Sudanese civil war (2023–present)

Since Sudan gained independence in 1956, the country has experienced 20 military coup attempts. Sudan has usually been ruled by the military, interspersed with short periods of democratic parliamentary rule. Two civil wars—1955–1972 and 1983–2005—between the central government and the southern regions, killed 1.5 million people and ultimately led to the independence of South Sudan in 2011. Separately, the conflict in the western region of Darfur displaced two million people and killed more than 200,000. War in Darfur and the formation of the RSF By the turn of the 21st century, Sudan's western Darfur region had endured prolonged instability and social strife due to ethnic tensions and disputes over land and water. In 2003, this situation erupted into a full-scale rebellion against government rule, against which president and military strongman Omar al-Bashir vowed to use forceful action. The resulting War in Darfur was marked by widespread state-sponsored acts of violence, leading to charges of war crimes and genocide against al-Bashir. The initial phase of the conflict left approximately 300,000 dead and 2.7million forcibly displaced; even though the intensity of the violence later declined, the situation in the region remained far from peaceful. To crush uprisings by non-Arab tribes in the Nuba Mountains, al-Bashir relied upon the Janjaweed, a collection of Baggara Arab militias that were drawn from camel-trading tribes which were active in Darfur and portions of Chad. In 2013, al-Bashir announced that the Janjaweed would be reorganised as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and he also announced that the RSF would be placed under the command of the Janjaweed's commander General Hemedti. The RSF perpetrated mass killings, mass rapes, pillage, torture, and destruction of villages. They were accused of committing ethnic cleansing against the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa peoples. but Hemedti was not personally implicated in the 2003–2004 atrocities. These developments ensured that RSF forces grew into the tens of thousands and came to possess thousands of armed pickup trucks which regularly patrolled the streets of Khartoum. Political transition In December 2018, protests against al-Bashir's regime began, starting the first phase of the Sudanese revolution. Eight months of sustained civil disobedience were met with violent repression. In April 2019, the military (including the RSF) ousted al-Bashir in a coup d'état, ending his three decades of rule; the military established the Transitional Military Council, a junta. Protests calling for civilian rule continued; in June 2019, the TMC's security forces, which included both the RSF and the SAF, perpetrated the Khartoum massacre, in which more than a hundred demonstrators were killed Origins of the SPLM–N and the SLM The Sudan Liberation Movement (or Army; SLM, SLA, or SLM/A) is a rebel group active in the region of Darfur, primarily composed of members of non-Arab ethnicities and established in response to their marginalization by the Bashir regime. Since 2006, the movement has split into several factions due to disagreements over the Darfur Peace Agreement, with some factions joining the government in Khartoum. By 2023, the three most prominent factions were the SLM-Minnawi under Minni Minnawi, the SLM-al-Nur under Abdul Wahid al-Nur, and the SLM-Tambour under Mustafa Tambour. The SLM-Minnawi and SLM-Tambour signed the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement, but the SLM-al-Nur refused to sign and kept fighting. The SPLM–N was founded by units of the predominantly South Sudanese Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army stationed in areas that remained in Sudan following the South Sudanese vote for independence in 2011. These forces then led a rebellion in the southern states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile a few months later. In 2017, the SPLM–N split between a faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu and one led by Malik Agar, with al-Hilu demanding secularism as a condition for peace, whereas Agar did not agree with this. During the Sudanese revolution, al-Hilu's faction declared an indefinite unilateral ceasefire. In 2020, a peace agreement was signed between the Sudanese government and Agar's faction, Further steps to consolidate the agreement stalled following the 2021 coup, and the al-Hilu faction instead signed an agreement with the SLM-al-Nur and the Sudanese Communist Party, agreeing to co-operate to draft a 'revolutionary charter' and remove the military from power. Prelude In the months following the 2021 coup, the already weak Sudanese economy steeply declined, fueling wide protests demanding that the junta return power to civilian authorities. Hemedti's expression of regret over the October 2021 coup signalled a widening divide between him and al-Burhan. As part of this deal negotiations were conducted between the SAF, RSF, and civilian leaders, but these negotiations were delayed and halted by political disagreements. Chief among the disputes was the integration of the RSF into the military: the RSF insisted on a 10-year timetable for its integration into the regular army, while the army demanded integration within two years. Other contested issues included the status given to RSF officers in the future hierarchy, and whether RSF forces should be under the command of the army chief rather than Sudan's commander-in-chief, al-Burhan. On 11 April 2023, RSF forces deployed near the city of Merowe as well as in Khartoum. Government forces ordered them to leave and were refused. This led to clashes when RSF forces took control of the Soba military base south of Khartoum. == Course of the war ==

April–May 2023 Battle of Khartoum On 15 April 2023, the RSF attacked SAF bases across Sudan, including Khartoum and its airport. There were clashes at the headquarters of the state broadcaster, Sudan TV, which was later captured by RSF forces. The next day saw a SAF counteroffensive, with the Sudanese Army retaking Merowe Airport alongside the headquarters of Sudan TV and the state radio. The Sudan Civil Aviation Authority closed the country's airspace as fighting began. Telecommunications provider MTN shut down Internet services, and by 23 April there was a near-total Internet outage attributed to attacks on the electricity grid. Sudanese international trade began to break down, with Maersk, one of the largest shipping companies in the world, announcing a pause on new shipments to the country. became de facto leader of the Sudanese government.|alt=A photo of Malik Agar wearing a pink collared shirt. He is smiling at the camera. Hemedti directed his forces to capture or kill al-Burhan, and RSF units engaged in pitched and bloody combat with the Republican Guard. Ultimately al-Burhan managed to evade capture or assassination, but his base at the Sudanese Armed Forces Headquarters was placed under RSF siege, rendering him unable to leave Khartoum. In an interview with Al Jazeera, Hemedti accused al-Burhan and his commanders of forcing the RSF to start the war by scheming to bring deposed leader Omar al-Bashir back to power. Following the first few days of war the SAF brought in reinforcements from the Ethiopian border. Although a ceasefire was announced for Eid al-Fitr, fighting continued across the country. Combat was described as particularly intense along the highway from Khartoum to Port Sudan and in the industrial zone of al-Bagair. Intercommunal clashes were reported in Blue Nile State and in Geneina. By the beginning of May the SAF claimed to have weakened the RSF's combat capabilities and repelled its advances in multiple regions. The Sudanese police deployed its Central Reserve Forces in the streets of Khartoum in support of the SAF, claiming to have arrested several hundred RSF fighters. The SAF announced it was launching an all-out attack on RSF in Khartoum using air strikes and artillery. Air strikes and ground offensives against the RSF over the next few days caused significant damage to infrastructure, but failed to dislodge RSF forces from their positions. Following further threats to his life from Hemedti, al-Burhan gave a public video address from his besieged base at the Army Headquarters, vowing to continue fighting. On 19 May, al-Burhan officially removed Hemedti as his deputy in the Transitional Sovereignty Council and replaced him with former rebel leader and council member Malik Agar. With al-Burhan trapped in Khartoum, Agar became de facto leader of the Sudanese government, assuming responsibility for peace negotiations, international visits and the day-to-day running of the country. On 6 May, delegates from the SAF and the RSF met directly for the first time in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for what was described by Saudi Arabia and the United States as "pre-negotiation talks". After diplomatic lobbying from the Saudis and Americans the warring sides signed the Treaty of Jeddah on 20 May, vowing to ensure the safe passage of civilians, protect relief workers, and prohibit the use of civilians as human shields. The agreement did not include a ceasefire, and clashes resumed in Geneina, causing more casualties. The situation remained volatile, with both sides trading blame for attacks on churches, hospitals, and embassies. Casualties mounted, particularly in Geneina, where Arab militias loyal to the RSF were accused of atrocities