Post-WWII situation In 1949,
Venezuela initiated the move towards the establishment of what would become OPEC, by inviting Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to exchange views and explore avenues for more regular and closer communication among petroleum-exporting nations as the world recovered from
World War II. At the time, some of the world's largest
oil fields were just entering production in the Middle East. The United States had established the
Interstate Oil Compact Commission to join the
Texas Railroad Commission in limiting overproduction. Both oil ministers were angered by the price cuts, and the two led their fellow delegates to establish the Maadi Pact or
Gentlemen's Agreement, calling for an "Oil Consultation Commission" of exporting countries, to which MOCs should present price-change plans. Jablonski reported a marked hostility toward the West and a growing outcry against "
absentee landlordism" of the MOCs, which at the time controlled all oil operations within the exporting countries and wielded enormous political influence. In August 1960, ignoring the warnings, and with the US favoring Canadian and Mexican oil for strategic reasons, the MOCs again unilaterally announced significant cuts in their posted prices for Middle Eastern crude oil.
1960–1975: Founding and expansion The following month, during 10–14 September 1960, the Baghdad Conference was held at the initiative of Tariki, Pérez Alfonzo, and Iraqi prime minister
Abd al-Karim Qasim, whose country had skipped the 1959 congress. Government representatives from Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela met in
Baghdad to discuss ways to increase the price of crude oil produced by their countries, and ways to respond to unilateral actions by the MOCs. Despite strong US opposition: "Together with Arab and non-Arab producers, Saudi Arabia formed the Organization of Petroleum Export Countries (OPEC) to secure the best price available from the major oil corporations." The Middle Eastern members originally called for OPEC headquarters to be in Baghdad or Beirut. Venezuela argued for a neutral location, and so the organization chose
Geneva, Switzerland. On 1 September 1965, OPEC moved to
Vienna, Austria, after Switzerland declined to extend
diplomatic privileges. At the time, Switzerland was attempting to reduce their foreign population and the OPEC was the first intergovernmental body to leave the country because of restrictions on foreigners. Austria was keen to attract international organizations and offered attractive terms to the OPEC. During the early years of OPEC, the oil-producing countries had a 50/50 profit agreement with the oil companies. OPEC bargained with the dominant oil companies (the Seven Sisters), but OPEC faced coordination problems among its members. If one OPEC member demanded too much from the oil companies, then the oil companies could slow down production in that country and ramp up production elsewhere. The 50/50 agreements were still in place until 1970 when Libya negotiated a 58/42 agreement with the oil company
Occidental, which prompted other OPEC members to request better agreements with oil companies.> In 1971, an accord was signed between major oil companies and members of OPEC doing business in the
Mediterranean Sea region, called the
Tripoli Agreement. The agreement, signed on 2 April 1971, raised oil prices and increased producing countries' profit shares. From 1961–1975, the five founding nations were joined by
Qatar (1961),
Indonesia (1962–2008, rejoined 2014–2016),
Libya (1962),
United Arab Emirates (originally just the
Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 1967),
Algeria (1969),
Nigeria (1971),
Ecuador (1973–1992, 2007–2020), and
Gabon (1975–1994, rejoined 2016). By the early 1970s, OPEC's membership accounted for more than half of worldwide oil production.
Angola joined in 2007, followed by
Equatorial Guinea in 2017. Since the 1980s, representatives from Canada, Egypt, Mexico, Norway, Oman, Russia, and other oil-exporting nations have attended many OPEC meetings as observers, as an informal mechanism for coordinating policies.
