Mobilisation When war broke out in August 1914, VI London Bde had already completed its annual training camp for the year, and the brigade was mobilised at Brixton under the command of
Lieutenant-Colonel R.J. MacHugh, who had been Commanding Officer (CO) since 1912. After mobilisation the 2nd London Division's artillery brigades moved to the country round
Hemel Hempstead,
Berkhamsted and
Kings Langley in
Hertfordshire to begin war training. On the outbreak of war, TF units were invited to volunteer for Overseas Service. On 15 August 1914, the WO issued instructions to separate those men who had signed up for Home Service only, and form these into reserve units. On 31 August, the formation of a reserve or 2nd Line unit was authorised for each 1st Line unit where 60 per cent or more of the men had volunteered for Overseas Service. The titles of these 2nd Line units would be the same as the original, but distinguished by a '2/' prefix. In this way duplicate batteries, brigades and divisions were created, mirroring those TF formations being sent overseas. Eventually these too were prepared for overseas service and 3rd Line reserve units were formed to produce reinforcement drafts to the others. The duplicate 2/VI London Brigade was formed in September 1914 and separated in March 1915 when 1/VI Brigade went overseas.
1/VI London Brigade At the end of October 1914 the 2nd London Division was chosen to reinforce the
British Expeditionary Force (BEF) fighting on the
Western Front and training was stepped up, despite bad weather and equipment shortages. Brigade and Divisional training began in February 1915 and it received its orders for the move to France on 2 March. By 22 March all the batteries had reached the divisional concentration area around
Béthune.
Aubers Ridge While the division's infantry were introduced to trench routine by being attached in groups to the
1st and
2nd Divisions holding the line, the TF field batteries with their obsolescent 15-pounders were interspersed with those of the two Regular divisions equipped with modern
18-pounder guns. However, ammunition was very scarce, and the guns were restricted to three rounds per gun per day during April. Ammunition was being saved up for the
Battle of Aubers Ridge on 9 May, when the 15-pounders of 1/VI London Bde joined with the guns of 1st and 2nd Divisions and the
Royal Horse Artillery (RHA) to cut the
barbed wire for the assault by 1st Division. The bombardment began at 05.00 with
Shrapnel shell, then at 05.30 the guns switched to
High Explosive (HE) shell to join the howitzers already firing at the German
breastworks. At 05.40 the guns lifted to targets further back and the infantry moved to the attack. The attackers ran into devastating machine gun fire (there was no artillery
barrage to suppress the defenders) and they found that the wire was inadequately cut and the breastworks barely touched. The inexperienced artillery had failed in all its tasks. A renewed bombardment was ordered from 06.15 to 07.00, but the artillery's forward observation officers (FOOs) were unable to locate the hidden German machine gun positions, which required a direct hit from an HE shell to be put out of action. The second attack failed as badly as the first, as did two others launched during the afternoon, and the survivors were pinned down in
No man's land until nightfall, despite a further bombardment being laid on to allow them to withdraw.
Festubert Although 2nd London Division suffered few casualties at Aubers Ridge, its gunners had learned a sobering lesson about the impossibility of suppressing strong defences with inadequate guns and shells. On 11 May the division was redesignated
47th (1/2nd London) Division, and on the night of 14/15 May it took its place in the line for the
Battle of Festubert. The guns were already in place, with 47th Divisional Artillery operating under the control of
7th Division. Despite the continuing shortage of ammunition, the plan this time was for a long methodical bombardment. On 13 and 14 May the field guns carried out three two-hour deliberate bombardments each day, attacking the wire with slow observed fire or keeping the enemy communication trenches under fire. At night they carried out intermittent bombardments of the communication trenches and defences, to stop supplies being brought up and to prevent repairs being carried out. The guns fired about 100 rounds per day. During 15 May feint bombardments mimicking the moment of assault were carried out, but the actual attack was made after dark with some success. The fighting went on for several days, and 47th (2nd L) Division made its own first attack on the night of 25 May. The leading brigade captured the German front and support trenches, but were then pinned down by accurate German artillery fire and could advance no further. This effectively ended the battle. The heavy rate of fire during the battle was too much for the old 15-pdrs: by 26 May, 11 out of 36 guns in the division were out of action.
