Mali War

Since Mali's independence in 1960, pressures from government policies aimed at crushing traditional power structures, social mores, and local justice customs have caused several rebellions by the Tuaregs. Repeated promises of autonomy made in the aftermath of these uprisings were ignored, and Tuareg leaders were frequently sidelined from national politics. By late 2010, Tuareg political activists were renewing calls for Azawadi independence, asserting that they were marginalized and consequently impoverished in both Mali and Niger, and that mining projects had damaged important pastoral areas. Contributing to these grievances were broader issues such as climate change and a long history of forced modernization imposed on the nomadic societies of northern Mali, which deepened the divide between Tuareg communities and the central government. During the 2000s, Salafi jihadists and preachers associated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) began infiltrating northern Mali from southern Algeria. Upon returning, they found that, despite past promises, little had changed in the relationship between their communities and the central government. and was reportedly joined by some Arab leaders. Bilal Ag Acherif, leader of the MNLA, declared that the responsibility was on Mali to grant the Saharan peoples their right to self-determination, otherwise they would take it themselves. 1990s vet Iyad Ag Ghali, who had made an unsuccessful bid to become the secretary general of the MNLA at Zakak and to become the successor to the amenukal of the Ifoghas Tuaregs, started his own group, Ansar Dine, which drew from members of the Ifoghas tribe and Tuareg jihadists. The former faction of the party included prominent figures who were not fully committed to jihadist ideology but were willing to collaborate to achieve shared goals. Eventually, the jihadist faction would gain the upper hand as they had adsorbed AQIM numbers and were favored by Ghali. By January 2013, the combined strength of these three groups was estimated at 3,000. Cooperation between these jihadist groups with Boko Haram and Ansaru militants, who came from Nigeria via Niger, was reported during the rebellion. Furthermore, reports during the rebellion indicated that Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau was in Gao, receiving shelter after being wounded by Nigerian forces, before leaving in January 2013. The MNLA was de facto allied with the other Jihadist groups. In 2011, the size of the Malian army was around 12,150. == Tuareg rebellion (January–April 2012) ==

According to Stratfor, the first attack began on 16–17 January 2012 by MNLA militants against a military barracks and a national guard base in Menaka. The attack was thwarted by a government helicopter, forcing the attackers to retreat, though there were reports that Tuareg rebels led by Malian army defector Ag Assalat Habbi may still be in the Menaka area. Attacks continued on the morning of 17 January against the disorganized and under resourced government forces in the cities of Ménaka, Aguelhok, and Tessalit. Conflicting reports emerged regarding control of these locations during the clashes, with the Malian government releasing a statement on 20 January indicating that the three towns of Menaka, Aguelhoc, and Tessalit had been reclaimed. On 24 January, after cutting off supply lines for two days and receiving reinforcements, rebel forces managed to retake Aguelhok, either due to the Malian army's depletion of ammunition or as part of a tactical withdrawal intended to consolidate forces in Kidal. The following day, the Malian military, with the help of airstrikes, once again recaptured the town. Control of Aguelhok and other settlements continued to shift multiple times. amid protests in southern Mali due growing dissatisfaction over the government's handling of the rebellion. On 1 February, the MNLA took captured Ménaka, followed by Kidal on 6 February. In March, Ansar Dine emerged publicly through Malian social media, releasing a video showing its fighters taking over the military base at Aguelhok. In the video, the group's deputy leader, Cheikh Ag Aoussa, declared their objective of establishing Sharia law in Mali. several government units abandoned attempts to relieve them. A week later, they retreated to Algeria, leaving its base and the airport in rebel hands. In the end, a large number of government soldiers had been killed, captured, or deserted, and significant amounts of ammunition were either destroyed or captured by MNLA. Ansar Dine stated that it had control of the Mali-Algeria border. Coup d'état On 21 March 2012, soldiers displeased with the management of the rebellion attacked several locations in the capital Bamako, including the presidential palace, state television, and military barracks. The next morning, Captain Amadou Sanogo, the chairman of the new National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State (CNRDR), made a statement in which he announced that the junta had suspended Mali's constitution and taken control of the nation. The mutineers cited Touré's alleged poor handling of the insurgency and the lack of equipment for the Malian Army as their reasons for the rebellion. The CNRDR would serve as an interim regime until power could be returned to a new, democratically elected government. While the coup was widely supported by population, including by the United Nations Security Council, the African Union, and the African Union also suspended Mali. The U.S., the World Bank, and the African Development Bank suspended development aid funds in support of ECOWAS and the AU's reactions to the coup. Côte d'Ivoire President Alassane Ouattara, who was the rotational chairman of ECOWAS, said that once the civilian government was restored an ECOWAS stand-by force of 2,000 soldiers could intervene against the rebellion. Burkina Faso's President Blaise Compaore was appointed as a mediator by ECOWAS to resolve the crisis. On the day of the deadline, the junta and ECOWAS reached an agreement in which both Sanogo and Touré would resign, sanctions would be lifted, the mutineers would be granted amnesty, and power would pass to National Assembly of Mali Speaker Dioncounda Traoré. Following Traoré's inauguration, he pledged to "wage a total and relentless war" on the Tuareg rebels unless they released their control of northern Malian cities. Despite this de jure transition, Sanogo seemed to remain the "real" head of state. In May, further military setbacks trigged protests in favor