Islamic State – Khorasan Province

Reflecting the contentious and fluid nomenclature within the larger Islamic State organization, ISIS–K is referred to by various names. The larger organization has shifted between names such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Islamic State of Iraq and as-Sham (ISIS), and later simply the Islamic State (IS). This name is considered derogatory in Arabic-speaking Iraq and Syria, as it resembles the words Daes (, lit. 'to trample', 'to run over') and Dāhis (, lit. 'one who causes discord'). In interviews with western researchers and journalists, ISIS–K members and heads alike use the term 'Daesh' to describe the movement, despite its derogatory connotations. The term 'Wilayah', translated as 'Province' comes from the Arabic term for an administrative subdivision, led by a wali (governor), the primary subdivision of historic Islamic caliphates. The Islamic State uses the term Wilayat for each of its regional branches, such as Islamic State – West Africa Province (ISWAP). The term 'Khorasan' refers to Greater Khorasan, a historical eastern region of the Iranian Plateau between Western and Central Asia. Khorasan was first established as a region under the Persian Sasanian Empire and expanded under the Umayyad Caliphate. Today, the lands of the Khorasan region include northeastern Iran, most of Afghanistan, and the southern areas of Central Asia. The Greater Khorasan region is not to be confused with similarly named North, South, and Razavi (Central) Khorasan Provinces of modern Iran. ISIS–K's first wali, Hafiz Saeed Khan, in a 2016 interview featured in the Islamic State's 13th issue of the magazine Dabiq, described the region of Khorasan and its significance: == History ==

Background Prior to the official establishment of ISIS–K in 2015, a number of Islamic militant jihadist groups operated in South and Central Asia, seeking to supplant existing governments with a more fundamentalist, Islamist government. These groups fought against the governments of Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and China, most with support from al-Qaeda which had operated with a base of operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan since 1988. In response to failed negotiations with the Taliban following the 11 September 2001 attacks by al-Qaeda against the United States, the U.S. overthrew the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and launched a military campaign against al-Qaeda and Taliban militants who fought to reclaim the country. The insurgent conflict became a focal point for jihadism in the Khorasan region with nearly every jihadist group in the region taking part to varying degrees. Later in 2003, the United States overthrew the Ba’athist government of Iraq and its leader, Saddam Hussein. Jamat al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad ('Organization of Monotheism and Jihad'), led by Jordanian Salafist jihadist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, quickly gained notoriety for bloody attacks on Shia mosques, civilians, Iraqi government, American, and foreign troops. In 2004, Zarqawi swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden and the group became part of Ayman al-Zawahiri's campaign against the United States, becoming known as al-Qaeda in Iraq or AQI. Under the 2007 surge of American troops in Iraq, AQI was diminished until 2011 when the group newly under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, began to reemerge and spread into the nascent Syrian civil war. Capturing a number of cities in Iraq and Syria, notably Raqqa, Fallujah, Mosul, Tikrit, Ramadi, Aleppo, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (rebranded later to 'Islamic State') declared an Islamic caliphate in 2014 with al-Baghdadi as caliph. By 2010, the Taliban resistance had become weakened under the stresses of factionalism, and the Taliban had lost credibility with many of the jihadist groups for its attempts to negotiate with NATO forces. In contrast, the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in March 2011 shifted the attention of jihadists from the Afghan jihad to the Levant. With jihadist groups flocking to take part in the conflict, al-Qaeda's branches in Afghanistan and Pakistan began lobbying to send groups of fighters to join the Syrian jihad, a measure to demonstrate to the world that al-Qaeda was still actively involved in a global jihad, especially as donor states' interest in the Afghan jihad faded in favor of the surging ISIS campaign in Syria. Although al-Qaeda-linked Afghan and Pakistani jihadists had traveled to fight in the Levant as early as 2003, most groups had been small in number and quickly integrated into assorted ISIS units. Harakat Khilafat Baluch, Jaysh ul Islam, Mullah Bakhtwar's group, the Shamsatoo group, and radical student groups in Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan. By May 2020 ISIS–K territorial control in Afghanistan was reportedly limited to parts of Chawkay District in Kunar province, specifically Chalas village, Dewaygal Valley and Shuraz Valley. On 26 July 2020, a United Nations report stated that even though the IS branch in Afghanistan had undergone further severe reverses in its former Afghan strongholds of Nangarhar and Kunar provinces, it was too soon to discount it as a threat. Although in territorial retreat, IS in Afghanistan could carry out high-profile attacks in various parts of the country, including Kabul. == Attacks ==