1973–1974: Oil embargo The oil market was tight in the early 1970s, which reduced the risks for OPEC members in nationalising their oil production. One of the major fears for OPEC members was that nationalisation would cause a steep decline in the price of oil. This prompted a wave of nationalisations in countries such as Libya, Algeria, Iraq, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. With greater control over oil production decisions and amid high oil prices, OPEC members unilaterally raised oil prices in 1973, prompting the 1973 oil crisis. In October 1973, the
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC, consisting of the Arab majority of OPEC plus Egypt and Syria) declared significant production cuts and an oil
embargo against the United States and other industrialized nations that supported Israel in the
Yom Kippur War. In 1973, the result was a sharp rise in oil prices and OPEC revenues, from US$3/bbl to US$12/bbl, and an emergency period of energy
rationing, intensified by panic reactions, a declining trend in US oil production, currency devaluations, and a lengthy UK coal-miners dispute. For a time, the UK imposed an emergency
three-day workweek. Seven European nations banned non-essential Sunday driving. US gas stations limited the amount of petrol that could be dispensed, closed on Sundays, and restricted the days when petrol could be purchased, based on number plate numbers. Even after the embargo ended in March 1974, following intense diplomatic activity, prices continued to rise. The world experienced a
global economic recession, with
unemployment and inflation surging simultaneously, steep declines in stock and bond prices, major shifts in
trade balances and
petrodollar flows, and a dramatic end to the
post-WWII economic boom. The 1973–1974 oil embargo had lasting effects on the United States and other industrialized nations, which established the
International Energy Agency in response, as well as national
emergency stockpiles designed to withstand months of future supply disruptions. Oil
conservation efforts included lower speed limits on highways, smaller and more
energy-efficient cars and appliances, year-round
daylight saving time, reduced usage of
heating and air-conditioning, better
building insulation, increased support of
mass transit, and greater emphasis on
coal,
natural gas,
ethanol,
nuclear and other
alternative energy sources. These long-term efforts became effective enough that US oil consumption rose only 11 percent during 1980–2014, while
real GDP rose 150 percent. In the 1970s, OPEC nations demonstrated convincingly that their oil could be used as both a political and economic weapon against other nations, at least in the short term. The embargo also meant that a section of the
Non-Aligned Movement saw power as a source of hope for their
developing countries. The Algerian president
Houari Boumédiène expressed this hope in a speech at the UN's sixth Special Session, in April 1974:
1975–1980: Special Fund, now the OPEC Fund for International Development OPEC's
international aid activities date from well before the 1973–1974 oil price surge. For example, the
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development has operated since 1961. In the years after 1973, as an example of so-called "
checkbook diplomacy", certain Arab nations have been among the world's largest providers of foreign aid, and OPEC added to its goals the selling of oil for the socio-economic growth of poorer nations. The OPEC Special Fund was conceived in
Algiers, Algeria, in March 1975, and was established in January 1976. "A Solemn Declaration 'reaffirmed the natural solidarity which unites OPEC countries with other developing countries in their struggle to overcome underdevelopment,' and called for measures to strengthen cooperation between these countries... [The OPEC Special Fund's] resources are additional to those already made available by OPEC states through a number of bilateral and multilateral channels." The Fund became an official international development agency in May 1980 and was renamed the
OPEC Fund for International Development, with Permanent Observer status at the United Nations. In 2020, the institution ceased using the abbreviation OFID.
1975: Hostage siege On 21 December 1975, Saudi Arabia's
Ahmed Zaki Yamani, Iran's
Jamshid Amuzegar, and the other OPEC oil ministers were taken hostage at their semi-annual conference in
Vienna, Austria. The attack, which killed three non-ministers, was orchestrated by a six-person team led by Venezuelan terrorist "
Carlos the Jackal", and which included
Gabriele Kröcher-Tiedemann and
Hans-Joachim Klein. The self-named "Arm of the Arab Revolution" group declared its goal to be the liberation of
Palestine. Carlos planned to take over the conference by force and hold for ransom all eleven attending oil ministers, except for Yamani and Amuzegar who were to be executed. He was finally captured in 1994 and is serving life sentences for at least 16 other murders.
