Junior officer Commissioned into the Army as an
Infantry second lieutenant, Schwarzkopf reported to the
United States Army Infantry School at
Fort Benning, Georgia, where he attended the Infantry
Officer Basic Course and earned his
Parachutist Badge from October 1956 to March 1957. His first assignment was as a
platoon leader and later
executive officer of E Company, 2nd Airborne Battle Group,
187th Airborne Infantry Regiment,
101st Airborne Division, at
Fort Campbell, Kentucky. He later recounted that it was then that he found chronic problems in military leadership, amid what historians have called a larger doctrinal crisis. Schwarzkopf later said there were many officers and NCOs he met on that assignment who "had no sense of duty or honor, and who saw the world through an alcoholic haze". He was promoted to
first lieutenant in 1958. In July 1959, Schwarzkopf was assigned his first overseas assignment. He was a staff officer alternating with duties as a platoon leader, liaison officer, and reconnaissance platoon leader with the
6th Infantry Regiment in
West Germany. In July 1960, Schwarzkopf was assigned as
aide-de-camp to Brigadier General Charles Johnson who commanded the
Berlin Brigade in
West Berlin. Schwarzkopf was promoted to
captain in July 1961 and attended the Advanced Infantry School at Fort Benning for eight months and qualified for the
Master Parachutist Badge. In June 1962, Schwarzkopf enrolled at the
University of Southern California in a Master of Science in Engineering course studying missile mechanics. He graduated in June 1964 with a Master of Science in
mechanical and
aerospace engineering. He then returned to West Point to serve an obligatory tour as an instructor in the Department of Mechanics. He was assigned to teach at the Military Academy for three years, but after a year he volunteered for service in
South Vietnam for faster career advancement with a combat tour. West Point approved his request in early 1965, stipulating that he would return and complete his remaining obligation afterwards.
Vietnam War In the Vietnam War, Schwarzkopf served as a task force adviser to the
Army of the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Division. He was promoted to
major shortly after arriving in Vietnam. After an initial orientation at
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), headquartered in
Saigon, Schwarzkopf was sent north to
Pleiku in the
central highlands, in the
II Corps Tactical Zone. He got his first combat experience on 3 August, when he was the senior adviser to a force of 1,000 South Vietnamese paratroopers sent to relieve a beleaguered South Vietnamese Army force at
Đức Cơ Camp. The paratroopers took heavy casualties and a second, larger force was required to relieve them. That force too came into heavy contact. Schwarzkopf and his group fought continuously for several days. At one point, he braved heavy North Vietnamese fire to recover and treat a handful of wounded South Vietnamese soldiers and escort them to safety. By 17 August, the
173rd Airborne Brigade arrived and broke the siege, ending the
Battle of Đức Cơ. General
William Westmoreland later arrived to review the battle and congratulate Schwarzkopf. For his leadership in the battle, Schwarzkopf was awarded the
Silver Star. On 14 February 1966, Schwarzkopf led an ARVN paratrooper assault on a
Viet Cong position, during which he was wounded four times by small arms fire. However, he refused medical evacuation or to relinquish command until the objective had been captured and so he was awarded a second Silver Star and a
Purple Heart. After ten months of combat duty, Schwarzkopf was pulled from the front by MACV and reassigned as senior staff adviser for
civil affairs to the ARVN Airborne Division. He returned to the United States and finished his teaching assignment at West Point where he was an associate professor in the Department of Mechanics. In 1968 he attended the Army's
Command and General Staff College at
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, completing the course in June 1969. During this time he met Brenda Holsinger, a
flight attendant for
Trans World Airlines. They were introduced at a West Point football game in 1967 and married the next year. The couple would later have three children: Cynthia, born in 1970; Jessica, born in 1972; and Christian, born in 1977. In 1969, Schwarzkopf was promoted to
lieutenant colonel and ordered to a second tour in Vietnam, leaving in June. He was assigned as executive officer to the chief of staff at MACV headquarters based at
Tan Son Nhut Air Base in Saigon. Schwarzkopf later recalled this second tour of duty was very different from his first. There were now 500,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam, the strategy of
Vietnamization was in full effect, and recent events such as the
Tet Offensive and
My Lai massacre had put U.S. combat troops under increased political scrutiny. In December 1969, he got his first field command, taking over the
1st Battalion, 6th Infantry,
198th Infantry Brigade at