Loos In June 47th (2nd L) Division took over trenches in front of
Loos-en-Gohelle from the French. This was the sector selected for the next major British attack (the
Battle of Loos), to which part of 47th (2nd L) Division would provide the southern 'hinge'. 1/VI London Bde with its obsolescent guns was not assigned a major role in the complex artillery plan, and 10 of its guns remained in reserve at
Haillicourt, behind the attack of 141st (5th London) Brigade. Supported by
poison gas clouds, the attacking portion of 47th (2nd L) Division made good progress. However, events had not played out so well further north, at Hill 70 and the
Hohenzollern Redoubt, and the battle raged on after 47th (2nd L) Division had been relieved between 28 September and 1 October. On 13 October 47th (2nd L) Division was in support for the final attack on the Hohenzollern Redoubt, and was practising on dummy trenches for a follow-up attack on
Hulluch next day, but the results at the Hohenzollern were so disappointing that the operation was cancelled. The division took over the line and the artillery was in constant action over the following weeks. On 6 November 1915 the batteries of 1/VI London Bde were re-equipped with modern 18-pounders. Ammunition supply also improved, and the guns could be used for counter-battery (CB) work.
Spring 1916 On 17 May 1916 1/VI London Bde was renumbered
CCXXXVI Bde (236 Bde) and the batteries were designated A, B and C. At the same time it was joined by 1/22nd London Bty from 1/VIII London (Howitzer) Brigade (now CCXXXVIII Bde), which became D (H) Bty; it was equipped with four
4.5-inch howitzers. At this time the brigade ammunition columns (BACs) were abolished and incorporated into the divisional ammunition column (DAC).
Somme On 1 August 1916 47th (2nd L) Division began to move south to join in the
Somme Offensive. While the infantry underwent training with the newly introduced tanks, the divisional artillery went into the line on 14 August in support of
15th (Scottish) Division. The batteries were positioned in Bottom Wood and near
Mametz Wood, and became familiar with the ground over which 47th (2nd L) Division was to attack, while supporting 15th (S) Division's gradual encroachment on
Martinpuich. Casualties among FOOs and signallers was heavy in this kind of fighting. Between 9 and 11 September 47th (2nd L) Division took over the front in the High Wood sector, and on 15 September the
Battle of Flers-Courcelette was launched, with tank support for the first time. The barrage fired by the divisional artillery left lanes through which the tanks could advance. However, the tanks proved useless in the tangled tree stumps of High Wood, and the artillery could not bombard the German front line because No man's land was so narrow. Casualties among the attacking infantry were extremely heavy, but they succeeded in capturing High Wood and the gun batteries began to move up in support, crossing deeply-cratered ground. Here casualties among the exposed guns and gunners took their toll, but a German counter-attack was broken up by gunfire. Next day the division fought to consolidate its positions round the captured 'Cough Drop' strongpoint. When the infantry were relieved on 19 September the artillery remained in the line under 1st Division. 47th (2nd L) Division came back into the line to relieve 1st Division on 28/29 September, and began attacking
Eaucourt L'Abbaye as part of the
Battle of the Transloy Ridges, finally securing the ruins on 3 October. This allowed the batteries to cross the High Wood Ridge into a small valley where they remained for the rest of the Somme fighting, helping to cover the unsuccessful attacks by 47th (2nd L) Division and later
9th (Scottish) Division against the
Butte de Warlencourt through October. By now the gun lines were crowded together in deep mud, guns sank up to their axles, and getting ammunition through was extremely difficult. The artillery was finally relieved on 14 October and followed the rest of the division to the
Ypres Salient. A further reorganisation of field artillery in the BEF was carried out in November 1916. In CCXXXVI Bde this meant that C Bty was broken up between A and B to bring them up to six guns each, and the brigade was joined by 523 (H) Bty, which had recently joined 47th Divisional Artillery from England and became C (H) Bty. Another reorganisation came on 19 January 1917, when C (H) Bty (523 (H) Bty) left to bring batteries in army field brigades up to six howitzers and was replaced by C/CCXXXVIII Bty (originally part of 1/VIII London Bde), while a section of D (H)/
