At least one scholar (Ervand Abrahamian) has argued that Khomeini's "decrees, sermons, interviews, and political pronouncements" have outlasted his theological works because it is the former and not the latter that the Islamic Republic of Iran "constantly reprints." Without the decrees, sermons, interviews, and political pronouncements "there would have been no Khomeinism [ideology]. Without Khomeinism there would have been no revolution. And without the Islamic Revolution, Khomeini would have been no more than a footnote to Iranian history."
Improvisational ability Outside of his doctrinal beliefs, Khomeini has also been noted for being a "brilliant tactician," with a great "ability to improvise."
Elaine Sciolino writes: Khomeini once protested the shah's enfranchisement of women, and then encouraged women to participate in his revolution and vote for his government when he needed their numbers. He once promised that clerics would hold only temporary positions in government and then allowed them to hold the most senior positions. He pledged to continue the war against Iraq until its defeat and then abruptly made peace. He once said that the fact that "
I have said something does not mean that I should be bound by my word." Indeed, it is that suppleness, that ability to improvise that has outlived Khomeini and that continues to pervade the Islamic Republic, keeping it going. At least one scholar (Daniel Brumberg) has argued that Khomeini's ability to swing from one "religiopolitical...perspective to another" has been exploited by followers to advance their various and competing agendas. In particular reformists such as
Muhammad Khatami in search of more democracy and less theocracy. Another (Abrahamian) argues that Khomeini's "ideological adaptability" belie the "label of fundamentalist" applied to him in both the West and in Iran.
Governance Rulers As to how jurists should influence governance, Ayatollah Khomeini's leadership changed direction over time as his views on governance evolved. On who should rule and what should be the ultimate authority in governance: • Khomeini originally accepted traditional Shia political theory, writing in "Kashf-e Asrar" that, "We do not say that government must be in the hands of" an Islamic jurist, "rather we say that government must be run in accordance with God's law ... " suggesting a parliament of Shi'a jurists could choose a just king. ( امام خمينى، كشف الاسرار: ۱۸۷ – ص ۱۸۵) • Later he told his followers that "Islam proclaims monarchy and hereditary succession wrong and invalid." Only rule by a leading Islamic jurist (
velayat-e faqih) would prevent "innovation" in
Sharia or Islamic law and ensure it was properly followed. The need for this governance of the faqih was "necessary and self-evident" to good Muslims. • Once in power and recognizing the need for more flexibility, he finally insisted the ruling jurist need not be one of the most learned, that
Sharia rule was subordinate to interests of Islam (
Maslaha – `expedient interests` or `public welfare`), and the "divine government" as interpreted by the ruling jurists, who could overrule Sharia if necessary to serve those interests. The Islamic "government, which is a branch of the absolute governance of the Prophet of God, is among the primary ordinances of
Islam, and has precedence over all secondary ordinances such as
prayer (salat),
fasting (sawm), and
pilgrimage (hajj)."
Lack of detail on governing While Khomeini was keenly focused on the ulama's right to rule and the state's "moral and ideological foundation", he did not dwell on the state's actually functioning or the "particulars" of its management. According to some scholars (Gheissari and Nasr) Khomeini never "put forward a systematic definition of the Islamic state and Islamic economics;... never described its machinery of government, instruments of control, social function, economic processes, or guiding values and principles." In his plan for Islamic Government by Islamic Jurists he wrote: "The entire system of government and administration, together with necessary laws, lies ready for you. If the administration of the country calls for taxes, Islam has made the necessary provision; and if laws are needed, Islam has established them all... Everything is ready and waiting. All that remains is to draw up ministerial programs ..."
Power of modern government Scholar
Shadi Hamid argues that an important feature of Khomeinism was the combining of conservative Islamic teachings not with iron-age horse powered technology, but with power of the modern state "in all of its sprawling, overbearing glory", something unique in Islamic history.