Chu Lai. He later said that the troops were initially demoralized and in poor condition, racked with rampant drug use and disciplinary problems as well as a lack of support from home. Despite the brigade's otherwise-controversial performance record, Schwarzkopf was quickly regarded as one of its best combat commanders. He aggressively stepped up patrols and operations to counter Viet Cong infiltration in the battalion's sector. He developed his leadership attitudes during this command. Fellow commander
Hal Moore later wrote that during his time in Vietnam, Schwarzkopf acquired his well-known short temper, and argued via radio for passing American
helicopters to land and pick up his wounded men. He also showed a preference of leading from the front and prided himself on avoiding the rear areas, which he termed a "cesspool". During this second tour, Schwarzkopf noted two incidents that haunted him. On 17 February 1970, two men in C Company, 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry were killed by
friendly fire from an American artillery shell that had been called in by Schwarzkopf but had struck a tree near their position on its way to a target. The parents of one soldier blamed him for the death of their son, a claim that Schwarzkopf strongly denied and termed an accident of war. On 28 May 1970, Schwarzkopf landed his helicopter when discovering troops of B Company who had stumbled into a minefield. Two company officers had been wounded and two soldiers were trapped, fearful of setting off more mines. Although a
medevac was on its way, Schwarzkopf ordered his
UH-1 Huey to remove the wounded. As he attempted to help the troops back out of the field, one soldier struck a landmine, breaking a leg, and began to panic. Fearing that he would set off another landmine, Schwarzkopf
pinned the soldier to the ground while another soldier put a splint on the wounded man's leg. In doing so, another mine was set off, killing three and wounding Schwarzkopf's artillery officer. Returning to the United States in 1970, Schwarzkopf was awarded a third Silver Star and a second Purple Heart for risking his life to protect the soldiers, as well as three
Bronze Star Medals and a
Legion of Merit for his command performance. Still, his experiences in Vietnam embittered him to foreign policy. Upon returning to the United States, he spoke of a wariness of future conflicts to author
C. D. B. Bryan in 1971. He related those experiences under his real name, which was changed to Lieutenant Colonel Byron Schindler for the made for TV movie
Friendly Fire in 1979.
Rise to General Disgruntled by the treatment of
Vietnam veterans in the United States after the war, Schwarzkopf considered leaving the military but ultimately decided to stay in the hope of fixing some of the problems encountered by the military during the war. He underwent surgery at
Walter Reed Army Hospital shortly after his return from Vietnam to repair longstanding back problems exacerbated by parachute jumps. Between 1970 and 1983, Schwarzkopf took on a number of different assignments. Promoted to
colonel, Schwarzkopf volunteered for an assignment in
Alaska, and in late 1974 became deputy commander of the
172nd Infantry Brigade at
Fort Richardson, Alaska. In 1975, Col Schwarzkopf served as Commander of Troop E, 1st Squadron,
1st Cavalry Regiment, at
Fort Wainwright, AK. Subsequently, in October 1976, he moved to
Fort Lewis, Washington, to command the 1st Brigade of the
9th Infantry Division, where he impressed his division commander, Major General
Richard E. Cavazos. The two frequently hunted together and developed a close friendship. Having been very successful in improving the combat readiness of the 1st Brigade, he was nominated to receive his first star as a
brigadier general. His promotion ceremony occurred at Fort Lewis shortly after he had relinquished command of the brigade. In July 1978, Schwarzkopf became deputy director of plans at the
U.S. Pacific Command in
Hawaii. He then served a two-year stint as assistant division commander of the
8th Infantry Division (Mechanized) in Germany. He returned to Washington, DC, for an assignment as director of personnel management for the Army, subordinate to the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, General
Maxwell R. Thurman. Schwarzkopf was promoted to
major general. In June 1983, he became commanding general of the
24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at
Fort Stewart, Georgia. He immediately established an extremely rigorous training regimen and became well known among the troops of the command for his strict training and aggressive personality. On 25 October 1983, Schwarzkopf was appointed to the command group for the
Invasion of Grenada. He was the chief army adviser to the overall operation commander,
Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, Commander,
United States Second Fleet/Commander Joint Task Force 120. The operation was plagued by logistical difficulties, exacerbated by poor communication and lack of co-operation between the