On 24 January 2018, militants launched a bomb and gun attack on a Save the Children office in Jalalabad, killing six people and injuring 27. ISIS–K claimed responsibility, saying it was targeting Western institutions. In the aftermath of the attack, Save the Children suspended its operations in Afghanistan. On 17 August 2019, a suicide bombing took place during a wedding in a wedding hall in Kabul. At least 92 people were killed in the attack and over 140 injured. ISIS–K claimed responsibility for the bombing, stating that the attack targeted the Shi'ites. On 12 May 2020, a hospital's maternity ward in Kabul and a funeral in Kuz Kunar were attacked, resulting in the deaths of 56 people and injuries of 148 others, including newborn babies, mothers, nurses, and mourners. The U.S. government said that ISIS–K conducted the May 2020 Afghanistan attacks, not the Taliban, but this assertion was rejected by the republican Afghan government. On 2 November 2020, more than 32 people were killed and 50 others injured in an attack on Kabul University. The ISIS–K claimed responsibility for the attack. On 26 August 2021, an ISIS–K suicide bomber attacked Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, killing over 170 people, including 28 Taliban members and 13 U.S. military personnel. Amidst the Taliban advance on Kabul in preceding weeks, hundreds to thousands of ISIS–K prisoners had been released or otherwise escaped from detention, leading to U.S. fears of attacks on the airport and future targets. After the attack, the Taliban announced that they would curtail the operations of ISIS–K and capture its leader Shahab al-Muhajir. On 6 September 2022, the Human Rights Watch reported that since the Taliban took over Afghanistan in August 2021, the ISIS–K has claimed responsibility for 13 attacks against Hazaras and has been linked to at least 3 more, killing and injuring at least 700 people. The Islamic State affiliate has repeatedly attacked Hazaras and other religious minorities at mosques, schools, and workplaces. ISIS–K claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Russian embassy in Kabul in September 2022. External operations The majority of ISIS–K attacks have been based in Afghanistan, traditionally the group's primary base of operations. Since the close of the NATO presence in Afghanistan and the subsequent military takeover by the Taliban, the group has increased its presence across the border in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPK), where it has launched an increasing share of its attacks. ISIS–K's first external operation (operations beyond its conventional area of operations) came on 18 April 2022, during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, when the group launched ten rockets out of a Katyusha launcher from northern Afghanistan, over the Amu Darya (Oxus) river into the Uzbek border city of Termez. ISIS-Central published the account in its an-Naba Newsletter, Issue #335, and released video of the launch via the organization's Amaq News Agency. In an-Naba, ISIS claimed the attack was conducted as part of the larger organization's 'Raid of Revenge for the Two Sheikhs', in which a number of its subordinate provinces conducted a cumulative 245 attacks between 17 April and 1 May in stated revenge for the 3 February 2022 U.S. counterterrorism operation killing ISIS's caliph (and successor to the recently killed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi and the November 2021 U.S. airstrike killing ISIS chief spokesman, Abu Hamza Al-Qurashi. The Uzbek Ministry of Defense and Afghan Taliban both denied reports of the attack. Shortly after the attack against Uzbekistan, on 7 May, ISIS–K conducted its second external operation against Tajikistan. According to ISIS-Central's an-Naba newsletter's 338th issue, the group launched seven rockets from a Katyusha launcher from the Afghan-Tajik border in Takhar Province targeting the "headquarters of the apostate Tajik army." Similar to its rocket attack against Uzbekistan, ISIS-Central published an account of the attack in an-Naba and a video of the operation through Amaq News Agency. in Russia on 22 March 2024 ISIS–K's third external operation, the first of which to gain high-profile international attention and produce obvious casualties, was a twin bombing on 3 January 2024 against a gathering of Iranians mourning the death of former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force (QF) commander, Qasem Soleimani, at his grave in Kerman, Iran. The bloody attack killed 96, and injured 284. ISIS-K's fourth and most high-profile external operation was a 22 March 2024 attack by four Tajik gunmen against Russian civilians in the Crocus City Hall attack. The attack, claimed by ISIS–K, killed 145 and injured 551 and marked the deadliest attack on Russian soil since the Beslan school siege in 2004, and it is also the deadliest ever Islamic State attack on European soil to this day, closely followed by the 2015 Paris attacks. IS-affiliated Amaq News Agency published a video filmed by one of the attackers. On 27 January 2026, Azerbaijan's State Security Service announced that it had arrested three militants affiliated with ISKP who were allegedly planning an attack on the Israeli embassy in Baku. == Operations by opponents ==

