NPT Non Signatories India,
Pakistan and
Israel have been "threshold" countries in terms of the international non-proliferation regime. They possess or are quickly capable of assembling one or more nuclear weapons. They have remained outside the 1970 NPT. They are thus largely excluded from trade in nuclear plants or materials, except for safety-related devices for a few safeguarded facilities.
In May 1998 India and Pakistan each exploded several nuclear devices underground. This heightened concerns regarding a
nuclear arms race between them, with Pakistan involving the
People's Republic of China, an acknowledged nuclear weapons state. Both countries are opposed to the NPT as it stands, and India has consistently attacked the Treaty since its inception in 1970 labeling it as a lopsided treaty in favor of the nuclear powers. Relations between the two countries are tense and hostile, and the risks of nuclear conflict between them have long been considered quite high.
Kashmir is a prime cause of bilateral tension, its sovereignty
being in dispute since 1948. There is a persistent low-level bilateral military conflict due to the alleged backing of insurgency by Pakistan in India, and the infiltration of Pakistani state-backed militants into Indian-administered
Jammu and Kashmir, along with the
disputed status of Kashmir. Both engaged in a
conventional arms race in the 1980s, including sophisticated technology and equipment capable of delivering nuclear weapons. In the 1990s the arms race quickened. In 1994 India reversed a four-year trend of reduced allocations for defence, and despite its much smaller economy, Pakistan was expected to push its own expenditures yet higher. Both have lost their patrons: India, the former USSR, and Pakistan, the United States. But it is the growth and modernization of China's nuclear arsenal and its assistance with Pakistan's nuclear power programme and, reportedly, with missile technology, which exacerbate Indian concerns. In particular, as viewed by Indian strategists, Pakistan is aided by China's
People's Liberation Army.
India Nuclear power for civil use is
well established in India. Its civil nuclear strategy has been directed towards complete independence in the nuclear fuel cycle, necessary because of its outspoken rejection of the NPT. Due to economic and technological isolation of India after the nuclear tests in 1974, India has largely diverted focus on developing and perfecting the fast breeder technology by intensive materials and fuel cycle research at the dedicated center established for research into fast reactor technology,
Indira Gandhi Center for Atomic Research (IGCAR) at
Kalpakkam, in the
southern part of the country. At the moment, India has a small fast
breeder reactor and a much larger
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor. This self-sufficiency extends from uranium exploration and mining through fuel fabrication, heavy water production, reactor design and construction, to reprocessing and waste management. It is also developing technology to utilise its abundant resources of thorium as a nuclear fuel. India has 14 small nuclear power reactors in commercial operation, two larger ones under construction, and ten more planned. The 14 operating ones (2548 MWe total) comprise: • two 150 MWe BWRs from the United States, which started up in 1969, now use locally enriched uranium and are under safeguards, • two small Canadian PHWRs (1972 & 1980), also under safeguards, and • ten local PHWRs based on Canadian designs, two of 150 and eight 200 MWe. • two new 540 MWe and two 700 MWe plants at Tarapur (known as TAPP:
Tarapur Atomic Power Station) The two under construction and two of the planned ones are 450 MWe versions of these 200 MWe domestic products. Construction has been seriously delayed by financial and technical problems. In 2001 a final agreement was signed with Russia for the country's first large nuclear power plant, comprising two VVER-1000 reactors, under a Russian-financed US$3 billion contract. The first unit is due to be commissioned in 2007. A further two Russian units are under consideration for the site. Nuclear power supplied 3.1% of India's electricity in 2000. Its weapons material appears to come from a Canadian-designed 40 MW "research" reactor which started up in 1960, well before the NPT, and a 100 MW indigenous unit in operation since 1985. Both use local uranium, as India does not import any nuclear fuel. It is estimated that India may have built up enough weapons-grade plutonium for a hundred nuclear warheads. It is widely believed that the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan used Canadian