CCXXXV Bty (originally B (H) Bty from CLXXVI (Leicestershire) (H) Bde in
34th Division of
New Army) joined D (H) Bty to bring it up to six howitzers. This gave the brigade its final organisation for the rest of the war: • A Bty – 1/15th London Bty + half 1/17th London Bty • B Bty – 1/16th London Bty + half 1/17th London Bty • C Bty – 1/19th London Bty + half 1/18th London Bty • D (H) Bty – 1/22nd London (H) Bty + half D (H)/CLXXVI (Leicestershire) Bty
Messines At Ypres 47th (2nd L) Division garrisoned the
Hill 60 sector, where mine warfare had been conducted for two years, and where the British had dug a massive deep mine beneath the hill ready for the planned
Battle of Messines. The divisional artillery was arranged in two groups, one in
Ypres, the other in the Railway Dugouts. These battery positions were under enemy observation and were frequently shelled during the winter. On 16 January 1917 a German attack was anticipated, and the divisional artillery, together with that of
23rd and
41st Divisions and the Corps and Army heavy guns, carried out an intense bombardment, which brought considerable enemy retaliation. As well as organised bombardments of the enemy lines, the guns frequently responded to SOS calls from the front during enemy raids, and laid on wire-cutting and box barrages for British
trench raids. Several weeks before the Battle of Messines (7 June) the artillery had begun destructive shoots on various points in the enemy lines and communications, and began wire-cutting in May. The enemy response was fierce and casualties in men and guns were frequent. 47th (2nd L) Division's role in the attack was to advance on either side of the Ypres–
Comines Canal, which was practised over taped-out courses behind the lines. On 31 May bombardment of the enemy trenches became intense, and on 3 and 5 June the barrages were practised, forcing the Germans to retaliate and give away their gun positions. At 03.30 on 7 June a series of massive mines were fired under the enemy lines from Hill 60 all along the Messines–Wytschaete Ridge, and the infantry began their advance. About two-thirds of the 18-pdrs fired a
creeping barrage ahead of the infantry, while the remainder and the 4.5inch howitzers fired standing barrages ahead. The German defences were shattered by the mines and the bombardment, and the infantry cleared their first objectives with little difficulty. A standing barrage then protected them while they prepared for the second phase. On 47th (2nd L) Division's front there was a hold-up at Spoil Bank by the canal in the second phase, but a new barrage was laid on this point and a renewed attack made at 19.00; although this too was held up, the position was later secured by the division. The field batteries were moved up to cover the new forward positions and to break up counter-attacks. During the battle some 18-pdr batteries fired as many as 6000 rounds in 24 hours.
Ypres After Messines the division was withdrawn for training, and following a short spell back in the line at Hill 60 it was in reserve for the opening of the
Third Ypres Offensive on 31 July. It held an active portion of the front under enemy observation from 18 August to 3 September, and advanced and improved the line, but the artillery found it difficult to inflict much damage on the enemy, which had adopted defence in depth with most of the troops hidden in dead ground. Between 8 and 17 September the division was in the line again, making preparations for
I ANZAC Corps' attack due on 20 September and keeping up pressure by means of frequent raids. One of these raids, on 15 September, employed a hurricane bombardment to rush a troublesome enemy strongpoint near Inverness Copse. 47th (2nd L) Division was then moved south on 21 September to join
First Army leaving the artillery in the line for a while longer. The division was stationed in a quiet sector in front of
Oppy and
Gavrelle. The British defences were not a continuous trench line, but a series of platoon or company strongpoints, the area between each to be covered by the artillery and machine guns. Once the divisional artillery joined from Ypres, close liaison with the infantry positions was achieved, and enemy positions were regularly bombarded. Wire-cutting for raids was also carried out, and smoke and incendiary ammunition was now available.
