1914 Outbreak of war in 1914. During the
Curragh Mutiny (March 1914) Haig urged caution on his BGGS
John Gough, whose brother
Hubert Gough was threatening to resign rather than coerce Ulstermen into a semi-independent Ireland. Haig stressed that the army's duty was to keep the peace. Sir John French was forced to resign as
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, after putting in writing a promise that officers would not be required to coerce Ulster; Haig respected Hubert Gough's principled stand but felt French had allowed himself to be used as a political tool by
H. H. Asquith. Upon the outbreak of war in August 1914, Haig helped organize the
British Expeditionary Force (BEF), commanded by Field Marshal Sir John French. As planned, Haig's Aldershot command was formed into
I Corps. In a letter to Haldane (4 August), Haig predicted that the war would last for months if not years; Haig wanted Haldane to delay sending the BEF to France until the Territorial Army had been mobilised and incorporated. Haig attended the War Council (5 August), at which it was decided that it was too dangerous to mobilise forward in France at
Maubeuge near the Belgian border, as British mobilisation was running three days behind that of
France and
Germany. There were no other contingency plans – Haig and Kitchener proposed that the BEF would be better positioned to counter-attack in
Amiens. Sir John French suggested landing at
Antwerp, which was vetoed by
Winston Churchill as the
Royal Navy could not guarantee safe passage. A critical biographer writes that Haig was "more clear-sighted than many of his colleagues". In his much-criticised memoirs
1914, French claimed that Haig had wanted to postpone sending the BEF, which may be partly true given what Haig had written to Haldane. Haig was so angry at this claim that he asked
Cabinet Secretary Maurice Hankey to correct French's "inaccuracies". However Haig also rewrote his diary from this period, possibly to show himself in a better light and French in a poor one. The original manuscript diary does not survive but there is no positive evidence that it was destroyed, and it is just as likely that the extant typed version was prepared from dictation or notes now lost. Hankey's notes of the meeting record that Haig suggested delaying or sending smaller forces, but was willing to send forces if France was in danger of defeat or if France wanted them (which it did). Haig predicted that the war would last several years and that an army of a million men, trained by officers and NCOs withdrawn from the BEF, would be needed. During a royal inspection of Aldershot (11 August), Haig told the King that he had "grave doubts" about French's temper and military knowledge. He later claimed that these doubts had gone back to the Boer War but there appears to have been an element of later embellishment about this; Haig had in fact praised French during the Boer War and had welcomed his appointment as CIGS in 1911.
Mons to the Marne (GOC
2nd Division), Brigadier-General
John Gough (Haig's BGGS), and Brigadier-General
E. M. Perceval (commanding the 2nd Division's artillery) in a street in France, 1914. Haig crossed over to
Le Havre. The BEF landed in France on 14 August and advanced into Belgium. Haig was irritated by Sir John French, who ignored intelligence reports of German forces streaming westwards from Brussels, threatening an encirclement from the British left. Although II Corps fought off the German attack at
Mons on 23 August the BEF was forced to withdraw. The retreats of I and
II Corps had to be conducted separately because of the
Mormal Forest. The two corps were supposed to meet at
Le Cateau but I Corps under Haig were stopped at
Landrecies, leaving a large gap between the two. Haig's reactions to his corps' skirmish with German forces at Landrecies (during which Haig led his staff into the street, revolvers drawn, promising to "sell our lives dearly") caused him to send an exaggerated report to French, which caused French to panic. The following day 26 August, General
Horace Smith-Dorrien's II Corps engaged the enemy in the
Battle of Le Cateau, which was unsupported by Haig. This battle slowed the German advance. However, a critical biographer writes that too much has been made of the "moment of panic" at Landrecies, and that the retreat, over a period of 13 days, is a tribute to the "steady and competent leadership" of Haig and Smith-Dorrien. On 25 August the French commander
Joseph Joffre ordered his forces to retreat to the
Marne, which compelled the BEF to further withdraw. Haig was irritated by the high-handed behaviour of the French, seizing roads which they had promised for British use and refusing to promise to cover the British right flank. He complained privately of French unreliability and lack of fighting competence, a complaint which he would keep up for the next four years. He wrote to his wife that he wished the British were operating independently from Antwerp, a proposal which he had rejected as "reckless" when Sir John French had made it at the War Council on 4 August. The retreat caused Sir John French to question the competence of his Allies and led to his decision to withdraw the BEF south of the
Seine. On 1 September, Lord Kitchener intervened by visiting French and ordering him to re-enter the battle and coordinate with Joffre's forces. The battle to defend
Paris began on 5 September and became known as the
first Battle of the Marne. Haig had wanted to rest his corps but was happy to resume the offensive when ordered. He drove on his subordinates when he thought them lacking in "fighting spirit". Although Sir John French praised Haig's leadership of his corps, Haig was privately contemptuous of French's overconfidence prior to Mons and excessive caution thereafter.
