British official historian Brigadier
James Edward Edmonds, in 1925, recorded that "The British Army of 1914 was the best trained, best equipped and best organized British Army ever sent to war". This was in part due to the
Haldane reforms, and the Army itself recognising the need for change and training. Training began with individual training in winter, followed by squadron, company or battery training in spring. Regimental, battalion and brigade training took place in summer and division or inter-divisional exercises and army manoeuvres in late summer and autumn. The common doctrine of headquarters at all levels was outlined in the
Field Service Pocket Book which Haig had introduced while serving as Director of Staff Studies at the War Office in 1906. The Second Boer War had alerted the army to the dangers posed by fire zones that were covered by long-range
magazine-fed rifles. In the place of volley firing and
frontal attacks, there was a greater emphasis on advancing in extended order, the use of available cover, the use of artillery to support the attack, flank and converging attacks and fire and movement. The Army expected units to advance as far as possible in a firing line without opening fire, both to conceal their positions and conserve ammunition, then to attack in successive waves, closing with the enemy decisively. The cavalry practised reconnaissance and fighting dismounted more regularly, and in January 1910, the decision was made at the General Staff Conference that dismounted cavalry should be taught infantry tactics in attack and defence. They were the only cavalry from a major European power trained for both the mounted cavalry charge and dismounted action, and equipped with the same rifles as the infantry, rather than short-range
carbines. The cavalry were also issued with
entrenching tools prior to the outbreak of war as a result of experience gained during the Second Boer War. The infantry's marksmanship and fire and movement techniques had been inspired by Boer tactics and were established as formal doctrine by Colonel
Charles Monro when he was in charge of the School of Musketry at
Hythe. In 1914, British rifle fire was so effective that there were some reports to the effect that the Germans believed they were facing huge numbers of machine guns. The Army concentrated on rifle practice, with days spent on the ranges dedicated to improving marksmanship and obtaining a rate of fire of 15 effective rounds a minute at . One sergeant set a record of 38 rounds into a target set at in 30 seconds. In their 1914 skill-at-arms meeting, the 1st Battalion
Black Watch recorded 184 marksmen, 263 first-class shots, 89-second-class shots and four third-class shots, at ranges from . The infantry also practised squad and section attacks and fire from cover, often without orders from officers or
NCOs so that soldiers would be able to act on their own initiative. In the last exercise before the war, it was noted that the "infantry made wonderful use of ground, advances in short rushes and always at the double and almost invariably fires from a prone position".
Weapons The British Army was armed with the
Short Magazine Lee–Enfield Mk III (SMLE Mk III) which featured a bolt-action and large
magazine capacity that enabled a trained rifleman to fire 20–30 aimed rounds a minute. First World War accounts tell of British troops repelling German attackers, who subsequently reported that they had encountered machine guns, when in fact, it was simply a group of trained riflemen armed with SMLEs. The heavy
Vickers machine gun proved itself to be the most reliable weapon on the battlefield, with some of its feats of endurance entering military mythology. One account tells of the action by the 100th Company of the Machine Gun Corps at
High Wood on 24 August 1916. This company had 10 Vickers guns and was ordered to give sustained covering fire for 12 hours onto a selected area away in order to prevent German troops forming up there for a counterattack while a British attack was in progress. Two companies of infantry were allocated as ammunition, rations and water carriers for the gunners. Two men worked a belt–filling machine non–stop for 12 hours, keeping up a supply of 250-round belts. They used 100 new barrels and all of the water, including the men's drinking water and the contents of the
latrine buckets, to keep the guns cool. In that 12-hour period, the 10 guns fired just short of one million rounds between them. One team is reported to have fired 120,000. At the close of the operation, it is alleged that every gun was working perfectly and that not one had broken down during the whole period. The lighter
Lewis gun was adopted for land and aircraft use in October 1915. This had the advantage of being about 80% faster to build than the Vickers and far more portable. By the end of the First World War, over 50,000 Lewis Guns had been produced. They were nearly ubiquitous on the Western Front, outnumbering the Vickers gun by a ratio of about 3:1. The British used improvised mortars as a stop-gap, with the
2-inch medium mortar and its "toffee apple" projectile being deployed from March 1915. This was superseded by the 81mm
Stokes Mortar, first issued at the end of 1915 which was later adopted by the French Army too. Finally, the
Mark I tank, a British invention, was seen as the solution to the stalemate of trench warfare. The Mark I had a range of without refuelling, a speed of , and first saw service on the Somme in September 1916.
