Early relations American newspapers in the 1720s were uniformly pro-Iranian, especially during the revolt of Afghan emir
Mahmud Hotak () against the
Safavid dynasty. Political relations between
Qajar Persia and the
United States began when the
Shah of Iran,
Nassereddin Shah Qajar, officially dispatched Iran's first ambassador, Mirza Abolhasan, to
Washington, D.C. in 1856. In 1883,
Samuel G. W. Benjamin was appointed by the United States as the first official diplomatic envoy to Iran; however, ambassadorial relations were not established until 1944. During the
Persian Constitutional Revolution in 1909, American
Howard Baskerville died in
Tabriz while fighting with a militia in a battle against royalist forces. After the Iranian parliament appointed United States financier
Morgan Shuster as Treasurer General of Iran in 1911, an American was killed in
Tehran by gunmen thought to be affiliated with Russian or British interests. Shuster became even more active in supporting the Constitutional Revolution of Iran financially.
Arthur Millspaugh, an American economic adviser, was sent to Persia in 1923 as a private citizen to help reform its inefficient administration. His presence was seen by Persians as a means to attract foreign investment and counterbalance European influence. The mission ended in 1928 after Millspaugh fell out of favor with the shah. Until World War II, relations between Iran and the United States remained cordial. As a result, many Iranians sympathetic to the
Persian Constitutional Revolution came to view the US as a "third force" in their struggle to expel British and Russian dominance in Persian affairs. American industrial and business leaders were supportive of Iran's drive to modernize its economy and to expel British and Russian influence from the country.
Reza Khan, a military officer in Persia's
Cossack Brigade, came to power after leading a British-backed coup in 1921 that overthrew the
Qajar Dynasty. He later declared himself
shah (king) and took the name Reza Pahlavi. "Big Three" at the 1943
Tehran Conference After a dispute over German influence during
World War II, Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in 1941 and was succeeded by his son,
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. At the 1943
Tehran Conference, the
Allied "Big Three"—
Joseph Stalin,
Franklin D. Roosevelt, and
Winston Churchill—issued the
Tehran Declaration to guarantee the post-war independence and boundaries of Iran. In 1949, the
Constituent Assembly of Iran gave the shah the power to dissolve the parliament. When the
Cold War began, the United States was alarmed by the attempt by the Soviet Union to set up separatist states in Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, as well as its demand for military rights to the
Dardanelles in 1946. This fear was enhanced by the
loss of China to communism, the uncovering of Soviet spy rings, and the start of the
Korean War.
Prime minister Mossadeq In 1951, Iran
nationalised its oil industry, effectively seizing the assets of the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). On April 28, 1951,
Mohammad Mosaddegh was elected as Prime Minister by the
Parliament of Iran. The British planned to retaliate by attacking Iran, but U.S. President
Harry S. Truman pressed Britain to moderate its position in the negotiations and to not invade Iran. American policies fostered a sense in Iran that the United States supported Mossadeq, along with optimism that the oil dispute would soon be resolved through "a series of innovative proposals" that would provide Iran with "significant amounts of economic aid." Mossadeq visited Washington, and the American government made "frequent statements expressing support for him." At the same time, the United States honored the British embargo and, without Truman's knowledge, the Central Intelligence Agency station in Tehran had been "carrying out covert activities" against Mosaddeq and the National Front "at least since the summer of 1952".
The coup d'état in 1959 In 1953, the U.S. and
Britain orchestrated a
coup to overthrow Iran's prime minister
Mohammad Mosaddeq, fearing communist influence and economic instability after Iran nationalized its oil industry. The coup, led by the
CIA and
MI6, the Shah's brutal secret police, to maintain his rule. Many liberal Iranians believe that the coup and the subsequent U.S. support for the shah enabled the Shah's arbitrary rule, contributing to the "deeply anti-American character" of the
1979 revolution later. After the coup, the United States played a central role in reorganizing Iran's oil sector. Under U.S. pressure,
BP joined a
consortium of Western companies to resume Iranian oil exports. The consortium operated on behalf of the state-owned National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which retained formal ownership of Iran's oil and infrastructure. However, the consortium maintained operational control, barred Iranian oversight of its financial records, and excluded Iranians from its board. The agreement was part of a wider transition from British to American dominance in the region and worldwide. While initially seen as a
Cold War success, the coup later became a source of deep resentment, with critics calling it a blow to democracy and a lasting stain on U.S.-Iran relations.