against non-Arab residents. A temporary ceasefire was signed and faced challenges as fighting persisted in Khartoum, and the agreed-upon ceasefire time saw further violence. Between 28 and 97 people were reportedly killed by the RSF and Arab militias when they attacked the predominantly Masalit town of Misterei in West Darfur on 28 May. June–September 2023 in June. Continued fighting in Khartoum As June began, Khartoum witnessed tank battles resulting in casualties. The RSF took control of several important cultural and government buildings, including the National Museum of Sudan and the Yarmouk Military Industrial Complex. Acute food insecurity affected a significant portion of Sudan's population. By July, al-Burhan was still trapped at the Army Headquarters and unable to leave, and to break him out the SAF elected to send a column of troops to lift the siege of the base. This force was ambushed by the RSF and defeated, with the paramilitary claiming it had killed hundreds of soldiers and captured 90 vehicles, along with the column's commander. In response to the escalating violence in Khartoum, the SAF increased the intensity of their airstrikes and artillery bombardment, leading to heightened civilian casualties often numbering in the dozens per strike. Shelling by the RSF also increased in intensity, leading to many civilian casualties in turn. Heavy fighting continued in Khartoum throughout August, with clashes breaking out across the city. The RSF laid siege to the SAF's Armoured Corps base, breaching its defences and taking control of surrounding neighbourhoods. The SAF also made offensives, with the RSF-controlled Republican Palace and Yarmouk Complex coming under SAF air bombardment. An offensive was launched against Yarmouk, but this was beaten back after the RSF shipped in reinforcements. One of the few remaining bridges between Khartoum and Khartoum North was also destroyed by the SAF, in an attempt to deny the RSF freedom of movement. On 24 August an SAF operation successfully rescued al-Burhan from his besieged base at the Army Headquarters, allowing him to head to Port Sudan and hold a cabinet meeting there. Diplomatic efforts Ceasefires between the warring parties were announced but often violated, leading to further clashes. The SAF and RSF engaged in mutual blame for incidents, while the Sudanese government took action against international envoys. The Saudi embassy in Khartoum was attacked and evacuations from an orphanage were carried out amid the chaos. Amidst the turmoil, Sudan faced diplomatic strains with Egypt, leading to challenges for Sudanese refugees seeking entry. With al-Burhan out of Khartoum for the first time since the start of the war, he was able to fly to Egypt and hold a meeting with the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Following this visit al-Burhan went on a tour of numerous countries, heading to South Sudan, Qatar, Eritrea, Turkey, and Uganda. He then proceeded to New York City as head of the Sudanese delegation to the 78th United Nations General Assembly, where he urged the international community to declare the RSF a terrorist organization. SPLM–N (Al-Hilu) involvement The Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement–North (SPLM–N) broke a long-standing ceasefire agreement in June, attacking SAF units in Kadugli, Kurmuk and Dalang, the latter coinciding with an attack by the RSF. The SAF claimed to have repelled the attacks, while the rebels claimed to have attacked in retaliation for the death of one of their soldiers at the hands of the SAF and vowed to free the region from "military occupation". Civil society organizations supporting the SPLM–N claimed its operations sought to protect civilians from possible attacks by the RSF. Al-Hilu's faction launched further offensives in July, moving into South Kordofan and gaining control of several SAF bases. In response the SAF brought in artillery and heavily bombarded SPLM–N positions. In February 2025, the SPLM–N (Al-Hilu) signed the Sudan Founding Charter drafted by the RSF-led Government of Peace and Unity, officially allying itself with the RSF. Darfur front In Darfur, fighting and bloodshed were particularly fierce around the city of Geneina, where hundreds died and extensive destruction occurred. RSF forces engaged in frequent acts of violence against the Masalit population of Geneina, leading to accusations of ethnic cleansing. On 4 August the RSF claimed that it had taken full control over all of Central Darfur. A United Nations investigation discovered numerous mass graves in Darfur that contained Masalit civilians. The RSF and Arab militias were additionally accused of having killed lawyers, human rights monitors, doctors and non-Arab tribal leaders. The governor of West Darfur, Khamis Abakar, was abducted and killed by armed men in June, hours after accusing the RSF of genocide and calling for international intervention in a TV interview. The SAF, for their part, conducted indiscriminate airstrikes against Darfur that killed many civilians, especially in Nyala. Tribal and rebel groups in Darfur began to declare allegiance to one or the other of the warring parties. A faction of the Darfur-based Sudan Liberation Movement led by Mustafa Tambour (SLM-T) joined the conflict in support of the SAF. In contrast the controversial Tamazuj rebel group formally declared its alliance with the RSF, joined by the leaders of seven Arab tribes, including that of Hemedti's. As September arrived both sides made offensives in Darfur. The RSF took control of several towns in West Darfur and also attacked the market of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. SAF offensives saw success in Central Darfur, with the Sudanese Army retaking parts of Zalingei from the RSF. Fighting in Darfur also began to increasingly spill over into North Kordofan, with the SAF attacking RSF positions in the state capital of El-Obeid and clashes over the town of Um Rawaba. Both sides made withdrawals to end the month, with the RSF retreating from Um Rawaba while the SAF withdrew from Tawila. October–December 2023 SAF collapse in Darfur was the last of the five state capitals in Darfur under SAF control. By October 2023, the SAF in Darfur was experiencing acute shortages in supplies due to RSF-imposed sieges and had failed to utilize its air superiority to stem RSF advances. On 26 October, the RSF captured Nyala, Sudan's fourth-largest city, after seizing control of the Sudanese Army's 16th Infantry Division headquarters. The fall of Nyala, a strategic city with an international airport and border connections to Central Africa, allowed the RSF to receive international supplies more easily and concentrate its forces on other Sudanese cities. After Nyala's fall, RSF fighters turned their focus to Zalingei, the capital of Central Darfur. The Sudanese Army's 21st Infantry Division, stationed in Zalingei, fled the city without a fight and allowed the RSF to take it over. In Geneina, reports emerged that tribal elders were attempting to broker the surrender of the SAF garrison in the city to prevent bloodshed. The Sudanese Army rejected the proposal, raising fears of an imminent RSF assault on the city and causing civilians to flee across the border into Chad. The RSF besieged the headquarters of the Sudanese Army's 15th Infantry Division in Geneina, giving the garrison a six-hour ultimatum to surrender. The base was captured two days later when the 15th withdrew from the area before fleeing to Chad. Those left behind, numbering in the hundreds, were taken prisoner and paraded in RSF media with signs of abuse. With Geneina's fall, Ed Daein and El Fasher were the last remaining capitals in Darfur under government control, with both cities under heavy RSF pressure. Ed Daein fell in the early hours of 21 November, with RSF forces taking control of the city after seizing the headquarters of the Sudanese Army's 20th Infantry Division. SAF garrisons in East Darfur subsequently abandoned their positions and withdrew, allowing the RSF to occupy the area. In response to RSF gains in Darfur and subsequent abuses, the Justice and Equality Movement, Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (Minnawi), and other smaller rebel factions renounced their neutrality and declared war on the RSF. Peace negotiations stall Attempts by other nations and international organisations to negotiate peace had largely been dormant since the failure of the Treaty of Jeddah, but in late October the RSF and SAF met once more in Jeddah to attempt to negotiate peace. This new round of talks was a failure, with neither side willing to commit to a ceasefire. Instead, the warring factions agreed to open channels for humanitarian aid. On 3 December 2023 negotiations were indefinitely suspended due to the failure of both the SAF and the RSF to open up aid channels. With the failure of the talks in Jeddah, the East African Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) hosted a peace summit in early December. Earlier attempts by IGAD to open negotiations had floundered after the SAF had accused Kenyan President William Ruto of supporting the RSF. IGAD's talks appeared to make more progress than the Jeddah negotiations, with Hemedti and al-Burhan agreeing to meet in person at some point in the future. RSF crossing of the Nile The RSF attacked the town of Wad Ashana in North Kordofan on 1 October along a key commercial route. In West Kordofan, an uptick in fighting was reported, with the RSF