Sharia (Islamic law) In his manifest Islamic Government, Khomeini emphasized the wonder and preciousness of sharia, divine law. and how being divine, no human should ever attempt to change it. However, at least one scholar notes a number of ways that Khomeini made sharia (or at least the sharia of
Usuli Shi'ism) "subordinate to the revolution". • Khomeini defrocked a grand ayatollah (
Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari) and "promoted clerics as a function of their political allegiance and not their religious rank". Khomeini's ideas on Mahdism would be further developed after his death; most notably by his successor
Ali Khamenei and the
principalist cleric
Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi. Yazdi called for cultivating a generation based on Mahdist ideology and values. Building on Khomeni's ideas, Ali Khamenei demarcated five stages as part of the millenarian framework: "an Islamic Revolution, an Islamic regime, an Islamic government, an Islamic society, and an Islamic civilization." The doctrine of Mahdism is taught in Islamist seminaries and it is also a core ideological hallmark of the
Basij and the
IRGC institutions. Since the emergence of the
2009 Green movement, a "
cult of Mahdism" has been heavily promoted by the IRGC and state-backed clergy in an attempt to deter the youth from embracing secular ideas; and it is strongly tied to the inner circle of Ali Khamenei.
Mohammadi Golpayegani, chief staff of the
Office of Supreme Leader backed the
2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, claiming that it was a “prelude to the reappearance" of 12th Imam.
Conspiracy theories Throughout his political career Khomeini expressed a belief in the existence of plots and conspiracies fomented by foreigners and their Iranian agents against Islam and Muslims. Abrahamian argues that this belief, shared among adherents of most political persuasions in Iran to varying degrees, can be explained by the domination of Iran's politics by foreign powers for the past 200 years until the Islamic revolution, first by Russia and Britain, later by the United States. Foreign influence was involved in all of Iran's three military coups:
1908 (Russian),
1921 (UK) and
1953 (UK and US). One of the reasons Khomeini gave in his 1970 lecture series for why theocratic rule of humanity by Islamic jurists was essential, was that (he believed) it was the only form of government that would protect the Muslim world from the conspiracies of colonialists, who were responsible for, the decline of
Muslim civilization, the conservative `distortions` of
Islam, and the divisions between nation-states,
between Sunnis and Shiis, and between oppressors and oppressed. He argued that the colonial powers had for years sent
Orientalists into the East to misinterpret Islam and the
Koran and that the colonial powers had conspired to undermine Islam both with religious quietism and with secular ideologies, especially
socialism,
liberalism, monarchism, and
nationalism. At least one scholar (Abrahamian) sees "far-reaching" consequences in the belief in ever-present conspiracies. If conspiracy dominates political action then "those with views different from one's own were members of this or that foreign conspiracy. Thus political activists tended to equate competition with treason, ... One does not compromise and negotiate with spies and traitors; one locks them up or else shoots them. ... The result was detrimental for the development of
political pluralism in Iran. ... Differences of opinion within organizations could not be accommodated; it was all too easy for leaders to expel dissidents as 'foreign agents'. Abrahamian believes that what he calls this "paranoid style" paved the way for the
mass executions of 1981–82, where "never before in Iran had firing squads executed so many in so short a time over so flimsy an accusation."
