Relations with Lloyd George Curzon did not have
David Lloyd George's support. Curzon and Lloyd George had disliked one another since the
1911 Parliament Crisis. The Prime Minister thought him overly pompous and self-important, and it was said that he used him as if he were using a
Rolls-Royce to deliver a parcel to the station; Lloyd George said much later that
Winston Churchill treated his ministers in a way that Lloyd George would never have treated his: "They were all men of substance — well, except Curzon." Multiple drafts of resignation letters written at this time were found upon Curzon's death. Despite their antagonism, the two were often in agreement on government policy. Lloyd George needed the wealth of knowledge Curzon possessed so was both his biggest critic and, simultaneously, his largest supporter. Likewise, Curzon was grateful for the leeway he was allowed by Lloyd George when it came to handling affairs in the Middle East. Other cabinet ministers also respected his vast knowledge of Central Asia but disliked his arrogance and often blunt criticism. Believing that the Foreign Secretary should be non-partisan, he would objectively present all the information on a subject to the Cabinet, as if placing faith in his colleagues to reach the appropriate decision. Conversely, Curzon would take personally and respond aggressively to any criticism. It has been suggested that Curzon's defensiveness reflected institutional insecurity by the
Foreign Office as a whole. During the 1920s the Foreign Office was often a passive participant in decisions which were mainly reactive and dominated by the prime minister. The creation of the job of
Colonial Secretary, the
Cabinet Office and the
League of Nations added to the Foreign Office's insecurity.
Policy under Lloyd George .
Grey: Pre–World War II Polish territory east of the Curzon Line annexed by the Soviet Union after the war. After nine months as acting Secretary while Balfour was at the
Paris Peace Conference, Curzon was appointed Foreign Secretary in October 1919. He gave his name to the British government's proposed Soviet-Polish boundary, the
Curzon Line of December 1919. Although during the subsequent
Polish-Soviet War,
Poland conquered
territory in the east, after
World War II, Poland was shifted westwards, leaving the border between Poland and its eastern neighbours today approximately at the Curzon Line. Curzon was largely responsible for the
Peace Day ceremonies on 19 July 1919. These included the plaster
Cenotaph, designed by the noted architect Sir
Edwin Lutyens, for the Allied Victory parade in London. It was so successful that it was reproduced in stone, and still stands. In 1918, during World War I, as
Britain occupied Mesopotamia, Curzon tried to convince the Indian government to reconsider his scheme for
Persia to be a buffer against Russian advances. British and Indian troops were in Persia protecting the oilfields at
Abadan and watching the Afghan frontier – Curzon believed that British economic and military aid, sent via India, could prop up the Persian government and make her a British client state. The
Anglo-Persian Agreement of August 1919 was never ratified and the British government rejected the plan as Russia had the geographical advantage and the defensive benefits would not justify the high economic cost. Small British forces had twice occupied
Baku on the Caspian in 1918, while an entire British division had occupied
Batum on the Black Sea, supervising German and Turkish withdrawal. Against Curzon's wishes, but on the advice of Sir
George Milne, the commander on the spot, the
CIGS Sir Henry Wilson, who wanted to concentrate troops in Britain, Ireland, India, and Egypt, and of Churchill (
Secretary of State for War), the British withdrew from Baku (the small British naval presence was also withdrawn from the Caspian Sea), at the end of August 1919 leaving only three battalions at Batum. In January 1920 Curzon insisted that British troops remain in Batum, against the wishes of Wilson and the prime minister. In February, while Curzon was on holiday, Wilson persuaded the
Cabinet to allow withdrawal, but Curzon had the decision reversed on his return, although to Curzon's fury (he thought it "abuse of authority") Wilson gave Milne permission to withdraw if he deemed it necessary. At Cabinet on 5 May 1920 Curzon "by a long-winded jaw" (in Wilson's description) argued for a stay in Batum. After a British garrison at
Enzeli (on the Persian Caspian coast) was taken prisoner by
Bolshevik forces on 19 May 1920, Lloyd George finally insisted on a withdrawal from Batum early in June 1920. For the rest of 1920 Curzon, supported by
Milner (Colonial Secretary), argued that Britain should retain control of Persia. When Wilson asked (15 July 1920) to pull troops out of Persia to put down the rebellions in
Iraq and
Ireland, Lloyd George blocked the move, saying that Curzon "would not stand it". In the end, financial retrenchment forced a British withdrawal from Persia in the spring of 1921. Curzon worked on several Middle Eastern problems. He designed the
Treaty of Sèvres (10 August 1920) between the victorious Allies and the
Ottoman Empire. The treaty obliged the de facto end of Turkey's sovereign state status, but a new government in
Turkey under
Mustafa Kemal rejected the treaty. In response, the
Greeks invaded Turkey. Curzon tried and failed to induce the Greeks to accept a compromise on the status of
Smyrna and failed to force the Turks to renounce their nationalist program. Lloyd George tried to use force at
Chanak but lost support and was forced to step down as prime minister. Curzon remained as foreign secretary and helped tie down loose ends in the Middle East at the
peace conference at Lausanne. Curzon helped to negotiate Egyptian independence (
agreed in 1922) and the division of the
British Mandate of Palestine, despite the strong disagreement he held with the policy of his predecessor Arthur Balfour, and helped create the
Emirate of Transjordan for
Faisal's brother, which may also have delayed the problems there. According to
Sir David Gilmour, Curzon "was the only senior figure in the British government at the time who foresaw that its policy would lead to decades of Arab–Jewish hostility". In 1922, he was the chief negotiator for the Allies of the
Treaty of Lausanne, which officially ended the war with the Ottoman Empire and defined the borders of Turkey. Curzon defended the geopolitical talent of
Eyre Crowe, who served as
Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office from 1920 until his death in 1925.
Under Bonar Law Unlike many leading Conservative members of Lloyd George's Coalition Cabinet, Curzon ceased to support Lloyd George over the
Chanak Crisis and had just resigned when Conservative backbenchers voted at the
Carlton Club meeting to end the Coalition in October 1922. Curzon was thus able to remain Foreign Secretary when
Bonar Law formed a purely Conservative ministry. In 1922–23 Curzon had to negotiate with
France after French troops
occupied the Ruhr to enforce the payment of
German reparations; he described the French Prime Minister (and former president)
Raymond Poincaré as a "horrid little man". Curzon had expansive ambitions and was not much happier with Bonar Law, whose foreign policy was based on "retrenchment and withdrawal", than he had been with Lloyd George. Curzon provided invaluable insight into the Middle East and was instrumental in shaping British foreign policy in that region. ==Passed over for the premiership, 1923==