U.S.–Shah alliance {{Infobox bilateral relations|Pahlavi Iran–United States|Imperial State of Iran|United States|map=Iran United States Locator 2.svg and
Robert McNamara in 1961
Nuclear cooperation In 1953, U.S. President
Eisenhower launched Iran's nuclear program as part of
Atoms for Peace program. In 1967, the U.S. helped Iran create its nuclear program by providing the Tehran Research Reactor, the nation's first
nuclear reactor, as well as 5.58 kg of
enriched uranium. Iran is one of the 51 original signatories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on July 1, 1968, and its Parliament ratified the treaty in February 1970.
Strategic alliance and geopolitical importance Iran's border with the
Soviet Union, and its position as the largest, most powerful country in the oil-rich Persian Gulf, made Iran a "pillar" of
US foreign policy in the Middle East. In 1960, Iran joined
Iraq,
Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, and
Venezuela to form the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), aiming to challenge the dominance of Western oil companies and reclaim control over national oil resources. In the 1960s and 1970s, Iran's oil revenues grew considerably. Beginning in the mid-1960s, this development "weakened U.S. influence in Iranian politics" while strengthening the Iranian state's power over its own population. By the 1970s, surging OPEC profits gave the group substantial leverage over Western economies and elevated Iran's strategic value as a U.S. ally.
Military cooperation and arms sales Lee Driscoll and other historians have said that between 1969 and 1974 U.S. President
Richard Nixon actively recruited the Shah as an American puppet and proxy. However, Richard Alvandi argues that it worked the other way around, with the Shah taking the initiative. President Nixon, who had first met the Shah in 1953, regarded him as a westernizing anticommunist statesman who deserved American support now that the British were withdrawing from the region. They met again in 1972 and the Shah agreed to buy large quantities of American military hardware, and took responsibility for ensuring political stability and fighting off Soviet subversion throughout the region. Permitting Iran to purchase U.S. arms served
Cold War objectives by securing the Shah's alignment with Washington after Iran had briefly explored Soviet alternatives in the 1960s, while also benefiting the American economy. However, because of the
1973 Arab-Israeli War and the subsequent
Arab oil embargo against the United States, oil prices became very high. This enabled the shah to buy more advanced weaponry than U.S. officials had expected, which caused concern in Washington.
Cultural and academic relations in 1969 Cultural relations between the two countries remained cordial until 1979.
Pahlavi University,
Sharif University of Technology, and
Isfahan University of Technology, three of Iran's top academic universities, were directly modeled on
private American institutions such as the
University of Chicago,
MIT, and the
University of Pennsylvania. The Shah was generous in awarding American universities with financial gifts. For example, the
University of Southern California received an endowed chair of petroleum engineering, and a million dollar donation was given to the
George Washington University to create an
Iranian Studies program. Negotiations over American nuclear exports to Iran faltered as Ford insisted on additional safeguards beyond those required by the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, which the Shah rejected as an infringement on Iran's sovereignty. In 1975, President Ford approved a plan allowing Iran to process U.S. nuclear materials and purchase a plutonium reprocessing facility.
