The Abhidharma texts' field of inquiry extends to the entire
Buddhadharma, since their goal was to outline, systematize and analyze all of the teachings. Abhidharmic thought also extends beyond the sutras to cover new philosophical and psychological ground which is only implicit in sutras or not present at all. There are certain doctrines which were developed or even invented by the Abhidharmikas and these became grounds for the debates among the different
early Buddhist schools.
Dhamma theory The "base upon which the entire [Abhidhamma] system rests" is the 'dhamma theory' and this theory 'penetrated all the early schools'. For the Abhidharmikas, the ultimate components of existence, the elementary constituents of experience were called
dhammas (Pali:
dhammas). This concept has been variously translated as "factors" (Collett Cox), "psychic characteristics" (Bronkhorst), "phenomena" (Nyanaponika) and "psycho-physical events" (Ronkin). The
early Buddhist scriptures give various lists of the constituents of the person such as the five skandhas, the six or 18
dhatus, and the
twelve sense bases. In Abhidhamma literature, these lists of dhammas systematically arranged and they were seen as the ultimate entities or momentary events which make up the fabric of people's experience of reality. The idea was to create an exhaustive list of all possible phenomena that make up the world. The conventional reality of substantial objects and persons is merely a conceptual construct imputed by the mind on a flux of dhammas. However, dhammas are never seen as individually separate entities, but are always dependently conditioned by other dhammas in a stream of momentary constellations of dhammas, constantly coming into being and vanishing, always in flux. Perception and thinking is then seen as a combination of various dhammas. Cittas (awareness events) are never experienced on their own, but are always
intentional and hence accompanied by various mental factors (cetasikas), in a constantly flowing stream of experience occurrences. Human experience is thus explained by a series of dynamic processes and their patterns of relationships with each other. Buddhist Abhidhamma philosophers then sought to explain all experience by creating lists and matrices (matikas) of these dhammas, which varied by school. The four categories of dhammas in the Theravada Abhidhamma are: •
Citta (
Mind, Consciousness, awareness) •
Cetasika (
mental factors, mental events, associated mentality), there are 52 types •
Rūpa — (
physical occurrences, material form), 28 types •
Nibbāna — (
Extinction, cessation). This dhamma is unconditioned For the Abhidharmikas,
truth was twofold and there are two ways of looking at reality. One way is the way of everyday experience and of normal worldly persons. This is the category of the nominal and the conceptual (paññatti), and is termed the conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya). However, the way of the Abhidharma, and hence the way of enlightened persons like the Buddha, who have developed the true insight (
vipassana), sees reality as the constant stream of collections of dharmas, and this way of seeing the world is ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). As the Indian Buddhist
Vasubandhu writes: "Anything the idea of which does not occur upon division or upon mental analysis, such as an object like a pot, that is a 'conceptual fiction'. The ultimately real is otherwise." For Vasubandhu then, something is not the ultimately real if it 'disappears under analysis', but is merely conventional. The ultimate goal of the Abhidharma is
Nirvana and hence the Abhidharmikas systematized dhammas into those which are skillful (kusala), purify the mind and lead to liberation, and those which are unskillful and do not. The Abhidharma then has a soteriological purpose, first and foremost and its goal is to support Buddhist practice and meditation. By carefully watching the coming and going of dhammas, and being able to identify which ones are wholesome and to be cultivated, and which ones are unwholesome and to be abandoned, the Buddhist meditator makes use of the Abhidharma as a schema to liberate his mind and realize that all experiences are impermanent, not-self, unsatisfactory and therefore not to be clung to.
Svabhāva The Abhidharmikas often used the term
svabhāva (Pali: sabhāva) to explain the causal workings of dharmas. This term was used in different ways by the different Buddhist schools. This term does not appear in the sutras. The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya states: “dharma means ‘upholding,’ [namely], upholding intrinsic nature (svabhāva)” while the Theravādin commentaries holds that: “dhammas are so called because they bear their intrinsic natures, or because they are borne by causal conditions.” According to Peter Harvey, the Theravadin view of dharmas was that "'They are dhammas because they uphold their own nature [sabhaava]. They are dhammas because they are upheld by conditions or they are upheld according to their own nature' (Asl.39). Here 'own-nature' would mean characteristic nature, which is not something inherent in a dhamma as a separate ultimate reality, but arise due to the supporting conditions both of other dhammas and previous occurrences of that dhamma." The
Visuddhimagga of
Buddhaghosa, the most influential classical Theravada treatise, states that not-self does not become apparent because it is concealed by "compactness" when one does not give attention to the various elements which make up the person. The
Paramatthamañjusa Visuddhimaggatika of
Acariya Dhammapala, a later Theravada commentary on the
Visuddhimagga, refers to the fact that we often assume unity and compactness in phenomena and functions which are instead made up of various elements, but when one sees that these are merely empty dhammas, one can understand the not-self characteristic:"when they are seen after resolving them by means of knowledge into these elements, they disintegrate like froth subjected to compression by the hand. They are mere states (
dhamma) occurring due to conditions and void. In this way the characteristic of not-self becomes more evident." However, the Sarvastivadins did not hold that dharmas were completely independent of each other, as the
Mahavibhasa states: "conditioned dharmas are weak in their intrinsic nature, they can accomplish their activities only through mutual dependence" and "they have no sovereignty (aisvarya). They are dependent on others." Svabhava in the early Abhidhamma texts was then not a term which meant ontological independence, metaphysical essence or underlying substance, but simply referred to their characteristics, which are dependent on other conditions and qualities. According to Ronkin: "In the early Sarvāstivāda exegetical texts, then, svabhāva is used as an atemporal, invariable criterion determining what a dharma is, not necessarily that a dharma exists. The concern here is primarily with what makes categorial types of dharma unique, rather than with the ontological status of dharmas." The Buddhist philosopher
Dharmakirti uses the concept of svabhāva, though he interprets it as being based on causal powers. For Dharmakirti, the essential nature (or ‘nature-svabhāva’) is:“The arising of an effect that is inferred by way of a causal complex is characterized as a svabhāva of that causal complex, because [the capacity for] the effect’s production does not depend on anything else.” Other
early Buddhist schools did not accept the svabhava concept, instead positing a kind of
nominalism or
conceptualism (
prajñaptivada). This view was widespread among the
Mahasamghika Nikaya. One school was even called "
Prajñaptivada" because of their denial of the ultimate reality of all dharmas and their view that all dharmas are characterized by
prajñapti (provisional designation or fictitious construction). Another school called the Vainasikas also held that all dharmas were without svabhava. According to
Paramārtha (499–569), another school, the
Ekavyavahārikas held "that both the mundane and the supramundane factors [dharmas] are merely nominal (
prajñapti). They therefore claimed that all factors have no real essence, and that hence the same name applies to all [dharmas]." This helps to explain their name as “Ekavyavahārika” (those who propound the single meaning). Paramārtha also notes that the
Lokottaravāda school held "that the mundane factors have arisen from perversion (viparyāsa) and are only nominal (prajñapti)." However, in contrast to the other schools, they also held that the supramundane dharmas (nirvana etc.) were not nominal but real.