of a return to military rule, during which some government soldiers allowed protesters to burst into Traoré's office, where they "grabbed him by the collar and beat him on the head into unconsciousness." Though the offensive ostensibly included both the MNLA and Ansar Dine, according to Jeremy Keenan of the University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies, Ansar Dine's military contribution was slight: "What seems to happen is that when they move into a town, the MNLA take out the military base – not that there's much resistance – and Iyad [ag Aghaly] goes into town and puts up his flag and starts bossing everyone around about Sharia law." On 6 April 2012, stating that it had secured all of its desired territory, the MNLA declared independence from Mali, which was rejected as invalid by the African Union and the European Union. Acherif was made President of the Transitional Council of the State of Azawad. In total, at least 1,000 Malian soldiers had been killed, captured, or deserted. == Islamist–Tuareg nationalist conflict (June–November 2012) ==

As soon as independence was declared, tensions emerged between the MNLA and jihadist groups due to differences in goals with their common enemy defeated. Tuareg nationalists sought to maintain an independent state, while the jihadist wished to spread Islamic rule to the rest of Mali and neighboring states. The MNLA succeeded in negotiating their release without violence, and one MNLA commander said that the movement had decided to disarm other armed groups. On 8 April, a mostly Arab militia calling itself the National Liberation Front of Azawad (FNLA) announced its intention to oppose Tuareg rule, battle the MNLA, and "return to peace and economic activity"; the group claimed to consist of 500 fighters. On 26 April, this group briefly took over a part of the region, before withdrawing on the request of AQIM to avoid civilian deaths. Later, they split into several factions, including the pro-rebel MAA-Dissident and pro-government MAA-Tabankort. On 26 May, the MNLA and Ansar Dine to sign a provisional plan make Azawad an Islamic state and merge the two groups into a single regular army. Less than a week later, the agreement was denounced by MNLA political leadership as a betrayal of its secular values, leading their representatives to walk back on the promises in the initial agreement. In early June, Nigerien president Mahamadou Issoufou stated that Afghan and Pakistani jihadists were training Touareg Islamist rebels. Battle of Gao and aftermath in northern Mali Protests broke out on 26 June 2012 in the city of Gao, the majority of whose people are not Tuaregs, but rather sub-Saharan groups such as the Songhay and Fula peoples. The protestors opposed the Tuareg rebels and the partition of Mali. Two were killed as a result of the protests, allegedly by MNLA troops. The protesters used both Malian and Islamist flags, and France 24 reported that many locals supported the Islamists as a result of their opposition to the Tuareg nationalists and the secession of Azawad. The same day, this tension erupted into all-out combat in Gao between the MNLA and MOJWA, supported by ~100 Boko Haram militants, with both sides deploying heavy weaponry. MNLA Secretary General Acherif was wounded in the battle. The MNLA was soon driven from the city, and subsequently withdrew from Kidal and Timbuktu without resistance, following orders by Ansar Dine. Soon, the jihadist groups had seized control of nearly all of Azawad, with the exception of a few towns and isolated pockets still held by the MNLA and allied militias. In the same month, a splinter group broke off from the MNLA; calling itself the Front for the Liberation of the Azawad (FPA), the group stated that Tuareg independence was no longer a realistic goal and that they must concentrate on fighting the Islamists. Takeover of Douentza and Ménaka On 1 September, MOJWA took over the southern town of Douentza, which had previously been held by a Songhai secular militia, the Ganda Iso. A MOJWA spokesman said that the group had had an agreement with the Ganda Iso, but had decided to occupy the town when the militia appeared to be acting independently, and gained control of the town following a brief standoff with Ganda Iso. Once MOJWA troops surrounded the city, the militia reportedly surrendered without a fight and were disarmed. On 16 November, Tuareg MNLA forces launched an offensive against Gao in an attempt to retake the town. However, by the end of the day, the Tuaregs were beaten back by the MOJWA forces after the Islamists laid an ambush for them. A Malian security source said that at least a dozen MNLA fighters were killed while the Islamists suffered only one dead. An MNLA official stated that their forces killed 13 MOJWA fighters and wounded 17, while they suffered only nine wounded. On 19 November, MOJWA and AQIM forces took over the eastern town of Ménaka, which had previously been held by the MNLA, with dozens of fighters from both sides and civilians killed. On the first day of fighting, the MNLA claimed its forces killed 65 Islamist fighters, while they suffered only one dead and 13 wounded. The Islamists for their part stated they killed more than 100 MNLA fighters and captured 20. On 28 November, the AQIM took over Léré without major confrontation. By December, all urban areas had fallen into Islamist hands. == Foreign intervention (January–June 2013) ==

Following requests from both the Mali government and ECOWAS for foreign military intervention, on 12 October 2012 the United Nations Security Council unanimously, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, passed a French resolution approving an African-led force to assist the army of Mali in combating the Islamist militants. The resolution gave 45 days for "detailed and actionable recommendations" On 8 January 2013, rebels were reported by Al Jazeera to have captured 12 Malian government troops near the town of Konna. On the same day, RFI reports that governmental troops fired warning shots and slightly progressed from Konna toward Douentza. MNLA realigns with the Malian Government The alliance between the Tuareg nationalists and jihadist groups severely damaged the international legitimacy of the broader Tuareg movement. As a result, At that time, the MNLA controlled no big localities and was only strong in rural and desert areas near the borders with Mauritania, Algeria and Niger, having been driven off from most of its claimed territory by Islamist groups. Soon, it would