CANDU reactors to produce fissionable materials for their weapons; however, this is not accurate. Both Canada (by supplying the 40 MW research reactor) and the United States (by supplying 21 tons of heavy water) supplied India with the technology necessary to create a nuclear weapons program, dubbed CIRUS (Canada-India Reactor, United States). Canada sold India the reactor on the condition that the reactor and any by-products would be "employed for peaceful purposes only." . Similarly, the United States sold India heavy water for use in the reactor "only... in connection with research into and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes" . India, in violation of these agreements, used the Canadian-supplied reactor and American-supplied heavy water to produce plutonium for their first nuclear explosion,
Smiling Buddha. The Indian government controversially justified this, however, by claiming that Smiling Buddha was a "peaceful nuclear explosion." The country has at least three other research reactors including the tiny one which is exploring the use of thorium as a nuclear fuel, by breeding fissile U-233. In addition, an advanced heavy-water thorium cycle is under development. India
exploded a nuclear device in 1974, the so-called
Smiling Buddha test, which it has consistently claimed was for peaceful purposes. Others saw it as a response to China's nuclear weapons capability. It was then universally perceived, notwithstanding official denials, to possess, or to be able to quickly assemble, nuclear weapons. In 1999 it deployed its own
medium-range missile and has developed an
intermediate-range missile capable of reaching targets in China's industrial heartland. In 1995 the United States quietly intervened to head off a proposed nuclear test. However, in 1998 there were five more tests in
Operation Shakti. These were unambiguously military, including one claimed to be of a sophisticated thermonuclear device, and their declared purpose was "to help in the design of nuclear weapons of different yields and different delivery systems". Indian security policies are driven by: • its determination to be recognized as a dominant power in the region • its increasing concern with China's expanding nuclear weapons and missile delivery programmes • its concern with Pakistan's capability to deliver nuclear weapons deep into India It perceives nuclear weapons as a cost-effective political counter to China's nuclear and conventional weaponry, and the effects of its nuclear weapons policy in provoking Pakistan is, by some accounts, considered incidental. India has had an unhappy relationship with China. After an uneasy ceasefire ended the
1962 war, relations between the two nations were frozen until 1998. Since then a degree of high-level contact has been established and a few elementary confidence-building measures put in place. China still occupies some territory which it captured during the aforementioned war, claimed by India, and India still occupies some territory claimed by China. Its nuclear weapon and missile support for Pakistan is a major bone of contention.
American President George W. Bush met with India
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to discuss India's involvement with nuclear weapons. The two countries agreed that the United States would give nuclear power assistance to India.
Pakistan admitted that the nuclear weapons-related material including these
centrifuges, known as
Pak-1, were acquired from Pakistan Over the years in
Pakistan,
nuclear power infrastructure has been well established. It is dedicated to the industrial and
economic development of the country. Its current nuclear policy is aimed to promote the socio-economic development of its people as a "foremost priority"; , there were three operational mega-commercial nuclear power plants while three larger ones were under construction. Infrastructure established by the IAEA and the U.S. in the 1950s–1960s was based on peaceful research and development and the economic prosperity of the country. Although the civil-sector nuclear power was established in the 1950s, the country has an
active nuclear weapons program which was started in the 1970s. Reacting to India's first nuclear weapon test, Prime Minister
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the country's political and military science circles sensed this test as final and dangerous anticipation to Pakistan's "moral and physical existence." With diplomat
Aziz Ahmed on his side, Prime Minister Bhutto launched a serious diplomatic offense and aggressively maintained at the session of the
United Nations Security Council: After 1974,
Bhutto's government redoubled its effort, this time equally focused on uranium and plutonium.