assaulting a "vital" oil field in Baleela, south of Al-Fulah. Geolocated footage showed RSF fighters celebrating around Baleela Airport after allegedly capturing it. The Battle of Khartoum continued with the RSF seizing the town of al-Aylafoun, southeast of the capital, on 6 October. In the process, the paramilitary gained control of key oil infrastructure. By late October the RSF controlled most of Khartoum but had failed to seize key military bases, while al-Burhan's government had largely relocated to Port Sudan. in Khartoum was destroyed on 11 November. This effectively cut the RSF off from its forces in Omdurman, giving the SAF a strategic advantage. In an attempt to gain a new crossing over the Nile and supply its forces in Omdurman, the RSF launched an assault on the Jebel Aulia Dam in the village of Jabal Awliya. As Jebel Aulia could not be destroyed without flooding Khartoum, its capture would give the RSF a path over the Nile the SAF could not easily remove. A week-long battle commenced over the dam and its surrounding village, which ended in an RSF victory. The force captured the dam on 20 November, and all SAF resistance ceased in the village the following day. On 5 December, local militias along with RSF soldiers attacked SPLM–N (al-Hilu) forces in the village of Tukma, southeast of Dalang in South Kordofan, resulting in the deaths of four people and the destruction of the village. On 8 December, the RSF entered Gedaref State for the first time. Elsewhere in Gezira the RSF made major gains, taking control of the city of Rufaa in the state's east and entering the Butana region. The Sudanese Army put up little resistance in Wad Madani itself, the 1st Division withdrawing from the city as the RSF took over. The fall of Wad Madani was viewed as a major blow to the SAF, as it dramatically widened the frontline and opened up large parts of the country to potential RSF offensives. Within a few days RSF fighters had advanced to within 25km of Sennar, the largest city in Sennar State. Amid the deteriorating situation, the SAF were reported to be arming civilians while government officials in the east called on the population to mobilize. Al-Burhan gave a widely promoted public speech to soldiers in Red Sea State, promising to arm civilian militias to fight the RSF and to fight against 'colonialism', which was viewed by observers as a reference to Emirati support for the RSF. Hemedti travels abroad Following the fall of Wad Madani, efforts by IGAD to negotiate a ceasefire made progress as the SAF's weakened position made them more eager to enter talks. Whereas previously opposition from Islamist political groups to negotiation had prevented al-Burhan from committing to a specific date, now both he and Hemedti agreed to meet on 28 December. A day before the meeting was due, it was cancelled as Hemedti recanted his desire to attend. Instead the RSF leader went on a diplomatic tour, travelling on a chartered Emirati jet and meeting with several African national leaders. On the tour Hemedti also met with former Prime Minister Hamdok and his Taqaddum organisation in Addis Ababa, with the RSF agreeing in a declaration negotiated with the Taqaddum to release political prisoners, open up humanitarian aid corridors and negotiate further with the SAF. This tour was regarded by observers as an attempt by Hemedti to portray himself as the leader of Sudan and improve his international image, as his reputation had been severely damaged since the fall of Wad Madani due to large-scale looting by RSF fighters. On 5 January, al-Burhan vowed to continue the war against the RSF and rejected the latest peace efforts, declaring that war crimes committed by the RSF precluded negotiation. On 14 January, both Hemedti and Burhan received official invitations from IGAD to attend its upcoming summit on 18 January. Hemedti accepted the invitation, but Burhan refused. On 16 January, the Sudanese government suspended its ties with IGAD, accusing the body of violating Sudan's sovereignty. This effectively marked the end of IGAD's efforts to mediate peace talks. Fighting in Kordofan and Gezira As 2024 began, the RSF made attacks into South Kordofan, defeating SAF forces in the town of Habila in the Nuba Mountains and pushing toward Dalang. On 7 January the RSF attacked SAF positions in Dalang, meeting fierce resistance from the army and civilian militias. During the fighting the SPLM–N (al-Hilu) entered the city, taking control of several neighbourhoods. SPLM–N forces proceeded to attack the RSF, and the paramilitary retreated from the city. In January 2024, the RSF focused on consolidating its gains in Gezira State. Fighting was reported on 17 January east of El Manaqil, the last major town not under RSF control. The SAF delivered weapons to the city by helicopter, including selectively distributing them among civilians in the town, attempting to bolster its defences. Sudan's National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) selectively recruited and armed civilians based on perceived loyalty. On 24 January 2024, the RSF launched an attack on Babanusa after encircling the city for months. By 25 January, the RSF gained control of the city centre and entered the headquarters of the 22nd infantry division. Until March 2024, the RSF maintained its position in Gezira State but was unable to break through. The RSF recruited in Gezira State to try to capture territory in El-Gadarif from the SAF. The JEM, which has allied with the SAF, helped the SAF build up its forces in El-Gadarif for a counteroffensive to try to retake Wad Madani. In April 2024, the SAF and its allies began the counteroffensive, attacking from the east and west of Wad Madani in an attempt to retake it. Clashes were reported in Al-Madina Arab on 15 April. In December 2024, the SAF launched an offensive in southern Gezira. The SAF were able to make small progress, which involved recapturing the town of Wad el-Haddad, a town on the border of Sennar State. It also was able to recapture Um al-Qura, but the RSF reoccupied the village. In January 2025, the SAF made the first major military operation of 2025. The Sudanese Army was able to make large gains in Gezira and some gains in North Kordofan. On 8 January, the SAF had recaptured Haj-Abdallah after a tense battle that inflicted losses on the RSF. The SAF stated that seven RSF vehicles were destroyed. A day later, the SAF attacked RSF positions in Al-Shabarga in the southeastern part of the state, led by field commander Bassam Abu Satour, leading to the RSF's withdrawal and the SAF recapturing the city, while in the western part of the state, the SAF took control of the villages Mahla, Tahla, and Al-Kumar Al-Jaaliyeen. On 10 January, the SAF recaptured Um al-Qura while the Sudan Shield Forces took Wad al-Abyad. These successful offensives led to the SAF retaking control of Wad Madani on 11 January from three fronts. (Bahri). The White Nile flowing from the south is joined by the Blue Nile flowing from the east. After advancing in Gezira and Khartoum, the SAF launched a military operation in North Kordofan for the first time, after being on the defensive in Darfur and Kordofan from the start of the war. The SAF's "Sayyad Force", captured the entirety of the Umm Ruwaba district. By the start of February, the SAF had recaptured Al-Hasaheisa, Tambul, and Rufa'a. This left the RSF in control of only northwestern Gezira. SAF gains in Omdurman The SAF gained ground in Omdurman in February 2024, linking up their forces in the northern part of the city and relieving a 10-month siege of their forces in the city centre. The SAF also took control of the Al-Hilal Stadium. On 12 March, the SAF defeated an attempted RSF counteroffensive in Omdurman and took control of the headquarters of the Sudan National Broadcasting Corporation. The RSF maintained its control of Khartoum and continued to threaten Khartoum North. By April 2024, fighting in Khartoum State was still ongoing, with the RSF in control of the southern and western parts of Omdurman and the SAF in control of the northern and eastern parts of Omdurman, with the RSF controlling the majority of Khartoum and Khartoum North. The SAF continued to prepare an offensive to relieve its surrounded bases in Khartoum North. As of March 2025, SAF controls majority of the city. On 29 March, SAF forces announced the control of the Libya Market in Omdurman and seized weapons and equipment left behind by the RSF. On the same day, SAF launched new offensives into the city of Ombadda, west of Omdurman. April–December 2024 Fighting in Darfur On 15 April, during the Siege of El Fasher, at least nine civilians were killed in a renewed offensive by the RSF on the city of El Fasher in North Darfur. The Joint Darfur Force declared war on the RSF and allied with the SAF. The fighting in El Fasher diverted SAF resources from other areas, hampering planned counter-offensives to retake Khartoum and Wad Madani. In particular, the SAF has been using its limited aviation resources to carry out airstrikes in North Darfur and resupply El Fasher using airdrops. From April 2024, the conflict had been escalating in El Fasher, while the civilians remained trapped with no safety or food. In a June 2024 report, the International Crisis Group said the intensifying battle could lead to mass slaughter, and that there was a need for all sides to de-escalate. The report said the UN and the US should broker the de-escalation and must put pressure on the RSF and its main