Commonwealth South Africa's policies were subject to international scrutiny in 1960, when
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan criticised them during his
Wind of Change speech in
Cape Town. Weeks later, tensions came to a head in the
Sharpeville massacre, resulting in more international condemnation. Soon afterwards,
Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd announced
a referendum on whether the country should become a republic. The referendum on 5 October that year asked Whites; "Are you in favour of a Republic for the Union?", and 52% voted "Yes". As a consequence of this change of status, South Africa needed to reapply for continued membership of the
Commonwealth, with which it had privileged trade links.
India had become a
republic within the Commonwealth in 1950, but it became clear that African and South and Southeast Asian member states would oppose South Africa due to its apartheid policies. As a result, South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth on 31 May 1961, the day that the Republic came into existence. During the 1980s, the Commonwealth advocated for economic sanctions to accelerate the dismantling of apartheid, and in 1986 during a mini-summit which involved seven different countries, including the United Kingdom, a tough programme of sanctions was agreed.
Organisation for African Unity The
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was created in 1963. Its primary objectives were to eradicate colonialism and improve social, political and economic conditions in Africa. It censured apartheid and demanded sanctions against South Africa. African states agreed to aid the liberation movements in their fight against apartheid. In 1969, 14 nations from Central and East Africa gathered in
Lusaka, Zambia, and formulated the
Lusaka Manifesto, which was signed on 13 April by all of the countries in attendance except
Malawi. This manifesto was later taken on by both the OAU and the United Nations. Regarding South Africa, the manifesto said that the countries supported peaceful change "if it were possible", and made clear that they would support
guerrilla liberation movements if necessary. South Africa's negative response to the Lusaka Manifesto and rejection of a change to its policies brought about another OAU announcement in October 1971. The
Mogadishu Declaration stated that South Africa's rebuffing of negotiations meant that its Black people could only be freed through military means, and that no African state should converse with the apartheid government.
Outward-looking policy In 1966,
B. J. Vorster became prime minister. He was not prepared to dismantle apartheid, but he did try to redress South Africa's isolation and to revitalise the country's global reputation, even with other African states. This he called his "Outward-Looking" policy. Vorster's willingness to talk to African leaders stood in contrast to Verwoerd's refusal to engage with them. In 1966, he met the heads of the neighbouring states of
Lesotho,
Swaziland and
Botswana. In 1967, he offered technological and financial aid to any African state prepared to receive it, asserting that no political strings were attached, aware that many African states needed financial aid despite their opposition to South Africa's racial policies. Many were also tied to South Africa economically because of their migrant labour population working down the South African mines. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland remained outspoken critics of apartheid, but were dependent on South African economic assistance.
Malawi was the first non-neighbouring country to accept South African aid. In 1967, the two states set out their political and economic relations. In 1969, Malawi was the only country at the assembly which did not sign the Lusaka Manifesto condemning South Africa's apartheid policy. In 1970, Malawian president
Hastings Banda made his first official stopover in South Africa. Associations with Mozambique followed suit and were sustained after that country won its sovereignty in 1975. Angola was also granted South African loans. Other countries which formed relationships with South Africa included
Liberia,
Ivory Coast,
Madagascar,
Mauritius,
Gabon,
Zaire (now DR Congo) and the
Central African Republic. Although these states condemned apartheid (more than ever after South Africa's denunciation of the Lusaka Manifesto), South Africa's economic and military dominance meant that they remained dependent on South Africa to varying degrees.
Sports and culture Beginning South Africa's isolation in sport began in the mid-1950s and increased throughout the 1960s. Apartheid forbade multiracial sport, which meant that overseas teams, by virtue of them having players of different races, could not play in South Africa. In 1956, the
International Table Tennis Federation severed its ties with the all-White South African Table Tennis Union, preferring the non-racial South African Table Tennis Board. The apartheid government responded by confiscating the passports of the Board's players so that they were unable to attend international games.
Isolation Verwoerd years In 1959, the non-racial South African Sports Association (SASA) was formed to secure the rights of all players on the global field. After meeting with no success in its endeavours to attain credit by collaborating with White establishments, SASA approached the
International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1962, calling for South Africa's expulsion from the Olympic Games. The IOC sent South Africa a caution to the effect that, if there were no changes, they would be barred from competing at the
1964 Olympic Games in
Tokyo. The changes were initiated, and in January 1963, the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC) was set up. The Anti-Apartheid Movement persisted in its campaign for South Africa's exclusion, and the IOC acceded in barring the country from the 1964 Olympic Games. South Africa selected a multi-racial team for the next Olympic Games, and the IOC opted for incorporation in the
1968 Mexico City Olympic Games. Because of protests from AAMs and African nations, however, the IOC was forced to retract the invitation. Foreign complaints about South Africa's bigoted sports brought more isolation. Racially selected New Zealand sports teams toured South Africa until the 1970
All Blacks rugby tour, when
Maori were allowed to enter the country under the status of "honorary Whites". Huge and widespread protests occurred in
New Zealand in 1981 against the
Springbok tourthe government spent $8,000,000 protecting games using the army and police force. A planned All Black tour to South Africa in 1985 remobilised the New Zealand protesters and it was cancelled. A "rebel tour"not government sanctionedwent ahead in 1986, but after that sporting ties were cut, and New Zealand made a decision not to convey an authorised rugby team to South Africa until the end of apartheid.
