Law and politics Smuts began to practise law in
Cape Town, but his abrasive nature made him few friends. Finding little financial success in the law, he began to devote more and more of his time to politics and journalism, writing for the
Cape Times. Smuts was intrigued by the prospect of a united South Africa, and joined the
Afrikaner Bond. By good fortune, Smuts's father knew the leader of the group,
Jan Hofmeyr. Hofmeyr in turn recommended Jan to
Cecil Rhodes, who owned the
De Beers mining company. In 1895, Smuts became an advocate and supporter of Rhodes. When Rhodes launched the
Jameson Raid, in the summer of 1895–96, Smuts was outraged. Feeling betrayed by his employer, friend and political ally, he resigned from De Beers, and left political life. Instead he became state attorney in the capital of the
South African Republic,
Pretoria. After the Jameson Raid, relations between the British and the Afrikaners had deteriorated steadily. By 1898, war seemed imminent.
Orange Free State President
Martinus Steyn called for a
peace conference at
Bloemfontein to settle each side's grievances. With an intimate knowledge of the British, Smuts took control of the Transvaal delegation. Sir
Alfred Milner, head of the British delegation, took exception to his dominance, and conflict between the two led to the collapse of the conference, consigning South Africa to war.
Psychology Smuts was the first South African to be internationally regarded as an important psychologist. During Smuts's undergraduate years at Cambridge University, he produced a manuscript in 1895 in which he analysed the personality of the famous American poet
Walt Whitman. Smuts had no interest in pursuing a career in psychology.
Recognition from Adler Adler later wrote a letter, dated 31 January 1931, where he stated that he recommended Smuts's book to his students and followers. He referred to it as "the best preparation for the science of Individual Psychology". Smuts' forces penetrated the Cape Colony extent that some elements came within sight of Table Mountain. To draw out British forces, Smuts sought to take a major target, the copper-mining town of
Okiep in the present-day
Northern Cape Province (April–May 1902), which he laid under siege. Events in the Transvaal overtook the siege before it was resolved: in late April a dispatch from
Lord Kitchener reached Smuts, inviting him to the peace conference at Veeringen. Smuts agreed a truce and with the garrison and departed to attend the peace negotiations. In his absence Boer officer
Manie Maritz attempted to break the truce by attacking the town with a train packed full of explosives. This effort failed when the train derailed outside of the town and its deadly cargo burnt off harmlessly. Before the conference, Smuts met Lord Kitchener at
Kroonstad railway station, where they discussed the proposed terms of surrender. Smuts then took a leading role in the negotiations between the representatives from all of the commandos from the Orange Free State and the South African Republic (15–31 May 1902). Although he admitted that, from a purely military perspective, the war could continue, he stressed the importance of not sacrificing the Afrikaner people for that independence. He was very conscious that "more than 20,000 women and children have already died in the
concentration camps of the enemy". He felt it would have been a crime to continue the war without the assurance of help from elsewhere and declared, "Comrades, we decided to stand to the bitter end. Let us now, like men, admit that that end has come for us, come in a more bitter shape than we ever thought." His opinions were representative of the conference, which then voted by 54 to 6 in favour of peace. Representatives of the Governments met Lord Kitchener and at five minutes past eleven on 31 May 1902, the Acting
State President of the South African Republic,
Schalk Willem Burger signed the
Treaty of Vereeniging, followed by the members of his government, Acting
State President of the Orange Free State,
Christiaan De Wet, and the members of his government.
A British Transvaal Despite Smuts's exploits as a general and a negotiator, nothing could mask the fact that the Boers had been defeated.
Lord Milner had full control of all South African affairs, and established an
Anglophone elite, known as
Milner's Kindergarten. As an Afrikaner, Smuts was excluded. Defeated but not deterred, in May 1904, he decided to join with the other former Transvaal generals to form a political party,
Het Volk ('The People'), to fight for the Afrikaner cause.