begin to support French and Chadian forces in restoring state authority to the cities in the north and in operations against their mountain strongholds, particularly with intelligence, while still opposing the Malian army. Later, an estimated 1,200 Islamist fighters advanced to within 20 kilometers of Mopti, a nearby Mali military garrison town. The air strikes reportedly destroyed half a dozen Islamist armed pick-up trucks and a rebel command center. One French pilot, Lieutenant Damien Boiteux, was killed after his attack helicopter was downed by ground fire during the operation. During the night of 11 January 2013, the Malian army, backed by French troops, claimed it had regained control of the town of Konna, and claimed to have killed over 100 Islamists. Afterwards, a Malian lieutenant said that mopping up operations were taking place around Konna. AFP witnesses had seen dozens of Islamist corpses around Konna, with one saying he counted 46 bodies. The French stated four rebel vehicles were hit by their airstrikes, while the Malian Army claimed nearly 30 vehicles were bombed. Several dozens of Malian soldiers and 10 civilians were also killed. A resident of Gao, the headquarters of the MOJWA, said that the city's hospital had been overwhelmed with dead and wounded. In all, one local resident counted 148 bodies around Konna. On 12 January, the British government announced that it was deploying two Royal Air Force C-17 transport planes in a non-combat role to ferry primarily French but also potentially African forces into Mali. On 13 January, regional security sources announced the death in Konna of Abdel Krim, nicknamed "Kojak", a high level leader in the Ansar Dine group. French defense minister Le Drian said that new airstrikes were ongoing in Mali, had happened during the night and would happen the next day. A resident of Léré said that airstrikes had been conducted in the area. The airstrikes were concentrated on three areas, Konna, Léré and Douentza. Two helicopters were seen attacking Islamist positions in Gao. A dozen strikes targeted the city and its outskirts. A resident reported that all Islamist bases around Gao had been taken out of operation by the strikes. An Islamist base in Kidal was targeted by the French air force. French defence minister Le Drian, announced that four Rafale fighters had participated in the Gao airstrikes. They had left France and were based in Chad. It was reported that following the strikes that destroyed their bases, the MUJAO forces left Gao. Residents reported that 60 Islamists died in the Gao airstrikes. Others were hiding in the houses and picked up the dead bodies during the night. On 14 January, the Islamists attacked the city of Diabaly, 400 km north of Bamako in the government-held areas. They came from the Mauritanian border where they fled to avoid the airstrikes. The AQIM leader known as Abu Zeid was leading the operation. On the same day, Islamists pledged to launch attacks on French soil. Meanwhile, the Royal Canadian Air Force dispatched a C-17 transport plane to Mali in a similar role as those of the British C-17s. The Danish Parliament decided to contribute a C-130 transport plane and the Belgian government made the decision to send two C-130s along with one Medical Component Agusta A109 Medevac medical evacuation helicopter along with 80 support personnel to Mali. In Aménas hostage crisis On 16 January, it was reported that a group of AQIM militants had crossed the border from Mali into Algeria and had captured an Algerian/Statoil/BP-owned natural gas field, In Aménas, near the border with Libya. The militants were reported to have killed two foreign nationals and were holding 41 foreign nationals hostage, and a spokesman for the group said that the purpose of the attack was to get revenge on the countries that had intervened in Mali. The hostages reportedly included several American, Japanese, British, Romanian, Filipino and Norwegian citizens. Algeria was reportedly negotiating with the militants to try and obtain the hostages' release. On 19 January, 11 militants and 7 hostages were killed in a final assault to end the standoff. In addition, 16 foreign hostages were freed, including 2 Americans, 2 Germans, and 1 Portuguese. Malian northward advance On 16 January, French special forces, along with the Malian army, began fighting small and mobile groups of jihadists inside the city of Diabaly, but the French defense minister denied the presence of French troops fighting in Diabaly. The government of Spain approved the dispatch of one transport aircraft to Mali for logistical and training support. Meanwhile, the government of Germany authorized the contribution of two Transall C-160 transport aircraft to ferry African troops into the capital Bamako. Likewise, the government of Italy pledged air transport-based logistical support. On 17 January, Banamba was put on alert after Islamists were reportedly spotted near the town. The Malian army immediately deployed 100 soldiers to the town, which were reinforced later. A convoy of Islamists reportedly left Diabaly and was heading towards Banamba, but ultimately no fighting took place in the town. On 18 January, the Malian Army released a statement claiming to have complete control of Konna. The claim was confirmed by residents of Konna and a spokesman for Ansar al-Dine. The same day, rebels were driven out of Diabaly according to multiple local sources. Reports came out on 19 January that residents of Gao had lynched Aliou Toure, a prominent Islamist leader and the MOJWA police commissioner of the city, in retaliation for the killing of a local journalist, Kader Toure. AFP cited local reports saying that the Islamists were beginning to leave other areas under their control to seek refuge in the mountainous and difficult-to-access Kidal Region. On the same day, two Nigerian soldiers were killed and five were injured by Islamists near the Nigerian town of Okene as they were heading toward Mali. On 20 January, the United States denied that they had attempted to bill the French for American support in the conflict. USAF C-17s began to fly in French troops and supplies the next day. On 21 January, French and Malian troops entered Diabaly without resistance. Douentza was also taken that day. On the evening of 24 January Malian soldiers took control of Hombori. On the same day a splinter group of Ansar al-Dine, calling itself the Islamic Movement of Azawad (MIA), stated that it wanted to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict and urged