Vorster years On 6 September 1966, Verwoerd was fatally stabbed at Parliament House by parliamentary messenger
Dimitri Tsafendas.
John Vorster took office shortly after, and announced that South Africa would no longer dictate to the international community what their teams should look like. Although this reopened the gate for international sporting meets, it did not signal the end of South Africa's racist sporting policies. In 1968, Vorster went against his policy by refusing to permit
Basil D'Oliveira, a Coloured South African-born cricketer, to join the English cricket team on its tour to South Africa. Vorster said that the side had been chosen only to prove a point, and not on merit. D'Oliveira was eventually included in the team as the first substitute, but the tour was cancelled. Protests against certain tours brought about the cancellation of a number of other visits, including that of an England rugby team touring South Africa in 1969–70. The first of the "White Bans" occurred in 1971 when the Chairman of the Australian Cricketing Association
Sir Don Bradmanflew to South Africa to meet Vorster. Vorster had expected Bradman to allow the tour of the Australian cricket team to go ahead, but things became heated after Bradman asked why Black sportsmen were not allowed to play cricket. Vorster stated that Blacks were intellectually inferior and had no finesse for the game. Bradman, thinking this ignorant and repugnant, asked Vorster if he had heard of a man named
Garry Sobers. On his return to
Australia, Bradman released a short statement: "We will not play them until they choose a team on a non-racist basis." In South Africa, Vorster vented his anger publicly against Bradman, while the African National Congress rejoiced. This was the first time a predominantly White nation had taken the side of multiracial sport, producing an unsettling resonance that more "White" boycotts were coming. In 1971, Vorster altered his policies even further by distinguishing multiracial from multinational sport. Multiracial sport, between teams with players of different races, remained outlawed; multinational sport, however, was now acceptable: international sides would not be subject to South Africa's racial stipulations. In 1978, Nigeria
boycotted the
Commonwealth Games because New Zealand's sporting contacts with the South African government were not considered to be in accordance with the 1977
Gleneagles Agreement. Nigeria also led the 32-nation boycott of the
1986 Commonwealth Games because of UK Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher's ambivalent attitude towards sporting links with South Africa, significantly affecting the quality and profitability of the Games and thus thrusting apartheid into the international spotlight.
Cultural boycott In the 1960s, the Anti-Apartheid Movements began to campaign for cultural boycotts of apartheid South Africa. Artists were requested not to present or let their works be hosted in South Africa. In 1963, 45 British writers put their signatures to an affirmation approving of the boycott, and, in 1964, American actor
Marlon Brando called for a similar affirmation for films. In 1965, the
Writers' Guild of Great Britain called for a proscription on the sending of films to South Africa. Over sixty American artists signed a statement against apartheid and against professional links with the state. The presentation of some South African plays in the United Kingdom and the United States was also vetoed. After the arrival of
television in South Africa in 1975, the British Actors Union,
Equity, boycotted the service, and no British programme concerning its associates could be sold to South Africa. Similarly, when
home video grew popular in the 1980s, the Australian arm of
CBS/Fox Video (now
20th Century Fox Home Entertainment) placed stickers on their
VHS and
Betamax cassettes which labelled exporting such cassettes to South Africa as "an infringement of copyright". Sporting and cultural boycotts did not have the same effect as economic sanctions, but they did much to lift consciousness amongst normal South Africans of the global condemnation of apartheid.