First Battle of Ypres On 15 October, after two weeks of friction between British and French generals, Haig's I Corps was moved to Ypres in Flanders as part of the "
Race to the Sea". In the belief that the German northern flank was weak, Haig was ordered to march on
Ghent,
Bruges and
Courtrai in western Belgium but the new German Chief of Staff
Erich von Falkenhayn was trying to do the opposite and roll up the Allied northern flank. I Corps marched headlong into a thrust westward by fresh German forces, resulting in the
First Battle of Ypres. German forces, equipped with 250 heavy guns (a large number for this stage in the war), outnumbered I Corps by two to one and came close to success. At one point Haig mounted his horse to encourage his men, who were retreating around Gheluvelt, although the town had just been recaptured by a
battalion of the
Worcesters. Haig cemented his reputation at this battle and Ypres remained a symbolic location in later years. Haig was also influenced by the fact that the Germans had called off their offensive when they were on the verge of success, concluding that attacks needed to be kept up so long as there was any chance of success. After a fortnight of intense fighting I Corps had been reduced from 18,000 men to just under 3,000 effectives by 12 November. After six days of bickering between British and French generals, I Corps was relieved by French troops; Haig was very suspicious of the pro-French sympathies of Sub Chief of Staff
Henry Wilson. French, who had been ordered by his doctor to relieve the strain on his heart, recommended Haig for immediate promotion to
general. Haig travelled to London on French's behalf to consult Kitchener about the plan to expand the BEF and reorganise it into two armies. At this point it was thought that the war would end once the Germans were defeated by the Russians at
Łódź and the difficulties of attacking on the
Western Front were not yet appreciated. A failed attack by Smith-Dorrien's II Corps on Messines–Wytschaete (14–15 December) was blamed on poor GHQ staff work, and on 18 December, Haig met French, who said he wanted to sack the BEF chief of staff
Archibald Murray, whose performance had been unsatisfactory throughout the campaign and promote his deputy Henry Wilson. Haig thought that Wilson had "no military knowledge" and recommended Quarter-Master General
"Wully" Robertson. This was also the view of Lord Kitchener, so Robertson received the promotion. Haig received promotion to general on 16 November 1914.
1915 Spring offensives to his left. Like French, Haig wanted to push along the North Sea Coast to
Ostend and
Zeebrugge but Joffre did not want the British acting so independently. Germany had recently sent eight infantry divisions to the
Eastern Front, so French and Joffre agreed that a French offensive in
Artois and
Champagne, should be accompanied by a British offensive at
Neuve-Chapelle to be conducted by Haig. At Neuve Chapelle, Haig wanted a quick bombardment and his subordinate
Henry Rawlinson a longer and more methodical one. Shortage of shells meant that only a thirty-five-minute bombardment was possible but the small front of the attack gave it the concentration to succeed. Haig was greatly interested in the potential of aircraft and met Major
Hugh Trenchard of the
Royal Flying Corps to organise photographic air reconnaissance and a map of German lines was obtained; aircraft were also used for artillery spotting. Four divisions attacked at the
Battle of Neuve Chapelle on 10 March and penetrated but no progress was made on subsequent days, as the Germans brought in reinforcements. Casualties were around 12,000 on each side. Whilst the Germans attacked Smith-Dorrien at the
Second Battle of Ypres (April), new Allied offensives were planned by the French at
Vimy and by Haig at Aubers Ridge (9 May). It was believed on the British side that the lessons of Neuve Chapelle had been learned – reserves were ready to exploit and mortars were ready to support attackers who had advanced beyond artillery cover – and that this time success would be complete not partial. The
attack was less successful than Neuve Chapelle as the bombardment was over a wider front and against stronger defences; Haig was still focussed on winning a decisive victory by capturing key ground, rather than amassing firepower to inflict maximum damage. Attacks (at Festubert, 15–25 May) as a diversion, gained over a front of , with 16,000 British casualties to around 6,600 German losses. Sir John French was satisfied that the attacks had taken pressure off the French at their request but Haig felt that German reserves were being exhausted, bringing victory nearer.