1979–1980: Oil crisis and 1980s oil glut and
Iran–Iraq War disrupted regional stability and oil supplies. Electric utilities worldwide switched from oil to coal, natural gas, or nuclear power; national governments initiated multibillion-dollar research programs to develop alternatives to oil; and commercial exploration developed major non-OPEC oilfields in Siberia, Alaska, the North Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico. By 1986, daily worldwide demand for oil dropped by 5 million barrels, non-OPEC production rose by an even-larger amount, Illustrating the volatile multi-year timeframes of typical market cycles for natural resources, the result was a six-year decline in the price of oil, which culminated by plunging more than half in 1986 alone. As one oil analyst summarized succinctly: "When the price of something as essential as oil spikes, humanity does two things: finds more of it and finds ways to use less of it." Faced with increasing economic hardship (which ultimately contributed to the collapse of the
Soviet bloc in 1989), the "
free-riding" oil exporters that had previously failed to comply with OPEC agreements finally began to limit production to shore up prices, based on painstakingly negotiated national quotas that sought to balance oil-related and economic criteria since 1986. (Within their sovereign-controlled territories, the national governments of OPEC members are able to impose production limits on both government-owned and private oil companies.) Generally when OPEC production targets are reduced, oil prices increase.
1990–2003: Ample supply and modest disruptions set by retreating Iraqi troops in 1991. Leading up to his August 1990
Invasion of Kuwait, Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein was pushing OPEC to end overproduction and to send oil prices higher, in order to help OPEC members financially and to accelerate rebuilding from the 1980–1988
Iran–Iraq War. But these two Iraqi wars against fellow OPEC founders marked a low point in the cohesion of the organization, and oil prices subsided quickly after the short-term supply disruptions. The September 2001
Al Qaeda attacks on the US and the March 2003
US invasion of Iraq had even milder short-term impacts on oil prices, as Saudi Arabia and other exporters again cooperated to keep the world adequately supplied. In the 1990s, OPEC lost its two newest members, who had joined in the mid-1970s. Ecuador withdrew in December 1992, because it was unwilling to pay the annual US$2 million membership fee and felt that it needed to produce more oil than it was allowed under the OPEC quota, although it rejoined in October 2007. Similar concerns prompted Gabon to suspend membership in January 1995; it rejoined in July 2016. Lower demand triggered by the 1997–1998
Asian financial crisis saw the price of oil fall back to 1986 levels. After oil slumped to around US$10/bbl, joint diplomacy achieved a gradual slowing of oil production by OPEC, Mexico and Norway. After prices slumped again in Nov. 2001, OPEC, Norway, Mexico, Russia, Oman and Angola agreed to cut production on 1 January 2002 for 6 months. OPEC contributed 1.5 million barrels a day (mbpd) to the approximately 2 mbpd of cuts announced. In June 2003, the
International Energy Agency (IEA) and OPEC held their first joint workshop on energy issues. They have continued to meet regularly since then, "to collectively better understand trends, analysis and viewpoints and advance market transparency and predictability."
2003–2011: Volatility Widespread insurgency and sabotage occurred during the 2003–2008 height of the
American occupation of Iraq, coinciding with rapidly increasing oil demand from China and
commodity-hungry investors, recurring
violence against the Nigerian oil industry, and dwindling spare capacity as a cushion against
potential shortages. This combination of forces prompted a sharp rise in oil prices to levels far higher than those previously targeted by OPEC. Price volatility reached an extreme in 2008, as WTI crude oil surged to a record US$147/bbl in July and then plunged back to US$32/bbl in December, during the
worst global recession since World War II. OPEC's annual oil export revenue also set a new record in 2008, estimated around US$1 trillion, and reached similar annual rates in 2011–2014 (along with extensive
petrodollar recycling activity) before plunging again. By the time of the
2011 Libyan Civil War and
Arab Spring, OPEC started issuing explicit statements to counter "excessive speculation" in oil
futures markets, blaming financial speculators for increasing volatility beyond market fundamentals. In May 2008, Indonesia announced that it would leave OPEC when its membership expired at the end of that year, having become a net importer of oil and being unable to meet its production quota. A statement released by OPEC on 10 September 2008 confirmed Indonesia's withdrawal, noting that OPEC "regretfully accepted the wish of Indonesia to suspend its full membership in the organization, and recorded its hope that the country would be in a position to rejoin the organization in the not-too-distant future."