branches of the United States military. Schwarzkopf was named deputy commander of the invasion at the last minute, leaving him with little say in the planning. Schwarzkopf helped lead the initial landing operations while he was aboard . He was involved in an incident where the colonel commanding the
22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit initially refused to fly Army troops in Marine helicopters. He flew into
St. George's on the second day of the operation. While he initially did not think the US should have been involved in the conflict, he later said he considered the mission a success because it reasserted the dominance of the US military after the Vietnam War. Following the invasion, Schwarzkopf returned to the 24th Infantry Division and completed his tour as its commander. He was then among the leaders who were criticized for the poor interservice co-operation in the operation, particularly the poor communication between forces of the different branches in combat. The operation was a learning experience for Schwarzkopf, who saw the need to develop greater co-operation between the services for future joint operations. He would later push for more policies to make
joint warfare, and interservice co-operation standard practice in warfare. Specifically, the operation demonstrated a need for greater joint roles in planning, deploying troops, and communicating operations. Subsequent operations gave more authority to joint commanders in operations and doctrine and emphasized joint warfare doctrine over service-centered doctrine. In July 1985, Schwarzkopf began an 11-month assignment as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans at
the Pentagon. On 1 July 1986, he was promoted to
lieutenant general, and was reassigned to Fort Lewis as commander of
I Corps. He held the post for 14 months before returning to the Pentagon as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans in August 1987. In a second role, Schwarzkopf served as the Army's senior member on the
Military Staff Committee at the
United Nations Security Council, where he began to build diplomatic skills in dealings with representatives from other countries. As a part of his duties during the posting, he sat in on arms reduction talks with leaders from the
Soviet Union.
CENTCOM commander in November 1988 In November 1988, Schwarzkopf was named commander of
United States Central Command (CENTCOM), succeeding General
George B. Crist. Schwarzkopf was selected over a more popular choice,
Vice Admiral Henry C. Mustin because commanders considered him an accomplished strategic thinker who had experience both in combat and with diplomacy and had great knowledge of the
Middle East from his childhood experiences there. He assumed command of CENTCOM, with his headquarters at
MacDill Air Force Base in
Tampa, Florida, and was promoted to general. At the time of this appointment, CENTCOM had overall responsibility for U.S. military operations in 19 countries, and had 200,000 service members on call should a crisis arise. Schwarzkopf immediately took to changing the focus of the command, which had focused on the "Zagros Doctrine", a hypothetical ground invasion by the Soviet Union through the
Zagros Mountains, which the US would counter in Iran. Schwarzkopf was more concerned with the effects of the
Iran–Iraq War on the stability of the region than of an external threat posed by the Soviet Union. In testimony before the
Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) in March 1989, Schwarzkopf maintained that the Soviet Union was a threat to the region, but when giving an overview of the countries in the region, he noted that Iraq posed a threat to its weaker neighbors. He implored for the US to "seek to assert a moderating influence in Iraq". With regional turmoil growing, Schwarzkopf became concerned about the threat posed by
Saddam Hussein, focusing the attention of his command on preparing to respond to what he thought was a "more realistic scenario". That year, his command began planning to counter an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, seeing it as a likely conflict that would threaten the interests of the United States. In early 1990, he testified again before the SASC in threat-assessment hearings that the
Cold War was ending and that it was less likely the Soviet Union would exert military force in the region. Though he declined to identify Iraq specifically as a threat, he noted a regional conflict was the most likely event to destabilize the region and that noted Iraq's ceasefire with Iran meant it was continuing to grow and modernize its military. In early 1990, he drafted a war plan, Operations Plan , titled "Defense of the Arabian Peninsula", which envisioned an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia through Kuwait. During CENTCOM
military exercises in July 1990, termed
Internal Look '90, Schwarzkopf wrote a scenario that tested how the command would respond to a regional dictator invading a neighboring country and threatening
oilfields there, which closely mirrored the rising tension between Iraq and Kuwait. One week after the end of the exercises, Iraq
invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990.