Lack of shells at these offensives was, along with
First Sea Lord John Fisher's resignation over the failed
Dardanelles Campaign, a cause of the fall of the
Liberal Government (19 May). Haig did not approve of the
Northcliffe press attacks on Kitchener, whom he thought a powerful military voice against the folly of civilians like Churchill (despite the fact that Kitchener was an opponent of the strong General Staff which Haig wanted to see). French had been leaking information about the shell shortage to
Charles à Court Repington of
The Times, whom Haig detested and which he likened to "carrying on with a whore". French also communicated with
Conservative leaders and to
David Lloyd George who became
Minister of Munitions in the new
coalition government. Haig was asked by
Clive Wigram (one of the King's press staff) to smooth relations between French and Kitchener. At Robertson's suggestion, Haig received Kitchener at his HQ (despite French's attempt to block the meeting), where they shared their concerns about French. The two men met again in London (14 July), whilst Haig was receiving his
Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath (awarded on French's recommendation after Neuve Chapelle) from the
King, who also complained to him about French. Over lunch with the King and Kitchener, Haig remarked that the best time to sack French would have been after the retreat to the Marne; it was agreed that the men would correspond in confidence. Haig had long thought French petty, jealous, unbalanced, overly quick to meddle in party politics and easily manipulated by Henry Wilson. Haig was increasingly irritated by French's changes of orders and mercurial changes of mood as to the length of the war, which French now expected to last into 1916. Haig still thought Germany might collapse by November, although at the same time he was sending a memo to the War Office recommending that the BEF, now numbering 25 divisions, be equipped with the maximum number of heavy guns, ready for a huge decisive battle, 36 divisions strong in 1916.
Loos The war was not going well – besides the
failure at Cape Helles (landing 25 April),
Bulgaria had joined the
Central Powers (
Serbia was soon overrun). Allied attacks in the west were needed to take pressure off the
Russians, who were being flung out of
Poland. The original plan was to attack in July. At Joffre's insistence the offensive was planned next to the French
10th Army at Loos. Haig inspected the
Loos area (24 June) and expressed dissatisfaction with the ground. French and Haig would have preferred to renew the attack at Aubers Ridge. French was dissuaded by
Ferdinand Foch, who felt that only a British attack at Loos would pull in enough German reserves to allow the French to take Vimy Ridge. French wrote to Joffre saying he was willing to go along with these plans for the sake of Anglo-French cooperation, but then wrote to Joffre again suggesting an artillery bombardment with only limited British infantry attacks. Kitchener listened sympathetically to Joffre's suggestion that in future Joffre should set the size, dates and objectives of British offensives, although he only agreed for the Loos attack for the moment. It is unclear exactly why Kitchener and then Haig agreed to go along with Joffre's wishes – possibly the disastrous plight of the Russians, but it may be that a promise that poison gas could be used may have persuaded Haig. The French then postponed the attack as they picked new attacking ground in Champagne and arranged for extra shelling at Vimy, in both cases because of the very reasons – German-held villages and other obstructions – to which the British generals had objected. Only 850 guns were available, too few for concentrated bombardment over a frontage far wider than at Neuve Chapelle. There was also argument over the placement of the reserve (including inexperienced
New Army divisions), which Haig wanted close to the front. Haig had persuaded himself that decisive victory was possible, and it may be that French wanted to keep control of the reserve to stop them being thrown into battle needlessly. French tried in vain to forbid Haig to discuss his plans with Kitchener (on the grounds that Kitchener might leak them to politicians). Battle began (25 September) after Haig ordered the release of
chlorine gas. The attack failed in the north
against the Hohenzollern Redoubt but broke through the German first line in the centre. The reserves were tired after night marches to reach the front in secrecy and were not available until 2 pm, but were thrown into battle without success on the second day.
Haig replaces French Haig wrote a detailed letter to Kitchener claiming "complete" success on the first day and complaining that the reserves had not been placed as close to the front as agreed and that French had not released control of them when requested. Haig strengthened his case by reports that captured enemy officers had been astonished at the British failure to exploit the attack and by complaining about the government's foot-dragging at introducing conscription and the commitment of troops to sideshows like
Salonika and Suvla Bay. The failure of Loos was debated in the British press. Kitchener demanded a report and Lord Haldane was sent to France to interview French and Haig. French in turn demanded a report from Haig, in particular his claim to have penetrated the German lines.
Lord Stamfordham, the King's Secretary, telephoned Robertson to ask his opinion of French and Robertson conferred with Haig – who was pushing for Robertson to be appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff – before giving his opinion. The King also discussed the matter with Haig over dinner on a visit to the front (24 October). Haig again told him that French should have been sacked in August 1914. Four days later the King, whilst inspecting troops, was injured when thrown by one of Haig's horses and had to be evacuated to England on a stretcher, which embarrassed Haig. French had his orders releasing the reserves published in
The Times (2 November), with an article by Repington blaming Haig. Haig demanded a correction of French's "inaccuracies", whereupon French ordered Haig to cease all correspondence on this matter,. Haig met with the Prime Minister,
H. H. Asquith on 23 November and
Bonar Law (Conservative Leader) the next day. Rumours were rife that French was to be sacked. Matters had been delayed as Kitchener was away on an inspection tour of the Mediterranean and French was sick in bed. Kitchener returned to London (3 Dec) and at a meeting with Haig that day, told him that he was to recommend to Asquith that Haig replace French. Haig's appointment as Commander-in-Chief BEF was announced on 10 December and almost simultaneously Robertson became Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London. Haig and Robertson hoped that this would be the start of a new and more professional management of the war.