Causality and dependent origination Another important project for the Abhidharmikas was to outline a theory of
causality, especially of how momentary dharmas relate to each other through causes and conditions. The Sarvastivadin analysis focused on six causes (
hetu), four conditions (
pratyaya) and five effects (
phala). According to
K.L. Dhammajoti, for the Sarvastivada school, 'causal efficacy is the central criterion for the reality/existence (astitva) of a dharma' and hence they were also sometimes called the 'Hetuvada' school. A dharma is real because it is a cause and it has effects, if it had no causal efficacy, it would not exist. The six causes outlined by the Sarvastivada are: • Efficient cause (karana-hetu) – dharma A, causes dharma B • Homogeneous cause (sabhäga-hetu) – dharma A(1) causes another dharma A(2) • Universal cause (sarvatraga-hetu) – a homogeneous cause, pertaining only to defiled dharmas • Retribution cause (vipäka-hetu) – leads to karmic retribution • Co-existent cause (sahabhu-hetu) – a cause which arises from the mutuality of all dharmas, a 'simultaneous causality.' • Conjoined cause (samprayuktaka-hetu) In the
Mahavibhasa treatment of dependent origination, four different types are outlined: •
Momentary (ksanika) causation, as when all twelve moments of the chain are realized in a single moment of action •
Serial (sambandhika) causation, in which dependent origination is viewed in reference to the relationship between cause and effect •
Static (avasthika) causation, in which dependent origination involves twelve distinct periods of the five aggregates •
Prolonged (prakarsika) causation, in which that sequence of causation occurs over three lifetimes The Sarvastivada Vibhasa-sastrins accepted only static dependent origination The
Sautrāntika school used a theory of 'seeds' (
bīja) in the mental continuum to explain causal interaction between past and present dharmas, this theory was later developed by the
Yogacara school in their theory of “storehouse consciousness” (ālayavijñāna).
Temporality A prominent argument between the Abhidharmikas was on the
Philosophy of time. The
Sarvāstivādin tradition held the view (expressed in the Vijñanakaya) that dharmas exist in all three times – past, present, future; hence the name of their school means "theory of all exists". The
Sautrāntika,
Vibhajyavāda and Theravada schools argued against this
eternalist view in favor of
presentism (only the present moment exists). This argument was so central, that north Indian Buddhist schools were often named according to their philosophical position. According to
Vasubandhu: "Those who hold 'all exists' — the past, the present and the future — belong to the Sarvāstivāda. Those, on the other hand, who hold that some exist, viz., the present and the past karma that has not given fruit but not those that have given fruit or the future, are followers of the Vibhajyaväda." This concept is similar to the
Yogacara doctrine of the storehouse consciousness (alayavijnana), which was later associated with the
Buddha nature doctrine. This problem was also taken up by a group of Buddhist schools termed the
Pudgalavadins or "Personalists" which included the Vātsīputrīya, the Dharmottarīya, the Bhadrayānīya, the
Sammitiya and the Shannagarika. These schools posited the existence of a 'person' (pudgala) or self, which had a real existence that was not reducible to streams and collections of dharmas. They also often used other terms to refer to this real 'self', such as '
Atman' and '
Jiva' which are words for the immortal soul in Hinduism and Jainism respectively.
Atomism Some Abhidharmikas such as the Sarvastivadins also defended an
atomic theory. However unlike the Hindu
Vaisheshika school, Abhidharmic atoms (paramannu) are not permanent, but momentary. The Vaibhasika held that an atom is the smallest analyzable unit of matter (rupa), hence it is a 'conceptual atom' (prajnapti-paramanu), though this also corresponds to a real existing thing. The Mahabhivasa states: "An atom (paramänu) is the smallest rüpa. It cannot be cut, broken, penetrated; it cannot be taken up, abandoned, ridden on, stepped on, struck or dragged. It is neither long nor short, square nor round, regular nor irregular, convex nor concave. It has no smaller parts; it cannot be decomposed, cannot be seen, heard, smelled, touched. It is thus that the paramänu is said to be the finest (sarva-süksma) of all rüpas." ==Theravāda Abhidhamma==