Louis Botha was elected leader, and Smuts his deputy. When his term of office expired, Milner was replaced as
High Commissioner by the more conciliatory
William Palmer, 2nd Earl of Selborne. Smuts saw an opportunity and pounced, urging Botha to persuade the
Liberals to support ''Het Volk's'' cause. When the
Conservative government under
Arthur Balfour collapsed, in December 1905, the decision paid off. Smuts joined Botha in London, and sought to negotiate
responsible government for the
Transvaal within British South Africa. Using the thorny political issue of South Asian labourers ('
coolies'), the South Africans convinced Prime Minister Sir
Henry Campbell-Bannerman and, with him, the
cabinet and
Parliament. Through 1906, Smuts worked on the new constitution for the Transvaal, and, in December 1906, elections were held for the Transvaal parliament. Despite being shy and reserved, unlike the showman Botha, Smuts won a comfortable victory in the
Wonderboom constituency, near Pretoria. His victory was one of many, with
Het Volk winning in a
landslide and Botha forming the government. To reward his loyalty and efforts, Smuts was given two key cabinet positions:
Colonial Secretary and Education Secretary. Smuts proved to be an effective leader, if unpopular. As Education Secretary, he had fights with the
Dutch Reformed Church, of which he had once been a dedicated member, which demanded
Calvinist teachings in schools. As Colonial Secretary, he opposed a movement for equal rights for
South Asian workers, led by
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. There, Smuts was up against a hard-talking
Orange River Colony delegation, who refused every one of Smuts's demands. Smuts had successfully predicted this opposition, and their objections, and tailored his own ambitions appropriately. He allowed compromise on the location of the capital, on the official language, and on suffrage, but he refused to budge on the fundamental structure of government. As the convention drew into autumn, the Orange leaders began to see a final compromise as necessary to secure the concessions that Smuts had already made. They agreed to Smuts's draft South African constitution, which was duly ratified by the South African colonies. Smuts and Botha took the constitution to London, where it was
passed by Parliament and given
Royal Assent by King
Edward VII in December 1909. The harmony and co-operation soon ended. Smuts was criticised for his overarching powers, and the cabinet was reshuffled. Smuts lost Interior and Mines, but gained control of
Finance. That was still too much for Smuts's opponents, who decried his possession of both Defence and Finance, two departments that were usually at loggerheads. At the 1913 South African Party conference, the
Old Boers (
J. B. M. Hertzog,
Martinus Theunis Steyn,
Christiaan de Wet), called for Botha and Smuts to step down. The two narrowly survived a confidence vote, and the troublesome triumvirate stormed out, leaving the party for good. With the schism in internal party politics came a new threat to the mines that brought South Africa its wealth. A small-scale miners' dispute flared into a full-blown strike, and rioting broke out in Johannesburg after Smuts intervened heavy-handedly. After police shot dead twenty-one strikers, Smuts and Botha headed unaccompanied to Johannesburg to resolve the situation personally. Facing down threats to their own lives, they negotiated a cease-fire. But the cease-fire did not hold, and in 1914, a railway strike turned into a
general strike. Threats of a revolution caused Smuts to declare
martial law. He acted ruthlessly, deporting union leaders without trial and using
Parliament to absolve him and the government of any blame retroactively. That was too much for the Old Boers, who set up their own
National Party to fight the all-powerful Botha-Smuts partnership. Smuts was promoted to temporary
lieutenant general on 18 February 1916, and to honorary lieutenant general for distinguished service in the field on 1 January 1917. Smuts's chief intelligence officer, Colonel
Richard Meinertzhagen, wrote very critically of his conduct of the campaign. He believed
Horace Smith-Dorrien (who had saved the
British Army during the
retreat from Mons and was the original choice as commander in 1916) would have quickly defeated the Germans. In particular, Meinertzhagen thought that frontal attacks would have been decisive, and less costly than the flanking movements preferred by Smuts, which took longer, so that thousands of Imperial troops died of disease in the field. He wrote: "Smuts has cost Britain many hundreds of lives and many millions of pounds by his caution ... Smuts was not an astute soldier; a brilliant statesman and politician but no soldier." Meinertzhagen wrote these comments in October/November 1916, in the weeks after being relieved by Smuts due to symptoms of depression, and he was invalided back to England shortly thereafter. Early in 1917, Smuts left Africa and went to London, as he had been invited to join the
Imperial War Cabinet and the
War Policy Committee by
David Lloyd George. Smuts initially recommended renewed
Western Front attacks and a policy of attrition, lest with
Russian commitment to the war wavering,
France or
Italy would be tempted to make a separate peace.
Lloyd George wanted a commander "of the dashing type" for the
Middle East in succession to
Archibald Murray, but Smuts refused the command (late May) unless promised resources for a decisive victory, and he agreed with
William Robertson that Western Front commitments did not justify a serious attempt to capture
Jerusalem.