Cambrai 24 November 1917 during the
Battle of Cambrai On 19 November the division began a long march southwards, arriving on the night of 28/29 November to relieve the units holding Bourlon Wood, where fighting had been continuous since the launch of the
Battle of Cambrai on 20 November. A major German counter-attack began the following morning. The infantry of 47th (2nd L) Division were covered by the artillery of the divisions they were relieving, while CCXXXVI Brigade under the command of Lt-Col A.H. Bowring was away calibrating its guns at ranges on the old Somme battlefield. Late in the afternoon it received orders to move up and support
20th (Light) Division, which was holding onto Welsh Ridge and La Vacquerie under heavy attack. The brigade moved off at 04.30 on 1 December and came into action on the forward slopes above
Villers-Plouich, looking across at La Vacquerie only away. During the next few days the enemy tried hard to get into La Vacquerie but the FOOs were able to bring down their batteries' fire to break up these attacks. The battery positions were at the edge of the enemy barrage, and some casualties were suffered among the guns in the open on the forward slope. Any spare time the gunners had between shoots was spent in removing stores from Villers-Plouich in preparation for a withdrawal. By 5 December the battery positions were becoming precarious, and A and D Btys were withdrawn to the Beaucamp Valley and brigade HQ moved back to a chalkpit east of
Havrincourt Wood. The waggon lines had been behind Gouzeaucourt Wood, but were shelled out on 6 December. By 8 December B and C Btys were also withdrawn alongside brigade HQ, where the new line had stabilised.
Spring Offensive While the infantry of 47th (2nd L) Division were withdrawn from the
Flesquières salient to relatively comfortable winter quarters, the artillery remained in the line until 7 March 1918, when it was relieved and rejoined the division. The infantry took over the La Vacquerie sector from 2nd Division on the nights of 19/20 and 20/21 March. The anticipated
German spring offensive (
Operation Michael) began at 04.15 on 21 March (the
Battle of St Quentin), before the artillery had arrived, and the division was supported by 2nd Division's artillery in the subsequent fighting. 47th Divisional Artillery was separated from its parent formation for the next two months. CCXXXVI Brigade had been out of the line training in mobile warfare. By midday on 21 March it was on the road with orders to report to
19th (Western) Division, but on the way it was diverted to join
17th (Northern) Division, which assigned it positions near
Vélu Wood. By 17.00 it was shelling German positions in
Doignies and at 18.00 it fired an hour-long barrage to support 17th Division's counter-attack on Doignies, despite coming under hostile CB fire. Towards midnight the batteries were moved back, picked up the transport and marched through
Bapaume to support
6th Division, which was hard-pressed on the north side of the Cambrai road. A and B Batteries were sent north to positions east of
Sapignies, while C and D Btys and brigade HQ took up positions at dawn east of
Frémicourt. These batteries had to fire immediate barrages against the advancing German troops. The Germans pressed on throughout 22 March, and during the night C and D Btys were moved back west of Frémicourt. The brigade now came under the orders of
41st Division as the Germans pushed the British infantry back. On 24 March the guns came under heavy shellfire and had to withdraw to positions nearer Bapaume, and then went back further during the night to the shelter of the railway embankment near
Achiet-le-Petit. Dawn revealed the British infantry streaming back, followed by the enemy, and the brigade as ordered back again: the gun teams galloped up from Achiet-le-Petit and the guns were pulled out, covered by fire from two tanks and a battery of CCXXXV Bde. After a massive traffic jam in Achiet-le-Petit was cleared, the brigade deployed around
Bucquoy. But the line had been outflanked and the gun teams were shelled out of their positions, so the brigade was ordered back once more. By dawn on 26 March they were coming into action near
Gommecourt, with the gun teams close by in case another retirement. But
4th Australian Brigade came up and filled the gap, and the line held firm, supported. by frequent barrage fire from the guns: a determined German attack at 17.00 failed. The line here held firm during the last days of March and the gun teams could be rested for the first time since 21 March. The line was supported by an
ad hoc artillery ground commanded by Lt-Col Bowring, consisting of his own brigade together with two others from 41st Division. Enemy retaliation caused brigade HQ and D Bty to be moved to safer positions, bu there was no further retreat in this sector. On 5 April both of 47th (2nd L) Division's RFA brigades came under the command of
37th Division, supporting a counter-attack that disrupted the last phase of Operation Michael, the
Battle of the Ancre, on this front. CCXXXVI Brigade remained in the line until it was finally relieved to a rest area near
Abbeville on 9 May.