Abdul Qadeer Khan then established a network through Dubai to smuggle
URENCO technology to the
Engineering Research Laboratories. Earlier, he worked with the
Physics Dynamics Research Laboratories (FDO), a subsidiary of the Dutch firm VMF-Stork based in Amsterdam. Later after joining, Urenco, he had access through photographs and documents to the technology. In 1997, her statement was echoed by Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif who maintained that "since 1972, [P]akistan had progressed significantly, and we have left that stage (developmental) far behind. Pakistan will not be made a "hostage" to India by signing the CTBT, before (India).!" In May 1998, within weeks of India's nuclear tests, Pakistan announced that it had conducted six underground
tests in the Chagai Hills, five on 28 May and one on 30 May. Seismic events consistent with these claims were recorded. In 2004, the revelation of Khan's efforts led to the exposure of many defunct European consortiums which had defied export restrictions in the 1970s, and of many defunct Dutch companies that exported thousands of centrifuges to Pakistan as early as 1976. Many centrifuge components were apparently manufactured by the
Malaysian
Scomi Precision Engineering with the assistance of South Asian and German companies, and used a UAE-based computer company as a false front. It was widely believed to have had direct involvement by the Government of Pakistan. He was immediately given presidential immunity. However, the contents of Abdul Qadeer Khan's personal diaries present his perspective on the matters related to his activities concerning nuclear secrets. He claimed that he acted only at the order or "instigation" of the Pakistan government. Even when there was no official authorization, Pakistani military knew of Khan's activity according to the contents of the diaries. On one occasion in 1980, a colonel knew of Khan being in touch with Syria's Defense Minister Gen.
Mustafa Tlass and Gen. Hikmat Shihabi. Six months later, Khan was warned by
Zia Ul Haq to be careful over "nuclear drawings". In May 2025, the United States Defense Intelligence Agency's 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment highlighted Pakistan's nuclear proliferation efforts. It estimated the stockpile at approximately 170 warheads in 2024 and projected a potential increase to 200 by 2025. The report linked this growth to Pakistan's perception of India as an existential threat. It stated that Pakistan intended to counter India's conventional superiority through the development of tactical nuclear weapons. The report also noted that Pakistan had not adopted a “No First Use” policy.
North Korea The
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (or better known as
North Korea), joined the
NPT in 1985 and had subsequently signed a
safeguards agreement with the IAEA. However, it was believed that North Korea was diverting plutonium extracted from the fuel of its reactor at
Yongbyon, for use in nuclear weapons. The subsequent confrontation with IAEA on the issue of inspections and suspected violations, resulted in North Korea threatening to withdraw from the NPT in 1993. This eventually led to negotiations with the
United States resulting in the
Agreed Framework of 1994, which provided for IAEA safeguards being applied to its reactors and spent fuel rods. These spent fuel rods were sealed in canisters by the United States to prevent North Korea from extracting plutonium from them. North Korea had to therefore freeze its plutonium programme. During this period, Pakistan-North Korea cooperation in missile technology transfer was being established. A high-level delegation of
Pakistan military visited North Korea in August–September 1992, reportedly to discuss the supply of missile technology to Pakistan. In 1993,
PM Benazir Bhutto repeatedly traveled to China, and the paid
state visit to North Korea. The visits are believed to be related to the subsequent acquisition technology to developed its Ghauri system by Pakistan. During the period 1992–1994, A.Q. Khan was reported to have visited North Korea thirteen times. The missile cooperation program with North Korea was under
Dr. A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories. At this time China was under U.S. pressure not to supply the
M Dongfeng series of missiles to Pakistan. It is believed by experts that possibly with Chinese connivance and facilitation, the latter was forced to approach North Korea for missile transfers. Reports indicate that North Korea was willing to supply missile sub-systems including rocket motors, inertial guidance systems, control and testing equipment for US$50 million. It is not clear what North Korea got in return. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. in ''
Jane's Defence Weekly'' (27 November 2002) reports that Western analysts had begun to question what North Korea received in payment for the missiles; many suspected it was the nuclear technology. The KRL was in charge of both the uranium program and also of the missile program with North Korea. It is therefore likely during this period that cooperation in nuclear technology between Pakistan and North Korea was initiated. Western intelligence agencies began to notice the exchange of personnel, technology and components between KRL and entities of the North Korean 2nd Economic Committee (responsible for weapons production). A
New York Times report on 18 October 2002 quoted U.S. intelligence officials having stated that Pakistan was a major supplier of critical equipment to North Korea. The report added that equipment such as gas centrifuges appeared to have been "part of a barter deal" in which North Korea supplied Pakistan with missiles. Separate reports indicate (
The Washington Times, 22 November 2002) that U.S. intelligence had as early as 1999 picked up signs that North Korea was continuing to develop nuclear arms. Other reports also indicate that North Korea had been working covertly to develop an enrichment capability for nuclear weapons for at least five years and had used technology obtained from Pakistan (
The Washington Times, 18 October 2002).
