In
monarchies with either an
uncodified or partly unwritten constitution (such as the
United Kingdom or
Canada) or a wholly written constitution that consists of a text augmented by additional conventions, traditions,
letters patent, etc., the monarch generally possesses reserve powers. Typically these powers are: to grant
pardon; to dismiss a
prime minister; to refuse to
dissolve parliament; and to refuse or delay
royal assent to legislation (to
withhold royal assent amounts to a
veto of a bill, while to
reserve royal assent, in effect, amounts to neither granting nor refusing assent, but to delay making a decision for an undetermined period). There are usually strict constitutional conventions concerning when these powers may be used, and these conventions are enforced by public pressure. Using these powers in contravention of tradition would generally provoke a
constitutional crisis. Most constitutional monarchies employ a system that includes the principle of
responsible government. In such an order, the reserve powers are thought to be the means by which the monarch and his or her
viceregal representatives can legitimately exist as "constitutional guardians" or "umpires", tasked with guaranteeing that
Cabinet and parliament adhere to the fundamental constitutional principles of the
rule of law and responsible government itself. Some constitutional scholars, such as
George Winterton, have stated that reserve powers are a good thing in that they allow for a head of state to handle an unforeseen crisis and that the use of convention to limit the use of reserve powers allows for more gradual and subtle constitutional evolution than is possible through formal amendment of a written constitution. Others, such as
Herbert Evatt, believe or believed that reserve powers are vestigial and potentially open to abuse. Evatt felt that the reserve powers could be codified and still serve their intended function in a responsible government system, there was speculation on the potential exercise of viceregal reserve power by Campbell, in dismissing the premier in the absence of a parliamentary
motion of no confidence. Ultimately, Campbell was praised for his handling of the undesirable situation. These are among several exercises of the reserve powers in Australia in the 20th century at both state and federal levels.
Canada The reserve powers in Canada fall within the
royal prerogative and belong specifically to
the monarch, as the
Constitution Act, 1867, vests all executive power in the country's sovereign. King
George VI in 1947 issued
Letters Patent permitting the
governor general "to exercise all powers and authorities lawfully belonging to Us [the monarch] in respect of Canada." The reserve power of dismissal has never been used in Canada, although other reserve powers have been employed to force the
prime minister to resign on two occasions: The first took place in 1896, when the Prime Minister, Sir
Charles Tupper, refused to step down after his party did not win a majority in the
House of Commons during
that year's election, leading Governor General
the Earl of Aberdeen to no longer recognize Tupper as prime minister and disapprove of several appointments Tupper had recommended. On the second occasion in 1925, which came to be known as the
King–Byng affair, Prime Minister
William Lyon Mackenzie King, facing a
non-confidence motion in the House of Commons,
advised the Governor General,
the Viscount Byng of Vimy, to
dissolve the new parliament, but Byng refused. At the provincial level, on 29 June 2017
Lieutenant Governor of
British Columbia Judith Guichon used her reserve powers to deny the request of Premier
Christy Clark to dissolve the legislature and call a new election only 51 days after the recent provincial election. Clark had advised Guichon to dissolve the legislature as, in her view, the appointment of a Speaker would have resulted in frequent tie votes and an untenable position. Guichon refused this advice and instead asked
John Horgan to form a government, becoming the new premier. No modern governor general has
disallowed a bill, though
provincial lieutenant governors have.
Peter Hogg, a constitutional scholar, has opined that "a system of
responsible government cannot work without a formal head of state who is possessed of certain reserve powers." Further,
Eugene Forsey stated "the reserve power is indeed, under our Constitution, an absolutely essential safeguard of democracy. It takes the place of the legal and judicial safeguards provided in the United States by written Constitutions, enforceable in the courts."