Hundred Days 47th (2nd London) Division was rejoined by its artillery at the end of May and went into corps reserve in late June. On 28 June the artillery moved up to support an attack launched by the
Australian Corps (the
Battle of Hamel). The dawn attack was made with overwhelming artillery support, notable because to preserve secrecy the guns had not been able to register their barrage lines beforehand. CCXXXVI Brigade was able to turn a captured field gun onto the enemy. The Allied
Hundred Days Offensive began on 8 August 1918, and the artillery of 47th (2nd L) Division were once again detached, supporting
18th (Eastern) Division from 13 August to 4 September. CCXXXVI brigade found itself in the same
dugouts in Caterpillar Valley that they had occupied in 1916. On 22 August 18th (E) Division formed a defensive flank while 47th (2nd L) Division attacked from in front of
Amiens towards high ground beyond Happy Valley (the
Battle of Albert). The night before the attack D (H)/CCXXXVI Bty had their commander and 35 men put out of action by enemy
Mustard gas shelling. From now on the battle was constantly moving, and the British divisions began sending forward all-arms brigade groups including artillery batteries to clear strongholds and round up prisoners as they advanced. The field artillery frequently had to organise creeping barrages for these small operations, and casualties from enemy shellfire and gas were continuous. , 28 October 1918 Both 18th (E) and 47th (2nd L) Divisions, their infantry now very weak, were relieved in early September. 47th Divisional Artillery then moved by train (only the second time they had done this) to rejoin the rest of the division, which had been moved to the
Lille front. The division was scheduled to be transferred to the
Italian Front, but the orders wee changed and the division was put into the line to follow the retreating enemy across Aubers Ridge as far as the main Lille defences. After a 10-day pause, the division was relieved and once again prepared for the move to Italy. However, on 28 October this was finally changed, and 47th (2nd L) Division made the Official Entry into the liberated city of Lille on 28 October. It afterwards moved up to the
River Scheldt, occupying
Tournai when the enemy retired. It advanced beyond, but when the
Armistice with Germany came into force on 11 November, 47th Division marched back to
Tournai. Immediately after the Armistice 47th (2nd L) Division was engaged in railway repairs. It went into winter quarters mining villages in the Béthune area to await
demobilisation, which began in January 1919. By the end of March units had been reduced to
cadre strength, and these returned to England in May. The artillery brigades were demobilised at
Shoreham-by-Sea in June 1919.