supporters, including the United Arab Emirates. Crisis Group said the UAE should push the RSF to stand down, and urged all parties to allow the civilians to flee, open the region for aid delivery and resume national peace talks. On 14 June 2024, the SAF announced that it had killed Ali Yaqoub Gibril, a top RSF commander, in El Fasher. The United States had sanctioned Yagoub in May 2024 for endangering civilians in Darfur. In June 2024, The New York Times reported that more than 40 villages had been burned in El Fasher since April 2024. Fighting in Kordofan As of May 2024, fighting is ongoing in Babanusa, West Kordofan. The RSF are conducting an offensive to attempt to take control of West Kordofan. Fighting was also reported in North Kordofan. On 20 June 2024, the RSF captured Al-Fulah, the capital of West Kordofan, after the SAF withdrew from the city after several hours of fighting. The SAF retreated to Babanusa, its one remaining base in Kordofan. Fighting along the Nile and White Nile rivers In May 2024, the RSF launched attacks against the SAF between Khartoum State and River Nile State, as well as in White Nile State near the border with Gezira State. The SAF prepared its forces in River Nile State, ahead of a potential invasion of Khartoum Bahri. In June 2024, the RSF were still in control of Khartoum and Khartoum North, though the SAF controlled one enclave in each that it supplies by airdrop. In late June 2024, the RSF began an assault in the areas surrounding the city of Sennar. RSF forces struck out to the west of the city, causing the SAF to bring in reinforcements in anticipation of an attack on Sennar itself. Instead RSF forces avoided Sennar and attacked south towards Singa, the capital of Sennar State, capturing the lightly defended town on 29 June. This prevented the SAF from reinforcing Sennar from the south, placing the city under increased pressure. A united force consisting of the Gedaref-based 2nd SAF Infantry Division and a battalion of the JEM assaulted and retook Dinder on 1 July, but were driven out again by the RSF over the next few days. On 20 July, the RSF announced the death of Brigadier General Abdel Rahman Al-Bishi, its head of operations in Sennar and Blue Nile States, with Sudanese media reporting that he had been killed in a SAF airstrike. On 3 August, the RSF launched its first attack on Blue Nile State since the beginning of the war, with the group and the SAF contesting control over Al-Tadamun. On 15 August 2024, the Galgani massacre was carried out by the RSF, which killed at least 108 people, including at least 24 women and children. SAF offensives As September 2024 came, for the first time since the start of the war the balance of power seemed to be tipping towards the SAF. On 26 September, the SAF launched a major offensive against RSF positions in Khartoum. The attack on the city came from three fronts striking from the south, east and west of the capital. SAF airstrikes, which killed four and wounded 14, began at dawn followed by clashes within the city. The SAF reportedly captured three key bridges connecting Khartoum to other nearby cities, including the Omdurman Bridge which had previously acted as a line of separation between government and RSF control. Faced with an elusive enemy, the SAF became bogged down in urban fighting, with RSF snipers routinely paralyzing infantry advances. Starting on 20 October 2024, the RSF carried out the 2024 eastern Gezira State massacres, which killed at least 300 people and wounded at least 200 more. According to a report by the French newspaper Le Monde, as of November 2024, the war in Sudan has possibly entered its most dangerous phase since it began in April 2023. Both the SAF and RSF have officially ruled out settling the civil war through negotiations, with the only option on the table being total war. During the recent rainy season which brought a lull in the fighting, each side rearmed and restructured their forces. On 23 November, the SAF retook Singa following an offensive. 2025 Liberation of Khartoum The SAF retook Wad Madani, the capital of Gezira State on 11 January. On 8 February 2025, the SAF regained control of nearly all of Khartoum North as it intensified its offensive, and was preparing to retake the capital of Khartoum itself. On 24 February, the RSF claimed responsibility for downing a Russian-made Ilyushin aircraft in Nyala. Meanwhile, the RSF declared a rival government in Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, which the SAF-aligned administration refused to recognize. On 20 March, the SAF announced it was within 500 metres of the Presidential Palace and captured it on the next day. On 22 March, the SAF also recaptured the headquarters of the Central Bank of Sudan and the General Intelligence Service in Khartoum. It also retook Tuti Island, situated at the confluence of the Blue Nile and the White Nile, after advancing through the Tuti Bridge. On 26 March, they retook Khartoum International Airport and Jebel Aulia, regarded as the RSF's last stronghold in the capital, with al-Burhan proclaiming the liberation of Khartoum later in the day. On 20 May, the SAF announced the clearing of Khartoum State from the RSF. Fall of El Fasher Earlier in November 2024, the SAF reportedly shifted tactics: withdrawing from outer bases to lure RSF forces into trap engagements, especially in the southern axis of El Fasher. From December 2024 onwards the RSF were also mobilising additional fighters across Darfur for a concerted operation the city. Reports mentioned mobilisation of some 200 fighters from Central Darfur, the recruitment of foreign mercenaries and the RSF staging air and ground assaults on the city's hospitals and camps. In April, the RSF launched a major offensive in North Darfur, aiming to capture El Fasher, the last state capital in the region under SAF control. Beginning on 11 April, RSF ground and aerial assaults struck El Fasher and surrounding displacement camps, including Zamzam and Abu Shouk. By 13 April, the RSF claimed control of Zamzam camp after intense fighting that left over 200 civilians dead, including children and aid workers. The SAF denied RSF accusations of militarizing the camp, while rights groups documented widespread abuses by RSF fighters, including targeted killings and sexual violence. During this exchange, civilian neighbourhoods were also caught in the fighting; one hospital source reported injuries to civilians though exact numbers were not confirmed. On 19 September, RSF combat columns pushed toward SAF positions near the "Super Camp" southwest of the city, after which SAF sources reported defensive operations in the neighbourhoods of Al-Nasrat, Al-Shorfa and Al-Qubba. The RSF had already throughout the siege of El Fasher erected earthen berms encircling the city from the north, west and east, forming a kill-box environment that severely restricted SAF resupply and civilian movement. By August and September 2025, the siege conditions had degraded SAF supply lines significantly; SAF units admitted to hunger, low morale and desertion as food, ammunition and medical logistics dwindled. RSF penetrations into the city's periphery, especially blocks 16 and 17 of Abu Shouk and Naivasha market area, indicated that the outer ring of SAF control was collapsing. On 28 October, General al-Burhan confirmed that the SAF had withdrawn from El Fasher, confirming RSF control over the city. In October 2025, humanitarian workers and local officials reported that more than 2,500 civilians were summarily executed by the RSF following the fall of the city. The WHO reported that more than 460 patients and their companions were killed inside the city's last functioning hospital. Analysis of satellite imagery suggested that the RSF disposed of tens of thousands of bodies through burial and incineration to cover up mass killings. As of December 2025, some estimates place the total deaths from the El Fasher massacre between 60,000 and 68,000+. Kholood Khair estimated that 100,000 people were killed in the "genocidal violence" but noted that there were no official figures due to the lack of governance in the region. Despite initial setbacks, Al-Khiwai in West Kordofan was retaken by the SAF on 11 May, and on 13 May, the town of Al-Hamadi in South Kordofan, an administrative hub for the Hawazma tribe, was also retaken by the SAF, alongside some strongholds in southern Omdurman previously held by the RSF, such as the Al-Jami'a neighbourhood and all of the Al-Shaqla neighbourhood. On 1 December, the RSF announced that they had taken control of Babanusa, the last SAF-held city in West Kordofan, after a two-year siege. On 8 December, the RSF seized the Heglig oil field after the Sudanese Army withdrew across the southern border, as they feared fighting to defend the oilfield would see it destroyed. Production at Heglig was at about 20,000 barrels per day, significantly down from the pre-war level of 64,000. Upon arriving in Unity State, South Sudan, the Sudanese soldiers were disarmed by the South Sudan People's Defence Forces. Lt. Gen. Johnson Olony, South Sudan's Deputy Chief of Defence Forces for Mobilisation and Disarmament, said "We received them because they are our brothers." He also said this was coordinated between President Salva Kiir Mayardit of South Sudan and Abdel Fatah al-Burhan. Olony also said his army would take Heglig from the RSF "... to prioritize regional stability." Fighting in border regions On 5 May 2025, the RSF attacked Port Sudan