. Hodges argues that "In view of both its gradualism and its concern for striking a balance between extremes, justicialism has more in common with the American New Deal than with either Italian fascism or German national socialism." As a response to Carlos Fayt who characterized Perónism as fascist, James P. Brennan wrote: According to Pablo Bradbury, while there was a great divergence between formal Peronist ideology and the wider Peronist movement, the ideology of Perón was not fascist; Bradbury argues that nationalism of Peronism was not rooted in a sense of expansion or imperialist greatness, but was
left-wing nationalism that "found its most prominent expressions in anti-imperialism, whether against British economic dominance or US political interference." He also remarked that "Peronism originated in a military dictatorship, but established a populist authoritarian democracy". The democratizing movement within Peronism was significant, as it empowered previously marginalized groups – Peronism introduced universal suffrage and reshaped the definition of Argentinian citizenship and national identity. Bradbury also points to the racist rhetoric of middle-class and upper-class opponents of Peronism, who called Peronists
cabecitas negras ("little black heads"), portraying the Peronist masses as prone to criminality, unsophisticated, dark-skinned and of immigrant background.
Michael Goebel likewise points to the inclusive character of Peronism that conflicted with the exclusive nature of fascism – non-Spanish surnames were far more prevalent amongst the Peronist leadership than among any other political movement in Argentina, and "even in the more marginal provinces, Peronist politicians often had rather recent immigrant origins."
Cas Mudde stated that "it is not an exaggeration to state that [Perón's] populism in general propelled democracy forward, both by encouraging democratic behavior and by enrolling lower class groups and their quest for social justice in political life." In 1938, Perón was sent on a diplomatic mission to Europe. During this time, he became enamoured of the Italian fascist model. Perón's admiration for
Benito Mussolini is well documented. He credited both Italian fascism and German national socialism for creating a command economy that "harmonized the interests of workers", and his exact words in that respect were as follows: However, Perón also cautioned that only some elements of European fascism can be praised, as the Italian and German regimes otherwise led to "administrative centralization carried to the extreme; the absorption of all private or semiprivate entities (cultural association, universities, etc.); absolute militarism; a closed and directed economy." Robert D. Classweller argued: "Peronism was not fascism. Some of Peronism's adherents had a fascist outlook and mentality. Perón himself admired Mussolini and the idea of the corporate state. But all this was relatively superficial. No fascist society was ever erected on a mass base of laboring and dispossessed hordes. In its own descriptions of identity, Peronism rejected the Fascist parallel. It was more intimately grounded in the national history and ethos than was any European fascism. The structure of the Peronist state after the constitutional amendments of 1949 remained that of the old Argentine democratic order." Paul Corner and Jie-Hyun Lim similarly argued: "Peronism (like early Cold War populism as a whole) was not a dictatorship but an authoritarian form of democracy." Paola Raffaelli wrote: "Although some authors suggest that Peronism was a form of fascism, this was not the case. He was democratically elected and other parties and the Parliament were not banned, it did not pursue an ideology apart from a less-dependant nation, and Perón was in power three times for ten years within a twenty-eight years period of time." Some historians also note that accusations of fascism against Perón originated from Anglo-American circles, who saw Peronism as a threat to their interests in Argentina. Pablo Aguirre argued: "Traditionally Britain in general and the Labour Party in particular have taken little interest in the affairs of Latin America. For years after the Second World War the continent was strictly terra incognita. Analysis based on ignorance was often faulty. General Peron, for example, who "stole" Britain's railways and increased the price of "British" beef, was regarded as the reincarnation of Mussolini." Judith Alder Hellman also noted that those who accused Perón of fascism tend to equate communism and fascism as similar or identical ideologies -
Spruille Braden, the
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs of the United States who spearheaded a campaign to portray Peronism as a fascist movement, later "frankly admitted that he could never see the difference between Fascism and Communism".