France and Mali to cease hostilities in the north in order "to create a climate of peace which will pave the way for an inclusive political dialogue". On 26 January, French Special Forces took over the airport and an important bridge in the city of Gao which remained largely Islamist-held. The troops reported "harassment" from Islamist forces but no solid resistance to their operations. The city was taken by a French-backed Malian force later that day. A new split happened in Ansar Dine, with one of its commanders in Léré, Kamou Ag Meinly, quitting the group and joining the MNLA. On 27 January, French and Malian forces encircled Timbuktu and began securing the city. After gaining the airport on 27 January, the next day, Malian and French military sources claimed that the entire area between Gao and Timbuktu was under government control and access to the city was available. The city was fully taken by French and Malian forces by the next day. On 28 January, the MNLA took control of Kidal with the help of the MIA, an Ansar Dine breakaway group that split after the international intervention. The MNLA also took control of the towns of Tessalit and Khalil. Apparently, fighters who had deserted the MNLA for the better financed Ansar Dine were now returning to the MNLA. Islamists were reported to have fled to the mountains. On 29 January, the first non-Malian African troops entered North Mali. Nigerien soldiers occupied Ansongo and Chadian troops, Ménaka. The more numerous Chadian Army was also reported as moving north from Ménaka in support of the Malian Army. On 30 January, French troops reached Kidal airport. No Malian soldiers were with them, as a confrontation with Tuaregs was feared. The town was reportedly under control of fighters from both the MNLA and MIA. The MNLA, however, denied any collaboration or even a desire to collaborate with the MIA, and stated that their fighters were maintaining control of the town alongside French forces. Many leaders of Ansar Dine left Iyad Ag Ghali. Delegations from the MNLA and MIA left for Ouagadougou to negotiate with Malian officials. On 2 February, Chadian troops from MISMA reached Kidal and were stationed in a deserted base in the city. Their general said that they had no problem with the MNLA and had good relations with them. On the same day, the French President, François Hollande, joined Traoré in a public appearance in recently recaptured Timbuktu. On 8 February, French and Chadian troops announced that they had occupied Tessalit near the Algerian border, the location of one of the last airports still not controlled by the Malian government and its allies. ==Insurgency (2013–2023)==

Beginning of guerrilla phase The Islamists, facing a fierce international campaign of airstrikes, retreated to the Adrar des Ifoghas, rugged badlands in northeastern Mali, where knowledge of and control over local sources of water would play a vital role in continuing the conflict in that area. Between 8 and 10 February, MUJAO – who had been harassing government forces from the outskirts since Malian and French forces took the city on 26 January – launched the first two suicide attacks of the war in Gao, resulting in the death of the two bombers and injuring a Malian soldier and a civilian. Islamist fighters armed with AK-47s then crossed the Niger River on canoes, took over an abandoned police station and deployed snipers in nearby buildings in anticipation of the government forces' counterattack. The situation was controlled by pro-government forces after heavy fighting which included an air attack on the police station by French helicopters. On 18 February, at the request of the Malian government, the European Union launched the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali), deploying 550 troops from 22 EU states under the command of Brigadier-General Marc Rudkiewicz.On 19 February, Islamists attacked a French parachute regiment of 150 soldiers supported by a heavy vehicle patrol and Mirage fighter jets. One French commando, a sergeant, was killed and so were 20 Islamist militants. Gao was attacked a second time on 20 February. Islamists again crossed the Niger and came close to the city hall, possibly with help from locals. The same day, a car bomb exploded in Kidal, killing two people. On 22 February 2013, 13 Chadian soldiers and 65 Islamists were killed during heavy fighting in the northern mountains. The same day two suicide bombers crashed their cars into the MNLA's local operations center in the town of in Khalil, killing 5 people including 3 MNLA fighters and both bombers. U. S. President Obama announced on 22 February 2013 that about 100 American troops had been sent to Niger, which borders Mali, to aid the French in Mali. The most recent U. S. troops were sent to help set up a new air base, from which to conduct surveillance against Al Qaeda. 40 U.S. Air Force logistics specialists, intelligence analysts and security officers arrived in the capital of Niger on 20 February 2013, bringing the total Americans deployed in Niger to 100. On 24 February, 28 Islamists and ten Chadian soldiers were killed while fighting in the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains in Northern Mali. , March or April 2013 On 26 February, a car bomb exploded in Kidal targeting a MNLA checkpoint. At least 7 MNLA fighters along with the suicide bomber were killed in the attack. On 20 March, AQIM claimed to have executed a French hostage in Mali, Phillipe Verdon, who had been kidnapped in 2011. On 23 March, Islamist fighters from MUJAO attacked the city of Gao, causing heavy fighting for two hours. The Malian army eventually repulsed this attack. On 30 March, a suicide bomber detonated his explosives near a Malian army checkpoint in Timbuktu, allowing a group of jihadists to infiltrate by night. By 1 April, with the help of a French army detachment supported by war jets, the Malian army pushed the jihadists out of the city center. On 28 February, Algerian television informed that Abdelhamid Abou Zeid, one of the three top men of AQIM and deemed responsible of several kidnappings of westerners in the Sahel in the 2000s, had been killed in battle against Franco-Chadian forces in the Tigharghar mountains along with about 40 of his followers, some kilometres away from Aguelhok. The information was neither confirmed nor denied by the French Army. On 2 March, it was reported that Mokhtar Belmokhtar, mastermind of the In Amenas hostage crisis in which 800 hostages had been taken and 39 Westerners killed at an Algerian