Gulf War riding in a
Humvee with General Schwarzkopf in Saudi Arabia Initially believing that the
Iraqi Army would advance only to the
Rumailah oil field, Schwarzkopf was surprised when the Iraqis captured
Kuwait City. Fearing Iraq would next invade Saudi Arabia, Schwarzkopf ordered contingency plans put in motion, with the
82nd Airborne Division, 101st Airborne Division and 24th Infantry Division put on alert. He was then called to an emergency meeting with
US President George H. W. Bush, where his ''Internal Look '90'' command post wargame was made the basis of a potential counteroffensive plan. By 5 August, Bush opted for an aggressive response to the invasion. Schwarzkopf then accompanied
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to meet with
Saudi King Fahd to convince him to allow U.S. troops into Saudi Arabia to counter the Iraqi military. With Fahd's consent, Bush ordered troops into Saudi Arabia on 7 August, initially tasked to defend Saudi Arabia should Iraq attack. U.S. commanders from the beginning wanted a quick conflict characterized by decisive, overwhelming force, as opposed to the gradual escalation of U.S. involvement as had been seen in Vietnam. Schwarzkopf in particular was adamant to avoid repeating many of the policies governing military operations in Vietnam, especially the slow escalation of air power and troop forces. His plan for direct and overwhelming force was initially criticized in Washington as uncreative. By 13 August, the news media began to closely cover Schwarzkopf, who had been named to lead the operation.
Operation Desert Shield From his headquarters in Tampa, Schwarzkopf began planning the operations to defend Saudi Arabia. Lieutenant General
Charles Horner, USAF, ran the headquarters in
Riyadh. Schwarzkopf planned supply lines for the 50,000 troops initially sent to Saudi Arabia, tapping Major General
William G. Pagonis as director of the logistical operations, with
US Air Force cargo aircraft landing supplies at
Dhahran and
US Navy ships offloading troops and supplies at
Dammam. By 20 August, 20,000 U.S. troops were in Saudi Arabia, with another 80,000 preparing to deploy, and a further 40,000 reserves tapped to augment them. Schwarzkopf arrived at the CENTCOM command in Riyadh on 25 August, and on 29 August, he conducted his first front-line tour of the potential combat zone, accompanied by reporters. Over the next several weeks, Schwarzkopf spoke frequently with both reporters and troops under his command, conducting many high-profile press conferences and updates to the situation in Saudi Arabia. Schwarzkopf worked to help coordinate the contributions of the different nations contributing military forces to the effort. By mid-October, Schwarzkopf indicated he was confident the forces were of a sufficient level that they could defend Saudi Arabia if it was attacked. Through October, Schwarzkopf and his command were occupied with setting up facilities and supply lines for the troops streaming into Saudi Arabia. He also worked to minimize the culture clash among foreigners in
sharia-dominated Saudi Arabia such as the high visibility of women in military roles. Schwarzkopf remained at his command in Riyadh until December and made frequent frontline visits to the troops. On 29 December 1990, he received a
warning order from the Pentagon to be ready to attack into Iraq and Kuwait by 17 January. ,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during a press conference regarding the Gulf War|left Initially,
Operation Desert Shield involved a sea
interdiction campaign that saw international warships detaining and inspecting tankers from Iraq. As the buildup continued, Schwarzkopf was occupied with planning an offensive operation against the Iraqi units along the border, sometimes working 18-hour days in planning, closely assisted by a group of aides. He frequently met with subordinates and Saudi commanders. Schwarzkopf planned counters for Iraq's large
armored forces, air forces, and elite
Republican Guard forces. While planning, Schwarzkopf remained in frequent contact with
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Colin Powell concerning Schwarzkopf's plans for the offensive. Schwarzkopf devised an operational plan, dubbed "Operation Desert Storm", to be based on overwhelming force and strong infantry attacks supported by artillery and armor. By 8 November, Bush agreed to commit 400,000 US troops to Saudi Arabia at Schwarzkopf's insistence. Schwarzkopf believed that more troops would reduce the likelihood of high casualties. He planned a
strategic bombing campaign to precede an offensive into Kuwait, simultaneously striking the forward Iraqi forces and their supply lines. In the meantime, diplomatic solutions began to break down, and the deadline established by the United Nations Security Council, 15 January 1991, passed without a solution. By then, Schwarzkopf commanded an international army of 750,000, comprising 500,000 US troops and 250,000 troops from other nations, as well as thousands of
main battle tanks, combat aircraft and six
carrier battle groups. Most of the US and allied forces, however, were not combat veterans, and Schwarzkopf and the other allied commanders wanted to fight cautiously to minimize casualties. Schwarzkopf's experience in the Middle East allowed him to understand the factors surrounding the conflict, including the allied commanders, with greater ease. He had a good relationship with Saudi commander
Khalid bin Sultan, who, in turn, helped Schwarzkopf win over the Saudi Arabian populace. In spite of the co-operation, he later said that he considered the Arab troops to be the least effective of the war. Schwarzkopf also had an agreeable relationship with his deputy commander, Lieutenant General
Calvin Waller, who handled much of the administrative burden.