On 4 April 2020, the National Directorate of Security announced the arrest of the head of IS Aslam Farooqi by the Afghan military forces who took him into custody along with 20 other commanders. ;2017 Nangarhar airstrike On 13 April 2017, a GBU-43/B MOAB was dropped in an airstrike on a cave complex in Achin District, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. It was the first use of the bomb on the battlefield. The Afghan defense ministry reported it to have killed over 36 militants and destroyed the tunnel complex including a cache of weapons. No civilian casualties were reported. On 14 April 2017, Pakistan's security agencies along with the local police raided a house in Lahore's Factory Area as part of their combing operation which was approved by Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff Qamar Javed Bajwa in the aftermath of Mall Road bombing. After an exchange of fire which killed one "terrorist", three other suspects were arrested, one of them being Noreen Leghari, a student from Hyderabad, Pakistan who was claimed to be missing by her family four days prior to the raid. On a confessional statement released by ISPR, Noreen confessed to joining IS through a terrorist she met on social media, She also told authorities that she was recruited by IS to attack a church in Lahore on the Easter Sunday, two suicide jackets, four hand grenades and bullets were provided to them. On 4 September 2019, in a joint operation of Counter Terrorism Department, FIA and Balochistan Constabulary at least 6 IS militants were killed in an intelligence-based operation in Quetta's Eastern Bypass area. During the operation, one official of the Balochistan Constabulary was killed and eight others from the Counter Terrorism Department were injured. ;Mohmand Valley raid On 26 April 2017, a joint raid operation committed by U.S. Army Rangers and Afghan Special Forces in the Nangarhar Province resulted in the death of Sheikh Abdul Hasib, the leader of IS in Afghanistan. Along with Hasib, a number of other commanders of IS were killed according to a statement by the U.S. military. Two U.S. soldiers died during the operation, possibly due to friendly fire. On 1 January 2019, Afghan Special Forces attacked ISIS–K in Nangarhar Province's Achin District, killing 27 militants according to officials. Two local ISIS leaders, Sediq Yar and Syed Omar, were reported to be among those killed. On 10 January, senior ISIS–K commander Khetab Emir was also killed in a raid in Nangarhar according to a U.S. forces spokesman. Emir was reported to have facilitated major attacks and provided ISIS–K bombmakers with explosive materials. On 30 April 2019, Afghan government forces undertook clearing operations directed against both ISIS–K and the Taliban in eastern Nangarhar Province after the two groups fought for over a week over a group of villages in an area of illegal talc mining. The National Directorate of Security claimed 22 ISIS–K fighters were killed and two weapons caches destroyed while the Taliban claimed U.S.-backed Afghan forces killed seven civilians; a provincial official said over 9,000 families had been displaced by the fighting. On 21 August 2019, an airstrike killed six militants of IS in Nangarhar province including two Pakistani nationals. ;Taliban operations In July 2018, the Taliban launched an offensive against IS in the Jowzjan province. ;2021 U.S. airstrikes On 27 August 2021, the United States launched an airstrike against three suspected ISIS–K members in Nangarhar Province. On 29 August, a drone attack against a suspected Islamic State bomber in Kabul killed a family of nine, including six children. == Funding ==

money market in Kabul ISIS–K sustains its operations through a complex financing structure that draws on diverse sources. ISIS–K has benefitted significantly from financial support originating from the broader ISIS network, particularly from the central leadership. This internal coordination allows for a consistent inflow of funds, showcasing the interconnected nature of various ISIS factions. While the exact mechanisms of this financial relationship remain undisclosed, it is evident that support from ISIS-Central plays a pivotal role in strengthening ISIS–K's operational capacity. This internal funding stream highlighted the cohesive financial structure within the broader Islamic State. Controlled territories became a key source of revenue for ISIS–K through the implementation of a taxation system. The group levies taxes on local populations and businesses, demonstrating a degree of financial autonomy within its operational zones. This strategy allowed ISIS–K to extract resources directly from the communities it governed, contributing to its self-sufficiency. The local taxation approach reflects the group's ability to exploit the economic resources of the territories under its control, emphasizing a dynamic financial strategy tailored to the circumstances of each region. ISIS–K actively seeks external funding from sympathetic patrons, including wealthy individuals from Gulf countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Donations from these sources, coupled with collaborations with individuals willing to contribute resources, constitute a significant portion of the group's financial support. External funding not only provides an additional layer of financial backing but also highlighted the global network that ISIS–K tapped into for resources. Moreover, engaging in criminal enterprises, such as human trafficking and smuggling, further diversify ISIS–K's funding sources. The group's adaptability in generating funds from both international and illicit channels showcased a multifaceted financial strategy. ISIS–K engaged in various criminal enterprises, including human trafficking and smuggling, to bolster its financial resources. These illicit activities served as additional streams of income, contributing to the group's financial resilience. The involvement in criminal enterprises demonstrated ISIS–K's ability to adapt its funding strategies, indicating a level of sophistication in navigating a range of revenue-generating activities. Overall, ISIS–K's financing structure is characterized by a combination of internal support from ISIS-Central, local taxation in controlled territories, external funding from sympathetic patrons, and engagement in criminal enterprises. == Analysis ==