Charles Monro was promoted to GOC First Army in Haig's place, not Rawlinson whom Haig would have preferred, and for reasons of seniority Haig was forced to accept the weak-willed
Launcelot Kiggell, not
Richard Butler as chief of staff BEF in succession to Robertson. Haig and French, who seemed ill, had a final handover meeting (18 December, the day before the formal change of command), at which Haig agreed that Churchill – recently resigned from the Cabinet and vetoed from command of a brigade – should be given command of a battalion.
1916 Prelude to the Somme and General Rawlinson, GOC Fourth Army, at Querrieu, 1916. For the first time (2 January) Haig attended church service with
George Duncan, who was to have great influence over him. Haig saw himself as God's servant and was keen to have clergymen sent out whose sermons would remind the men that the war dead were martyrs in a just cause. Robertson and Kitchener wanted to concentrate all efforts on the Western Front, unlike many in the Cabinet who preferred to focus on
Salonika or
Mesopotamia. Haig and Robertson were aware that Britain would have to take on more of the offensive burden, as France was beginning to run out of men, but thought that the Germans might retreat in the west so they could concentrate on beating the Russians. Haig thought that the Germans had already had plenty of "wearing out", that a decisive victory was possible in 1916, and urged Robertson to recruit more cavalry. Haig's preference was to regain control of the Belgian coast by attacking in Flanders, to bring the coast and the naval bases at Bruges, Zeebrugge and Ostend into Allied hands and where the Germans would suffer great loss if they were reluctant to retreat. Lloyd George visited Haig at GHQ and afterwards wrote to Haig, to say that he had been impressed by his "grip" and by the "trained thought of a great soldier". Subsequent relations between the two men were not to be so cordial. Haig thought Lloyd George "shifty and unreliable". Haig had thought that the German troops reported near
Verdun were a feint prior to an attack on the British but the
Verdun Offensive began on 21 February. In March 1916 GHQ was moved from
Saint-Omer to
Montreuil, Pas-de-Calais. For his residence Haig commandeered Beaurepaire House a few kilometres away. Haig decided that Verdun had "worn down" the Germans enough and that a decisive victory was possible at once. The Cabinet were less optimistic; Kitchener would have preferred smaller, purely attritional attacks but sided with Robertson in telling the Cabinet that the Somme offensive should go ahead. Haig attended a Cabinet meeting in London (15 April) where the politicians were more concerned with the political crisis over the introduction of conscription. , asking his opinion on possible dates for launching the Somme offensive, 22 May 1916 The British refused to agree to French demands for a joint Anglo-French offensive from the Salonika bridgehead. Eventually, perhaps influenced by reports of French troop disturbances at Verdun, Haig agreed to attack on 29 June (later put back until 1 July). It later turned out that
Philippe Pétain at Verdun was warning the French government that the "game was up" unless the British attacked. The government was concerned at the volume of shipping space being used for fodder and wanted to cut the number of cavalry divisions. Haig opposed this, believing that cavalry would still be needed to exploit the imminent victory. Most of the fodder was for the horses, donkeys and mules which the BEF used to move supplies and heavy equipment. Discussing this matter with the King, Haig told him that Germany would collapse by the end of 1916. This round of planning ended with a sharp exchange of letters with the Cabinet, Haig rebuked them for interfering in military matters and declared that "I am responsible for the efficiency of the Armies in France". Lloyd George thought Haig's letter "perfectly insolent" and that the government "had the right to investigate any matter connected with the war that they pleased". , commanding the
Guards Division, at Beauquesne, France, 12 August 1916. , France, August 1916. From left to right: General Joseph Joffre,
Raymond Poincaré, King George V, General
Ferdinand Foch, General Sir Douglas Haig. From 1 July to 18 November 1916, Haig directed the British portion of the Battle of the Somme, which has since then been come to be seen to epitomize the supposed futility of the war itself. On 15 August, amidst the ongoing battle, Haig was honoured with a Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order. Haig's leadership during the Somme has been extensively debated. The initial bombardment on 1 July, the first day of the battle, saw excessive use of shrapnel shells, contributing to the staggering casualties – over 57,000 British and imperial soldiers were killed, wounded or missing in action on the first day alone, mainly suffered by General Rawlinson's Fourth Army. Critics argue that Haig underestimated the need for high-explosive shells to destroy German defences. However, Haig wasn't entirely to blame; as early as January 1915, he'd recognised the importance of high-explosive shells and pressed Major General
Stanley von Donop,
Master-General of the Ordnance, for increased production. in September 1916.