Israel Israel is also thought to possess an arsenal of potentially up to several hundred nuclear warheads based on estimates of the amount of fissile material produced by Israel. This has never been openly confirmed or denied however, due to Israel's
policy of deliberate ambiguity. An Israeli nuclear installation is located about ten kilometers to the south of
Dimona, the
Negev Nuclear Research Center. Its construction commenced in 1958, with
French assistance. The official reason given by the Israeli and French governments was to build a nuclear reactor to power a "
desalination plant", in order to "green the Negev". The purpose of the Dimona plant is widely assumed to be the manufacturing of nuclear weapons, and the majority of defense experts have concluded that it does in fact do that. However, the Israeli government refuses to confirm or deny this publicly, a policy it refers to as "ambiguity". Norway sold 20 tonnes of
heavy water needed for the reactor to Israel in 1959 and 1960 in a secret deal. There were no "safeguards" required in this deal to prevent the use of heavy water for non-peaceful purposes. The British newspaper
Daily Express accused Israel of working on a bomb in 1960. When the
United States intelligence community discovered the purpose of the Dimona plant in the early 1960s, it demanded that Israel agree to international inspections. Israel agreed, but on a condition that the U.S., rather than IAEA, inspectors were used, and that Israel would receive advanced notice of all inspections. Some claim that because Israel knew the schedule of the inspectors' visits, it was able to hide the alleged purpose of the site from the inspectors by installing temporary false walls and other devices before each inspection. The inspectors eventually informed the U.S. government that their inspections were useless due to Israeli restrictions on what areas of the facility they could inspect. In 1969, the United States terminated the inspections. In 1986,
Mordechai Vanunu, a former technician at the Dimona plant, revealed to the media some evidence of Israel's nuclear program. Israeli
Mossad agents arrested him in Italy, drugged him and transported him to Israel. An Israeli court then tried him in secret on charges of
treason and
espionage, and sentenced him to eighteen years imprisonment. He was freed on 21 April 2004, but was severely limited by the Israeli government. He was arrested again on 11 November 2004, though formal charges were not immediately filed. Comments on photographs taken by Vanunu inside the
Negev Nuclear Research Center have been made by prominent scientists. British nuclear weapons scientist
Frank Barnaby, who questioned Vanunu over several days, estimated Israel had enough plutonium for about 150 weapons. According to Lieutenant Colonel Warner D. Farr in a report to the
USAF Counterproliferation Center, while France was previously a leader in nuclear research "Israel and France were at a similar level of expertise after WWII, and Israeli scientists could make significant contributions to the French effort." In 1986
Francis Perrin,
French high-commissioner for atomic energy from 1951 to 1970 stated that in 1949 Israeli scientists were invited to the
Saclay nuclear research facility, this cooperation leading to a joint effort including sharing of knowledge between French and Israeli scientists especially those with knowledge from the
Manhattan Project.