Henry Kissinger later described it as a commercial deal with an ally, with no discussion of weapons concerns. In 1976, the U.S. covertly supported Saudi Arabia's move to drive down oil prices, undercutting Iran's revenues. By 1977, Iran had garnered unfavorable publicity in the international community for its bad human rights record. That year, the Shah responded to Carter's "polite reminder" by granting amnesty to some prisoners and allowing the
Red Cross to visit prisons. Through 1977, liberal opposition formed organizations and issued open letters denouncing the Shah's regime. Carter angered anti-Shah Iranians with a New Year's Eve 1978 toast to the Shah in which he said: Under the Shah's brilliant leadership Iran is an island of stability in one of the most troublesome regions of the world. There is no other state figure whom I could appreciate and like more. Observers disagree over the nature of United States policy toward Iran under Carter as the Shah's regime crumbled. According to historian
Nikki Keddie, the Carter administration followed "no clear policy" on Iran. The
US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski "repeatedly assured Pahlavi that the U.S. backed him fully". At the same time, officials in the State Department believed the revolution was unstoppable. After visiting the Shah in 1978, Secretary of the Treasury
W. Michael Blumenthal complained of the Shah's emotional collapse. Brzezinski and
Energy Secretary James Schlesinger were adamant in assurances that the Shah would receive military support. Sociologist
Charles Kurzman argues that the Carter administration was consistently supportive of the Shah and urged the Iranian military to stage a "last-resort coup d'état".
Iranian Revolution The Iranian/Islamic Revolution (1978–1979) ousted the Shah and replaced him with the anti-American Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The United States government State Department and intelligence services "consistently underestimated the magnitude and long-term implications of this unrest". Six months before the revolution culminated, the CIA had produced a report stating that "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a 'prerevolutionary' situation." Revolutionary students feared the power of the United States, particularly the CIA, to overthrow a new Iranian government. One source of this concern was a book by CIA agent
Kermit Roosevelt Jr. titled
Countercoup: The Struggle for Control of Iran. Many students had read excerpts from the book and thought that the CIA would attempt to implement this countercoup strategy. Khomeini referred to America as the "
Great Satan" and instantly got rid of the Shah's prime minister, replacing him with politician
Mehdi Bazargan. Until this point, the Carter administration was still hoping for normal relationships with Iran, sending its National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. The Islamic revolutionaries wished to extradite and execute the ousted Shah, and Carter refused to give him any further support or help return him to power. The Shah, suffering from terminal cancer, requested entry into the United States for treatment. The American embassy in Tehran opposed the request, as they were intent on stabilizing relations between the new interim revolutionary government of Iran and the United States. followed by his
Executive Order 12170 froze about $12 billion in Iranian assets, including bank deposits, gold and other properties. They were the first of a number of
international sanctions against Iran. The crisis ended with the
Algiers Accords in January 1981. Under the terms of the agreement and Iran's compliance, the hostaged diplomats were allowed to leave Iran. One of the chief provisions of the Accords was that the United States would lift the freeze on Iranian assets and remove trade sanctions. The agreement also established the
Iran–U.S. Claims Tribunal in The Hague to handle claims brought by Americans against Iran, as well as claims by Iran against Americans and the former shah. In search for a new set or order in this region, Washington adopted a policy designed to contain both sides economically and militarily. During the second half of the Iran–Iraq War, the
Reagan administration pursued several sanction bills against Iran; on the other hand, it established full diplomatic relations with
Saddam Hussein's
Ba'athist government in
Iraq by removing it from the US list of
State Sponsors of Terrorism in 1984. The Iran–Iraq War ended with both agreeing to a ceasefire in 1988.
1983: Hezbollah bombings Hezbollah, an Iran-backed
Shi'ite Islamist group, has carried out multiple anti-American attacks, including the 1983 U.S. Embassy bombing in
Beirut (killing 63, including 17 Americans), the Beirut barracks bombing (killing 241 U.S. Marines), and the 1996
Khobar Towers bombing. U.S. courts have ruled Iran responsible for these attacks, with evidence showing Hezbollah operated under Iran's direction and that
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei authorized the Khobar Towers bombing.
