Within political science there is a growing body of research and analysis on warlordism that has emerged within weak states that have gained independence as a result of the
collapse of empires. Warlord states are disproportionately concentrated within two regions—the former European colonies of Africa and the former Soviet republics of Eurasia.
Cooperative warlord politics While warlords are commonly viewed as regional leaders who threaten the sovereignty of a state, there are a number of states where the central government functions in collusion with warlords to achieve its goal of exercising its sovereignty over regions that would otherwise fall outside its control. In such
decentralized states, particularly those where armed groups challenge
national sovereignty, warlords can serve as useful allies of a central government that is unable to establish a monopoly over the use of force within its national territory.
Philippines As political scientist Dr. Ariel Hernandez documented, one example is the
Philippines, where successive presidential administrations—at least since
Ferdinand Marcos secured power in 1965—have "franchised violence to regional warlords" to counter the inroads of
communist insurgents,
Islamic rebels and
organized criminal gangs. This has led to the formation of at least 93 "Partisan Armed Groups", armed militias loyal to regional warlords who, in exchange for their loyalty and willingness to use their private armies to quell the threats from these opposition groups, are granted a degree of autonomy within designated regions, the
exclusive right to use violence and the right "to profit from the 'economy of violence' that they establish in their own areas".
Afghanistan Warlordism in Afghanistan—another state where the central government is unable to extend political, military or bureaucratic control over large swaths of territories outside the capital—functions cooperatively within the framework of the state, at times. The warlords, with their established militias, are able to maintain a monopoly of violence within certain territories. They form coalitions with competing warlords and local tribal leaders to present the central government with a challenge, and often the state will bargain to gain access to resources or "
rent", loyalty from the warlord and peace in the region. In exchange for peaceful coexistence, the warlord coalitions are granted special status and privileges, including the right to maintain
de facto political rule within the agreed-upon territory, exert force to retain their
monopoly over violence and extract rent and resources. "By limiting access to these privileges, members of the dominant warlord coalition create credible incentives to cooperate rather than fight among themselves." In the case of Afghanistan, state–warlord bargaining sometimes extends beyond these informal accords and elevates to the status of
political clientelism, in which the warlords are appointed to formal government positions, such as regional governor; a title which provides them
political legitimacy. During the state–warlord bargaining phase, warlords in Afghanistan have a high motivation to prolong war to create political instability, expose weakness of the central state, prompt regional criticism against the government and continue economic extraction.
Post-Soviet republics In his study of warlordism in
Georgia and
Tajikistan, political scientist Jesse Driscoll emphasizes how the collapse of the
Soviet Union precipitated the rise of militant, independence-seeking nationalist movements within the
republics—particularly within the Central Asian and
Caucasus regions—resulting in armed conflict and civil war. Many strongmen warlords had served in the
Soviet military, police units or intelligence services and had experience operating within highly organized bureaucracies. These warlords formed well-structured militias that not only established political and economic control over territories, but institutionalized bureaucracies to establish and maintain their monopolies over violence and rent and "incentivizing the behavior of citizens within a particular geographical space". Driscoll termed this warlordism "militia coalition politics". A truce was reached without any disarmament of militias; instead, the warlord coalitions reached a non-violent "order producing equilibrium",
Ungoverned warlordism, or warlords as "stationary bandits" One political theory, pioneered by American economist
Mancur Olson, posits that warlords can function as stationary bandits. In some African states, warlord politics can be a product of endowment-rich, extractable resources. Some nations, such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, have had stationary bandits who use extraction of resources such as diamonds, cobalt and timber ("
conflict resources") in order to increase their political power. They often enforce their right to these resources by claiming to be protecting the people. These warlords, or stationary bandits, often partner with compliant foreign firms and create
symbiotic relationships to yield greater power for the warlords and a source of wealth for external firms. The result is a political system in which a dominant coalition of warlords' strips and distributes valuable assets in exchange for bureaucratic services and security from foreign firms. Stationary bandits can amass power because of their economic connections with foreign firms. Oftentimes warlords will exert violence on a particular region in order to gain control. Once in control, these warlords can
expropriate the property or resources from the people and land and redistribute the riches in exchange for
monetary value. When people live in a particular region dominated by a warlord, they can choose to flee or live within the political structure the warlords have created. If the warlords provide protection against external threats of violence, the people will be likely to stay and continue living and working in that region, even though they are being
extorted. The trade-off becomes protection for extraction, and this political framework is common in periphery regions of countries which do not have a strong central government. == Contemporary examples of warlordism ==