for the first time using drones. On 19 May, the SAF took Wadi al-Atrun in Al-Malha, located on a strategic road linking Northern State and North Darfur. On 21 May, the SAF said it had cleared White Nile State of the RSF. On 23 May, the SAF announced the capture of the strategic city of Dibebad in South Kordofan. On 10 June, part of the border triangle linking Sudan, Libya, and Egypt at Gabal El Uweinat was attacked by the RSF and Libyan National Army (LNA), led by Khalifa Haftar, which struck directly into Sudanese territory controlled by the SAF. On 11 June, the RSF announced that they had entirely occupied the area; The SAF retreated and condemned the LNA for the strikes. By 16 June, the RSF had captured the entire Sudan-Libya border. On 22 June, after several days of fighting, the SPLM–N (al-Hilu) cut off the road connecting Kadugli and Dalang, placing them under siege. On 26 June, SAF recaptured Malken in the Blue Nile front as part of efforts to increase the pressure toward RSF. The SAF launched a massive counterattack on 28 June, reopening the road between Dalang and Kadugli. Diplomacy Diplomatic efforts to broker a truce were active in early 2025 but largely unsuccessful. Various proposed peace talks held in London, Washington, and Geneva failed to produce a lasting agreement. In April 2025, a British-led conference in London attempted to establish a contact group to restart negotiations, but the effort faltered when key Arab states (especially Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) refused to endorse a joint communiqué. While the UK, EU, and African Union pushed for a ceasefire and political roadmap, the regional powers prioritized different outcomes. By September 2025, the United States together with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE—known collectively as the "Quad"—presented a formal peace plan. The roadmap proposed a three-month humanitarian truce, to be followed by a permanent ceasefire and a nine-month political transition to civilian-led governance. However, implementation remained uncertain: the SAF voiced strong reservations, particularly demanding that the RSF withdraw from civilian areas before any truce could take effect. Meanwhile, RSF leaders announced that they would accept the Quad's proposal for a "humanitarian ceasefire" to mitigate the civilian toll. Some in the SAF posited that the truce would allow the RSF to consolidate gains after the fall of El Fasher. 2026 Government back in Khartoum In March 2025, the Sudanese Army recaptured Khartoum, which had been captured by the RSF shortly after the war began in 2023. After being based in Port Sudan for nearly three years, Sudan's military-led government returned to Khartoum on 11 January 2026, where Prime Minister Kamil Idris said it would start restoring services for a city devastated by war. The city remains badly damaged after mass displacement, looting, the occupation of civilian homes, and the near collapse of basic services. Kordofan In early 2026, fighting intensified in the Kordofan region, where almost daily drone strikes resulted in substantial civilian casualties and struck markets, health facilities, and residential areas. The shift in the epicentre of the conflict followed the SAF's recapture of Khartoum and the RSF's consolidation of control in Darfur. According to the conflict monitor ACLED, control of the Kordofan states would strengthen the RSF's ability to regain access to Sudan's central corridor and reinforce its rival administration in western Sudan. Both sides have been accused of carrying out strikes on civilian targets, while hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced and famine conditions were reported in parts of South Kordofan. == Casualties and war crimes ==

The fatality numbers are highly uncertain. According to a report published by Le Monde in November 2024, the war may have killed over 150,000 civilians through the combined tolls of bombardments, massacres, starvation and disease. A November 2024 report from the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine estimated more than 61,000 deaths in Khartoum State alone, for the period between April 2023 and June 2024. Early in the conflict, doctors on the ground warned that reported figures did not include all casualties as people could not reach hospitals due to difficulties in movement. Soon after the war broke out, a spokesperson for the Sudanese Red Crescent was quoted as saying that the number of casualties "was not small". Sudanese prosecutors recorded over 500 missing persons cases across the country, some of which were enforced disappearances, and were mostly blamed on the RSF. On 2 May 2024, a US Senate hearing on the war estimated that between 15,000 and 30,000 people had died, but considered that to be an underestimation by a factor of 10 to 15, stating the real death toll could be as high as 150,000. As of 27 May 2024, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project data reported 17,044 fatalities. On 29 March 2025, the Sudanese Group for Defending Rights and Freedoms said that it had recorded 50,000 missing persons cases since the beginning of the war. In early December, authorities reported that thousands of bodies hastily buried by residents and fighters were exhumed from Khartoum and the surrounding area. Sources reported that 15,000 bodies were recovered since April 2024. Darfur In Geneina, West Darfur, ethnic clashes that began in the last week of April 2023 had killed at least 1,100 people, while the Sultanate of Dar Masalit claimed that more than 5,000 people were killed and about 8,000 were wounded in the city. In July 2023, a Masalit tribal leader claimed that more than 10,000 people had been killed in West Darfur alone, and that 80% of Geneina's residents had fled. and Misterei, witnesses and other observers described the violence in the region as tantamount to ethnic cleansing or even genocide, with non-Arab groups such as the Masalit being the primary victims. Foreign casualties Civilians, including 15 Syrians, 15 Ethiopians and nine Eritreans have been killed across the country. An Indian national working in Khartoum died after being hit by a stray bullet on 15 April. Two Americans were killed, including a professor working in the University of Khartoum who was stabbed to death while evacuating. A two-year-old girl from Turkey was killed while her parents were injured after their house was struck by a rocket on 18 April. Ten students from the Democratic Republic of the Congo were killed in an SAF airstrike on the International University of Africa in Khartoum on 4 June. The SAF claimed that the Egyptian assistant military attaché was killed by RSF fire while driving his car in Khartoum, which was denied by the Egyptian ambassador. Two Greek nationals trapped in a church on 15 April sustained leg injuries when caught in crossfire while trying to leave. A Filipino migrant worker and an Indonesian student at a school in Khartoum were injured by stray bullets. On 17 April, the European Union Ambassador to Sudan, Aidan O'Hara of Ireland, was assaulted by unidentified "armed men wearing military fatigues" in his home, he suffered minor injuries and was able to resume working on 19 April. On 23 April, a French evacuation convoy was shot at, injuring one person. The French government later confirmed the casualty to be a French soldier. An employee of the Egyptian embassy was shot and injured during an evacuation mission. Evacuation of foreign nationals The outbreak of violence has led foreign governments to monitor the situation in Sudan and move toward the evacuation and repatriation of their nationals. Among some countries with several expatriates in Sudan are Egypt, which has more than 10,000 citizens in the country, and the United States, which has more than 16,000 citizens, most of whom are dual nationals. Efforts at extraction were hampered by the fighting within the capital Khartoum, particularly in and around the airport. This has forced evacuations to be undertaken by road via Port Sudan on the Red Sea, which lies about 650km (400 miles) northeast of Khartoum. from where they were airlifted or ferried directly to their home countries or third ones. Other evacuations were undertaken through overland border crossings or airlifts from diplomatic missions and other designated locations with direct involvement of the militaries of some home countries. Some transit hubs used during the evacuation include the port of Jeddah in Saudi Arabia and Djibouti, which hosts military bases of the United States, China, Japan, France, and other European countries. War crimes == Foreign involvement ==