1983: Anti-communist purge According to the
Tower Commission report: In 1983, the U.S. helped bring to the attention of Tehran the threat inherent in the extensive infiltration of the government by the communist
Tudeh Party and Soviet or pro-Soviet cadres in the country. Using this information, the Khomeini government took measures, including mass executions, that virtually eliminated the pro-Soviet infrastructure in Iran.
Iran–Contra Affair To evade congressional rules regarding an arms embargo, officials in
President Ronald Reagan's administration arranged in the mid-1980s to sell arms to Iran in an attempt to improve relations and obtain their influence in the release of hostages held in Lebanon.
Oliver North of the
National Security Council diverted proceeds from the arms sale to fund anti-Marxist
Contra rebels in
Nicaragua. In November 1986, Reagan issued a statement denying the arms sales. One week later, he confirmed that weapons had been transferred to Iran, but denied that they were part of an exchange for hostages. The revelation that profits from the arms sales had been illegally funneled to the Contras created a major political scandal for Reagan. Relevant background events during the first year of Bush's administration include the ending of the
Iran–Iraq War and the death of
Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini believed he had a sacred duty to purge Iran of what he saw as Western corruption and moral decay, aiming to restore the country to religious purity under Islamic theocratic rule. The war ended on February 28, 1991. The next year, the American Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions act, designed to prevent other countries from making large investments in Iranian energy. The act was denounced by the European CC as invalid.
Khatami and Iranian reformers In January 1998, newly elected Iranian President
Mohammad Khatami called for a "dialogue of civilizations" with the United States. In the interview, Khatami invoked
Alexis de Tocqueville's
Democracy in America to explain similarities between American and Iranian quests for freedom. American Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright responded positively. This brought free travel between the countries as well as an end to the American embargo of
Persian carpets and
pistachios. Relations then stalled due to opposition from
Iranian conservatives and American preconditions for discussions, including changes in
Iranian policy on Israel, nuclear energy, and
support for terrorism. Four members of the United States Congress: Senator
Arlen Specter, Representative
Bob Ney, Representative
Gary Ackerman, and Representative
Eliot L. Engel held informal talks in
New York City with several Iranian leaders in August 2000. The Iranians included
Mehdi Karroubi, speaker of the
Majlis of Iran (Iranian Parliament);
Maurice Motamed, a
Jewish member of the Majlis; and three other Iranian parliamentarians.
George W. Bush administration 2001–2009 Iran–United States relations during the George W. Bush administration (2001–2009) were marked by heightened tensions, mutual distrust, and periodic attempts at limited engagement. Following the
September 11 attacks in 2001, Iran initially was sympathetic with the United States. Relations deteriorated sharply after President
George W. Bush labeled Iran part of the "
Axis of Evil" in 2002, accusing the country of pursuing weapons of mass destruction that posed a threat to the U.S. In 2003, Swiss Ambassador Tim Guldimann relayed an unofficial proposal to the U.S. outlining a possible "grand bargain" with Iran. He claimed it was developed in cooperation with Iran, but it lacked formal Iranian endorsement, and the Bush administration did not pursue the offer. Between 2003 and 2008, Iran accused the United States of repeatedly violating its territorial sovereignty through drone incursions, covert operations, and support for opposition groups. In August 2005,
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became Iran's president. During his presidency, attempts at dialogue, including a
personal letter to President Bush, were dismissed by U.S. officials, while public tensions grew over Iran's nuclear program, U.S. foreign policy, and Ahmadinejad's controversial remarks at international forums. The United States intensified covert operations against Iran, including alleged support for militant groups such as
PEJAK and
Jundullah, cross-border activities, and expanded CIA and Special Forces missions. Iran was repeatedly accused by the U.S. of arming and training Iraqi insurgents, including
Shiite militias and groups linked to
Hezbollah, with American officials citing captured weapons, satellite images, and detainee testimonies. During this period, additional flashpoints included the U.S. raid on Iran's consulate in
Erbil, sanctions targeting Iranian financial institutions, a naval dispute in the
Strait of Hormuz, and the public disclosure of covert action plans against Iran.