oil refinery, had been killed as well. Chadian state television announced that "Chadian forces in Mali completely destroyed the main jihadist base in the Adrar de Ifhogas mountains... killing several terrorists including leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar", according to a BBC report. BBC correspondent Thomas Fessy said this would be a major blow if confirmed. Now that the bulk of the conflict is over and the need for extended military involvement is decreasing, France looks to the UN to take over with the peacekeeping force that had been suggested earlier in the conflict once it was a more stable situation. The operation was termed MINUSMA. In May, the High Council of Azawad (HCA) and MIA merged to form the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA). The group was founded by Amenokal of the Ifoghas, Alghabass Ag Intalla, and led by his older brother, Mohamed Ag Intalla, a former high-ranking member in the MNLA and Ansar Dine. Despite their rivalry with Ghali over leadership of the Ifoghas, they absorbed many former Ansar Dine members. Keïta presidency Perennial candidate and career politician Ibrahim Boubacar Keita of the Rally for Mali won the 2013 Malian presidential election on his third bid. His victory was largely attributed to support from influential Islamist figures, primarily "people's imam" Mahmoud Dicko, as well as backing from the military, including the leaders of the 2012 coup. Keita's rise to power represented a continuation of the political establishment that had prevailed under former presidents Touré and Konaré. He assumed office at a time when, thanks to French, African, and international military support, government forces had regained most of the territory previously controlled by Islamists and Tuareg nationalists, territory that would, within a few years, slip out of state control once again. Clashes between the MNLA and the government would continue throughout 2013–2014. One such event in May 2014, during a prime ministerial visit to Kidal, precipitated to the formation of the pro-government militias such as the Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies (GATIA) and MAA-Tabankort. From the founding of the ISSP, the proxy groups of ISIS and al-Qaeda in the country, in what researchers called the "Sahel exception" or "Sahel anomaly", peacefully co-existed in their fights against the Malian government and her allies. Jihadist activity was no longer confined to the north; it expanded rapidly into central Mali. By 2020, some estimates suggested that only one-third of the country remained under government authority. The "jihadist idyll" ended in 2019 when open conflict broke out between JNIM and the ISSP. The rivalry escalated into an all-time height in April 2020, with full-scale armed clashes occurring over a large territory and resulting in the deaths of around a thousand Islamic militants. Despite pro-independence protests, disarmament. demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) talks between the CMA and Mali continued into 2021. In May, following negotiations aimed at resolving disputes over the Algiers Accords, the CMA and Platform formed the Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad (CSP-PSD, shorten to CSP) coalition. 2021 coup and aftermath After coming to power, Ndaw began to clash with members of the National Transitional Council (CNT) over policy differences. Ndaw and his Prime Minister, Moctar Ouane, were in favor of cooperation with France, while Vice President Goïta and Defense Minister Sadio Camara were in favor of cooperation with Russia. On May 24, 2021, Ndaw and Ouane were detained by the military and taken to the Kati military base. Two days later, Goïta announced that both had been stripped of their powers, accusing them of attempting to "sabotage" the transition to a democratically elected government. In addition, Goïta announced that next elections would be held in 2022. Following these events, Goïta assumed the presidency and legislative functions were transferred to the CNT. Following the announcement of a five-year transition timeline by the junta in January 2022, ECOWAS imposed sweeping sanctions against Mali. These were largely lifted in July 2022 after the junta revised the timeline to a two-year transition, with presidential elections set for February 2024. In September 2023, the election was postponed indefinitely and protests were banned. By August 15, 2022, French troops had fully withdrawn from Mali towards Niger, ending their presence in the country. On Independence Day, hundreds marched again, carrying Russian flags and chanting anti-UN slogans. == CMA rebels, Mali counteroffensive, and JNIM escalation (August 2022–present) ==

In August, negotiations resumed between the CSP and the junta to address the stalled implementation of the Algiers Accords and continue DDR talks. They agreed on the gradual integration of 26,000 CSP fighters into the national army, including the incorporation of senior CSP officers into the military hierarchy, which the CMA criticised due to the lack of clarity regarding the future roles of CSP commanders within the integrated units. Tensions between the parties escalated following the agreement. By December, the CSP withdrew from peace talks, accusing the junta of refusing to negotiate or implement the 2015 agreement, and inaction in response to escalating jihadist and state violence in northern cities, which had left hundreds dead and thousands displaced. In February, the groups making up the CMA formally merged into a single organization. On 30 June 2023, the UN Security Council approved the request for the removal of peacekeepers. In July, MINUSMA, which at that point numbered 10,116 troops, started to transfer control of its 12 military bases to the Malian authorities. This sparked tensions between the government and the CSP, particularly over bases located at Ber and in the Kidal region, which they argued, under the accords, they were entitled to, even if small army units may be located there. They would not allow the army to take over the bases without prior negotiations. On 11 August, the CSP and junta forces, along with Wagner, clashed as they vied for control of the Ber base, from which MINUSMA had not yet fully withdrawn. The army seized the base two days later, following the departure of the last UN personnel. 