As the conflict has evolved, it has increasingly taken on regional dimensions. Analysts describe the war as shaped not only by internal rivalries but also by the involvement of external actors providing financial, military, and diplomatic support to the warring parties, contributing to dynamics resembling a proxy war. Foreign arms supplies to both sides In June 2024, a briefing by Amnesty International stated that the constant flow of foreign weapons is fueling the war and breaching the Darfur arms embargo. The organization found that the recently manufactured or transferred weapons and ammunition were being imported in large quantities into Sudan from China, Russia, Turkey, Yemen, the UAE and Serbia. The weapons supply has impacted the war by causing massive civilian displacement and a humanitarian crisis in Sudan. Both warring sides were using Chinese-manufactured advanced drone jammers, mortars and anti-material rifles. The RSF were also reported to be using recently manufactured armoured personnel carriers from the UAE. In October 2025, the SAF recovered boxes of arms, ammunitions and medicines supplied by the United Arab Emirates from an area previously held by the RSF in southeast Sudan. The UAE had been previously known for their support to the Sudanese military, and marginalised civilian rule by promoting the idea of Hemedti to helm the country's economic policy "in the interests of a stable transition". The RSF primarily funds its operations through gold exports to supporting countries, including the UAE, Kenya and Ethiopia. In 2025, after declaring their support for the RSF, Ethiopia and Kenya published quarterly gold production figures that were double those of the previous year. The aim was to present the military regime in positive light, securing meetings with potential oil investors and officials from US, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Russia to strengthen international ties, funding and equipment. In November 2025, Mark Carney visited to Abu Dhabi to meet with the UAE president. Carney said he discussed the Sudan civil war during this meeting, though the details are unclear. In addition, Canada exports weapons to the UAE; however, the UAE insists these weapons do not flow into the hands of the RSF. Despite this, Canadian weapons have been seen used by RSF soldiers. In 2016, a United Nations panel accused Canadian company STREIT Group of breaking the arms embargo against Sudan. The allegation involved a 2012 sales of 24 armoured vehicles. This is the third time the UN has condemned the company's actions, which violated the terms of the UN (Arms Trade Treaty, signed by Canada in 2019 and prohibits the export of arms to Sudan directly or through third countries. STREIT Group claimed that the exports do not violate controls because they do not have weapons attached to them. There has also been documentation of STREIT Group's armored vehicles over the years, RSF soldiers were also seen posting on social media over the years in armored vehicles manufactured by the group, along with rifles manufactured by another Canadian company, Sterling Cross Defense Systems. Chad On 7 June 2023, Hissein Alamine Tchaw-tchaw, a Chadian dissident who belongs to the same ethnic group as Hemedti and claims to be the leader of the Movement for the Fight of the Oppressed in Chad (MFOC), which is fighting the government of President Mahamat Déby, posted a video showing his participation in an RSF attack on the Yarmouk munitions factory in Khartoum. On 17 November 2023, the SLM-Minnawi and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) accused the Chadian government of supporting the RSF, and "supplying it with military equipment and mercenaries by opening its territory and airspace". A report from Africa Analyst alleged that Chadian soldiers belonging to a joint Chadian-Sudanese command under Osman Bahr intercepted a shipment of military equipment intended for the RSF on its way from N'Djamena and gave it instead to the JEM, which the latter denied. The Economist linked Chad's junta receiving financial support from the UAE in exchange for allowing it to support the RSF through Amdjarass airport. Following accusations by SAF deputy commander Yasser al-Atta of Chadian government support for the RSF, the Chadian government unsuccessfully demanded an apology from the Sudanese ambassador and expelled four Sudanese diplomats from the country on 17 December. On 5 November 2024, the government of Sudan filed a complaint with the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights demanding reparations from Chad for their support of the RSF, accusing Chad of violating international law. On 23 February 2026, Chad shut its eastern border with Sudan indefinitely, citing repeated incursions by Sudanese armed groups and growing insecurity near its territory. The decision followed heavy fighting in the border town of al-Tina between the RSF and forces aligned with the Sudanese army, and Chad said limited humanitarian exemptions could still be granted with prior approval. China China's approach to the conflict is shaped primarily by its economic interests, including investments in oil, mining, and infrastructure linked to the Belt and Road Initiative. While instability threatens these assets, Beijing has sought to balance its economic engagement with a policy of non-interference, avoiding explicit alignment with either side. By maintaining operations and prioritising the protection of long-term investments, China has continued to play an indirect role in the conflict without overt escalation. China initially adhered to non-interference, evacuating citizens and calling for peace without taking sides. This mirrored its approach in past conflicts, prioritizing stability to protect economic interests. China's Sudan strategy ties into the Belt and Road Initiative, aiming to secure Red Sea trade routes and infrastructure links, ambitions delayed by the civil war. On 9 January 2025 China donated emergency food aid (1,250 tonnes) to be allocated to all states. Egypt On 15 April, RSF forces claimed, via Twitter, to have taken Egyptian troops prisoner near Merowe, and a military plane carrying markings of the Egyptian Air Force. Initially, no official explanation was given for the Egyptian soldiers' presence, while Egypt and Sudan have had military cooperation due to diplomatic tensions with Ethiopia. Later on, the Egyptian Armed Forces stated that around 200 of its soldiers were in Sudan to conduct exercises with the Sudanese military. Of the captured Egyptian troops, 177 were released and flown back to Egypt aboard three Egyptian military planes that took off from Khartoum airport later in the day. The remaining 27 soldiers, who were from the Egyptian Air Force, were sheltered at the Egyptian embassy and later evacuated. On 16 April 2023, the RSF claimed that its troops in Port Sudan were attacked by foreign aircraft and issued a warning against any foreign interference. According to former CIA analyst Cameron Hudson, Egyptian fighter jets were a part of these bombing campaigns against the RSF, and Egyptian special forces units have been deployed and are providing intelligence and tactical support to the SAF. The Wall Street Journal said that Egypt had sent fighter jets and pilots to support the Sudanese military. On 17 April, satellite imagery obtained by The War Zone revealed that one Egyptian Air Force MiG-29M2 fighter jet had been destroyed and two others had been damaged or destroyed while stationed at Merowe Airbase. A Sudanese Air Force Guizhou JL-9 was among the destroyed aircraft. After initial confusion, the RSF accepted the explanation that Egyptian combat and support personnel were conducting exercises with the Sudanese military before the outbreak of hostilities. Ethiopia Ethiopia initially supported the RSF, which was seen as an ally who helped Ethiopia fight against the Tigray People's Liberation Front in the Tigray War. Ethiopia was also supportive of the RSF to counter Egyptian influence in Sudan. However, in July 2024, Primer Minister Abiy Ahmed visited Port Sudan and met with al-Burhan, signaling a shifting position on the conflict. RSF's Hemedti had previously paid a visit to Ethiopia in December 2023 to push for talks with the SAF. On 4 July 2025, senior Sudanese officials accused Ethiopia of exploiting the civil war by deploying army-backed militias into the disputed Al-Fashaga District, where they blocked farmers and cleared land under Ethiopian military protection. These forces, supported by Ethiopian regular troops, reportedly expelled Sudanese farmers amid a security vacuum created when Sudanese units were redeployed. Although Sudan reclaimed much of Al-Fashqa in 2020, recent troop withdrawals have allowed fresh incursions—and traders in the border district of Al Galabat reported that an armed Ethiopian group crossed the border to loot a livestock market before withdrawing. In February 2026, Reuters reported that Ethiopia was hosting a secret camp to train fighters for the RSF. Reuters said the camp was built in 2025, and that "Eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, said the United Arab Emirates financed the camp's construction and provided military trainers and logistical support to the site". Reuters said "The camp constitutes the first direct evidence of Ethiopia's involvement" in the war. An internal note from Ethiopia's security services said 4,300 fighters were training at the site in January 2026. Iran In October 2023, Iran and Sudan resumed diplomatic relations, aligning Tehran with the SAF. A June 2024 BBC investigation revealed that Iran violated the UN arms embargo by supplying drones to both sides. Although Sudanese officials denied receiving Iranian aid, Kenya The SAF rejected Kenya's mediation role in July 2023, accusing President William Ruto of having ties to RSF leader Hemedti and offering refuge to RSF members. SAF Lt. Gen. Yasir Alatta escalated tensions by calling Ruto a mercenary and challenging him to deploy troops. Sudan later threatened to quit IGAD unless Ruto was removed as head of its mediation committee. Kenya denied the accusations, calling them baseless and reaffirming its neutrality. In retaliation, Anonymous Sudan attacked Kenyan websites in late July. Tensions amplified in February 2025 when Kenya hosted a meeting in Nairobi