Obama administration 2009–2017 and Iranian Foreign Minister
Mohammad Javad Zarif in
Lausanne, Switzerland to discuss the
Iranian nuclear program, March 16, 2015 Iran–United States relations during the Obama administration (2009–2017) were defined by a shift from confrontation to cautious engagement, culminating in the landmark nuclear agreement of 2015. At the start of
Obama's presidency, both sides exchanged public messages signaling a possible thaw, with Iran voicing long-standing grievances and the United States calling for mutual respect and responsibility. However, after
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's disputed re-election in 2009, which sparked mass protests and allegations of fraud, the United States responded with skepticism and concern. In late 2011 and early 2012,
Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz and warned a U.S. aircraft carrier not to return to the Persian Gulf. The U.S. rejected the warning and maintained its naval presence, while experts doubted Iran's ability to sustain a blockade. The 2013 election of President
Hassan Rouhani, seen as a moderate, marked a shift in tone, with his outreach at the UN and a historic
phone call with Obama signaling renewed diplomatic engagement. While high-level contact resumed and symbolic gestures were exchanged, conservative backlash in Iran highlighted internal divisions over rapprochement. In 2015, the United States and other world powers reached the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, under which Iran agreed to limit its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. The agreement marked a major diplomatic achievement for the Obama administration, though it faced skepticism in Congress and mixed public support in the U.S. Despite the JCPOA, tensions between the United States and Iran persisted over ballistic missile tests, continued U.S. sanctions, and European business hesitancy due to fear of U.S. penalties. The administration also faced criticism for its handling of these issues, both from Iran and from political opponents.
First Trump administration 2017–2021 Iran–United States relations during the first Trump administration (2017–2021) were marked by a sharp policy shift from
Obama's engagement-oriented approach. Trump began with a
travel ban affecting Iranian citizens, and
withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). A broader
maximum pressure campaign followed, with over 1,500 sanctions targeting Iran's financial, oil, and shipping sectors, as well as foreign firms doing business with Iran, severely damaging its economy. The effort aimed to isolate Iran but met with strong resistance—even from U.S. allies—and often left Washington diplomatically isolated. Iran responded by threatening to resume unrestricted uranium enrichment; rejecting negotiations with the Trump administration, and intensified rhetoric. Tensions escalated in 2019 with U.S. intelligence reports of Iranian threats, attacks on oil tankers, the
downing of a U.S. drone by Iran, and suspected Iranian strikes on Saudi oil facilities. President Trump called off retaliatory strikes, opting for cyberattacks and additional sanctions instead. in Tehran, December 11, 2017 A major escalation followed a December 2019
rocket attack on the K-1 Air Base in Iraq, which led to American airstrikes on Iranian-backed militias and a retaliatory
attack on the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. On January 3, 2020, the U.S.
assassinated Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in a drone strike, prompting Iranian missile attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq and heightened fears of war. The crisis deepened with the accidental
downing of a Ukrainian passenger plane by Iranian forces and continued through early 2020 with retaliatory strikes and threats. Later in 2020, Iran blamed U.S. sanctions for limiting its COVID-19 response. They launched a military satellite, and were later accused of interfering in the U.S. presidential election and proxy attacks. Relations ended under Trump with continued hostility and unresolved disputes.
Biden administration 2021–2025 Iran–United States relations during the Biden administration (2021–2025) were shaped by efforts to revive the 2015 nuclear agreement alongside ongoing regional tensions, sanctions, cyberattacks, and proxy conflicts. Early in Joe Biden's presidency, U.S. officials expressed interest in returning to the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), but negotiations in Vienna eventually stalled.