2023-2024 Mali counteroffensive Following the CSP's capture of Anefis in October 2023, Mali and Wagner forces launched an offensive towards the CMA stronghold of Kidal. Their primary targets were the towns of Tessalit and Aguelhok, both of which still housed MINUSMA military bases at the time. Clashes erupted around Anefis on 6 October, with both the Malian army and the rebels claiming control of the town by day's end. A CSP spokesman later acknowledged that the Malian army had secured Anefis. Ben Bella of the CMA claimed that fighters from Niger, Algeria, and Libya were coming to help them in the conflict, while a Nigerien rebel leader called on fighters to "join them [the rebels] on the front line". By 15 November, following clashes triggered by the UN's early withdrawal from its base, junta and Wagner forces captured Kidal. Their victory was aided by drones strikes from Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2s, which disrupted CSP defensives and forced fighters to abandon their positions without engaging in sustained ground combat. Nevertheless, according to the Crisis Group, neither the junta nor CSP was in a position to decisively win the war, with CSP remained entrenched in rural areas. In December, the CSP began to blockade the now government-controlled Kidal, Ménaka, Gao, Taoudeni, and Timbuktu, which had already been periodically blockaded by JNIM, as well as the roads leading to Mauritania, Algeria, and Niger. On 20 December, the junta recaptured Aguelhok, the last vacated UN camp held by the CSP. In January 2024, accusing Algeria of interfering in its affairs, the junta terminated the accords and launched a new national peace initiative, which the CSP swiftly rejected, claiming it sidelined international mediation. On 29 April, it was reported that Abu Huzeifa, a commander for a Sahelian affiliate of Islamic State (ISGS) was killed during an operation in Menaka region by Malian army. He was involved in Tongo Tongo ambush which killed four U.S. soldiers and four Nigerien soldiers in neighbouring Niger. On 30 April, in an ambush planned by jihadists, ten pro-Government militiamen were killed outside Gao. On 3 July, an attack by jihadists in a village in central Mali killed about 40 civilians. On 24 July, the Malian army and Wagner forces captured the town of In-Afarak, near the Algerian border, from CMA rebels, but the settlement was recaptured by the rebels days later. On 27 July, Tuareg rebels claimed to have killed dozens of Malian and Wagner group soldiers in an ambush near the settlement of Tinzaouaten. They also shot down a helicopter, which crashed near Kidal. Reports from pro-Russian bloggers suggest that about 50–60 soldiers including 20 Wagner soldiers were killed in the ambush. The rebels announced that they suffered 7 deaths and 12 injuries in the fighting. On 17 August, an attack by JNIM militants killed about 15 Malian soldiers. Malian soldiers also fired back causing unknown militant casualties in the Mopti region, near the town of Diallassagou. On 20 August, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger wrote to the United Nations Security Council, complaining about Ukraine's support for rebel groups in the Sahel region. On 27 August, an alleged drone strike by the Malian army killed about 21 civilians in Tinzaouaten. On 17 September 2024, JNIM militants attacked a military training school and airport in the capital Bamako, killing more than 77 people and injuring 255 others. Among the dead were army personnel. At least 20 militants were captured. FLA From 26 to 30 November, the members of the CSP held a meeting in their new stronghold of Tinzawatène, where they dissolved themselves and merged into the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), officially returning to demands for the independence of Azawad. Hours later, the next morning, Mali launched several drone strikes on the town, killing eight members, including senior officials such as Almahmoud. In December, Mali, which had been increasingly relying on drones to compensate for its limited manpower and resources, acquired at least two Turkish Baykar Bayraktar Akıncı drones. an Akıncı, According to survivor testimony, the incident began with soldiers entering a livestock market and arresting more than thirty people, but releasing those who were not Fulani. The arrested individuals were then blindfolded and tied up before taken across the river to a cemetery. At the cemetery, the soldiers and militiamen began to slit the throats of each of the civilians before tossing them into a mass grave. The civilians were allegedly targeted for being Fulani, and accused of having ties to militant groups. In response to the disappearance of the arrested, protests were held in the town, leading to the military to allow the families to see the victims, and launch a probe into the killings. The attack was condemned by multiple international agencies, including Amnesty International and the International Federation for Human Rights. In June 2025, FLA's Alghabass sent an open letter to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, calling upon him to stop helping the Malian government and support the "oppressed Muslims". JNIM escalates attacks On 23 May 2025, an attack by JNIM militants occurred in Dioura, where they temporarily took control of the nearby military base. During the attack, 41 soldiers died. On 1 June 2025, JNIM militants attacked and took control of a Malian army base in Boulkessi. Around 30 Malian soldiers died before they retreated. On 2 June 2025, JNIM attacked an army camp and airport in Timbuktu. Residents reported hearing gunfire, and the airport was also shelled. An official estimated the death toll of around 40 soldiers. On 3 June 2025, the Malian Armed Forces launched airstrikes on terrorist positions in Diafarabé, Mopti region and Niagassadou, Douentza region, claiming to have caused heavy losses and disrupting terrorist plans. On 3 June 2025, JNIM attacked militiamen between the cities of Soumabougou and Saoura, killing at least 23 militiamen. On 4 June 2025, terrorists, alleged to be ISGS, attacked an army camp in Tessit, Gao Region, causing significant damage and taking equipment, 40 Malian soldiers were killed in attack. The Malian Armed Forces claimed that over 40 terrorist casualties were left abandoned in the aftermath of the attack, including leader Mamoudou Akilou. Additionally, retaliatory airstrikes were being conducted in response to the raid. On 5 June 2025, more than 50 JNIM militants attacked a military camp in Mahou, Sikasso region, killing at least 5 soldiers and injuring 10. On 6 June 2025, the Wagner Group announced that it would end its mission in Mali. However, the Africa