Infantry tactics , 25 September 1916, part of the battle of the Somme After the "race to the sea",
manoeuvre warfare gave way to
trench warfare, a development for which the British Army had not prepared. Expecting an offensive mobile war, the Army had not instructed the troops in defensive tactics and had failed to obtain stocks of
barbed wire,
hand grenades, or
trench mortars. In the early years of trench warfare, the normal infantry attack formation was based on the battalion and comprised four
companies that were each made up of four
platoons. The battalion would form 10 waves with between each, while each company formed two waves of two platoons. The first six waves were the fighting elements from three of the battalions' companies, the seventh contained the battalion headquarters. The remaining company formed the eighth and ninth waves which were expected to carry equipment forward and the tenth wave contained the stretcher bearers and medics. The formation was expected to move forward at a rate of every two minutes, even though each man carried his rifle,
bayonet, gas mask, ammunition, two
hand grenades,
wire cutters, a spade, two empty
sandbags and
flares. The carrying platoons, in addition to the above, also carried extra ammunition, barbed wire and construction materials to effect repairs to captured lines and fortifications. By 1918, experience had led to a change in tacticsthe infantry no longer advanced in rigid lines, but formed a series of flexible waves. They would move covertly, under the cover of darkness, and occupy shell holes or other cover near the German line.
Skirmishers formed the first wave and followed the creeping barrage into the German front line to hunt out points of resistance. The second or main wave followed in platoons or sections in single file. The third was formed from small groups of reinforcements, the fourth wave was expected to defend the captured territory. All waves were expected to take advantage of the ground during the advance. (See below for the procedure when operating with tanks.) Each platoon now had a Lewis gun section and a section that specialised in throwing hand-grenades (then known as bombs) and each section was compelled to provide two scouts to carry out reconnaissance duties. Each platoon was expected to provide mutual fire support in the attack they were to advance, without halting. However,
leap frogging was accepted, with the lead platoon taking an objective and the following platoons passing through them and onto the next objective, while the Lewis gunners provided fire support. Grenades were used for clearing trenches and dugouts and each battalion carried forward two trench mortars to provide fire support.
Tank tactics The tank was designed to break the deadlock of trench warfare. In their first use on the Somme, they were placed under command of the infantry and ordered to attack their given targets in groups or pairs. They were also assigned small groups of troops, who served as an escort while providing close defence against enemy attacks. Only nine tanks reached the German lines to engage machine gun emplacements and troop concentrations. On the way, 14 broke down or were ditched, another 10 were damaged by enemy fire. In 1917, during the
battle of Cambrai, the
Tank Corps adopted new tactics. Three tanks working together would advance in a triangle formation, with the two rear tanks providing cover for an infantry platoon. The tanks were to create gaps in the barbed wire for the accompanying infantry to pass through and then to use their armament to suppress the German strong points. The effectiveness of tank–infantry co-operation was demonstrated during the battle when Major General
George Harper of the
51st (Highland) Division refused to co-operate with the tanks, a decision that compelled them to move forward without any infantry support. The result was the destruction of more than 12 tanks by German artillery sighted behind bunkers. The situation had changed again by 1918, when tank attacks would have one tank every 100 or , with a tank company of 12–16 tanks per objective. One
section of each company would be out in front, with the remainder of the company following behind and each tank providing protection for an infantry platoon, who were instructed to advance, making use of available cover and supported by machine-gun fire. When the tanks came across an enemy strong point, they would engage the defenders, forcing them into shelter and leaving them to be dealt with by the following infantry.
