Radio Mogadishu and 5 June 1993 inspection Radio Mogadishu was a highly popular broadcast station with the residents of the city, and was a vital piece of SNA infrastructure that had been captured following a vicious battle with
Ali Mahdi's forces. Following the
Kismayo and
Galkayo incidents that station began to air anti-UNOSOM propaganda, incensing high ranking UN personnel. It was feared that the broadcasts would shift the attitudes of the Somali public towards the United Nations operation, leading UNOSOM officials to resolve to close the station. In mid-May, the Pakistani contingent was asked to draw up a plan to shut down the station. The Pakistanis did not possess the technical expertise required for such an operation and requested that the US supply experts. On the morning of Saturday June 5, 1993 an element of the Pakistani force in Somalia had been tasked with the inspection of site
AWSS 5, which happened to be located at Aidid controlled
Radio Mogadishu. The station was popular across the city, even among those who did not like Aidid or the Habr Gidr clan and concern that UNOSOM was coming to shut it down infuriated many citizens of Mogadishu. The fighting resulted in 24 Pakistanis and dozens of Somalis killed. UNOSOM believed forces associated with Aidid were behind the attack. The 1994 UN Inquiry concluded that in absence of a "...more convincing explanation," it believed the
Somali National Alliance was most likely behind the attack. Despite this, the commission noted that no evidence existed to back previous UNOSOM assertions that the attack had been pre-planned or pre-meditated by the SNA, and further noted that the incident had likely been a spontaneous reaction. Although UNOSOM II had fewer war-fighting resources than
UNITAF, it adopted a more ambitious and aggressive stance. Nevertheless, several UNOSOM contingents expressed opposition to the aggressive military posture. They viewed an offensive as politically misguided and militarily untenable. As the conflict dragged on, these contingents began advocating for a diplomatic resolution. The UN offensive that followed UNSCR 837 had significant negative repercussions for UNOSOM II as it incited hostility from across a wide spectrum of Somali society, extending to those Somali who had been most favorable of the intervention.
June 1993 UNOSOM offensive On 12 June 1993 US troops began a
military offensive around Mogadishu. On 17 June, a
warrant with a $25,000 reward was issued by Admiral
Jonathan Howe for information leading to the arrest of
Aidid, but he was never captured. That same day, Aidid's compound and
Radio Mogadishu were directly targeted by US
AC-130 gunships. Over the following weeks, strikes were carried out all over Mogadishu with
AC-130s and
attack helicopters. UNOSOM began to greatly increase its firepower in Mogadishu and started making deliberate
shows of force with Italian and American helicopters over the city. The US
Quick Reaction Force, which had been split up into several different hot spots in Somalia, was entirely recalled to Mogadishu.
BBC East Africa correspondent
Mark Doyle described the war between the
Somali National Alliance and UNOSOM forces as seen by journalists in Mogadishu: Typical daylight hours in south Mogadishu thunder to the sound of American
helicopter gunships criss-crossing the skies at low level; militia with small arms or
rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPGs) take aim at what they see as an offensive provocation. It's not unusual, from the main hotel in south Mogadishu, to view open battles, with U.S. helicopters firing
20-millimeter cannons at apparent militia ground positions. From other vantage points, full-scale battles have been observed pitting Turkish tanks, Pakistani
APCs, and American
Humvees against the militia. All this has taken place in a heavily built-up urban environment, with the inevitable heavy casualties. By night, the macabre events continue. Loud explosions are common as militia mortars are aimed at the UN compound or the fortified, UN-controlled airport. UN forces' flares light up the sky in an often futile attempt to pinpoint their enemy. Slow dull tracer fire streaks across the blackness from the militias' weapons. The crack-crack-crack and flash-flash-flash of cannons fired from U.S. helicopter gunships can be seen spitting at apparent militia emplacements. In the week after the offensive, US officers and intelligence experts contended that Aidid's
command and control capability over his SNA fighters had been significantly weakened, and the organization's
morale had taken a substantial hit. They also believed that the intensive American aerial bombardment had decimated most of the Somali National Alliance's arsenal. American officials involved in the war estimated that the SNA had no more than 300 loyal fighters, motivated merely by cash or
Khat handouts. However, interviews conducted by the
Washington Post with Somali insurgents painted a contrasting picture: a highly motivated and committed military force whose morale seemed to strengthen as the conflict intensified. Months into the conflict, US and UN officials would concede that they had, "...greatly underestimated their enemy," and a US helicopter attack on
Digfer Hospital on 17 June.
The Times reported that in the month following the offensive at least 200 civilians had been directly killed by foreign troops.