2008: Production dispute The differing economic needs of OPEC member states often affect the internal debates behind OPEC production quotas. Poorer members have pushed for production cuts from fellow members, to increase the price of oil and thus their own revenues. These proposals conflict with Saudi Arabia's stated long-term strategy of being a partner with the world's economic powers to ensure a steady flow of oil that would support economic expansion. Part of the basis for this policy is the Saudi concern that overly expensive oil or unreliable supply will drive industrial nations to conserve energy and develop alternative fuels, curtailing the worldwide demand for oil and eventually leaving unneeded barrels in the ground. To this point, Saudi Oil Minister Yamani famously remarked in 1973: "The Stone Age didn't end because we ran out of stones." To elucidate Saudi Arabia's contemporary approach, in 2024, Saudi Energy Minister Prince
Abdulaziz bin Salman articulated a stance that reflects how the kingdom has adapted to the evolving economic needs within OPEC and the broader international community. Emphasizing the need for a balanced and fair global
energy transition, he highlighted the importance of diversifying energy sources and noted significant investments in
natural gas,
petrochemicals, and
renewables. These efforts support economic development in
emerging countries and align with global
climate objectives. He addressed shifting
energy security concerns, stating, "Energy security in the 70s, 80s, and 90s was more dependent on oil. Now, you get what happened last year... It was gas. The future problem on energy security will not be oil. It will be renewables. And the materials, and the mines." Over the next few months, oil prices plummeted into the $30s, and did not return to $100 until the Libyan Civil War in 2011. As he explained in an interview: Is it reasonable for a highly efficient producer to reduce output, while the producer of poor efficiency continues to produce? That is crooked logic. If I reduce, what happens to my market share? The price will go up and the Russians, the Brazilians, US shale oil producers will take my share... We want to tell the world that high-efficiency producing countries are the ones that deserve market share. That is the operative principle in all capitalist countries... One thing is for sure: Current prices [roughly US$60/bbl] do not support all producers. When OPEC met in Vienna on 4 December 2015, the organization had exceeded its production ceiling for 18 consecutive months, US oil production had declined only slightly from its peak, world markets appeared to be oversupplied by at least 2 million barrels per day despite
war-torn Libya pumping 1 million barrels below capacity, oil producers were making major adjustments to withstand prices as low as $40, Indonesia was rejoining the export organization, and Iraqi production had surged after years of disorder. By 20 January 2016, the OPEC Reference Basket was down to US$22.48/bbl – less than one-fourth of its high from June 2014 ($110.48), less than one-sixth of its record from July 2008 ($140.73), and back below the April 2003 starting point ($23.27) of its historic run-up. As 2016 continued, the oil glut was partially trimmed with significant production offline in the United States, Canada, Libya, Nigeria and China, and the basket price gradually rose back into the $40s. OPEC regained a modest percentage of market share, saw the cancellation of many competing drilling projects, maintained the status quo at its June conference, and endorsed "prices at levels that are suitable for both producers and consumers", although many producers were still experiencing serious economic difficulties.
2017–2020: Production cut and OPEC+ As OPEC members grew weary of a multi-year supply contest with
diminishing returns and shrinking financial reserves, the organization finally attempted its first production cut since 2008. Despite many political obstacles, a September 2016 decision to trim approximately one million barrels per day was codified by a new quota agreement at the November 2016 OPEC conference. The agreement, which exempted disruption-ridden members Libya and Nigeria, covered the first half of 2017—alongside promised reductions from Russia and ten other non-members, offset by expected increases in the US shale sector, Libya, Nigeria,
spare capacity, and surging late-2016 OPEC production before the cuts took effect. These production cut deals with non-OPEC countries are generally referred to as "OPEC+". In December 2017, Russia and OPEC agreed to extend the production cut of 1.8 mbpd until the end of 2018. Qatar announced it would withdraw from OPEC effective 1 January 2019. According to
The New York Times, this was a strategic response to the
Qatar diplomatic crisis, which also involved Saudi Arabia, the
UAE,
Bahrain, and
Egypt. On 29 June 2019, Russia again agreed with Saudi Arabia to extend by six to nine months the original production cuts of 2018. In October 2019, Ecuador announced it would withdraw from OPEC on 1 January 2020, due to financial problems facing the country. In December 2019, OPEC and Russia agreed on one of the deepest output cuts so far to prevent oversupply in a deal that would last for the first three months of 2020.