1917 , May 1917 On 1 January 1917, Haig was made a
field marshal. King George V wrote him a handwritten note: Lloyd George, who had become
prime minister in December 1916, infuriated Haig and Robertson by placing the BEF under the command of the new French commander-in-chief,
Robert Nivelle. The failure of the
Nivelle offensive in April 1917 (which Haig had been required to support with a British
offensive at Arras) and the subsequent
French mutiny and political crisis, discredited Lloyd George's plans for Anglo-French co-operation. During the second half of 1917, Haig conducted an
offensive at Passchendaele (also known as the Third Battle of Ypres). Haig hoped to liberate the North Sea coast of Belgium from which German
U-boats were operating, provided that there was assistance from the French, support from Britain and that
Russia stayed in the war. at
Ebblinghem, 29 August 1917. The
Admiralty, led by
John Jellicoe, believed that the
U-boat threat could jeopardise Britain's ability to continue fighting. Another objective was to commit German resources to Belgian Flanders, away from the
Aisne sector in France, where the French mutiny had been worst, to give the
French Army time to recover. The Third Battle of Ypres caused the British far fewer casualties than the Battle of the Somme and the substantial success of the occupation of the ridges around Ypres, the first stage of the offensive strategy and inflicted comparable losses on the Germans, who were far less capable of replacing losses and which contributed to their defeat in 1918.
Cambrai By the end of 1917, Lloyd George felt able to assert authority over the generals and at the end of the year was able to sack the
First Sea Lord Admiral Jellicoe. Over the objections of Haig and Robertson, an inter-Allied
Supreme War Council was set up. When the council was inaugurated (11 November), Lloyd George attributed the success of the Central Powers to unity and scoffed at recent Allied "victories", saying he wished "it had not been necessary to win so many of them". His speech angered several leading politicians and
Secretary of State for War Edward Stanley, 17th Earl of Derby assured Haig of his backing. Haig and Pétain objected to a common command, arguing that coalitions work better when one power is dominant, which was no longer the case now that British military power had increased relative to that of France. Lloyd George got his wish to send British forces to
Italy, after the Italian
defeat at Caporetto in November. Haig knew that manpower was scarce in the BEF and at home and wrote to Robertson that an offensive at Cambrai would stem the flow of reinforcements to Italy; Robertson delayed the despatch of two divisions. Plans for a III Corps attack at Cambrai had been proposed as far back as May. Haig had informed the
War Office (5 June) that "events have proved the utility of Tanks". The plan was to trap German troops between the River
Sensée and
Canal du Nord, with the cavalry to seize the
Saint-Quentin Canal crossings, then exploit north-east. The first day objective was the high ground around Bourlon Wood and Haig was to review progress after 48 hours. The Third Army attacked at Cambrai early on 20 November with 1,000 guns (using a surprise predicted
barrage rather than a preliminary bombardment) and nine tank battalions. Haig visited the battlefield (21 November), inspecting the fighting at Bourlon Wood through his binoculars. He thought the attacks "feeble and uncoordinated" and was disappointed at the lack of grip by corps and division commanders and encountering
1st Cavalry Division, which had been ordered to fall back, resisted the temptation to countermand the order. At around 9 pm he decided to continue the attack on Bourlon Wood, a decision which has been much criticised but which made good military sense at the time and was supported by
Julian Byng, although the political need for a clear victory may have been a factor. The offensive continued but with diminishing returns. Bourlon Wood fell on 23 November but German counter-attacks had begun. Haig arrived at a
Third Army planning meeting (26 November) and ordered further attacks the following day but then had to bow to Byng deciding to go onto the defensive. Haig complained that the lack of extra divisions had prevented a breakthrough, a view described by one biographer as "self-deception, pure and simple". Some of the gains were retaken after 30 November, when the Germans made their first counter-offensive against the British since 1914, using new
Sturmtruppen tactics. GHQ intelligence had failed to piece together warnings. British casualties had mounted to over 40,000 by 3 December, with German losses somewhat less. Lloyd George was particularly angry at the embarrassing Cambrai reverse, but Haig's support amongst the Army, the public and many politicians made sacking him impossible; a plan that Haig be "promoted" to a sinecure, as generalissimo of British forces, was scotched when Lord Derby threatened resignation. Asked to provide a statement to the
House of Commons, Haig attributed the German success to "one cause and one alone ... lack of training on the part of junior officers and NCOs and men", a verdict supported by the court of enquiry which, at Derby's instigation, Haig ordered, although the enquiry also criticised "higher commanders" for failing to enforce defensive doctrine. In a later report to Robertson Haig accepted the blame, stating that the troops had been tired as a result of the attack on Bourlon Wood. he was required to dismiss him. Robertson had arrived at Haig's Headquarters with orders (signed by Derby) for his dismissal, in case Haig refused to do as he was asked. A common criticism is that Haig only accepted intelligence from Charteris (who told him what he wanted to hear) and did not cross-check it with other intelligence.