where the RSF and its allies signed a charter to form a parallel Sudanese government without the SAF's participation. Sudan condemned the move, accusing Kenya of undermining its sovereignty. Analysts noted a shift in Kenya's stance following Ruto's January 2025 UAE visit and economic agreement, suggesting a possible Emirati influence behind Kenya's actions. Libyan National Army The Egypt-backed Libyan National Army, under the command of Khalifa Haftar, dispatched aircraft to fly military supplies to the RSF before the outbreak of hostilities. Khalifa Haftar has reportedly denied these claims. Qatar Qatar has maintained a long-standing bilateral military relationship with Sudan. Since the start of the war, Doha has aligned itself with the SAF, in part to counter the UAE, which has supported the rival RSF. Reports indicate that Qatar provided at least six Chinese warplanes to the SAF. Doha has tried to discreetly supply the SAF with weapons during this conflict. Russia For much of the Sudanese civil war Russia has sent weapons to both the RSF and SAF. This began to shift during mid-2024, with the Russian government beginning to favour the SAF, concurrent with Russia–SAF discussions around the construction of a Russian naval base north of Port Sudan. The same year, Russia began delivering large quantities of weapons, jet components, fuel, and drones, to the Sudanese government in its effort against the RSF, allowing the SAF to recapture parts of the capital, Khartoum, from the RSF. Russia's involvement is also driven by broader strategic and economic interests, including efforts to secure a naval presence on the Red Sea and access to Sudanese gold resources. These resources have been particularly valuable in mitigating the impact of Western sanctions. In addition to its military engagement, Russia has used its diplomatic position, including at the United Nations, to protect its interests and resist ceasefire initiatives. American officials said that Wagner was offering to supply additional weapons to the RSF from its existing stocks in the Central African Republic. On 6 September, Wagner reportedly deployed a convoy of more than 100 vehicles carrying weapons to the RSF garrison in al-Zurug from Chad. SAF Lieutenant General Yasser al-Atta also accused the Wagner Group of bringing in mercenaries from several African nations to fight alongside the RSF. The head of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and the RSF denied the allegations. As relations between the Russian government and the SAF improved during mid-2024, the latter publicly claimed that the Wagner Group was no longer operating in Sudan. This claim was contradicted by a diplomatic source and eyewitnesses speaking to Middle East Eye. to the SAF, as it seeks to counterbalance the UAE's influence in Sudan, which supports the RSF. In response, Sudan has provided military support for the Saudi coalition in Yemen. South Sudan Since the outbreak of renewed violence in Sudan in 2023, South Sudan has adopted a mediatory role, urging peace and engaging with IGAD and the AU, though with limited success due to the conflict's complexity and multiple factions. South Sudan is deeply concerned about spillover effects—such as refugee flows and economic instability—and recognizes that its own fragile stability is tied to Sudan's fate. Tensions escalated further with a February 2025 alliance between Sudan's RSF and the SPLM–N, a rebel group near the South Sudanese border. Experts warn this could pull South Sudan into the conflict, especially if the Sudanese Army supports rival South Sudanese militias in response. With shared borders, historical ties, and existing political tensions between South Sudan's leaders (President Salva Kiir Mayardit and Vice President Riek Machar), the risk of both wars merging is high. The strategic location of the RSF-SPLM–N alliance also boosts smuggling and military operations, weakening the Sudanese Army and increasing regional instability. If left unchecked, experts fear the two conflicts could become indistinguishable, worsening humanitarian crises in both countries. Turkey Turkey's engagement reflects a combination of strategic ambition and commercial interests in Sudan and the wider Red Sea region. In addition to its role as a security partner, Ankara has sought to expand its economic footprint, including potential access to mineral resources and port infrastructure. This dual approach, combining defence cooperation with diplomatic outreach, has allowed Turkey to increase its influence while maintaining flexibility in its relations with different actors. Meanwhile, Arca Defense, another Turkish company, had extensive contact with RSF's procurement officer, though it denies selling weapons, adding complexity to Turkey's role. Turkey's interests include expanding military and diplomatic ties in the Horn of Africa, offering to mediate between Sudan and the UAE in December 2024. In January 2025, the Somali government agreed to host SAF troops at Camp TURKSOM for training, as part of a Turkish-led effort to bolster military support to the SAF. Uganda In February 2026, Sudan condemned Uganda after President Yoweri Museveni hosted RSF commander Hemedti in Entebbe. Sudan's foreign ministry said the visit violated international law and described it as a grave insult, while Museveni, who has been tasked by the African Union with mediation efforts, said he had stressed the need for dialogue and a peaceful political settlement. Ukraine On 19 September 2023, CNN reported that it was "likely" that Ukrainian special forces were behind a series of drone strikes and a ground operation directed against the Wagner Group-backed RSF near Khartoum on 8 September. but said that Ukraine "will be seeking and hunting down Russian military criminals... sooner or later". On 6 November 2023, the Kyiv Post released drone footage of what it claimed was Ukrainian special forces attacking Wagner Group personnel in an unidentified urban area in Sudan with an explosive projectile, which was believed to have been taken about two weeks before its publication. Two months later on 30 January 2024, the Kyiv Post reported that Ukrainian special forces had launched three drone strikes targeting the Wagner Group and other Russian organisations in Sudan as well as their Sudanese partners in the preceding weeks. The Kyiv Post released a report on 5 February 2024 with a video showing the aftermath of an attack allegedly by Ukrainian special forces on a Wagner Group unit which had purportedly suffered several deaths and the capture of at least one member of the unit who was seen being interrogated on camera. United Arab Emirates The UAE has faced mounting accusations of providing military support to RSF, including covert arms transfers, drone supply, and logistics routed through Chad, Libya, CAR, and South Sudan. New York Times, The Guardian, and BBC, along with diplomatic sources and satellite evidence, suggest Emirati cargo planes delivered weapons disguised as aid, with operations coordinated through Amdjarass airport in Chad. UAE denied the accusations. Sudan expelled Emirati diplomats, accused the UAE at the UN of aiding genocide, and submitted complaints to the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice. The residence of the UAE ambassador to Sudan in Khartoum was also attacked on 29 September 2024. The UAE was accused of using humanitarian cover such as Red Crescent hospitals for military purposes, including drone operations and weapon bunkers near the border. Sudan claimed these actions aimed to maintain Emirati influence and gold interests in Sudan, backed by historical investments and ongoing port and agriculture projects. The UAE's ties to the RSF date back to the Yemen war in 2018. Its involvement is said to include cooperation with the Wagner Group for arms deliveries and financing RSF logistics from within the Emirates. Identity documents recovered from a 2024 plane crash in Sudan included a Russian passport and an ID that linked to a UAE-based company. The US and the UK have called on the UAE to halt support, with US lawmakers introducing multiple bills to block arms sales to Abu Dhabi. The EU and Human Rights Watch also demanded accountability. Emirati diplomatic initiatives toward Sudan continued, such as hosting a humanitarian conference and pledging $200 million aid—actions seen by Sudan as attempts by UAE to improve its image. On 30 April 2025 UAE authorities said they had intercepted millions of rounds of ammunition at an airport in the UAE which was being illegally transferred to the SAF, which the latter denied. Sudan opened a case at the International Court of Justice alleging that the UAE was complicit in genocide against the Masalit. The court hearings began on 10 April 2025. On 5 May, the court dismissed the case, stating it "manifestly lacks" authority. Since the beginning of the Sudanese war, the UAE has been using the Bosaso International Airport Co (BIAC) as a key logistical hub to supply the RSF with arms and mercenaries. Due to its strategic location and the UAE's close ties with Puntland's leadership, Bosaso Airport serves as a crucial transit point for Emirati weapons and Colombian paramilitaries affiliated with Abu Dhabi's Global Security Service Group (GSSG) to Sudan. In September 2025, Sudan urged Somalia to cease the operations taking place in Bosaso. Sudan's Foreign Ministry accused the UAE of making "desperate efforts" at the Non-Aligned Movement meetings to protect the RSF