Nuclear arms control in South Asia The public stance of India and Pakistan on non-proliferation differs markedly. Pakistan has initiated a series of regional security proposals. It has repeatedly proposed a nuclear-free zone in South Asia, and has proclaimed its willingness to engage in nuclear disarmament and to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty if India would do so. It has endorsed a United States proposal for a regional five power conference to consider non-proliferation in South Asia. India has taken the view that solutions to regional security issues should be found at the international rather than the regional level, since its chief concern is with China. It therefore rejects Pakistan's proposals. Instead, the 'Gandhi Plan', put forward in 1988, proposed the revision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it regards as inherently discriminatory in favor of the nuclear-weapon States, and a timetable for complete nuclear weapons disarmament. It endorsed early proposals for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and for an international convention to ban the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes, known as the 'cut-off' convention. The United States for some years, especially under the
Clinton administration, pursued a variety of initiatives to persuade India and Pakistan to abandon their nuclear weapons programs and to accept comprehensive international safeguards on all their nuclear activities. To this end, the Clinton administration proposed a conference of the five nuclear-weapon states, Japan, Germany, India and Pakistan. India refused this and similar previous proposals, and countered with demands that other potential weapons states, such as Iran and North Korea, should be invited, and that regional limitations would only be acceptable if they were accepted equally by China. The United States would not accept the participation of Iran and North Korea and these initiatives have lapsed. Another, more recent approach, centers on 'capping' the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, which would hopefully be followed by 'roll back'. To this end, India and the United States jointly sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution in 1993 calling for negotiations for a 'cut-off' convention. Should India and Pakistan join such a convention, they would have to agree to halt the production of fissile materials for weapons and to accept international verification on their relevant nuclear facilities (enrichment and reprocessing plants). It appears that India is now prepared to join negotiations regarding such a Cut-off Treaty, under the UN Conference on Disarmament. Bilateral confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan to reduce the prospects of confrontation have been limited. In 1990 each side ratified
a treaty not to attack the other's nuclear installations, and at the end of 1991 they provided one another with a list showing the location of all their nuclear plants, even though the respective lists were regarded as not being wholly accurate. Early in 1994 India proposed a bilateral agreement for a 'no first use' of nuclear weapons and an extension of the 'no attack' treaty to cover civilian and industrial targets as well as nuclear installations. Having promoted the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty since 1954, India dropped its support in 1995 and in 1996 attempted to block the Treaty. Following the 1998 tests the question has been reopened and both Pakistan and India have indicated their intention to sign the CTBT. Indian ratification may be conditional upon the five weapons states agreeing to specific reductions in nuclear arsenals. The UN Conference on Disarmament has also called upon both countries "to accede without delay to the Non-Proliferation Treaty", presumably as non-weapons states.
NPT signatories Egypt In 2004 and 2005, Egypt disclosed past undeclared nuclear activities and material to the IAEA. In 2007 and 2008, high-enriched and
low-enriched uranium particles were found in environmental samples taken in Egypt. In 2008, the IAEA states Egypt's statements were consistent with its own findings. In May 2009,
Reuters reported that the IAEA was conducting further investigation in Egypt.
Iran In 2003, the IAEA reported that Iran had been in breach of its obligations to comply with provisions of its safeguard agreement. In 2005, the
IAEA Board of Governors voted in a rare non-consensus decision to find Iran in non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to report that non-compliance to the
UN Security Council. In response, the UN Security Council passed a series of resolutions citing concerns about the program. Iran's representative to the UN argues sanctions compel Iran to abandon its rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to peaceful nuclear technology. Iran says its uranium enrichment program is exclusively for peaceful purposes and has enriched uranium to "less than 5 percent," consistent with fuel for a nuclear power plant and significantly below the purity of WEU (around 90%) typically used in a weapons program. The director general of the
International Atomic Energy Agency,
Yukiya Amano, said in 2009 he had not seen any evidence in IAEA official documents that Iran was developing nuclear weapons.