2020: Saudi-Russian price war In early March 2020, OPEC officials presented an ultimatum to Russia to cut production by 1.5% of world supply. Russia, which foresaw continuing cuts as American
shale oil production increased, rejected the demand, ending the three-year partnership between OPEC and major non-OPEC providers. Another factor was
weakening global demand resulting from the
COVID-19 pandemic. This also resulted in 'OPEC plus' failing to extend the agreement cutting 2.1 million barrels per day that was set to expire at the end of March. Saudi Arabia, which has absorbed a disproportionate amount of the cuts to convince Russia to stay in the agreement, notified its buyers on 7 March that they would raise output and discount their oil in April. This prompted a Brent crude price crash of more than 30% before a slight recovery and
widespread turmoil in financial markets. Saudi Arabia had in March 2020 $500 billion of foreign exchange reserves, while at that time Russia's reserves were $580 billion. The
debt-to-GDP ratio of the Saudis was 25%, while the Russian ratio was 15%. "To Russia, this price war is more than just about regaining market share for oil," one analyst claims. "It’s about assaulting the Western economy, especially America’s." Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, represented by Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, maintains a conciliatory stance towards the U.S. shale industry. He clarified that harming this sector was never their intention, stating, "I made it clear that it was not on our radar or our intention to create any type of damage to their industry... they will rise again from the ashes and thrive and prosper." He also noted that Saudi Arabia is looking forward to a time when U.S. producers thrive once again in a market with higher oil demand." In April 2020, OPEC and a group of other oil producers, including Russia, agreed to extend production cuts until the end of July. The cartel and its allies agreed to cut oil production in May and June by 9.7 million barrels a day, equal to around 10% of global output, in an effort to prop up prices, which had previously
fallen to record lows.
2021: Saudi-Emirati dispute In July 2021, OPEC+ member United Arab Emirates rejected a Saudi proposed eight-month extension to oil output curbs which was in place due to
COVID-19 and lower oil consumption. The previous year, OPEC+ cut the equivalent of about 10% of demand at the time. The UAE asked for the maximum amount of oil the group would recognize the country of producing to be raised to 3.8 million barrels a day compared to its previous 3.2 million barrels. A compromise deal allowed UAE to increase its maximum oil output to 3.65 million barrels a day. Under the terms of the agreement, Russia would increase its production from 11 million barrels to 11.5 million by May 2022 as well. All members would increase output by 400,000 barrels per day each month starting in August to gradually offset the previous cuts made due to the COVID pandemic. This compromise, achieved where Saudi Arabia met the United Arab Emirates halfway, underscored OPEC+ unity. UAE Energy Minister
Suhail Al-Mazrouei thanked Saudi Arabia and Russia for facilitating dialogue leading to an agreement. He stated, "The UAE is committed to this group and will always work with it." On the Saudi side, Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman emphasized consensus building and stated that the agreement strengthens OPEC+'s ties and ensures its continuity.
2021–2023: Global energy crisis The record-high energy prices were driven by a global surge in demand as the world quit the economic recession caused by COVID-19, particularly due to strong energy demand in Asia. In August 2021, U.S. President
Joe Biden's national security adviser
Jake Sullivan released a statement calling on OPEC+ to boost
oil production to "offset previous production cuts that OPEC+ imposed during the pandemic until well into 2022." On 28 September 2021, Sullivan met in
Saudi Arabia with Saudi Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman to discuss the
high oil prices. The price of oil was about US$80 by October 2021, the highest since 2014. President Joe Biden and U.S. Energy Secretary
Jennifer Granholm blamed the OPEC+ for rising oil and gas prices.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has altered the global oil trade. EU leaders tried to ban the majority of Russian crude imports, but even prior to the official action imports to Northwest Europe were down. More Russian oil is now sold outside of Europe, more specifically to India and China. In October 2022, key OPEC+ ministers agreed to oil production cuts of 2 million barrels per day, the first production cut since 2020. This led to renewed interest in the passage of NOPEC.
