While an invaluable compendium "accommodating diverse textual traditions", a militarist section of the work takes a "multiplicity of views" as dangerous to the Qin state if listened to too much, though it withholds judgment of
Laozi,
Confucius,
Mozi,
Yang Zhu, or
Sun Bin, resorting to a "military model" comparable to the
Art of War rather than an ideology. Likely not considering it useful as a comparative, in the early Han,
Sima Tan didn't include militarism as a school. But militarism is a major viewpoint of the Qin, that is, its
stratocracy. While the Lushi Chunqiu considers
learning and teachers of central importance as if its fifth major point, as noted under Major Positions, John Knoblock includes
filial piety as its last major point, and
wu wei as its seventh. But "Affirmation of self-cultivation and
impartiality" is its first position. While the work does encourage the ruler to listen to ministers, its own priorities consist of such mundane positions as facilitating agriculture, trade and commerce, thrift, and reducing taxes. Although Qin's
Shang Yang, the
Han Feizi or
Sima Qian's
Li Si in the
Shiji are less tolerant,
Yuri Pines (
Stanford Encyclopedia) analysis of them is similar to Smith, discussing some of the same material. The much earlier Shang Yang was anti-intellectual but did not actually care about the
content of doctrines. Not "adoring" a martial spirit, he was concerned with recruiting farmers and soldiers, inculcating militarist regulations rather than values. Li Si isn't specifically anti-Confucian, so much as he is simply authoritarian. Opposing the "discourses of the former kings" in favor of teaching law in Chapter 49, the
Han Feizi's Chapter 50 resorts to simply having the king promulgate and prohibit doctrines, whatever they may be. By comparison, they cared more about state control, but still not doctrinal unity. Despite the later term
Chinese Legalism, they do not provide an
ideological alternative. ==Daoistic syncretism==