New Zealand New Zealand's early governors, the predecessors of today's
governors-general, exercised considerable power, with exclusive authority over some matters such as foreign and
Māori affairs. They also had a real choice in selecting premiers – parliaments of the period being composed of independent members who formed loose and shifting factions – and were not always obliged to act on the advice of their ministers. As New Zealand's political system matured, the
Colonial Office increasingly instructed the governors to follow the advice of local ministers, and the powers of the office have continually shrunk. Important remnants of these early powers remain. The governor-general has a number of reserve powers, which may be used on behalf of King
Charles III. Sir
Kenneth Keith describes the use of these powers as based on the principle that "The
Queen reigns, but the government rules, so long as it has the support of the House of Representatives". The most visible reserve powers are the power to appoint a
prime minister and the related power to accept a prime minister's resignation. This power is exercised every time a general election results in a change of government, most recently
in 2023. It may also be exercised if a prime minister
loses the confidence of Parliament and resigns instead of advising a dissolution of Parliament; the last such occasion was
in 1911. Finally, it may happen if a Prime Minister is maneuvered out of their position by their own party, retires or resigns for personal reasons, or dies in office. Though the power of appointment is listed among the reserve powers, in fact the governor-general abides by strict conventions, and has always appointed the leader of the dominant faction in the
House of Representatives. The governor-general retains the theoretical power to appoint as prime minister a member of the House of Representatives who clearly does not have the support of a majority of MPs, but no governor-general has sought to use this power since New Zealand gained
responsible government, though some cabinets in the 19th century proved extremely short-lived. In earlier times, if a prime minister died, became incapacitated, or resigned unexpectedly, a governor-general might be able to choose a temporary prime minister from among several senior ministers, while the governing party decided on a new leader who would then be duly appointed prime minister. Today, however, the practice of appointing – on prime-ministerial advice – a permanent deputy prime minister, who becomes acting prime minister when needed, has largely removed even this discretion from the governor-general. The governor-general has a number of other legal powers. They may dismiss an incumbent prime minister and
Cabinet, an individual
minister, or any other official who holds office "during the
King's pleasure" or "during the Governor-General's pleasure". Others, such as Professor Philip Joseph, believe the Governor-General does retain the power to refuse royal assent to Bills in exceptional circumstances - such as the abolition of democracy. A similar controversial power is the ability to refuse to make Orders and regulations advised by the Government or by individual Ministers. There have been a handful of occasions when reserve powers were used, or at least considered. In the 1890s, Premier
John Ballance advised the Governor to make several new appointments to the (since abolished)
Legislative Council. Two successive Governors,
the Earl of Onslow and
the Earl of Glasgow, refused to make the appointments, until the Colonial Office intervened in Ballance's favour. This incident markedly reduced the discretionary powers of the Governor. Though these remained the same in law for the time being, later Governors and governments considered that there would be far fewer scenarios in which their use would be appropriate. Almost a century later, in 1984, there was a brief
constitutional crisis. The outgoing Prime Minister, Sir
Rob Muldoon, had just lost an election, but refused to advise the Governor-General,
Sir David Beattie, to make urgent regulations desired not only by the incoming Prime Minister,
David Lange, but also by many in Muldoon's own party and cabinet. At the time, the option of Beattie dismissing Muldoon and replacing him, without waiting for Muldoon's resignation, was reportedly discussed. Muldoon eventually relented under pressure from his own cabinet, making the use of Beattie's reserve powers unnecessary.
Saint Kitts and Nevis A constitutional crisis occurred in
Saint Kitts and Nevis in 1981, when the
governor, Sir
Probyn Inniss, used his reserve powers to refuse assent to a bill passed by the government of Sir
Kennedy Simmonds, the country's
premier. Inniss believed that the bill was unconstitutional, and would soon be struck down by the
West Indies Associated States Supreme Court. The situation was resolved when Queen Elizabeth II, at the request of Simmonds, terminated Inniss's commission as governor.