Iraq Up to the late 1980s it was generally assumed that any undeclared nuclear activities would have to be based on the diversion of nuclear material from safeguards. States acknowledged the possibility of nuclear activities entirely separate from those covered by safeguards, but it was assumed they would be detected by national intelligence activities. There was no particular effort by IAEA to attempt to detect them. Iraq had been making efforts to secure a nuclear potential since the 1960s. In the late 1970s a specialised plant,
Osiraq, was constructed near Baghdad. The plant was attacked during the
Iran–Iraq War and was
destroyed by Israeli bombers in June 1981. Not until the 1990 NPT Review Conference did some states raise the possibility of making more use of (for example) provisions for "special inspections" in existing NPT Safeguards Agreements. Special inspections can be undertaken at locations other than those where safeguards routinely apply, if there is reason to believe there may be undeclared material or activities. After inspections in Iraq following the UN
Gulf War cease-fire resolution showed the extent of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program, it became clear that the IAEA would have to broaden the scope of its activities. Iraq was an NPT Party, and had thus agreed to place all its nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. But the inspections revealed that it had been pursuing an extensive clandestine uranium enrichment programme, as well as a nuclear weapons design programme. The main thrust of Iraq's uranium enrichment program was the development of technology for
electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) of indigenous uranium. This uses the same principles as a
mass spectrometer (albeit on a much larger scale). Ions of
uranium-238 and
uranium-235 are separated because they describe arcs of different radii when they move through a magnetic field. This process was used in the
Manhattan Project to make the highly enriched uranium used in the
Hiroshima bomb, but was abandoned soon afterwards. The Iraqis did the basic research work at their nuclear research establishment at Tuwaitha, near
Baghdad, and were building two full-scale facilities at Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat, north of Baghdad. However, when the war broke out, only a few separators had been installed at Tarmiya, and none at Ash Sharqat. The Iraqis were also very interested in
centrifuge enrichment, and had been able to acquire some components including some carbon-fibre rotors, which they were at an early stage of testing. In May 1998,
Newsweek reported that
Abdul Qadeer Khan had sent Iraq centrifuge designs, which were apparently confiscated by the
UNMOVIC officials. Iraqi officials said "the documents were authentic but that they had not agreed to work with A. Q. Khan, fearing an
ISI sting operation, due to
strained relations between two countries. The
Government of Pakistan and A. Q. Khan strongly denied this allegation whilst the government declared the evidence to be "fraudulent". They were clearly in violation of their NPT and safeguards obligations, and the IAEA Board of Governors ruled to that effect. The
UN Security Council then ordered the IAEA to remove, destroy or render harmless Iraq's nuclear weapons capability. This was done by mid-1998, but Iraq then ceased all cooperation with the UN, so the IAEA withdrew from this work. The revelations from Iraq provided the impetus for a very far-reaching reconsideration of what safeguards are intended to achieve.
Libya Libya possesses ballistic missiles and previously pursued nuclear weapons
under the leadership of
Muammar Gaddafi. On 19 December 2003, Gaddafi announced that Libya would voluntarily eliminate all materials, equipment and programs that could lead to internationally proscribed weapons, including
weapons of mass destruction and
long-range ballistic missiles. Libya signed the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and ratified it in 1975, and concluded a safeguards agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1980. In March 2004, the IAEA Board of Governors welcomed Libya's decision to eliminate its formerly undeclared nuclear program, which it found had violated Libya's safeguards agreement, and approved Libya's Additional Protocol. The United States and the United Kingdom assisted Libya in removing equipment and material from its nuclear weapons program, with independent verification by the IAEA. In 2002, Myanmar had notified IAEA of its intention to pursue a civilian nuclear programme. Later, Russia announced that it would build a nuclear reactor in Myanmar. There have also been reports that two Pakistani scientists, from the AQ Khan stable, had been dispatched to Myanmar where they had settled down, to help Myanmar's project. Recently, the
David Albright-led
Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) rang alarm bells about Myanmar attempting a nuclear project with North Korean help. If true, the full weight of international pressure will be brought against Myanmar, said officials familiar with developments. But equally, the information that has been peddled by the defectors is also "preliminary" and could be used by the west to turn the screws on Myanmar—on democracy and human rights issues—in the run-up to the elections in the country in 2010. During an
ASEAN meeting in Thailand in July 2009, US secretary of state
Hillary Clinton highlighted concerns of the North Korean link. "We know there are also growing concerns about military cooperation between
North Korea and
Burma which we take very seriously," Clinton said. However, in 2012, after contact with the American president, Barack Obama, the Burmese leader, Thein Sein, renounced military ties with DPRK (North Korea).