1918 Political manoeuvres Over lunch at
10 Downing Street with Derby and Lloyd George in January, Haig predicted that the war would end within a year because of the "internal state of Germany". Haig left the
War cabinet with the impression that he thought the Germans would launch small attacks on the scale of Cambrai. Haig recommended that the British draw in German reserves by renewing the offensive around Ypres, which did not meet with political approval. By now Haig's 1917 offensives were being criticised in the press and in Parliament, where
J.C. Wedgwood openly demanded a change of command. The purge of Haig's staff continued, with the removal of Sir Roland Maxwell (Quartermaster-General) and Lt-Gen
Launcelot Kiggell as BEF Chief of Staff. In January the Cabinet Minister
Jan Smuts and the
Cabinet Secretary Maurice Hankey were sent to France to discreetly see whether any of the Army Commanders were willing to replace Haig – none were. At the Supreme War Council at Versailles Haig and Pétain complained of shortage of troops, but Haig's political credibility was so low that Hankey wrote that they "made asses of themselves". It was agreed that an Allied General Reserve be set up, under Foch with Henry Wilson as his deputy; Haig was reluctant to hand over divisions and argued against a common command, claiming that it would be "unconstitutional" for him to take orders from a foreign general, and that he did not have the reserves to spare.
Alfred Milner thought Haig's stance "desperately stupid". Lloyd George proposed that the CIGS be reduced to his pre-1915 powers (i.e. reporting to the Secretary of State for War, not direct to the Cabinet) and that the British military representative at the Supreme War Council in Versailles be Deputy CIGS and a member of the
Army Council (i.e. empowered to issue orders to Haig). He offered Robertson a choice of remaining as CIGS with reduced powers or else accepting demotion to Deputy CIGS at Versailles. Derby summoned Haig to London, expecting him to support him in backing Robertson. In a private meeting with Lloyd George, Haig agreed with Robertson's position that the CIGS should himself be the delegate to Versailles, or else that the Versailles delegate be clearly subordinate to the CIGS to preserve unity of command. However, he accepted that the War Cabinet must ultimately make the decision, and according to Lloyd George "put up no fight for Robertson" and persuaded Derby not to resign. Haig thought Robertson egotistical, coarse, power-crazed and not "a gentleman" and was unhappy at the way Robertson had allowed divisions to be diverted. Henry Wilson now became CIGS, with
Henry Rawlinson as British military representative at Versailles. Although Haig had been suspicious of Wilson, they gradually established a warily respectful relationship.
German Michael offensive By March 1918 Germany's Western Front armies had been reinforced by the release of troops from the Eastern Front. At this point British troops were tired and weakened, and British
divisions had been cut in size from 12
battalions to 9. Allied intelligence did not fall for German deceptions that they might attack in Italy or the Balkans, but thought that the main attack might fall in the Cambrai-St Quentin sector. Haig inspected the
Fifth Army (7–9 March) and noted widespread concerns, which he shared, at lack of reserves. As late as 17 March,
Edgar William Cox, who had replaced Charteris as Intelligence Chief, predicted that the German Offensive was not yet immediately imminent. By 20 March, deployment of German trench mortars had been reported by deserters, and British artillery began some spoiling fire. Germany launched an attack,
Operation Michael (21 March 1918), with a force larger than the entire BEF and enjoying superiority of 5:1 over
Hubert Gough's Fifth Army, which were spread thinly over line recently taken over from the French. Haig was initially calm on 21 March, as owing to the communications of the time GHQ was "an information vacuum" where news often took over a day to reach him, and spent much of the day entertaining foreign dignitaries including the
United States Secretary of War Newton D. Baker. The Third Army retreated as planned from the
Flesquières salient. With three-quarters of the front under attack, the British troops fought hard and the Germans failed to reach their first-day objectives. However, lacking reserves Gough had to retreat behind the Crozat Canal. 22 March saw the Fifth Army retreat to the Somme; Haig still anticipated further German attacks in Champagne or Arras. The Germans did not initially realise the importance of
Amiens as an objective. After initial optimism, Tim Travers has written of "panic" setting in amongst senior officers at GHQ on 23 March, and there is evidence that a retreat towards the Channel Ports may have been considered.