Western influence While international opposition to apartheid grew, the
Nordic countriesand
Sweden in particularprovided both moral and financial support for the
ANC. On 21 February 1986a week before he was assassinated
Sweden's Prime Minister
Olof Palme made the
keynote address to the ''Swedish People's Parliament Against Apartheid'' held in
Stockholm. In addressing the hundreds of anti-apartheid sympathisers as well as leaders and officials from the ANC and the
Anti-Apartheid Movement such as
Oliver Tambo, Palme declared: "Apartheid cannot be reformed; it has to be eliminated." Other Western countries adopted a more ambivalent position. In
Switzerland, the
Swiss-South African Association lobbied on behalf of the South African government. The
Nixon administration implemented a policy known as the
Tar Baby Option, pursuant to which the US maintained close relations with the Apartheid South African government. The
Reagan administration evaded international sanctions and provided diplomatic support in international forums for the South African government. The United States also increased trade with the Apartheid regime, while describing the ANC as "a terrorist organisation". Like the Reagan administration, the government of
Margaret Thatcher pursued a policy of "
constructive engagement" with the apartheid government, vetoing the imposition of UN economic sanctions. Public U.S. government justifications for supporting the Apartheid regime included a belief in "
free trade" and the perception of the
anti-communist South African government as a bastion against
Marxist forces in Southern Africa, for example, by the military intervention of South Africa in the
Angolan Civil War in support of right-wing insurgents fighting to topple the government. The U.K. government also declared the ANC a terrorist organisation. , Netherlands, 11 June 1988 By the late-1980s, with no sign of a political resolution in South Africa, Western patience began to run out. By 1989, a bipartisan
Republican/
Democratic initiative in the US favoured
economic sanctions (realised as the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986), the release of Nelson Mandela, and a negotiated settlement involving the ANC. Thatcher too began to take a similar line, but insisted on the suspension of the ANC's armed struggle. The UK's significant economic involvement in South Africa may have provided some
leverage with the South African government, with both the UK and the US applying pressure and pushing for negotiations. However, neither the UK nor the US was willing to apply economic pressure upon their multinational interests in South Africa, such as the mining company
Anglo American. Although a high-profile compensation claim against these companies was thrown out of court in 2004, the
US Supreme Court in May 2008 upheld an appeals court ruling allowing another lawsuit that sought damages of more than US$400 billion from major international companies accused of aiding South Africa's apartheid system.
Effect of the Cold War "Total Onslaught" During the 1950s, South African military strategy was decisively shaped by fears of communist espionage and a conventional
Soviet threat to the strategic Cape trade route between the
south Atlantic and
Indian Oceans. The apartheid government supported the US-led
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as its policy of regional
containment against Soviet-backed regimes and insurgencies worldwide. By the late-1960s, the rise of Soviet
client states on the African continent, as well as Soviet aid for militant anti-apartheid movements, was considered one of the primary external threats to the apartheid system. South African officials frequently accused domestic opposition groups of being communist proxies. For its part, the Soviet Union viewed South Africa as a bastion of
neocolonialism and a regional Western ally, which helped fuel its support for various anti-apartheid causes. From 1973 onwards, much of South Africa's white population increasingly looked upon their country as a bastion of the
free world besieged militarily, politically, and culturally by Communism and radical
black nationalism. The apartheid government perceived itself as being locked in a proxy struggle with the
Warsaw Pact and by implication, armed wings of black nationalist forces such as
Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the
People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), which often received arms and training in Warsaw Pact member states.
Militarization of society Soviet support for militant anti-apartheid movements worked in the government's favour, as its claim to be reacting in opposition to aggressive communist expansion gained greater plausibility, and helped it justify its own domestic militarisation methods, known as "Total Strategy". allegedly with covert assistance from
Israel. As a result of "Total Strategy", South African society became increasingly militarised. Many domestic civil organisations were modelled upon military structures, and military virtues such as discipline, patriotism and loyalty were highly regarded. General conscription applied, which meant that all able-bodied white males aged eighteen and older were drafted into the armed forces. The length of national service was gradually extended to 12 months in 1972 and 24 months in 1978. Covert operations focused on espionage and domestic counter-subversion became common, the number of
special forces units swelled, and the
South African Defence Force (SADF) had amassed enough sophisticated conventional weaponry to pose a serious threat to the "
front-line states", a regional alliance of neighbouring countries opposed to apartheid. The apartheid government made judicious use of
extraterritorial operations to eliminate its military and political opponents, arguing that neighbouring states, including their civilian populations, which hosted, tolerated on their soil, or otherwise sheltered anti-apartheid insurgent groups could not evade responsibility for provoking retaliatory strikes. The reprisals which occurred beyond South Africa's borders involved not only hostile states, but neutral and sympathetic governments as well, often forcing them to react against their will and interests. External South African military operations were aimed at eliminating the training facilities,
safehouses, infrastructure, equipment, and manpower of the insurgents. It would also send a clear message to the host government that collaborating with insurgent forces involved potentially high costs. The insurgent bases were usually situated near military installations of the host government, so that SADF retaliatory strikes hit those facilities as well and attracted international attention and condemnation of what was perceived as aggression against the armed forces of another sovereign state. This would inevitably result in major engagements, in which the SADF's
expeditionary units would have to contend with the firepower of the host government's forces. This precipitated several artillery duels with the Zambian Army. One example was the
Gaborone Raid, carried out in 1985, during which a South African special forces team crossed the border into Botswana and demolished four suspected MK safe houses, severely damaging another four. Sabotage was also used as a pressure tactic when South Africa was negotiating with a host government to cease providing sanctuary to insurgent forces, as in the case of
Operation Argon. Successful sabotage actions of high-profile economic targets undermined a country's ability to negotiate from a position of strength, and made it likelier to accede to South African demands rather than risk the expense of further destruction and war. == State security ==