Iran increased uranium enrichment and imposed retaliatory sanctions, while the U.S. imposed new sanctions over missile programs, oil exports, and human rights abuses. which intensified following the outbreak of the Gaza war in late 2023, and by subsequent American retaliatory strikes. The period also saw disputes over the
assassination of Qasem Soleimani, and military escalations across the Gulf region. In 2023, a breakthrough occurred with a U.S.–Iran prisoner swap and the release of frozen Iranian funds, though indirect diplomacy remained fragile. Iran was later accused of interfering in the 2024 U.S. presidential election through cyber operations and AI disinformation. Alleged assassination plots targeting Donald Trump and dissidents on U.S. soil further strained relations. He signed the return of the
Maximum pressure campaign against the Iranian government. Trump called for talks for a nuclear peace agreement. In the
Friday prayer of February 7, Khamenei dismissed negotiations and stated that the Iranian government should not make a deal with the US. February 9, Trump said that he would rather make a deal with Iranians than let them be bombed by Israel. In March 2025, Khamenei stated that he did not intend to negotiate with Trump. IRGC General Salami threatened United States military with devastation. Trump threatened he would hold Iranian regime to blame for any shots
fired by Houthis.
Putin and Trump reached an agreement that Iran should never be in a position to destroy Israel. In April,
Ali Larijani, advisor to Khamenei, threatened Trump that Iran would make nuclear weapons. Islamic Republic military allegedly had recommended a preemptively strike on US military bases. In April, Trump stated that Iranians want direct negotiations.
Iran–United States negotiations began on April 12, 2025. In April 2025, U.S. congressmen
Joe Wilson and
Jimmy Panetta introduced a 'Free Iraq from Iran' bill. The legislation mandates the development of a comprehensive U.S. strategy to irreversibly dismantle Iran-backed militias, including the
Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and calls for the suspension of U.S. assistance to Iraq until these militias are fully removed. The bill also imposes sanctions on Iraqi political and military figures aligned with Iran, and provides support for Iraqi citizens and independent media to expose abuses committed by these militias. Its primary objective is to restore Iraq's sovereignty and reduce Iranian dominance without resorting to direct military intervention. In his speech during
his May 2025 trip to Middle East, Trump called out the Iranians as the most destructive force and denounced the Iran leaders for having managed to be turning green fertile farmland and rolling blackouts calling on it to make a choice between war and violence and making a deal. On June 7, 2025, the
U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on 10 individuals and 27 entities, including Iranian nationals and firms based in the
UAE and
Hong Kong. These targets include the Zarringhalam brothers, accused of
laundering billions via shell companies tied to the IRGC and the
Central Bank of Iran. The funds reportedly supported Iran's nuclear and missile programs, oil sales, and militant proxies. Relations further worsened after Iranian authorities threatened to attack U.S. and allied bases in the Middle East if the former were to involve itself in the
Iran–Israel war, after which the U.S. intervened in the Israeli attacks and bombed key Iranian nuclear sites. On June 21, 2025, the U.S., under the orders of Trump,
bombed 3 Iranian nuclear enrichment sites (
Fordow,
Natanz, and
Isfahan), briefly joining the
Iran–Israel war. Following the attacks, Iran pulled out and suspended nuclear talks indefinitely. During the
2025–2026 Iranian protests, Trump repeatedly stated to the Iranian authorities that the US would "intervene" if the Iranian government did not halt its
crackdown on protesters. In January 2026, during the widespread and increasingly violent crackdown on nationwide protests in Iran, Trump stated that the US was seriously considering a range of responses, including potential military options, if Iranian government actions crossed established "red line"s. Trump said that the US military was evaluating "very strong options" and that senior advisers were scheduled to discuss possible actions, while also noting that Iranian leaders had reached out for negotiations. Iranian officials stated that Iranian forces would retaliate against US forces and allied interests in the region if US forces attacked. On January 16, 2026, Trump announced that the Iranian leadership had reportedly canceled over 800 planned
executions. On January 27, 2026, following the deployment of the
USS Abraham Lincoln to the region the day before, a multi-day US aerial military drill in the region was announced. On the same day Trump said: "There is another beautiful war fleet sailing toward Iran right now." In addition,
The Pentagon ordered US Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles that were deployed at
Royal Air Force Lakenheath in Britain to move forward to American air bases in
Jordan. During the talks, the United States reportedly sought to address Iran's missile program and regional activities, whereas Iran emphasized that negotiations should remain limited to nuclear issues and sanctions relief. Both sides expressed commitment to continuing diplomatic engagement, though no immediate agreement was announced. Reports showed that Iran may have unbelievable flexibility towards further discussions in averting war. The renewed dialogue was widely interpreted as an effort by both sides to prevent further escalation following the January tensions, amid concerns that miscalculation could lead to a broader regional confrontation.