Doullens Haig had a GHQ Reserve which was massed in the north, 72 hours' march away, to protect the Channel Ports. The French Commander-in-Chief,
Pétain, agreed to place two French armies under
Émile Fayolle as a reserve in the Somme valley, but could not agree to Haig's request to send 20 French divisions to Amiens. 24 March was "probably the most traumatic day (Haig) had endured since" First Ypres in 1914. Half of BEF supplies came into
Le Havre,
Rouen and
Dieppe and passed by train through Amiens, making it a major choke point. Planning that winter had left open the question of whether the BEF would retreat southwest or form "an island" around the Channel Ports through which Haig's armies drew the other half of their supplies. A retreat on the ports does not seem to have been decided until some days after 21 March. This is one of the occasions where doubt has been cast on the authenticity of Haig's diary. For example, Haig's typed diary – probably based on notes prepared in April – describes Pétain as "almost unbalanced and most anxious", claiming that after attending a Cabinet meeting in Paris, where he had been ordered to "cover Paris at all costs", he threatened to retreat on Paris, leaving the British right flank uncovered. Tim Travers argues that Pétain said at the meeting that he would only retreat on Paris if Haig retreated on the Channel Ports, and that Pétain had come away satisfied that Haig would not break contact. In a postwar exchange of letters with Haig Pétain denied that he had ordered a retreat on Paris or had threatened Haig that he might, a recollection which
Herbert Lawrence appears to have supported. It has been suggested that Haig and Lawrence may simply have misunderstood his intentions, and that any factual errors in Haig's diary were honest if mistaken recollections. The letter is ambiguous and does not specifically mention a retreat "to" the ports. Sheffield argues that orders to Third Army were not a precursor to retreat but "a means to an end", pointing to orders for, if needs be, a counterattack onto the northern flank of the German attackers, Wilson claimed that Haig suggested Pétain be appointed Allied generalissimo (which is not consistent with Haig's later claim that Pétain was unwilling to help the British) and that he proposed
Ferdinand Foch over Haig's objections. At the
Doullens Conference (26 March), Haig accepted the appointment of Foch to coordinate reserves of all nationalities wherever he saw fit. In his typed diary Haig claimed much of the credit for Foch's appointment and to have insisted that he have wider powers over Pétain than
Georges Clemenceau had wanted to grant him. After a German offensive near Arras ("Mars", 28 March) was beaten back, between 29 and 31 March the Germans pushed on Amiens. A Canadian brigade took part in an action at
Moreuil Wood. Attacks on 4 April (
Villers-Bretonneux, east of Amiens) and 5 April on the Third Army front were beaten back by British and Australian forces, although contingency plans were still being prepared to cover Rouen and Le Havre in case Amiens fell.
German Georgette offensive Lloyd George demanded Haig sack Gough, and when Haig was reluctant he was given a direct order to do so by Derby. Just as "Michael" had swept over the Cambrai and the Somme battlefields, won at such cost by Haig's own offensives in previous years, this one swept over Passchendaele although not Ypres itself. The offensive threatened
Hazebrouck, "the Amiens of the north", a key railhead through which supplies were brought from the Channel ports. Foch had earlier refused to send four French divisions to Flanders but now redeployed
Paul Maistre's Tenth French Army to the Somme sector, freeing up British forces. On 30 April
Erich Ludendorff called a halt to the Flanders offensive. Although some American divisions were now serving with the British forces, Haig thought
John J. Pershing "very obstinate and stupid" for refusing to integrate US troops with Allied units. The near-debacle of March 1918 was an object of political controversy. Repington wrote that it was "the worst defeat in the history of the Army".
Andrew Bonar Law claimed in a House of Commons debate (23 April) that Haig and Pétain had agreed the extension of the British line, which was not wholly true as in January 1918 the Supreme War Council had ordered a longer extension than Haig and Pétain had agreed between themselves in December 1917. Lloyd George was accused (in the
Maurice Debate of 9 May 1918 in the House of Commons) of having hoarded troops in the UK to make it harder for Haig to launch offensives. Lloyd George misled the House of Commons in claiming that Haig's forces were stronger (1.75 million men) at the start of 1918 than they had been a year earlier (1.5 million men) – in fact the increase was caused by an increase of 335,000 in the number of labourers, and Haig had fewer combat infantry holding a longer stretch of front. Haig had opposed Maurice in taking his concerns into public, but was disappointed at how Lloyd George was able to get off the hook with a "claptrap speech". Maurice believed he had saved Haig from dismissal.