from condemnation and undercut international solidarity with Sudan. The Ministry said Abu Dhabi should not be allowed to exploit global forums, citing its suggestion of an alternative government. In August 2025, the Sudanese government released a statement accusing regional and international communities of targeting Sudan and supporting the RSF's aggression. It further claimed that the presence of numerous foreign mercenaries posed a significant threat to the nation's peace and security. The government asserted that it possessed undeniable evidence showing that UAE authorities had sponsored and financed mercenaries from Colombia and other neighboring countries. The UAE is the primary purchaser of Sudanese gold from RSF-controlled areas. United Kingdom The UK is the UN Security Council's penholder for Sudan. In June 2024, The Guardian reported that according to multiple sources, FCDO officials "attempted to suppress criticism" of the United Arab Emirates and its alleged role in supplying arms to the RSF. In December 2024, Sudan's Deputy Chairman of the Sovereign Council, Malik Agar, criticized the British government's position on the conflict, stating that the UK "must communicate with the UAE to stop the logistical support it provides to the militia". He also claimed that the Sudanese government was "ready to open a new page with the UK under the new government if it changes the way it manages its foreign files related to Sudan". In October 2025, the Sudanese government supplied the UN Security Council with documentation of military equipment made in the UK being used by the RSF. The equipment was allegedly sold by UK firms to the UAE, which then sent them to the RSF. United States On 20 January 2025, the Trump administration froze USAID payments for 90 days, redirecting most funds to military aid. This resulted in the closure of hundreds of soup kitchens, and increased deaths from starvation. A court ordered the freeze lifted on 13 February, but the administration cancelled nearly 10,000 aid contracts instead. The judge later demanded payments by 26 February, but Chief Justice John G. Roberts paused the order pending a Supreme Court ruling by 28 February. The US announced a diplomatic meeting of the International Quartet on Sudan, aiming to develop a unified vision to end the war, stop foreign involvement and secure a ceasefire. Scheduled for 29 July 2025 in Washington D.C., the meeting was to include the United States, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt. However, it was postponed at the last minute. Meanwhile, a coalition of Sudanese political parties rejected the UAE as a mediator, calling it "morally unqualified" due to its backing of the RSF. Libyan Army On April 2, 2026 head of the Libyan Army Al Namrouch met with the SAF and offered logistical and mechanical support to the Sudanese army. == Humanitarian impact ==

The war has triggered a severe humanitarian crisis. Within days into the fighting, communities faced severe shortages of food, water, medical supplies and fuel, with Khartoum and its surroundings hit hardest. In the first months of the war, about 25 million people out of a population of roughly 50 million, required humanitarian assistance. Aid delivery was hampered as supplies were looted. By September 2024, roughly 80% of healthcare facilities in Sudan were no longer functional. In October 2025, the WHO relayed reports that over 450 people had been massacred in El Fasher's last functioning hospital. The conflict has forcibly displaced nearly 12 million people inside and outside Sudan, Fatality figures remained highly uncertain, with some assessments suggesting the true number may exceed 150,000. == Analysis ==

Kholood Khair, director of policy organization Confluence Advisory, analysed the conflict as unfolding simultaneously at a local, national, and regional level. • At the local level, she stated that much of the violence is shaped by factors specific to individual communities and unresolved grievances predating the current war, resulting in localized and often retaliatory forms of violence. Alex de Waal added that the combatants displayed an extreme brutality, arguing that the conduct of fighters reflected not only a sense of impunity, but also had devastating consequences for Sudanese society. • At the national level, Khair described the conflict primarily as a struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, alongside a range of militias and civilian actors aligned with either side. This dimension has attracted the greatest international attention. The analysis argues that the relative likelihood of each scenario depends on the interaction between internal fragmentation and the strategic calculations of external actors. == Economy ==

Sudan's economy was seriously damaged by the conflict, with a near standstill in formal economic activity, particularly in Khartoum and parts of Darfur. The economy contracted heavily in 2023 and was expected to shrink further in 2024, while state revenues declined steeply. Currency depreciation accelerated, international trade dropped, amid allegations of large scale looting. == Disinformation ==

Throughout the Sudan conflict, the RSF have waged disinformation campaigns, using social media to manipulate public opinion, spread narratives and deny the massacres that are still happening. The RSF ran digital propaganda teams from Khartoum and Dubai, using verified social media accounts to distribute misleading content. The RSF were verified on Twitter and has launched a disinformation campaign against the SAF, accusing them of attacking civilians. Widespread disinformation included recycled footage from video games, past conflicts like Ukraine and Libya, and even archaeological props misrepresented as war crimes. For instance, SAF posted a video allegedly showing recent air operations, which was actually from the video game Arma 3. The SAF also circulated altered images, including a fabricated photo of Hemedti hospitalized in Nairobi. The RSF shared footage of an alleged SAF and Egyptian Air Force warplane reportedly shot down by the RSF found to be that of an Su-25 fighter jet that crashed in Mali, and the other of a Libyan aircraft taken outside Sudan in 2020. The RSF also sent bulletins to UK politicians with the help of Dubai-based Capital Tap Holdings, aiming to counter what it called "disproportionate" disinformation. Facebook removed RSF pages in August 2024, citing policy violations. The RSF blamed the SAF for instigating the ban and said it was negotiating with Meta to restore its accounts. After El Fasher was captured by the RSF, according to Middle East Eye, Emirati, Israeli, and far-right influencers tried to falsely frame the conflict as a sectarian one where Islamists were committing genocide against Christians. The conflict's information space has been further destabilized by false claims against organizations like the Sudanese Doctors Syndicate and by deepfake-like imagery. Disinformation experts, including Kyle Walter of Logically, warned that generative AI may be fueling the sophistication of fake content, undermining trust in all sources of information. == Sanctions ==

U.S. President Joe Biden issued an executive order on 4 May 2023 authorizing sanctions against actors destabilizing the country. The first sanctions followed in June, targeting companies linked to both the SAF and RSF, along with visa restrictions on unnamed individuals. Subsequent rounds of sanctions included RSF leaders Abdul Rahim Dagalo and Abdel Rahman Jumma (accused of killing West Darfur's governor), Islamist leader Ali Karti, firms in Sudan and Russia, and former Bashir regime officials involved in RSF support or coup plots. In May 2024, more RSF commanders were sanctioned for violence in North and Central Darfur. On 7 January 2025, the U.S. said it had determined that the RSF and allied militias committed genocide in Sudan and imposed sanctions on RSF leader Hemedti and affiliated entities to hold them accountable for systematic atrocities and reaffirmed support for Sudanese civil society and a peaceful, democratic future. However, critics said the measures came too late and would have limited impact. On 22 May 2025, the US announced new sanctions on Sudan over the SAF's use of chemical weapons against the RSF. One affiliated entity that received sanctions was a UAE LLC; according to Watan, in response, the UAE began lobbying in Washington to avoid direct sanctions. The UAE launched an investigation into the entities and reported that none of these seven companies hold a valid commercial license in the UAE or conduct any business activities within the country. On 12 July 2023, the United Kingdom announced sanctions on firms linked to the SAF and the RSF. On 15 April 2024, Canada imposed sanctions on two individuals and four entities linked to the SAF and the RSF. On 6 March 2025, Canada imposed sanctions on al-Burhan and Hemedti, due to "an unwillingness on the part of the leaders to negotiate an end to the war". On 23 June 2024, the European Union imposed sanctions on six entities for manufacturing and procuring weapons for the SAF and the RSF. On 18 July 2025, the European Council adopted a fourth package of restrictive measures against two individuals and two entities, Alkhaleej Bank and Red Rock Mining Company. == In popular culture ==

• Sudan, Remember Us, a 2024 documentary film directed by Hind Meddeb • Khartoum, a 2025 documentary film by several Sudanese filmmakers == See also ==