Artillery tactics s of the 39th Siege Battery,
Royal Garrison Artillery conducting a shoot in the Fricourt-Mametz valley, August 1916, during the battle of the Somme. Prior to the war, the artillery worked independently and was taught to support the infantry to ensure a successful attack. In 1914, the heaviest artillery gun was the 60-pounder, with four in each heavy battery. The
Royal Horse Artillery employed the 13-pounder, while the
Royal Field Artillery used the 18-pounder gun. By 1918, the situation had changed and the artillery were the dominant force on the battlefield. Between 1914 and 1918, the Royal Field Artillery increased from 45 to 173 field brigades, while the heavy and siege artillery of the
Royal Garrison Artillery had increased from 32 heavy and six siege batteries to 117 and 401 respectively. With this increase in the number of batteries of heavier guns, the armies needed to find a more efficient method of moving the heavier guns around. It was proving difficult to find the number of
draught horses required. The
War Office ordered over 1,000
Holt 75 caterpillar tractors, which transformed the mobility of the siege artillery. The army also mounted a variety of surplus naval guns on various railway platforms to provide mobile long-range heavy artillery on the Western Front. Until 1914, artillery generally fired over
open sights at visible targets, the largest unit accustomed to firing at a single target was the artillery regiment or brigade. One innovation brought about by the adoption of trench warfare was the
barrage, a term first used in the
battle of Neuve Chapelle in 1915. Trench warfare had created the need for
indirect fire, with the use of observers, more sophisticated artillery fire plans, and an increasingly scientific approach to gunnery where artillerymen had to use increasingly complicated calculations to lay the guns. Individual guns were aimed so that their fall of shot was coordinated with others to form a patternin the case of a barrage the pattern was a line. The
creeping barrage was a barrage that lifted in small increments, perhaps , so that it moved forward slowly, keeping pace with the infantry, who were trained to follow close behind the moving wall of their own fire, often as close as . Infantry commanders were encouraged to keep their troops as close to the barrage as possible, even at the risk of casualties from
friendly fire. A creeping barrage could maintain the element of surprise, with guns opening fire only shortly before the assault troops moved off. It was useful when enemy positions had not been thoroughly reconnoitred as it did not depend on identifying individual targets in advance. The idea behind the creeping barrage was that the infantry should reach the enemy positions before the defenders had time to recover, emerge from shelters, and man their positions. On the first day of the
battle of the Somme, the barrage outpaced the infantry, allowing the defenders to recover and emerge from their
dugouts, with disastrous results for the attackers. The creeping barrage demonstrated its effectiveness a year later, in 1917, during the
Second Battle of Arras. A weakness of the creeping barrage was that the infantry was subordinated to the artillery schedule, while the infantry commanders had less control over the tactical situation and were therefore in danger of forgetting how to manoeuvre their troops around the battlefield. The importance of the barrage was such that traditional infantry tactics, including a reliance on the infantry's own firepower to support its movement forward, was sometimes forgotten. Once the infantry had reached the German trenches, the artillery shifted from the creeping barrage to the
standing barrage, a static barrage ahead of the infantry that would protect them from counter-attack while they consolidated the position. A variant was the
box barrage, in which three or four barrages formed a box (or more often three sides of a box) around a position to isolate and prevent reinforcements being brought up into the front line. This was normally used to protect
trench raids, although it could also be used offensively against a German unit. Another type of barrage was the
SOS barrage, fired in response to a German counterattack. An SOS barrage could be brought down by firing a
flare signal of a pre-arranged colour as a German barrage tended to cut the telephone lines. A pre-registered barrage would then descend on No Man's Land. With the introduction of the tank, the artillery was no longer required to aid the infantry by destroying obstacles and machine gun positions. Instead, the artillery assisted by neutralising the German artillery with
counter-battery fire. British Army researchers under Lieutenant
William Lawrence Bragg developed
sound ranging, a method of determining the location of hostile artillery from the sound of its guns firing. A Counter Battery Staff Officer (CBSO) was assigned to each corps to coordinate the counter-battery effort, collating reports from sound ranging and Royal Flying Corps observers. By the end of the war, it was realised that the important effect of the barrage was to demoralise and suppress the enemy, rather than physical destruction. A short, intense bombardment immediately followed by an infantry assault was more effective than the weeks of grinding bombardment used in 1916.
Communications The
Royal Engineers Signal Service, formed in 1912, was given responsibility for communications that included signal
dispatch,
telegraph, telephone and later
wireless communications, from army headquarters to brigade and down to battery level for the artillery. For most of the war, the Army's primary methods of communication were signal dispatch (employing runners, messengers on horseback, dogs, and
carrier pigeons), visual signalling, telegraph, and telephone. In 1914, when the BEF arrived in France, there were two Engineer field companies attached to each infantry division, which was increased to three companies by September 1914. Each division also had a Signals company, which was responsible for communications between Corps, Division and Brigade headquarters.
Royal Engineer tunnelling companies were formed in response to the German blowing of 10 small mines in December 1914, at
Givenchy. Twenty-one companies were eventually formed and were employed digging subways, cable trenches,
Sapping, dugouts as well as offensive or defensive mining. Created in October 1915, the MGC consisted of infantry machine-gun companies, cavalry machine-gun squadrons and motor machine-gun batteries. In November 1916, each company was reformed as a battalion of three companies, with plans to increase the Corps to 20 battalions, each Tank Battalion had a complement of 32 officers and 374 men. In addition they had under command Indian, Egyptian, Chinese (
Chinese Labour Corps) and other native labourers, carriers and stores men. The Corps was assisted in its work by voluntary help from the
British Red Cross,
St John's Ambulance and the
Friends Ambulance Unit. While not strictly a member of the RAMC, stretcher bearer
Lance Corporal William Harold Coltman VC,
DCM & Bar,
MM & Bar, was the most decorated
other rank of the war. ==Life in the trenches==