Corps, a paramilitary controlled by the Russian government, stated that they would remain in Mali. On 9 June 2025, JNIM kidnapped 11 civilians from Diafarabé, including village chiefs and elected officials, claiming that it was in response for a massacre of Fulani civilians on May 12. Negotiations for the return of the hostages between Mali and JNIM began on the 12th On 12 June 2025, the Malian Armed Forces claimed to have killed high-ranking JNIM katiba Attaye Ag Boulkhey, during a reconnaissance mission in Idjardahanen, Mopti Region. On 13 June 2025, an SU-24 crash landed in the Niger River while returning from a mission as part of Operation Dougoukoloko, according to the Malian general staff. The two pilots survived, and were reported to be part of the Africa Corps. The Azawad Liberation Front claimed that they hit the plane with anti-air weaponry, causing it to retreat and eventually crash. On 28 June 2025, the Malian Armed Forces partook in a joint operation with the Africa Corps and the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad about 38 km north of Ménaka. The raid killed six ISGS militants, including their foreign born leader, Abu Dahdah. Dahdah was alleged to have provided explosives in the an earlier attack in Niger. On 1 July, JNIM launched a series of attacks on seven towns and positions across the Kayes Region including the capital, Kayes. The army reported that they successful countered the attacked and killed over 80 JNIM militants. On 14 July, the FLA ambushed a FAMA and Africa Corps convoy on a road in between the cities of Kidal and Anefis. The Malian military sources claimed that they had successfully pushed back the terrorists, while the FLA claimed an indisputable victory against the Malian army and its Russian allies. Other sources report that JNIM was involved in the ambush. The army also lost a Mi-24 during the ambush. On 19 August 2025, JNIM launched coordinated attacks in Farabougou and Biriki-Were. JNIM claimed 21 soldiers were killed and 15 vehicles were seized during the attacks. The military base in Farabogou was confirmed by the military as having been under control of the militants on August 23rd as part of a strategic withdrawal. On 5 September 2025, JNIM announced a blockade around the cities of Kayes and Nioro du Sahel Militants proceeded to set up checkpoints to extort "taxes" from drivers. Several people were also kidnapped during the blockade, as well as at least 40 fuel tankers being burned. On 16 September 2025, JNIM claimed to have killed 16 soldiers and destroyed 8 vehicles during an ambush on a joint Malian and Africa Corps convoy between Markala and Siribala. On 23 September 2025, two Emirati men and an Iranian man were kidnapped by JNIM. The men were taken from the private estate of Joumoua bin Maktoum al Maktoum, a retired general, in Sanankoroba, 40 km south of Bamako. The hostages were released on October 30th after the United Arab Emirates paid $50 million in weapons and cash. On 27 October 2025, the government declared a shutdown of schools and universities as the fuel crisis in the country got worse due to the jihadist blockade. The US called its civilians to leave the country immediately, while the Lebanese Foreign Ministry, said it is keeping contact with its diaspora with the chargé d'affaires at Lebanon's embassy in Liberia. On 8 November 2025, JNIM militants attacked the military base in Soumpi, killing 20, including the base commander. JNIM proceeded to loot the base before reinforcements arrived. On 11 November 2025, JNIM attacked and overran Loulouni, temporarily taking control. At least ten Dozo militiamen were killed in the attack, and hundreds fled the town, which was recaptured by government forces three days later. On 3 January 2026, jihadists attacked the Morila Gold Mine in the Sikasso Region, burning equipment and capturing seven hostages, though all hostages were released the following evening. On 25 January 2026, JNIM ambushed FAMA and Africa Corps forces in Diabaly, capturing equipment and destroying a vehicle. On 29 January 2026, JNIM attacked a fuel convoy traveling from the Senegalese border to Kayes, killing at least 15 and destroying a dozens of tanker trucks. On 4 February 2026, JNIM militants attacked Dozo militiamen in Kendié, killing five and injuring four. On 7 February 2026, the Malian Army announced three successful airstrikes, killing 35 JNIM militants nearby the Niger River in the Ségou region. On 9 March 2026, JNIM ambushed Malian and Russian Africa Corps forces in a village near Nampala, killing 10 soldiers, including three Russians. The attack was reportedly in relation for an alleged execution on March 9 of seven civilians by Africa Corps near the border with Mauritania. On 6 April 2026, JNIM kidnapped four Chinese nationals from a gold mine near Narena. On 25 April 2026, FLA and JNIM carried out a major offensive with attacks directed at the Modibo Keïta International Airport, Kati, Gao, Bamako, and several locations in the country in a coordinated attack, according to the Malian army. Moreover, according to a spokesperson for the group, the FLA took control of Kidal and shot down a helicopter near Gao. Malian minister of Defence, General Sadio Camara, was assassinated by JNIM militants in a suicide bombing in Kati. On 1 May 2026, the FLA and JNIM took control of the Amachach base outside of Tessalit in the Kidal Region, near the Algerian border, after Malian and Russian troops withdrew southward. == Weaponry and warfare ==

Drones Between December 2022 and December 2024, Mali integrated 17 Bayraktar TB2 drones and at least two Baykar Bayraktar Akıncı drones into its arsenal, becoming one of the largest African operators of Turkish drones. The TB2s demonstrated their effectiveness during the November 2023 capture of Kidal from the CSP, where drone strikes disrupted CSP defensives and forced fighters to abandon their positions without engaging in sustained ground combat. Mali has been increasingly relying on drones to compensate for its limited manpower and resources. Starlink According to the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, jihadist groups such as JMIN and ISSP have been using an illicit supply chain to acquire Starlink devices and bypass regulations on their use. The more secure communication of these devices has made it harder for government forces to intercept the plans of armed groups, allowing them to evade law enforcement and sustain illicit economies. A leader of the Union of Nigeriens for Vigilance and Patriotism, a support group for the Nigerien junta in the Agadez region, noted: In response, the governments of Niger and Chad have moved to legalize Starlink in hopes of better regulating the technology by requiring registration of the devices. However, these measures are unlikely to stop the supply chain. Starlink has also been adopted by the FLA and the armed forces of Mali. According to an FLA leader in the Tinzaouaten area, the group uses Starlink to coordinate operations, share intelligence, and communicate its narrative. In the Battle of Tinzaouaten (2024), the use of Starlink allowed the FLA to maintain secure communication across its dispersed units and release updates on social media, increasing its visibility to external audiences. == Casualties ==