Commanding officers The following commanded 1/VI London/CCXXXVI Brigade during the First World War: • Lt-Col R.J. MacHugh,
TD, from mobilisation to April 1915 • Lt-Col A.C. Lowe,
DSO, (previously commanded 47th Divisional Ammunition Column) May 1915 to September 1917 • Lt-Col A.H. Bowring, September 1917 to November 1918 • Lt-Col the Hon
H.G.O. Bridgeman, DSO, (previously
Brigade major, RA, 47th Division) November 1918 to demobilisation
2/VI London Brigade The 2/2nd London Division came into existence quickly as volunteers rushed to join up. There were no guns or horses for the artillery, but the batteries improvised dummy guns mounted on hardcarts, with wooden sights and washing-lines for drag-ropes. Although the
Master-General of the Ordnance, Major-General Sir
Stanley von Donop, was pleased with their work and promised them the first guns available, it was not until February 1915 that some old 15-pdrs arrived for training. In March 1915 the division took the place of 1/2nd London Division in the St Albans area. At the end of May, now numbered
60th (2/2nd London) Division, it moved into
Essex, with the artillery at
Much Hadham. Finally, at the end of November it began to receive new 18-pdr guns and towards the end of January 1916 the division moved to the
Warminster training area on
Salisbury Plain. On 28 April 3/2 Wessex Bty arrived as a fourth 18-pdr battery for 2/VI London Brigade. Then, as with the TF artillery brigades in the BEF, those in 60th Division were numbered on 17 May, 2/VI Londons taking the number
CCCI Brigade (301 Bde), and the batteries were lettered. 3/2 Wessex Bty was transferred to 2/VIII London (CCCIII) Brigade. The BACs were also absorbed into the DAC.
Western Front On 14 June 1916 orders arrived for 60th Division to move to the Western Front, and the artillery units made the crossing from
Southampton to
Le Havre between 22 and 26 June, with CCCI Bde under the command of Lt-Col Thatcher. The division concentrated in the area behind
Arras by 29 June. It relieved
51st (Highland) Division in the line on 14 July, with the artillery moving into position over the next three nights. The line held was facing the same strong German positions along Vimy Ridge that 47th (2nd L) Division had faced, and there was constant mine warfare and trench raiding. The artillery was mostly engaged in suppressing troublesome German trench mortars (
Minenwerfers) by firing short concentrated bombardments on specific sectors of the enemy line. Some trench raids were preceded by local wirecutting bombardments, or by a barrage, others were 'stealth' raids. On 30 August the divisional artillery underwent the same reorganisation into six-gun batteries that was going on throughout the BEF. In CCCI Bde this meant that A Bty was broken up to bring B and C up to six guns each, while D (H) Bty (originally 2/21 London Bty) joined from
CCC Bde. On 20 October the newly raised 519 (H) Bty arrived from England and became A (H) Bty. However, orders arrived on 1 November for the division to transfer to the
Macedonian front (Salonika), where the four-gun different establishment was still in force. On 5 November A (H) Bty left for CCC Bde, and the original A Bty was reformed from its sections in B and C Btys. The BAC was also reformed. Once the brigade was in Macedonia, the six-gun battery establishment was introduced there as well, and A Bty was once again (and finally) split between B and C Btys, which were redesignated A and B. (It was not until 17 June 1917 that D (H) Bty was redesignated C (H)): • A Bty – 2/16th London Bty + half 2/15th London Bty • B Bty – 2/17th London Bty + half 2/15th London Bty • C (H) Bty – 2/21st London (H) Bty
Salonika Entrainment of the artillery for the embarkation port of
Marseille began on 14 November and was a slow business due to lack of facilities: the drivers needed their wooden trench bridges to get their horses aboard the trains. All units were embarked and at sea by 12 December and proceeded to
Salonika via
Malta. Early in 1917 the division's units moved up the poor roads to the
Lake Doiran sector and settled in to improve the defences and harass the enemy. Veterinary officers found that the transport horses and mules in this campaign were overworked, but that artillery horses lacked exercise and it became standard practice to allow them to wander at will during the day and then round them up a feeding times. In early March the division began moving in bad weather to take over the line between Lake Doiran and the
Vardar in preparation for the Allied Spring offensive. Apart from diversionary raids, 60th (2/2nd L) Division took little part in the first part of this operation (8–9 April), most of its batteries being used to reinforce the main attack near Lake Doiran, which required several days' artillery preparation. The division did attack during the second phase of the offensive (8/9 May), but it captured its objectives by night attacks without preliminary artillery fire. A further advance was made by the division on 15 May, but the rest of the offensive having come to a standstill it was called off on 24 May. On 1 June 1917 the division was marched back to Salonika to embark for
Egypt.