2026 Iran war , destroyed by the United States On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a
large-scale joint military operation against Iran, codenamed
Operation Epic Fury by the US and
Operation Roaring Lion by Israel. Trump announced the operation in a video statement, stating the objectives were to destroy Iran's ballistic missile program, prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, and ultimately bring about
regime change in Iran. The
Israeli Defense Forces stated that approximately 200 fighter jets struck around 500 targets across Iran, including air defense systems, missile launchers, and command-and-control facilities. Strikes were reported in at least 14 Iranian cities, including
Tehran,
Isfahan,
Qom,
Karaj, and
Kermanshah. An
Iranian Red Crescent spokesperson reported that 24 of
Iran's 31 provinces were affected, with at least 201 people killed,
including Ali Khamenei, and 747 injured as of that evening. On April 3, 2026, it was reported in
Axios that the US expelled Iran's deputy ambassador to the UN, in December 2025. The issue remained silenced as it concerned national security. The report said that deputy ambassador Saadat Aghajani was asked to leave the USA under "section 13 procedures", rather than declaring him
persona non grata. On April 7,
Katie Miller said that the US was planning to revoke up to 4,000 visas of people with connections to the Iranian government. Following Donald Trump's March 2026 assertion that it was not "appropriate" for Iran to participate in the
2026 World Cup due to safety concerns amid military conflict, the Iran national team issued a statement arguing that no one could exclude them and that the United States should instead be removed as host for failing to ensure the safety of participating teams. In April 2026, U.S. special envoy
Paolo Zampolli proposed that Italy replace Iran at the 2026 FIFA World Cup, prompting swift rejection from Italian officials who called the idea "not appropriate" and "shameful." Italian Sports Minister
Andrea Abodi stated that qualification "must be earned on the pitch," while FIFA president
Gianni Infantino reiterated that Iran would participate as scheduled. On April 8, 2026, the United States and Iran agreed to a provisional two-week ceasefire ahead of planned negotiations in Pakistan. As part of the agreement, Tehran stated it would reopen the Strait of Hormuz to maritime traffic. Following the announcement of the conditional ceasefire, global
oil prices experienced a sharp decline. In April 2026, the Iranian-flagged container ship MV Touska was intercepted en route from Malaysia to Iran. According to Iranian sources and state media, the vessel was operating near the Gulf of Oman when it was targeted by United States naval forces as part of what they described as enforcement of a maritime blockade. Iranian reports stated that the ship was struck by the USS Spruance, which allegedly disabled its propulsion by firing on the engine room, after which U.S. Marines boarded and took control of the vessel. Iranian officials and media characterized the incident as an attack on a civilian commercial vessel and a violation of an existing ceasefire agreement. According to statements from U.S. officials, the operation was conducted after warnings were issued to the vessel, which was alleged to be violating sanctions and attempting to breach a naval blockade. The U.S. administration stated that the ship was declared subject to sanctions and that its seizure was part of enforcement actions in the region. Iranian authorities further claimed that the incident triggered retaliatory actions in the region and cited it as evidence of a breakdown of the ceasefire arrangements. == Economic relations ==