Airstrikes in particular heavily affected Somali civilians and sparked hostility. Each major armed confrontation with UN forces was noted to have the deleterious effect of increasing Aidid's stature with the Somali public. In the view of Professor
Mats Berdal of the
Department of War Studies at
King's College, the conduct of US armed forces during the conflict demonstrated that the US military was not attuned to the requirements of low-level military operations that
Somalia required at the time. He argued that, "[There is] a distinctive
mindset and approach to low-intensity operations which had been shaped by the American experience during and after
Vietnam, and by a deeply entrenched belief in the efficacy of technology and firepower as a means of minimizing one’s own casualties. It is an approach that was inappropriate to the particular circumstances of Somalia."The UNOSOM offensive had significant negative political consequences for the intervention as it alienated the Somali people, strengthened political support for Aidid, and led to growing criticism of the operation internationally. As a result numerous UNOSOM II contingents began to increasingly push for a more conciliatory and diplomatic approach with the
SNA. Relief agencies and humanitarian organizations publicly distanced themselves from the UN offensive. The backlash from Somali political and military factions against the offensive was so profound that even groups previously ambivalent or antagonistic towards
Aidid began to perceive the UN and US forces as foreign oppressors. The escalating UNOSOM offensive resulted in the operation forfeiting potential support from other Somali factions. Former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ramesh Thakur, stated that, "The scale, intensity, and frequency of the
use of force by UNOSOM after June 1993 bore little resemblance to the
rhetoric and expectations of when it was established, nor any recognizable relationship by then to a peacekeeping operation as defined in the UN
lexicon."
Johnathan Howe alleged that evidence to back UN claims could not be provided because the cameras recording the raid had jammed. The
Red Cross claimed that 54 Somalis had been killed, including several notable religious elders. According to Dr. Sebastian Kaempf, the
Abdi House raid represented the single most important event during UNOSOM II, as the consequences of the attack proved disastrous for UNOSOM interests in Somalia.
Black Hawk Down author
Mark Bowden noted 12 July had been a serious mistake and had the effect of firmly uniting a large portion of
Mogadishu behind Aidid
. Notable groups and organizations such as the
Vatican, the
Organisation of African Unity,
World Vision,
Doctors Without Borders,
Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International called for UNOSOM to review it policies and course. |left The raid exposed deep rifts and created dissension amongst the UNOSOM II coalition, which consequently began fraying the cohesion and unity of the operation. The head of the UNOSOM II Justice Division criticized the raid in a memo to head of UNOSOM, US Admiral
Johnathan Howe. Further criticism of the raid came from numerous contributing states such as
Ireland,
Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates,
Zimbabwe, The Italians, who had ruled
Somalia as a colonial territory for half a century, believed that the unprecedented attack threatened to widen the civil war and turn the Somalis against the entire UN
peacekeeping force. A Pakistani officer in Mogadishu noted that the clash between the Americans and Italians was destroying the cohesion of UNOSOM II, and that a review of strategy was desperately needed. Intense diplomatic efforts were consequently made in order to avert a major split in UNOSOM II. At least nine UN civilian employees in Mogadishu working for the humanitarian sector either resigned or walked away from their posts in protest, including the top UNOSOM Justice Division official in Somalia,
Ann Wright. By September 1993, the
Pan-Arab newspaper
Al-Hayat reported that several Somali Islamic factions, which had previously remained neutral in the war, had now tacitly allied with the SNA. As civilian casualties began mounting in July and August numerous Islamic factions began to launch attacks on UNOSOM forces in Mogadishu after sunset. Independent sources in Mogadishu, corroborated by Al-Hayat, indicated that the majority of night military operations throughout 1993 were coordinated by a variety of Somali
Islamic groups within the city. Notably,
Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, a prominent Somali
Islamist militant organization that had previously been in conflict with Aidid's forces in 1992, also began engaging in the insurgency against the American and UN forces. While Aidid did not overtly claim responsibility for these night operations,
Al-Hayat noted that he sought to project the appearance of being the orchestrator for propaganda purposes. In response, President
Bill Clinton approved the proposal to deploy a special task force composed of 400 US Army Rangers and Delta-force Commandos. Despite growing reservations about the effectiveness of UNOSOM military operations against the
Somali National Alliance, the immediate concern of protecting US forces led to the decision to deploy elite forces. In August elite unit, named
Task Force Ranger, consisting of 441 elite US troops was flown into Mogadishu and began a manhunt for
Aidid in what became known as
Operation Gothic Serpent. On October 3, 1993, Task Force Ranger raided a hotel in Mogadishu to capture high ranking SNA personnel. What ensued was the longest, bloodiest and deadliest battle for US and UNOSOM II troops in Somalia. In what later became known as the
Battle of Mogadishu, eighteen US soldiers were killed. Images of their dead bodies being dragged through the streets were broadcast on internationally, infuriating the American public. ==Fallout of the Battle of Mogadishu and the end of UNOSOM II==