2022: Oil production cut 's President
Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan with Russian president
Vladimir Putin, days after OPEC+ cut oil production, 11 October 2022 In October 2022, OPEC+ led by Saudi Arabia announced a large cut to its oil output target in order to aid Russia. In response, US President
Joe Biden vowed "consequences" and said the US government would "re-evaluate" the longstanding
U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia.
Robert Menendez, the Democratic chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called for a freeze on cooperation with and arms sales to Saudi Arabia, accusing the kingdom of helping Russia underwrite its war with Ukraine. Saudi Arabia's foreign ministry stated that the OPEC+ decision was "purely economic" and taken unanimously by all members of the conglomerate, pushing back on pressure to change its stance on the Russo-Ukrainian War at the UN. In response, the White House accused Saudi Arabia of pressuring other OPEC nations into agreeing with the production cut, some of which felt coerced, saying the United States had presented the Saudi government with an analysis showing there was no market basis for the cut. United States National Security Council spokesman
John Kirby said the Saudi government knew the decision will "increase Russian revenues and blunt the effectiveness of sanctions" against Moscow, rejecting the Saudi claim that the move was "purely economic". According to a report in
The Intercept, sources and experts said that Saudi Arabia had sought even deeper cuts than Russia, saying Saudi Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman wanted to sway the
2022 United States elections in favor of the
GOP and the
2024 United States presidential election in favor of
Donald Trump. In contrast, Saudi officials maintain that their decision to reduce oil production was driven by concerns over the
global economy, not political motivations. They state that the cuts were a response to the global economic situation and low inventories, which could trigger a rally in
oil prices. Saudi Arabia affirms its actions by emphasizing its strategic partnership with the U.S., focusing on peace, security, and prosperity. In 2023, the
IEA predicted that demand for fossil fuels such as oil, natural gas and coal would reach an all-time high by 2030. OPEC rejected the IEA's forecast, saying "what makes such predictions so dangerous, is that they are often accompanied by calls to stop investing in new oil and gas projects." In November 2024,
S&P Global alleged that the UAE ignored the OPEC's oil production cuts and produced around 700,000 barrels more than the agreed quota, that is, 2.91m barrels per day. Analysts asserted that the Emirates’ “quota busting” would underestimate Saudi and Russia's efforts to increase oil prices by cutting production. While Russia was seeking to fund its war with Ukraine, Saudi had its own plans of diversifying the economy.
2025–2026: Production increases and the Iran War In 2025, OPEC+ began the process of reversing voluntary production cuts. As of September 2025, the group had already cuts of about 2.5 million barrels per day—equivalent to ~2.4% of global demand. OPEC+ announced it would continue to reverse cuts and said it would boost production by 137,000 barrels per day in October. As the U.S. and Israel began
attacks on Iran in March 2026, OPEC agreed to raise production by about 200,000 barrels to help buffer potential disruptions from the attacks, with Saudi Arabia having already increased its production the month prior. As the Iran war persisted with Iran taking steps to
block the Strait of Hormuz, preventing oil tankers from leaving the
Persian Gulf, some OPEC countries like Kuwait had to cut back production. Ongoing conflict and attacks from Iran on the neighboring countries also affected production by mid-April, with individual national production falling between 23% and 61% for each nation. The UAE, the third-largest producer in OPEC at the time, announced it was withdrawing from OPEC and OPEC+ in late April, effective May 1, 2026. The Emirati government stated "While near-term volatility, including disruptions in the Arabian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, continues to affect supply dynamics, underlying trends point to sustained growth in global energy demand over the medium to long term." While the UAE said it would be able to increase oil production outside of the OPEC controls, a concept they had discussed in previously years, Vivian Nereim and Ismaeel Naar of
The New York Times also attributed growing tension between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, the leading country of OPEC, as a reason for the withdrawal. UAE has aligned with Israel in contrast to the other Arab states, and backs the opposition group, the paramilitary
Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the
Sudanese civil war whereas Saudi Arabia and Egypt support the government in that conflict. The division between the UAE and Saudi Arabia was also likely impacted by Iran's retaliatory attacks on the region, according to Nereim and Naar. UAE officials also criticized
Gulf Cooperation Council members for weak political and military support during Iranian attacks. ==Membership==