In total, from 2012 to 2023, 13,105 civilians and combatants were killed in armed conflict. Displaced As of 2020, 600,000 have been displaced by this conflict. == Human rights concerns ==

Following several reports of abuse from both sides, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court opened a case investigating war crimes in Mali on 16 January 2013. This case is the quickest any ICC investigation has begun after foreign military intervention. Claims against separatists and Islamists In May 2012, Amnesty International released a report stating that the conflict had created Mali's worst human rights situation since 1960. The organization stated that fighters with the MNLA and Ansar Dine were "running riot" in Mali's north, and documented instances of gang rape, extrajudicial executions, and the use of child soldiers by both Tuareg and Islamist groups. On 3 April 2012, armed groups looted 2,354 tons of food from United Nations' World Food Programme's warehouses in Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu, causing the WFP to suspend its food distribution operations in northern Mali. Other targets of looting included hospitals, hotels, government offices, Oxfam offices and the offices and warehouses of other unnamed aid groups. The WFP also stated that 200,000 had so far fled the fighting, predicting that the number would rise. Claims against Islamists Ansar el Dine also blocked a humanitarian convoy bringing medical and food aid from reaching Timbuktu on 15 May, objecting to the presence of women in the welcoming committee set up by city residents; after negotiations, the convoy was released on the following day. The group reportedly banned video games, Malian and Western music, bars, and football in Gao Islamist forces were also reported to have intervened against looters and ordered women to wear head scarves. The CNRDR's spokesman Amadou Konare claimed that "women and girls have been kidnapped and raped by the new occupants who are laying down their own law." The anti-slavery organization Temedt claims that ex-slaves were the first targeted for punishment by Islamist forces and that former masters have used the violence to recapture ex-slaves. On 29 July 2012, a couple was stoned to death by Islamists in Aguelhok for having children outside of marriage. An official reported that many people left the town for Algeria following the incident. On 9 August, Islamist militants chopped off the hand of an alleged thief in the town of Ansongo, despite a crowd pleading with the militants for mercy. In November 2025, it was reported that Mariam Cissé, a TikTok influencer who posted videos supporting Mali's military, was abducted in the Timbuktu region and subsequently executed by the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Destruction of ancient monuments in Timbuktu During the conflict, Islamists also damaged or destroyed a number of historical sites on the grounds that they said were idolatrous, particularly in Timbuktu, a UNESCO World Heritage Site. On 4 May 2012, Ansar Dine members reportedly burned the tomb of a Sufi saint. In late June, Islamists attacked several more sites in Timbuktu with pickaxes and shovels. On 28 January 2013, as French-led Malian troops captured the airport of the World Heritage town of Timbuktu. The Ahmed Baba Institute, host of priceless ancient manuscripts, was razed by fleeing Islamists. Claims against the Malian Army and loyalists The Tuaregs and Arabs who lived in Bamako and elsewhere in southern Mali were subjects of a rash of ethnic attacks by black Malians, despite many of them being hostile to Azawad separatism as well as the Islamists. In fact, a large part of them actually had only recently arrived to the government-held south, fleeing the violence in the north. An incident arose on 8 September 2012 when a group of Malian soldiers detained 17 unarmed Tablighi preachers from Mauritania in Dogofry, north-east of Diabaly, while en route to a religious conference in Bamako and executed all but one of them without reporting to their own command. The Malian government expressed its condolences for the event, which Associated Press considered a symptom of the disintegration of discipline and command in the Malian Army as a result of the 21 March Coup. On 19 January 2013, Human Rights Watch report killings and other human rights abuses committed by the Malian army in the central Malian town of Niono. Tuaregs and Arabs were especially targeted. On 23 January 2013, BBC reported claims by the International Federation of Human Rights that Malian Army soldiers had carried out summary executions against people suspected of being militant, and with bodies subsequently being hastily buried in makeshift graves and wells. Some victims were reportedly killed for not having identity documents or for their ethnicity. Reportedly, dozens of ethnic Tuaregs living in Bamako had their homes raided by government troops. == In popular culture ==

Mali earned the first win in the 2013 Africa Cup of Nations football championship on 20 January 2013 with a 1–0 win over Niger. After scoring the only goal, Seydou Keita displayed a T-shirt with a peace sign on it. A number of musicians from Mali came together to record the song Mali-ko (meaning peace) and release a video titled ''Voices United for Mali-'Mali-ko''' in early 2013 about the ongoing conflict in the country. The collaboration includes many well-known Malian musicians, including Oumou Sangaré, Vieux Farka Touré, and Amadou & Mariam. The 2014 film Timbuktu centers on the brief occupation of Timbuktu by Ansar Dine and was selected to compete for the Palme d'Or in the main competition section at the 2014 Cannes Film Festival, where it won the Prize of the Ecumenical Jury and the François Chalais Prize. == Notes ==