Populism Another way Khomeini's views changed direction over time was concerning political populism and relations between social classes. Before 1970, Khomeini had had the conventional traditional "paternalistic" religious views on class. Since "God had created both private property and society, society should be formed of a hierarchy of mutually dependent strata (
qeshreha)." The poor should not be envious of the rich, and the rich should be grateful to God, avoid any displays of wealth and make generous charitable contributions to the poor. at the same time "careful scrutiny" of his writing during this time show him to have been "remarkably vague" on the specifics of how he planned to help the poor – "especially on the question of private property". In this way, Abrahamian argues, Khomeini's "ideas, and his movement" despite being Islamic, bear a striking resemblance to populist movements in other countriesparticularly those of South America such as
Juan Perón and
Getúlio Vargas. Like them, Khomeini led a "radical but pragmatic" protest movement "against the established order". The movement was not of the working class and poor, but of the "propertied middle class". "The lower classes, especially the urban poor" were not so much served by his movement as mobilized by Khomeini. These movements attacked "the upper class and foreign powers," but not property rights. They preached "a return to `native roots` and eradication of `cosmopolitan ideas.` It claimed "a noncapitalist, noncommunist `third way` towards development," emphasizing "cultural, national, and political reconstruction," not economic and social revolution." Other followers of Khomeini who maintain he did support democracy and that the Islamic Republic is democratic include
Ali Khamenei,
Mohammad Khatami and
Morteza Motahhari. Khomeini preached to his followers about theocratic rule by jurists, but not to the public. He made statements before the revolution indicating support for "
democracy", but opposition to it once in power. During a pre-revolutionary meeting with Karin Samjabi in Paris in November 1978, he stated that the future government of Iran would be 'democratic and Islamic`. but after he had returned to Iran and the Shah's government had collapsed, told a huge crowd of Iranians, "Do not use this term, `democratic.` That is the Western style,`" One explanation for this change of position is that Khomeini needed the support of the pro-democracy educated middle class to take power. Another is that Khomeini used another definition of "democracy" than "Western
parliamentary" or representative democracy (
Shaul Bakhash). According to scholar Bakhash, Khomeini believed that the huge turnout of Iranians in anti-Shah demonstrations during the revolution meant that Iranians had already voted in a `referendum` for an Islamic republic. Khomeini wrote that in Muslim countries, Islam and Islamic law, truly belong to the people. In contrast, in a republic or a constitutional monarchy, most of those claiming to be representatives of the majority of the people will approve anything they wish as law and then impose it on the entire population. In drawing up the constitution of his Islamic Republic, he and his supporters agreed to include Western-democratic elements, such as an elected parliament and president, but some argue he believed Islamic elements, not Western-style elected parliaments and presidents, should prevail in government. After the ratifying of the Islamic constitution he told an interviewer that the constitution in no way contradicted democracy because the `people love the clergy, have faith in the clergy, and want to be guided by the clergy` and that it was right that
Supreme Leader oversee the work of the non-clerical officials `to make sure they don't make mistakes or go against the law and the Quran.' As the revolution was consolidated, terms like "democracy" and "liberalism" – considered praiseworthy in the West – became words of criticism, while "revolution" and "revolutionary" were terms of praise. According to Khomeini, proponents of "
democracy" and even "
Islamic democracy" are misguided. He stated in a 1980 interview:"But as for ‘democratic,’ we won’t accept it even if you put it next to ‘Islamic.’ Even apart from this, as I said in an earlier talk, to juxtapose “democratic” and “Islamic” is an insult to Islam. Still another scholar, non-Iranian Daniel Brumberg, argues that Khomeini's statements on politics were simply not "straightforward, coherent, or consistent," and that in particular he contradicted his writings and statements on the primacy of the rule of the jurist with repeated statements on the importance of the leading role of the parliament, such as `the Majlis heads all affairs`, and `the majlis is higher than all the positions which exist in the country.` This, according to Brumberg, has created a legacy where his followers "exploited these competing notions of authority" to advance "various agendas of their own." Reformist seizing on his statements about the importance of majlis, and theocrats on those of rule by the clergy.