Peter de la Billière, commander of the British contingent, and
Michel Roquejeoffre, commander of the French contingent, also co-operated well with Schwarzkopf. The good relationship between the allied commanders allowed their forces to co-operate effectively during the operation.
Operation Desert Storm in 1991 The
air campaign against Iraq began on 17 January 1991, after 139 days of planning and buildup. Schwarzkopf sent a prepared statement to the troops ahead of the first airstrikes, which were timed to hit their targets at 02:40. He oversaw the strikes from his war room in Riyadh, emerged from his command center late in the day on 18 January to speak to the press, and said the air war had gone "just about exactly as we had intended it to go". He then began making frequent briefings to the media. He declined to measure the success of the campaign by counting suspected Iraqi casualties, believing that would undermine his credibility. The air campaign proved to be a success by achieving
air superiority and destroying the Iraqi military's communications network, supplies, and many tanks and armored vehicles. By 20 January he announced Iraq's
nuclear test reactors had been destroyed, and by 27 January he announced that the coalition had total air superiority in Iraq. Over 38 days, the Air Force destroyed 39 percent of the
T-72 tanks, 32 percent of the
Armored Personnel Carriers, and 47 percent of the artillery. In the aggregate, the Air Force met the goal of 50 percent attrition of the Iraqi ground force. Bush then gave Hussein an ultimatum to withdraw from Kuwait by 12:00 on 23 February or Schwarzkopf's ground forces would attack. Schwarzkopf began his ground campaign in earnest at 04:00 on 24 February, with the Saudi-led Arab forces attacking into Kuwait City, while two
US Marine Corps divisions struck at the oil fields, and the
VII Corps and
XVIII Airborne Corps on the left flank struck quickly to cut off the Iraqi forces from the west, which would later be known as his "Left Hook" strategy. Schwarzkopf expected the war to last several weeks and had anticipated
chemical weapon attacks by the Iraqi forces, which did not occur. Resistance was lighter than Schwarzkopf expected, and Iraqi troops surrendered in large numbers. Within 90 hours, his force had destroyed 42 of 50 Iraqi Army divisions at a cost of about 125 killed and 200 wounded among American troops, and about 482 killed, 458 wounded among all of the coalition. He ordered his forces to destroy as much Iraqi armor and equipment as possible to ensure the weakening of Iraq's offensive capability in the near term. White House chief of staff
John Sununu suggested that should the cease-fire take effect at 5 a.m. on 28 February, it would be possible to name the conflict "The Hundred Hour War". Powell agreed and talked with Schwarzkopf, who pointed out that it would also make it a "Five Day War". Schwarzkopf, who had ordered a media blackout during the ground offensive, finally appeared before journalists on 27 February to explain his strategy. On 3 March, he arrived in Kuwait City to survey the aftermath of the Iraqi occupation and negotiate a ceasefire with Iraqi military leaders and to work out the return of
prisoners of war on both sides. With this in place, he then began the process of overseeing U.S. troops returning from the conflict. For his services during the war, Schwarzkopf was welcomed back to America with a parade down
Broadway in New York, along with other honors. He became the only person to receive the Distinguished Service Medal from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard. Schwarzkopf also led a highly publicized
homecoming parade in Washington, D.C., on 8 June 1991, where he was greeted by Bush amid thousands of onlookers. His reception differed markedly from that of commanders who returned from the Vietnam and
Korean Wars. He became an instant national celebrity and the source of great curiosity by the general public. He was quick to award praise and medals to the troops, part of what he saw as restoring pride in the US armed forces after the Vietnam War. ==Later life==