Taliban – ISIS–K relations Since the Taliban took control of the Afghan central government following the United States withdrawal and the collapse of the Afghan National Army (ANA) in August 2021, the Taliban has been locked in a violent counterinsurgency against ISIS–K. The Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan sought international legitimacy by demonstrating its efforts to curb terrorism and secure national sovereignty over Afghan territory, namely for prospects of international investment to reverse Afghanistan's increasing poverty. ISIS–K, seeking to establish the Khorasan Province as the center of a greater Islamic State on Afghan territory, principally seeks to undermine the so-called 'apostate' and 'Western puppet' Taliban regime in hopes of once again regaining control of Afghan territory. Beginning in late 2022 and continuing through 2023, ISIS–K launched attacks on diplomats from the People's Republic of China and Islamic Republic of Pakistan, aiming to deter foreign recognition, investment, or support to the Taliban government through violent attacks exhibiting Taliban failures to provide security. As per the report published by United Nations Security Council’s Sanctions Monitoring Team in 2025, ISIS-K maintains opportunities link with dissatisfied members of Afghan Taliban and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. Membership According to a UN report, up to 70 IS fighters arrived from Iraq and Syria to form the initial core of the group in Afghanistan. Most of the group's membership growth has come from recruiting Afghan defectors from the Taliban. In Afghanistan, IS has not only been recruiting from the villages but also the urban middle class and specifically targeting the universities, as lecturers in Islamic law as well as students at Kabul University have pledged allegiance to the group. Foreign fighters from Pakistan and Uzbekistan are also known to be part of the group. The Taliban also claimed that two Malaysians of ISIS–K were caught by them following a gun battle in Kabul on 26 August 2021. Individuals from Myanmar and Bangladesh have also been part of it, and one known Bangladeshi national of ISIS–K was arrested by the Afghan intelligence agency in 2020. After the takeover of Kabul by the Taliban in 2021, several members of Afghan intelligence agency and Afghan national army have also joined the Islamic State – Khorasan Province. A report published by United Nations Security Council’s Sanctions Monitoring Team in 2025 stated that there were around 2,000 ISIS-K fighters operating in Afghanistan. The report also stated that ISIS-K had recruited around 600 volunteers from Central Asia, mainly from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, with some remaining in their home countries while others have traveled to Afghanistan and Europe. The group has also failed to establish a foothold in Pakistan because of anti-terrorism operations conducted by Pakistan's law enforcement agencies against the group. A series of successful operations by US, Afghan and coalition forces in Afghanistan against the group has also crippled the group's ability to operate in the region. Designation as a terrorist organization Many nations effectively designate ISIS–K as a terrorist organization as a subordinate element of the larger Islamic State, though not listing it separately. On 14 May 2019, the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee listed "The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan" as designated entity QDe.161, the first ISIS affiliate to be individually designated by the United Nations. Immediately following, some states automatically adopted the UN designation of ISIS–K. == Media ==

ISIS–K is a prolific producer of propaganda, outdone only by the Islamic State's core in Iraq and Syria. ISIS–K publishes and circulates a variety of materials through the al-Azaim Media Foundation () for Media Production, whose status as an official element of ISIS–K experts disagree on as the group has yet to claim or disclaim them. Notably, the al-Azaim Foundation has been known to issue claims of attacks before al-Amaq News Agency, the Islamic State's foremost source for claims of attacks by any Islamic State affiliate. Al-Azaim, which publishes nearly all ISIS–K propaganda, appeared publicly in August 2021 as the US withdrew its forces and the Taliban took power in Kabul. Prior to the Taliban takeover, ISIS–K propaganda was produced and distributed by multiple organizations including Khalid Media (responsible for video statements) and Black Flags (audio and text statements), until their 2021 consolidation into al-Azaim. Content for al-Azaim is often written and submitted by sympathizers and supporters in the region, about 70% of which is originally published in Pashto, however many supporters provide translation services of al-Azaim's content and that of the Islamic State's publications into Pashto, Dari, Urdu, Tajik, Bengali, Hindi, Russian, and sometimes Arabic, Tamil, Malayalam, and Uyghur. Al-Azaim primarily disseminates its content through Telegram, X (formerly Twitter), Rocket.Chat, and others. In 2022, amidst raids by the Taliban General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) against ISIS–K targets, GDI had infiltrated a number of ISIS–K channels which had temporarily disrupted content distribution. Beyond books, monographs, videos, and letters, al-Azaim Foundation is best known for its production of regular newsletters and magazines, most famous of which are Khorasan Ghag (lit. Voice of Khorasan) magazine in Pashto, the Voice of Khurasan magazine in English, and Yalghar (lit. Attack) in Urdu. Although addressing modern events in newsletters and magazines, discrediting the Taliban as religious leaders, political leaders, and guarantors of security occupy the bulk of ISIS–K propaganda. == See also ==