Tuvalu The
Constitution of Tuvalu provides, in article 52, that the
Governor-General exercises his powers "only in accordance with the advice of (a) the Cabinet; or (b) the Prime Minister [...] except where he is required to act (c) in accordance with the advice of any other person or authority [...] or (e) in his own deliberate judgment (in which case he shall exercise an independent discretion)". In 2013, Governor-General Sir
Iakoba Italeli was requested by the Opposition to act without (and indeed against) the Prime Minister's advice. On 28 June, Prime Minister
Willy Telavi's government had lost
a crucial by-election, which gave the Opposition a majority of one in Parliament. The Opposition immediately called for the government to reconvene Parliament, so that a
motion of no confidence could be introduced, and a new government formed. Prime Minister Telavi responded that, under the Constitution, he was only required to convene Parliament once a year (for a vote on the budget), and was thus under no obligation to summon it until December. The Opposition turned to the Governor-General. On 3 July, Italeli exercised his reserve powers in ordering Parliament to convene, against the Prime Minister's wishes, on 30 July. In the end, the Governor-General dismissed the Prime Minister from office.
United Kingdom In the United Kingdom, the monarch has numerous theoretical
personal prerogatives, but beyond the appointment of a prime minister, there are in practice few circumstances in modern British government where these prerogatives could be justifiably exercised; they have rarely been exercised in the last century. In October 2003 the Government made public the following prerogatives but it said at the time that a comprehensive catalogue of prerogative powers could not be supplied: • To refuse to dissolve Parliament when requested by the prime minister. This was last reputedly considered in 1910, but
George V later changed his mind. Harold Wilson, leading a minority government in 1974, was told that
Elizabeth II might refuse to dissolve Parliament if she could identify an alternative prime minister able to command a cross-party majority. See
Lascelles Principles. • To appoint a prime minister of their own choosing. This was last done in Britain in 1963 when
Elizabeth II appointed
Alec Douglas-Home as prime minister, on the advice of outgoing
Harold Macmillan. • To dismiss a prime minister and their government on the monarch's own authority. This was last done in Britain in 1834 by
King William IV. • To summon and prorogue Parliament. • To command the
armed forces. • To dismiss and appoint ministers. • To commission officers in the armed forces. • To appoint
King's Counsel. • To issue and withdraw passports. • To create corporations via
royal charter. • To appoint
bishops and archbishops of the
Church of England. • To grant honours. • To grant the
prerogative of mercy. • To delay a bill's assent through the use of his or her reserve powers in near-revolutionary situations, thereby vetoing the bill. • To refuse royal assent of a parliamentary bill on the advice of ministers. This was last done by
Queen Anne when she withheld royal assent from
Scottish Militia Bill 1708. • To declare war and peace. • To deploy the armed forces overseas. • To ratify and make treaties. • To refuse the "
King's Consent", where direct monarchical assent is required for a bill affecting, directly or by implication, the prerogative, hereditary revenues—including
ultimus haeres,
treasure trove, and
bona vacantia—or the personal property or interests of the Crown to be heard in Parliament. In 1999,
Queen Elizabeth II, acting on the advice of the government, refused to signify her consent to the
Military Action Against Iraq (Parliamentary Approval) Bill, which sought to transfer from the monarch to Parliament the power to authorise military strikes against
Iraq. These powers could be exercised in an emergency such as a
constitutional crisis (such as surrounded the
People's Budget of 1909) or in wartime. They would also be very relevant in the event of a
hung parliament. For example, in the hung parliament in 1974, Prime Minister
Edward Heath attempted to remain in power but was unable to form a
working majority. The Queen then asked
Harold Wilson, leader of the
Labour Party, which had the largest number of seats in the Commons but not an overall majority, to attempt to form a government. Subsequently, Wilson asked that if the government were defeated on the floor of the House of Commons, the Queen would grant a dissolution, which she agreed to.
Japan Unlike most other constitutional monarchs, the
Emperor of Japan has no reserve powers. Following
Japan's defeat in
World War II, the Emperor's role is defined in Chapter I of the 1947
Constitution of Japan, as decided by
foreign powers that had defeated the country. It states that sovereignty rests with the Japanese citizenry, not the Emperor who is merely the symbol of the State and the unity of the people.