North Korea The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) acceded to the NPT in 1985 as a condition for the supply of a nuclear power station by the
USSR. However, it delayed concluding its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, a process which should take only 18 months, until April 1992. During that period, it brought into operation a small gas-cooled, graphite-moderated, natural-uranium (metal) fuelled "Experimental Power Reactor" of about 25
MWt (5
MWe), based on the
UK Magnox design. While this was a well-suited design to start a wholly indigenous nuclear reactor development, it also exhibited all the features of a small plutonium production reactor for weapons purposes. North Korea also made substantial progress in the construction of two larger reactors designed on the same principles, a prototype of about 200 MWt (50 MWe), and a full-scale version of about 800 MWt (200 MWe). They made only slow progress; construction halted on both in 1994 and has not resumed. Both reactors have degraded considerably since that time and would take significant efforts to refurbish. In addition, it completed and commissioned a reprocessing plant that makes the Magnox
spent nuclear fuel safe, recovering
uranium and
plutonium. That plutonium, if the fuel was only irradiated to a very low burn-up, would have been in a form very suitable for weapons. Although all these facilities at the
Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center were to be under safeguards, there was always the risk that at some stage, the DPRK would withdraw from the NPT and use the plutonium for weapons. One of the first steps in applying NPT safeguards is for the IAEA to verify the initial stocks of uranium and plutonium to ensure that all the nuclear materials in the country have been declared for safeguards purposes. While undertaking this work in 1992, IAEA inspectors found discrepancies that indicated that the reprocessing plant had been used more often than the DPRK had declared, which suggested that the DPRK could have weapons-grade plutonium which it had not declared to the IAEA. Information passed to the IAEA by a Member State (as required by the IAEA) supported that suggestion by indicating that the DPRK had two undeclared waste or other storage sites. In February 1993 the IAEA called on the DPRK to allow special inspections of the two sites so that the initial stocks of nuclear material could be verified. The DPRK refused, and on 12 March announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT (three months' notice is required). In April 1993 the IAEA Board concluded that the DPRK was in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and reported the matter to the UN Security Council. In June 1993 the DPRK announced that it had "suspended" its withdrawal from the NPT, but subsequently claimed a "special status" with respect to its safeguards obligations. This was rejected by IAEA. Once the DPRK's non-compliance had been reported to the UN Security Council, the essential part of the IAEA's mission had been completed. Inspections in the DPRK continued, although inspectors were increasingly hampered in what they were permitted to do by the DPRK's claim of a "special status". However, some 8,000 corroding fuel rods associated with the experimental reactor have remained under close surveillance. Following bilateral negotiations between the United States and the DPRK, and the conclusion of the
Agreed Framework in October 1994, the IAEA has been given additional responsibilities. The agreement requires a freeze on the operation and construction of the DPRK's plutonium production reactors and their related facilities, and the IAEA is responsible for monitoring the freeze until the facilities are eventually dismantled. The DPRK remains uncooperative with the IAEA verification work and has yet to comply with its safeguards agreement. While Iraq was defeated in a war, allowing the UN the opportunity to seek out and destroy its nuclear weapons programme as part of the cease-fire conditions, the DPRK was not defeated, nor was it vulnerable to other measures, such as
trade sanctions. It can scarcely afford to import anything, and sanctions on vital commodities, such as oil, would either be ineffective or risk provoking war. Ultimately, the DPRK was persuaded to stop what appeared to be its nuclear weapons programme in exchange, under the agreed framework, for about US$5 billion in energy-related assistance. This included two 1000 MWe light-water nuclear power reactors based on an advanced U.S. System-80 design. In January 2003 the DPRK withdrew from the NPT. In response, a series of discussions among the DPRK, the United States, and China, a series of six-party talks (the parties being the DPRK, the ROK, China, Japan, the United States and Russia) were held in
Beijing; the first beginning in April 2004 concerning North Korea's weapons program. On 10 January 2005, North Korea declared that it was in the possession of nuclear weapons. On 19 September 2005, the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks ended with a joint statement in which North Korea agreed to end its nuclear programs and return to the NPT in exchange for diplomatic, energy and economic assistance. However, by the end of 2005 the DPRK had halted all six-party talks because the United States froze certain DPRK international financial assets such as those in a bank in Macau. On 9 October 2006, North Korea announced that it has performed its first-ever
nuclear weapon test. On 18 December 2006, the six-party talks finally resumed. On 13 February 2007, the parties announced "Initial Actions" to implement the 2005 joint statement including shutdown and disablement of North Korean nuclear facilities in exchange for energy assistance. Reacting to UN sanctions imposed after missile tests in April 2009, North Korea withdrew from the six-party talks, restarted its nuclear facilities and conducted a
second nuclear test on 25 May 2009. On 12 February 2013, North Korea conducted an
underground nuclear explosion with an estimated yield of 6 to 7 kilotonnes. The detonation registered a magnitude 4.9 disturbance in the area around the epicenter.
