The need for a dam The Colorado River is the single largest source of water in the
southwestern United States and northwest Mexico; before massive dam projects tamed the river in the 20th century, its flow was far from dependable. Annual discharge from the Colorado River and its tributaries ranges from , and 10-year averages may fluctuate as much as . After this catastrophe, California and Arizona began to call for a dam to control the tempestuous river. In 1922, six U.S. states signed the
Colorado River Compact to officially allocate the flow of the Colorado River and its tributaries. Each half of the Colorado River Basin—the Upper Basin, comprising Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming—and the Lower Basin, with California and Nevada—was allotted of water annually, and
Treaty relating to the utilization of waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande was signed in 1944 allocating to Mexico. The third lower basin state, Arizona, did not ratify the Compact until 1944 because it was concerned that California might seek to appropriate a portion of its share before it could be put to use. The total, , was based on only thirty years of streamflow records starting in the late 1890s. It was believed to represent the annual flow as measured at
Lee's Ferry, Arizona (the official dividing point of the upper and lower basins), downstream of present-day Glen Canyon Dam. As it turned out, the early 20th century was one of the wettest periods in the last 800 years. The dependable natural flow past Lees Ferry is now believed to be about . Possible locations for this dam were debated for years, and the Bureau of Reclamation's first study for a dam at Glen Canyon was made in 1924, in addition to studies for locations at
Black and Boulder Canyons lower on the Colorado, below Grand Canyon. These studies found that the lower Colorado sites had stronger foundation rock which might result in less reservoir seepage. The Glen Canyon site was so remote that delivering supplies and transporting workers there would be infeasible at the time. The first Glen Canyon proposal lay upstream of the Lee's Ferry dividing line, and would be considered the Upper Basin's water. With its substantial Congressional clout, California refused to allow the "virtual faucets" of a Colorado River dam "to be built in what amounted to hostile territory." With the Glen Canyon site out of the question, the initial need for a reservoir was realized in 1936 with the completion of
Hoover Dam in Black Canyon, storing in the mammoth reservoir of
Lake Mead. It was not able to weather the worst floods or droughts, and was filling with sediment at a rate that would render it useless in a few hundred years. But most importantly, Hoover only controlled the lower portion of the river. The Upper Basin states, whose rivers remained undammed, had no way to ensure they could fulfill their delivery obligation to the Lower Basin states while retaining enough water for their own use. Without storage reservoirs of their own, the Upper Basin states risked a "call" on the Colorado River during drought years: they would be forced to use less water in order to keep the river flowing to Lake Mead and California, the state with the most senior water rights.
Colorado River Storage Project To provide water for the Upper Basin and ensure delivery to the Lower Basin, the Bureau of Reclamation proposed the
Colorado River Storage Project, which would consist of a dam on the Colorado River at Glen Canyon, several dams on the
Gunnison River and
San Juan River, and a pair of dams to be built on the
Green River, the Colorado's major upper tributary, at
Echo Park and Split Mountain. The 1956 Colorado River Storage Project Act authorized the purposes of "regulating the flow of the Colorado River, storing water for beneficial consumptive use, providing for reclamation of arid and semi-arid lands, providing flood control, and generating hydropower." In 1963, Arizona's congressional delegation proposed these dams as part of the
Central Arizona Project to accomplish these goals. The state of California opposed the project, as it would eliminate the "surplus" water in the Colorado (really the Upper Basin's yet unused supplies) it had gotten accustomed to using. The Bureau of Reclamation recognized a more serious problem. Construction of the Storage Project, and allowing the Upper Basin to develop its water supplies, would tip the whole Colorado River system toward a structural water deficit since the Colorado River's average flow is less than what was apportioned in the 1922 Compact. To make up for this deficit, the USBR incorporated these proposals with the "Pacific Southwest Water Plan" on January 21, 1964, in which power sales from Glen, Marble and Bridge (often called "cash register dams") would be used to fund a diversion of water from the wetter
Pacific Northwest to the Colorado Basin.