Palestine Immediately after landing at
Alexandria 60th (2/2nd L) Division moved to the
Suez Canal to join the
Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF), where its units were reorganised. On 17 June, B Bty left to join a new CCLXVIII Bde being formed at
El Ferdan for
74th (Yeomanry) Division.The BAC was also absorbed into the DAC once more. The division then underwent training before crossing
Sinai in early July 1917. Further intensive training followed until late October, when the division made its first full-scale attack of the war, at
Beersheba. In the weeks leading up to the attack artillery officers had regularly ridden close to the Beersheba defences to reconnoitre, often under fire. Concentration for the attack was carried out under cover of darkness, beginning on 20/21 October and completed on 28/29 October. The divisional artillery was divided into Right and Left groups corresponding to the two attacking brigade; CCCI Bde was part of Left Group under Lt-Cil Thatcher supporting
181st (2/6th London) Brigade. The whole force moved forward with great secrecy over featureless desert under moonlight on 30/31 October, the
Royal Engineers improving the track north of Wadi ed Sabe for the artillery, which was in position by 01.30. All guns had 200 rounds available. At dawn the guns began to bombard Hill 1070, pausing at 07.00 to let the smoke and dust clear. At 08.30 the guns switched from wire-cutting to intensive bombardment, 181st Bde moving forward as the guns lifted, and taking the hill in 10 minutes. As soon as new Observation Posts (OPs) had been established on the hill the batteries galloped forward over the stony ground to begin wire-cutting on the main Turkish position. The general advance was resumed at 12.15 and 181st Brigade captured its objectives easily, 'thanks largely to the excellent work of the 301st Artillery group', according to the divisional history. By 13.00 the whole of the defence works were in British hands, and that evening the
Desert Mounted Corps entered Beersheba. The next phase of the offensive involved 60th (2/2nd L) Division in an attack on
Kauwukah in the Turkish Sheria position (the
Battle of Hareira and Sheria) on 6 November. The attacking brigades moved forwards at 03.30 with the artillery, which began wire-cutting as soon as it was in position. Each 18-pdr battery cut two gaps in the wire by 12.15, and then began a bombardment of the enemy trench as the attack went in against heavy fire. The field guns then lifted onto the works in the second line. The whole defensive position was in the division's hands by 14.00 and it pushed patrols ahead towards Sheria and its water supply. Sheria was captured at daybreak the following morning, without artillery preparation, but afterwards there was heavy fighting, and several Turkish counter-attacks were broken up by the field guns. The infantry brigade groups continued their advance the following day, supported by their artillery groups, and entered
Huj. of an RFA battery engaging Turkish batteries at Nebi Samwil After a short rest at Huj, the division
bivouacked at
Gaza under heavy rain, then began a march through the mud to Junction Station, which it reached on 22 November. It now entered the last stage of the
Battle of Nebi Samwil, where the objectives were a tangle of hill slopes, with tracks so bad that it was impossible to bring up the guns until roads had been made for them. Nebi Samwil had been captured by units of
75th Division, and the London battalions that relieved them came under fierce counter-attacks on 29 November; only the supporting British artillery fire allowed them to maintain their position. However, the way was now open to attack the final defences of
Jerusalem; an encirclement was chosen, to avoid attacking the city itself. The surprise attack began on 8 December without artillery support; once progress had been made the batteries were to move up and come under command of the brigade groups. The going was tough for the guns, but CCCI Bde got though and eventually came into action within close rifle range of the enemy. C (H) Battery under Lt-Col Thatcher, together with C (H)/CCCII Bty, came up through Qalonye and supported
180th (2/5th London) Brigade's afternoon attack on the heights above
Lifta; the hill was carried with great dash at the point of the bayonet. The battery suffered one officer mortally wounded, one man killed and 13 wounded. The division consolidated its gains that evening. The advance was resumed the following morning and the infantry fought their way into the suburbs of Jerusalem; there was little the artillery could do to support them. The Turks evacuated the city and the following morning the mayor and civic leaders