Malaysia The
Yang di-Pertuan Agong (the elective, supreme federal ruler, commonly glossed as “King”) has no reserve powers. Article 40 of the
Malaysian constitution specifies only three powers of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong: to reject a request to dissolve
Parliament; to convene a meeting of the
Conference of Rulers; and to appoint the
Prime Minister, whom he has no power to dismiss.
Spain The
Spanish Constitution of 1978 does not specifically grant
emergency powers to the government, though does state in Article 56 that the
monarch "arbitrates and moderates the regular functioning of the institutions", and invests the monarch with the responsibility of overseeing that the forms of the constitution are observed. It is through this constitutional language that wider "reserve powers" are granted to the monarch. It is through this clause and his position as commander-in-chief of the
Spanish Armed Forces that
King Juan Carlos I undermined the attempted
23-F military
coup in 1981. Title II, Articles 56
The King is Head of State, the symbol of its unity and permanence. He arbitrates and moderates the regular functioning of the institutions, assumes the highest representation of the Spanish State in international relations, especially with the nations of its historical community, and exercises the functions expressly conferred on him by the Constitution and the laws. Title VI
Judicial Power, Article 117, Articles 122 through 124, outlines the monarch's role in the country's independent
judiciary. However, by
constitutional convention established by Juan Carlos I, the monarch exercises prerogatives after having solicited government advice, while remaining politically
non-partisan and independent. Receiving government advice does not necessarily bind the monarch into executing said advice, except where prescribed by the Constitution.
It is incumbent upon the King: •
a. To Sanction and promulgate the laws •
b. To summon and dissolve the Cortes Generales and to call for elections under the terms provided for in the Constitution. •
c. To Call for a referendum in the cases provided for in the Constitution. • ''e. To appoint and dismiss members of the
Government on the
President of the Government's proposal.'' •
f. To issue the decrees approved in the Council of Ministers, to confer civil and military honours and distinctions in conformity with the law. • ''g. To be informed of the affairs of State and, for this purpose, to preside over the meetings of the Council of Ministers whenever, he sees fit, at the President of the Government's request.'' •
h. To exercise supreme command of the Armed Forces •
i. To exercise the right of clemency in accordance with the law, which may not authorize general pardons. •
j. To exercise the High Patronage of the Royal Academies. the monarch is not subject to any responsibility but for his acts to be valid must be endorsed by the Government and will not be valid without such an endorsement. The only exception is that the monarch is free to appoint and remove the members of private and military advisors (
Casa Real). Title IV of the Constitution invests the monarch with sanction (
Royal Assent) and promulgation (publication) of laws, while Title III
The Cortes Generals, Chapter 2
Drafting of Bills outlines the method by which bills are passed. According to Article 91, within fifteen days that a bill has been passed by the Cortes Generales, the monarch shall give assent and publish the new law. Article 92 invests the monarch with the right to call for a referendum on the advice of the president and the previous authorization of Congress. No provision within the Constitution invests the monarch with the ability to veto legislation directly, however no provision forbids the denial of royal assent – effectively, a veto. When the media asked King
Juan Carlos I if he would endorse the bill legalizing
same-sex marriages, he answered "
Soy el Rey de España y no el de Bélgica" ("I am the King of Spain, and not that of Belgium") in reference to King
Baudouin of Belgium who in 1990 had refused to grant express assent to a Belgian bill legalising
abortion (though allowing it to become law through a legal loophole). The King gave his royal assent to Law 13/2005 on 1 July 2005; the law was
gazetted in the
Boletín Oficial del Estado on 2 July, and came into effect on 3 July 2005.
Sweden Much like the Emperor of Japan, the
King of Sweden does not have any constitutional responsibility for the governance of the Realm, with strictly ceremonial and representative functions remaining. Under the
1974 Instrument of Government, the supreme executive authority is the
Government (composed of the
Prime Minister and other cabinet ministers), which is responsible to the
Riksdag. The King, however, is not subordinate to the Government and thus could play an independent role as moral authority, but the prevailing convention, expressed in the preparatory works of the 1974 Instrument of Government, is that the King should stay away from anything which could reasonably be interpreted as
partisan politics or criticism of the Government in office. == Republics ==