Environmental concerns (left) joining the Green River. The USBR proposed damming the Green a short distance downstream, behind the large cliff (Steamboat Rock) at right. The Echo Park dam would be inside the federally protected
Dinosaur National Monument and would submerge of scenic canyons – a move that alarmed environmentalists. The environmental organization
Sierra Club, led by
David Brower, was the most vocal opponent of Echo Park Dam, and fought a protracted battle against the Bureau of Reclamation, on the basis that "building the dam would not only destroy a unique wilderness area, but would set a terrible precedent for exploiting resources in America's national parks and monuments". The Bureau of Reclamation favored the Echo Park site over Glen Canyon, because its narrow canyons and high elevation (more than , as compared to at Glen Canyon) would lead to less evaporation. It said that building Echo Park Dam and a "low" Glen Canyon Dam would save of water per year over a "high" Glen Canyon Dam (which was ultimately the version to be built). While studying the figures, Brower discovered that the difference should be no more than . Although it is unclear whether the discrepancy was due to a miscalculation or intentional manipulation, Brower said "it would be a great mistake [to rely on the Bureau's figures] when they cannot add, subtract, multiply and divide." Echo Park was considered a victory for the American environmental movement, but it only happened in exchange for a dam upstream at
Flaming Gorge, and increasing the size of the proposed dam at Glen Canyon to replace the storage that would have been provided by Echo Park. A common misconception is that the environmentalists were given a choice between damming Echo Park and damming Glen Canyon, but the USBR "had always planned to build a dam at Glen Canyon, regardless of the outcome of the Echo Park debate".
Floyd Dominy, commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation, was a vital figure in pushing the project through Congress and convincing politicians to take a pro-dam stance, and to assuage rising public concerns. Dominy realized that the USBR had considerable political clout in Western states, due to the economic contributions of its water projects. Reisner wrote that "Dominy cultivated Congress as if he were tending prize-winning orchids ... If some Senator was causing him trouble, money for his project could disappear mighty fast." With the necessary political support secured, the Colorado River Storage Project was authorized in April 1956, and groundbreaking of Glen Canyon Dam began in October of the same year. David Brower visited Glen Canyon shortly after the decision to build the dam, and "realized once he arrived that this was not a place for a reservoir". The Colorado River flowed gently across the bottom of the canyon, in sharp contrast to the roaring rapids upstream in
Cataract Canyon and downstream in the Grand Canyon. After his groundbreaking
1869 expedition, John Wesley Powell had named Glen Canyon for its characteristics: "So we have a curious ensemble of wonderful features – carved walls, royal arches, glens, alcove gulches, mounds and monuments. From which of these features shall we select a name? We decide to call it Glen Canyon." In addition to its variegated rock formations, Glen Canyon supported a rich
riparian zone habitat on the numerous low
river terraces formed by the Colorado River, with as many as 316 bird species, 79 plant species and 34 kinds of mammals. In 1963, when construction on the dam was well underway, the Sierra Club published a book on Glen Canyon,
The Place No One Knew, featuring photographs by
Eliot Porter, and lamenting the loss of the canyon before most of the American public had a chance to visit, or were even aware of its existence. Though little known to most Americans before Porter's book, Glen Canyon had been visited by a handful of hikers and boaters (such as Powell's expedition), and some had even been interviewed by Brower. As said to Brower by writer
Wallace Stegner, who had been to the canyon in 1947, "Echo doesn't hold a candle to Glen." Emboldened by Echo Park and desperate to prevent the Grand Canyon from reaching the same fate as Glen, Brower and the Sierra Club directed attention towards the proposed
Bridge and
Marble dams. The Sierra Club launched an extensive publicity campaign to sway public opinion against the plan; in response to the USBR's argument that new reservoirs would open up the Grand Canyon to recreational boaters as Lake Powell had, a full-page advertisement in the
New York Times ran the slogan: "Should we also flood the Sistine Chapel so tourists can float nearer the ceiling?" Faced with public outcry, the Bureau abandoned its Grand Canyon dams, effectively terminating most of the Pacific Southwest Water Plan, in 1968. The coal-fired
Navajo Generating Station was built near Page, to make up for the electric power that was lost with the cancellation of the dam project. The Sierra Club lost its
IRS tax-exempt status a day after the advertisement was released due to its disruptive political activities. ==Construction==