Protection of Nazi war criminals After World War II, Argentina became a haven for Nazi war criminals, with explicit protection from Perón, who even shortly before his death commented on the
Nuremberg Trials: Author
Uki Goñi alleges that
Axis Power collaborators, including
Pierre Daye, met with Perón at
Casa Rosada, the President's official executive mansion. The Swiss Chief of Police Heinrich Rothmund and the Croatian priest
Krunoslav Draganović also helped organize the
ratline. An investigation of 22,000 documents by the
DAIA in 1997 discovered that the network was managed by
Rodolfo Freude who had an office in the Casa Rosada and was close to Eva Perón's brother, Juan Duarte. According to Ronald Newton, Ludwig Freude, Rodolfo's father, was probably the local representative of the Office Three secret service headed by
Joachim von Ribbentrop, with probably more influence than the German ambassador Edmund von Thermann. He had met Perón in the 1930s, and had contacts with Generals
Juan Pistarini, Domingo Martínez, and
José Molina. Ludwig Freude's house became the meeting place for Nazis and Argentine military officers supporting the
Axis. In 1943, he traveled with Perón to Europe to attempt an arms deal with Germany. (2nd from left) and President Perón (2nd from right), who appointed Freude Director of the
Argentine Intelligence Secretariat After the war, Ludwig Freude was investigated over his connection to possible looted Nazi art, cash and precious metals on deposit at two Argentine banks,
Banco Germanico and Banco Tornquist. But on 6 September 1946, the Freude investigation was terminated by presidential decree. Examples of Nazis and collaborators who relocated to Argentina include
Emile Dewoitine, who arrived in May 1946 and worked on the
Pulqui jet;
Erich Priebke, who arrived in 1947;
Josef Mengele in 1949;
Adolf Eichmann in 1950; Austrian representative of
the Škoda arms manufacturer in Spain
Reinhard Spitzy;
Charles Lescat, editor of
Je Suis Partout in
Vichy France; and SS functionary Ludwig Lienhardt. Many members of the notorious Croatian
Ustaše (including their leader,
Ante Pavelić) took refuge in Argentina, as did
Milan Stojadinović, the former Serbian Prime Minister of
monarchist Yugoslavia. In 1946 Stojadinović went to Rio de Janeiro, and then to Buenos Aires, where he was reunited with his family. Stojadinović spent the rest of his life as presidential advisor on economic and financial affairs to governments in Argentina and founded the financial newspaper
El Economista in 1951, which still carries his name on its masthead. A Croatian priest,
Krunoslav Draganović, organizer of the San Girolamo
ratline, was authorized by Perón to assist Nazi operatives to come to Argentina and evade prosecution in Europe after World War II, (left) with Juan Perón (right). As in the United States (
Operation Paperclip), Argentina also welcomed displaced German scientists such as
Kurt Tank and
Ronald Richter. Some of these refugees took important roles in Perón's Argentina, such as French collaborationist
Jacques de Mahieu, who became an ideologue of the Peronist movement, before becoming mentor to a Roman Catholic nationalist youth group in the 1960s. Belgian collaborationist
Pierre Daye became editor of a Peronist magazine.
Rodolfo Freude, Ludwig's son, became Perón's chief of presidential intelligence in his first term. Goñi places particular emphasis on the part played by Perón's government in organizing the ratlines, as well as documenting the aid of Swiss and Vatican authorities in their flight. The Argentine consulate in
Barcelona gave false passports to fleeing Nazi war criminals and collaborationists. Recently declassified files from Brazil and Chile reveal that during WWII Péron sold 10,000 blank Argentine passports to ODESSA – the organisation set up to protect former SS men in the event of defeat.
Tomás Eloy Martínez, writer and professor of Latin American studies at
Rutgers University, wrote that Juan Perón allowed Nazis into the country in hopes of acquiring advanced German technology developed during the war. Martínez also noted that Eva Perón played no part in allowing Nazis into the country. However, one of Eva's bodyguards was in fact an ex-Nazi commando named
Otto Skorzeny, who had met Juan on occasion. Perón's biographer Jill Hedges wrote on Perón's attitude and actions regarding the Nazi immigration to Argentina:
Jewish and German communities of Argentina The
German Argentine community in Argentina is the third-largest immigrant group in the country, after the ethnic
Spanish and the
Italians. The German Argentine community predates Juan Perón's presidency, and began during the political unrest related to the 19th-century
unification of Germany. Laurence Levine writes that Perón found 20th-century German civilization too "rigid" and had a "distaste" for it. Fraser and Navarro write that Juan Perón was a complicated man who over the years stood for many different, often contradictory, things. In the book
Inside Argentina from Perón to Menem author Laurence Levine, former president of the US-Argentine
Chamber of Commerce, writes, "although anti-Semitism existed in Argentina, Perón's own views and his political associations were not anti-Semitic...." Perón appointed several Jewish Argentinians as government advisers, such as his economic advisor,
José Ber Gelbard. In 1946 Perón's government allowed Jewish army privates to celebrate their holidays, which was intended to foster Jewish integration. Perón sought to recruit the Jewish community into his Peronist support base as to broaden the support for his "New Argentina" and also dispel the accusations of fascism. In 1947, Perón founded
Organización Israelita Argentina (OIA), the Jewish wing of the Peronist Party, in attempt to promote his ideology amongst the Jewish community. While OIA failed to attract much support of Argentinian Jews, it became an intermediary between Perón and the Jewish community. Argentinian Jews entered dialogue with Perón through IOA, securing favors and concessions. Jewish newspapers in Argentina particularly praised the socialist nature of Perón's planned economy, leading to limited expressions of support. Peronism allowed the Jewish community to actively participate in the political life of Argentina; Jewish writer
Isaías Lerner remarked: "The triumph of Perón meant a greater participation of the [Jewish] community in the political arena. For the first time in Argentina's political history, a political party courted our community." ==Socialist influences==