Edmund Allenby was appointed instead. Like other members of the War Cabinet, Smuts's commitment to Western Front efforts was shaken by
Third Ypres. In 1917, following the
German Gotha Raids, and lobbying by
Viscount French, Smuts wrote a review of the British Air Services, which came to be called the Smuts Report. He was helped in large part in this by General Sir
David Henderson who was seconded to him. This report led to the treatment of air as a separate force, which eventually became the
Royal Air Force. and Smuts at Versailles, July 1919 By mid-January 1918, Lloyd George was toying with the idea of appointing Smuts Commander-in-Chief of all land and sea forces facing the
Ottoman Empire, reporting directly to the War Cabinet rather than to Robertson. Early in 1918, Smuts was sent to
Egypt to confer with Allenby and
William Marshall, and prepare for major efforts in that theatre. Before his departure, alienated by Robertson's exaggerated estimates of the required reinforcements, he urged Robertson's removal. Allenby told Smuts of Robertson's private instructions (sent by hand of
Walter Kirke, appointed by Robertson as Smuts's adviser) that there was no merit in any further advance. He worked with Smuts to draw up plans, using three reinforcement divisions from
Mesopotamia, to reach
Haifa by June and
Damascus by the autumn, the speed of the advance limited by the need to lay fresh rail track. This was the foundation of Allenby's successful offensive later in the year. Like most
British Empire political and military leaders in the First World War, Smuts thought the
American Expeditionary Forces lacked the proper leadership and experience to be effective quickly. He supported the Anglo-French amalgamation policy towards the Americans. In particular, he had a low opinion of General
John J. Pershing's leadership skills, so much so that he proposed to Lloyd George that Pershing be relieved of command and US forces be placed "under someone more confident, like [himself]". This did not endear him to the Americans once it was leaked.
Statesman Smuts and Botha were key negotiators at the
Paris Peace Conference. Both were in favour of reconciliation with
Germany and limited reparations. Smuts was a key architect of the
League of Nations through his correspondences with
Woodrow Wilson, his work with the
Imperial War Cabinet during the First World War and his book
League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion. According to Jacob Kripp, Smuts saw the League as necessary in unifying white internationalists and pacifying a race war through indirect rule by Europeans over non-whites and segregation. Hungary's rejection led to the conference's approval of a
Czechoslovak-
Romanian invasion and harsher terms in the
Treaty of Trianon. The
Treaty of Versailles gave South Africa a
Class C mandate over German South-West Africa (which later became
Namibia), which was occupied from 1919 until withdrawal in 1990. At the same time, Australia was given a similar mandate over
German New Guinea, which it held until 1975. Both Smuts and the Australian prime minister
Billy Hughes feared the rising power of the
Empire of Japan in the post-First World War world. When the former
German East Africa was divided into two mandated territories (
Ruanda-Urundi and
Tanganyika),
Smutsland was one of the proposed names for what became Tanganyika. Smuts, who had called for
South African territorial expansion all the way to the River Zambesi since the late 19th century, was ultimately disappointed with the League awarding South-West Africa only a mandate status, as he had looked forward to formally incorporating the territory to South Africa. Smuts returned to South African politics after the conference. When Botha died in 1919, Smuts was elected prime minister, serving until a shocking defeat in 1924 at the hands of the
National Party. After the death of the former American President Woodrow Wilson, Smuts was quoted as saying that: "Not Wilson, but humanity failed at Paris." While in Britain for an
Imperial Conference in June 1921, Smuts went to Ireland and met
Éamon de Valera to help broker an armistice and peace deal between the
warring British and Irish nationalists. Smuts attempted to sell the concept of Ireland receiving
Dominion status similar to that of Australia and South Africa. During his first premiership Smuts was involved in a number of controversies. The first was the
Rand Revolt of March 1922, where aeroplanes were used to bomb white miners who were striking in opposition to proposals to allow non-whites to do more skilled and semi-skilled work previously reserved to whites only. Smuts was accused of siding with the
Rand Lords who wanted the removal of the colour bar in the hope that it would lower wage costs. The white miners perpetrated acts of violence across the Rand, including murderous attacks on non-Europeans, conspicuously on African miners in their compounds, and this culminated in a general assault on the police. Smuts declared martial law and suppressed the insurrection in three days – at a cost of 291 police and army deaths, and 396 civilians killed. A Martial Law Commission was established which found that Smuts used larger forces than were strictly required, but had saved lives by doing so. The second was the
Bulhoek Massacre of 24 May 1921, when at Bulhoek in the eastern Cape eight hundred South African policemen and soldiers armed with
maxim machine guns and two field artillery guns killed 163 and wounded 129 members of an indigenous religious sect known as "Israelites" who had been armed with knobkerries, assegais and swords and who had refused to vacate land they regarded as holy to them. Casualties on the government side at Bulhoek amounted to one trooper wounded and one horse killed. Once again, there were charges of the unnecessary use of overwhelming force. However, no commission of enquiry was appointed. The third was the
Bondelswarts Rebellion, in which Smuts supported the actions of the South African administration in attacking the Bondelswarts in
South West Africa. The mandatory administration moved to crush what they called a rebellion of 500 to 600 people, of which 200 were said to be armed (although only about 40 weapons were captured after the Bondelswarts were crushed).