surrendered the city to two sergeants of
2/19th Londons. 60th (2/2nd L) Division was then pushed forward into positions from which to defend the captured city. Turkish counter-attacks began on 22 December, and a major attack followed on the night of 26/27 December. This was beaten off and the division took the opportunity to push forward up the
Nablus Road into the hills over the following days. 60th Divisional Artillery made 'extraordinary exertions' to get its guns up to support attacks that captured the heights of Tahuneh and Shab Salah on 29 December. The Nablus Road defences were then garrisoned by 180th Bde with CCCI Bde in support. There was a pause in operations until February 1918 when the EEF moved to drive the Turks east of the
Jordan. 60th (2/2nd L) Division advanced with three brigade groups, each supported by artillery, and worked its way forward between 14 and 21 February over rough country, after which the supporting Australian
1st Light Horse Brigade swept into
Jericho, leaving the Turks with only small bridgeheads west of the Jordan. CCCI Brigade played no part in the
Battle of Tell 'Asur that followed. The former B/CCCI Bty, having served with 74th (Y) Division through the campaign from Gaza to Tell 'Asur as A/CCLXVIII, returned to CCCI on 21 March 1918 and resumed its position as B Bty. The EEF settled down to defend its Jordan bridgeheads; CCCI Brigade was posted to support the Australian
2nd Light Horse Brigade and
Imperial Camel Corps garrisoning a bridgehead at the
Wadi el Auja confluence. The Turks attacked the Auja bridgehead on 11 April but were driven off, the artillery observers on the high ground to the west having 'an admirable view'. Later that month the 60th (2/2nd L) Division played its part in the
Second Transjordan raid. CCCI Brigade crossed the river at Ghoraniyeh on 29 April, but while the mounted troops reached
Es Salt the Londoners could not break through the Turkish positions in the foothills, and the raiding force was withdrawn on 4 May. 60th (2/2nd L) Division then went into Corps Reserve for a rest. As a result of the German Spring Offensive and consequent manpower crisis on the Western Front, 60th (2/2nd L) Division was changed between 25 May and 1 August to an
Indian Army establishment, releasing three-quarters of its London infantry units for service in France and replacing them with Indian units; however, this did not affect the artillery, which continued to serve with the division in Palestine. In July the Abu Tulul salient in the Jordan Valley was garrisoned by the 1st Light Horse Brigade when it was attacked by German troops bolstering the Turks. Among the artillery supporting this sector was C (H)/CCCI Bty. When the Australian unit in the front line heard the sound of movement in front at 01.00 on 14 July he called down a defensive barrage in front of his position; the enemy artillery also came into action, shelling the whole position. A serious attack came in at 03.30 as the Australians withdrew their outposts, but after a fierce fight the Light Horse recovered their positions and took hundreds of prisoners. For the final offensive in Palestine, the
Battle of Megiddo, 60th Division was transferred to the coastal sector where the breakthrough was to be made. The opening attack (the
Battle of Sharon) went in at 04.30 on 19 September behind an intense artillery bombardment. As soon as the barrage programme was complete, the artillery moved up behind the infantry, who had gained their first objectives. 181st Brigade was ordered up from support at 06.15 and by 10.00 was advancing on Umm Sur with the two 18-pdr batteries of CCCI Bde, which had crossed the
Nahr el Faliq. It then carried on to reach Tel Subik by 14.00, as the Turks streamed away in retreat. The 60th Division advanced for the next three days against enemy rearguards until it ran ahead of its supplies. After the battle the pursuit was carried out by the mounted troops and 60th Division was left behind on salvage duties. It was still in the rear areas when the
Armistice of Mudros ended the war with Turkey on 31 October. The division then went back to Alexandria where
demobilisation began and units were gradually reduced to cadres, though still with some responsibility for internal security and seizing illegal arms. The division ceased to exist on 31 May 1919. ==Interwar==