Russia Security of
nuclear weapons in Russia remains a matter of concern. According to high-ranking Russian
SVR defector
Tretyakov, he had a meeting with two Russian businessmen representing a state-created
C-W corporation in 1991. They came up with a project of destroying large quantities of chemical wastes collected from Western countries at the island of
Novaya Zemlya (a test place for Soviet nuclear weapons) using an underground nuclear blast. The project was rejected by Canadian representatives, but one of the businessmen told Tretyakov that he keeps his own nuclear bomb at his
dacha outside
Moscow. Tretyakov thought that man was insane, but the "businessmen" (
Vladimir K. Dmitriev) replied: "Do not be so naive. With economic conditions the way they are in Russia today, anyone with enough money can buy a nuclear bomb. It's no big deal really".
South Africa In 1991, South Africa acceded to the NPT, concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and submitted a report on its nuclear material subject to safeguards. At the time, the state had a nuclear power programme producing nearly 10% of the country's electricity, whereas Iraq and North Korea only had research reactors. The IAEA's initial verification task was complicated by South Africa's announcement that between 1979 and 1989 it built and then dismantled a number of nuclear weapons. South Africa asked the IAEA to verify the conclusion of its weapons programme. In 1995 the IAEA declared that it was satisfied all materials were accounted for and the weapons programme had been terminated and dismantled. South Africa has signed the NPT, and now holds the distinction of being the only known state to have indigenously produced nuclear weapons, and then verifiably dismantled them.
Sweden After World War II, Sweden considered building nuclear weapons to deter a Soviet invasion. From 1945 to 1972 the
Swedish government ran a clandestine nuclear weapons program under the guise of civilian defense research at the
Swedish National Defence Research Institute. By the late 1950s, the work had reached the point where underground testing was feasible. However, at that time the
Riksdag prohibited research and development of nuclear weapons, pledging that research should be done only for the purpose of defense against nuclear attack. The option to continue development was abandoned in 1966, and Sweden subsequently signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. The program was finally concluded in 1972.
Syria On 6 September 2007,
Israel bombed an officially unidentified site in Syria which it later asserted was a nuclear reactor under construction (
see Operation Outside the Box). The alleged reactor was not asserted to be operational and it was not asserted that nuclear material had been introduced into it. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei criticized the strikes and deplored that information regarding the matter had not been shared with his agency earlier.
Taiwan During the
Cold War, the United States deployed nuclear weapons at
Tainan Air Force Base of
Taiwan as part of the
United States Taiwan Defense Command. Nonetheless, Taiwan began its own nuclear weapon program under the auspices of the
Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER) at the
Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology since 1967. Taiwan was able to acquire nuclear technology from abroad (including a research reactor from
Canada and low-grade
plutonium from the United States), which were subject to
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, but which Taiwan used for its nuclear weapon program. In 1972, US president ordered to remove the nuclear weapons from Taiwan by 1974. Then recognized as the
Republic of China, Taiwan ratified the NPT in 1970. After the IAEA found evidences of Taiwan's efforts to produce the
weapons-grade plutonium, Taiwan agreed to dismantle its nuclear weapon program under U.S. pressure in September 1976. The nuclear reactor was shut down and the plutonium mostly returned to the U.S. However secret nuclear activities were exposed after the
Lieyu massacre by Colonel
Chang Hsien-yi, deputy director of INER, who defected to the U.S. in December 1987 and produced a cache of incriminating documents. This program was also halted under the U.S. pressure. ==Breakout capability==