Gysbert Hofmeyr, the Mandatory Administrator, organised 400 armed men, and sent in aircraft to bomb the Bondelswarts. Casualties included 100 Bondelswart deaths, including a few women and children. A further 468 men were either wounded or taken prisoner. South Africa's international reputation was tarnished. Ruth First, a South African anti-apartheid activist and scholar, describes the Bondelswarts shooting as "the
Sharpeville of the 1920s". As a botanist, Smuts collected plants extensively over southern Africa. He went on several botanical expeditions in the 1920s and 1930s with
John Hutchinson, former botanist-in-charge of the African section of the Herbarium of the
Royal Botanic Gardens and taxonomist of note. Smuts was a keen mountaineer and supporter of mountaineering. One of his favourite rambles was up
Table Mountain along a route now known as Smuts' Track. In February 1923 he unveiled a memorial to members of the
Mountain Club who had been killed in the First World War. In December 1934, Smuts told an audience at the
Royal Institute of International Affairs that: How can the
inferiority complex which is obsessing and, I fear, poisoning the mind, and indeed the very soul of
Germany, be removed? There is only one way and that is to recognise her complete equality of status with her fellows and to do so frankly, freely and unreservedly ... While one understands and sympathises with
French fears, one cannot, but feel for Germany in the prison of inferiority in which she still remains sixteen years after the conclusion of the war. The continuance of the Versailles status is becoming an offence to the conscience of Europe and a danger to future peace ... Fair play, sportsmanship—indeed every standard of private and public life—calls for frank revision of the situation. Indeed ordinary prudence makes it imperative. Let us break these bonds and set the complexed-obsessed soul free in a decent human way and Europe will reap a rich reward in tranquility, security and returning prosperity. Though in his Rectorial Address delivered on 17 October 1934 at
St Andrews University he stated that: The new Tyranny, disguised in attractive patriotic colours, is enticing youth everywhere into its service. Freedom must make a great counterstroke to save itself and our fair western civilisation. Once more the heroic call is coming to our youth. The fight for human freedom is indeed the supreme issue of the future, as it has always been.
Second World War Smuts, standing left, at the 1944
Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference After nine years in opposition and academia, Smuts returned as
deputy prime minister in a 'grand coalition' government under
J. B. M. Hertzog. When Hertzog advocated neutrality towards
Nazi Germany in 1939, the coalition split and Hertzog's motion to remain out of the war was defeated in
Parliament by a vote of 80 to 67.
Governor-General Sir Patrick Duncan refused Hertzog's request to dissolve parliament for a general election on the issue. Hertzog resigned and Duncan invited Smuts, Hertzog's coalition partner, to form a government and become prime minister for the second time in order to lead the country into the
Second World War on the side of the
Allies. On 24 May 1941, Smuts was appointed a
field marshal of the
British Army. Smuts's importance to the Imperial war effort was emphasised by a quite audacious plan, proposed as early as 1940, to appoint Smuts as
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, should Churchill die or otherwise become incapacitated during the war. This idea was put forward by
Jock Colville, Churchill's private secretary, to Queen
Mary and then to
George VI, both of whom warmed to the idea. In May 1945, he represented South Africa in
San Francisco at the drafting of the
United Nations Charter. According to historian
Mark Mazower, Smuts "did more than anyone to argue for, and help draft, the UN's stirring preamble." Smuts saw the UN as key to protecting white imperial rule over Africa. Also in 1945, he was mentioned by
Halvdan Koht among seven candidates that were qualified for the
Nobel Prize in Peace. However, he did not explicitly nominate any of them. The person actually nominated was
Cordell Hull. ==Later life==