German Bluecher offensive at Versailles, France, July 1918. By late spring the BEF had taken just over 300,000 casualties. Battalions had had to be brought in from the Middle East. Haig spent time touring his forces in May. Haig's wife reported rumours that he was to be brought home as
Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces; when Wilson denied the rumours to Haig, Haig recorded that "no one has been chosen yet!" to replace him. A third major German offensive against the French on the Aisne ("
Blücher"), starting on 27 May, overwhelmed Hamilton-Gordon's IX British Corps which had been sent there to refit after being involved in "Michael" and "Georgette". At a conference at Versailles (1 June) there was friction between Haig, who was worried that the Germans would attack his sector again, and Foch, who demanded that the US divisions trained by the British be moved to his sector to release French divisions. Foch moved French forces down from Flanders, but there was further friction at a meeting in Paris about Foch's request to move British reserves south. Haig threatened to appeal to the British government if he felt Foch was demanding too many British troops, They told Haig that he should consider himself subordinate to Foch for the time being. , the BEF's adjutant general, while his CGS, Lieutenant General
Lawrence, Kiggell's successor, is on his right. With another German attack imminent, Herbert Lawrence was asked (Haig was on leave in England) to send eight divisions – he sent only two. Haig thought this was breaching an agreement of 1 July that covering Paris and the Somme was to take priority. Wilson consulted the War Cabinet then told Haig to "exercise his judgement" about holding the British line. Haig felt that they would take credit for Foch's victory but might dismiss him if disaster befell the British forces.
Turn of the Tide and the Hundred Days , French President
Raymond Poincaré and Haig at GHQ at Montreuil, 7 August 1918 In July and August the Germans were defeated at the
Second Battle of the Marne and
Amiens. The latter victory was described by General
Erich Ludendorff as "The Black Day of the German Army" after mass surrenders of German troops. On 11 August Haig, contrary to the wishes of Marshal Foch, insisted on a halt to the Amiens offensive and launched a new attack on 21 August between the
Scarpe and
the Ancre. As with his previous offensives in 1916 and 1917, Haig encouraged his subordinates to aim for ambitious objectives, in this case a thrust from
Albert to
Bapaume, and this time with more success than in previous years. On 10 September Haig, on a brief visit to London, insisted that the war could end that year and asked Lord Milner (
Secretary of State for War) to send all available men and transportation. Milner afterwards shared with Wilson his concerns that Haig would embark on "another Passchendaele". Haig's forces continued to enjoy much success, but when they began to advance towards the
Hindenburg Line Haig received a supposedly "personal" telegram from the CIGS Henry Wilson (31 August), warning him that he was not to take unnecessary losses in storming these fortifications. Haig, surmising that the War Cabinet were not forbidding him to attack but might dismiss him if the assault failed, telegraphed Wilson back that they were a "wretched lot" and wrote that attacking the Germans now would be less costly than allowing them time to regroup. , Sir Douglas Haig, Sir
Henry Rawlinson. Middle row, left to right: Sir
Julian Byng, Sir
William Birdwood, Sir
Henry Horne. Back row, left to right: Sir
Herbert Lawrence, Sir
Charles Kavanagh,
Brudenell White, Percy,
Louis Vaughan,
Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd,
Hastings Anderson. Germany first requested an Armistice after the penetration of the Hindenburg Line at its strongest point, St Quentin/Cambrai, on 28 September, and the almost simultaneous capitulation of
Bulgaria, and discussions continued until the ceasefire on 11 November. When consulted on terms for an armistice in October, Haig stated that "Germany is not broken in the military sense. During the last weeks her forces have withdrawn fighting very bravely and in excellent order". In private correspondence Haig was more sanguine. In a mid-October letter to his wife he stated that "I think we have their army beaten now". Haig urged moderation, suggesting that Germany only be asked to give up Belgium and
Alsace-Lorraine, and warning that humiliating terms might lead to a militarist backlash. Haig suspected Wilson, a staunch
Unionist, of wanting to prolong the war as an excuse to subdue southern Ireland by bringing in conscription there. The
dissolution of Austria-Hungary encouraged the politicians to demand stricter terms (although less strict than Foch or Pershing would have liked) and Germany was required to evacuate the
Rhineland as well. Whereas the French, American and Belgian armies combined captured 196,700 prisoners-of-war between 18 July and the end of the war, Haig's forces, with a smaller army than the French, engaged the main mass of the German Army and captured 188,700 prisoners. British daily casualty rates (3,645 per day) were heavier during this period than at the Somme (2,950) or Passchendaele (2,121), because British forces were attacking across the line, instead of being rotated through a single offensive. The military historian,
Gary Sheffield, called this, the so-called
Hundred Days Offensive, "by far the greatest military victory in British history". Of the 3,080 men sentenced to death in all theatres, 346 were executed, 266 (77%) were for desertion, 37 for murder and 18 for cowardice. Just over 250 of the executions took place during Haig's time as C-in-C, but only executed men's records survive, so it is hard to comment on the reasons why men were reprieved.
Promotion of army dentistry during the First World War During the war, Haig suffered from
toothache and sent for a Parisian dentist. Consequently, within months the British Army had hired a dozen dentists and, by the end of the war, there were 831. This led to the formation of the
Royal Army Dental Corps in 1921. == Later life ==