Third World According to at least one observer (
Olivier Roy), from the overthrow of the shah until the death of Khomeini in 1989,
Human rights Khomeini believed it was essential that Muslims (and eventually everyone) be governed by Islamic law/Sharia. Khomeini ruled "that the penalty for conversion from Islam, or apostasy, is death." After the creation of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, thousands of people were executed in public, including homosexuals. On 12 September 1979,
Oriana Fallaci, Italian journalist, interviewed Khomeini, asking him if it was right to shoot homosexuals. He responded that some societies "where men are permitted to give themselves to satisfy other men's desires", and that "the society that we want to build does not permit such things. When she responded about the "boy they shot yesterday, for sodomy.", he responded "Corruption, corruption. We have to eliminate corruption." Before taking power, Khomeini expressed support for the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. "We would like to act according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We would like to be free. We would like independence," he stated. However, once in power, Khomeini took a firm line against dissent, warning opponents of theocracy for example: "I repeat for the last time: abstain from holding meetings, from blathering, from publishing protests. Otherwise I will break your teeth." Khomeini believed that, since Islamic government was essential for Islam, what threatened the government threatened Islam. Since God Almighty has commanded us to follow the Messenger and the holders of authority, our obeying them is actually an expression of obedience to God. Iran adopted an alternative human rights declaration, the
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, in 1990 (one year after Khomeini's death), which differs from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, requiring law to be in accordance with
Sharia, denying complete equality with men for women, and forbidding speech that violates the "dignity of Prophets", or "undermines moral and ethical values." One observer, Iranian political historian
Ervand Abrahamian, believes that some of the more well-known violations of international human rights initiated by Khomeinithe fatwa to kill British-citizen author
Salman Rushdie and the
mass executions of leftist political prisoners in 1988can be explained best as a legacy for his followers. Abrahamian argues Khomeini wanted to "forge unity" among "his disparate followers, [and] raise formidable – if not insurmountable – obstacles in the way of any future leader hoping to initiate a detente with the West," and most importantly to "weed out the half-hearted from the true believers", such as heir-designate Ayatollah
Hussein-Ali Montazeri, who protested the killings and was dismissed from his position. According to Zahra Eshraghi, granddaughter of Ayatollah Khomeini, "Discrimination here [in Iran] is not just in the constitution. As a woman, if I want to get a passport to leave the country, have surgery, even to breathe almost, I must have permission from my husband."
Economics In the realm of economics, Khomeini was known both for his lack of interest and conflicting views on the subject. He famously replied to a question before the revolution about how the Islamic Republic would manage Iran's economy by saying economics was "for donkeys" (also translated as "for fools"), and expressed impatience with those who complained about the inflation and shortages following the revolution saying: "I cannot believe that the purpose of all these sacrifices was to have less expensive melons." His lack of attention has been described as "possibly one factor explaining the inchoate performance of the Iranian economy since the 1979 revolution," (along with the mismanagement by clerics trained in Islamic law but not economic science). Khomeini has also been described as being "quite genuinely of two minds", After his death until 1997, the "
bazaari side" of the legacy predominated with the regime of President
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Rafsanjani and Supreme Leader
Ali Khamenei, emphasized `reconstruction,` `realism,` `work discipline,` `managerial skills,` `modern technology,` `expertise and competence,` `individual self-reliance,` `entrepreneurship,` and `stability.`" The populist side of Khomeini's economic legacy is said to be found in President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who allegedly "mirrored" Khomeini's disdain for the "donkey" science of economics, wearing "his contempt for economic orthodoxy as a badge of honour", and overseeing sluggish growth and rising inflation and unemployment under his administration. Khomeini strongly opposed Marxism. `Atheistic Marxists` were the one group he excluded from the broad coalition of anti-Shah groups he worked to rally behind his leadership. In his last will and testament, he urged future generations to respect property on the grounds that free enterprise turns the `wheels of the economy` and prosperity would produce `social justice` for all, including the poor. Islam differs sharply from communism. Whereas we respect private property, communism advocates the sharing of all things – including wives and homosexuals. What one scholar (
Ervand Abrahamian) called the populist thrust of Khomeini can be found in the fact that after the revolution, revolutionary tribunals expropriated "agribusinesses, large factories, and luxury homes belonging to the former elite," but were careful to avoid "challenging the concept of private property." On the other hand, Khomeini's revolutionary movement was influenced by Islamic leftist and thinker Ali Shariati, and the leftist currents of the 1960s and 1970s. Khomeini proclaimed Islam on the side of the
mustazafin and against exploiters and imperialists. In part for this reason, a large section of Iran's economy was nationalized during the revolution. At least as of 2003, Iran's public sector and government workforce remains very large. Despite complaints by free marketeers, "about 60% of the economy is directly controlled and centrally planned by the state, and another 10–20% is in the hands of five semi-governmental foundations, who control much of the non-oil economy and are accountable to no one except the supreme leader."
Women in politics In October 1962 when the shah introduced a plan to (among other things) let women vote for the first time, Khomeini (and other religious people) were enraged: `The son of Reza Khan has embarked on the destruction of Islam in Iran. I will oppose this as long as the blood circulates in my veins.`" Religious Muslims fought the bill and the shah backed down. Historian Ervand Abrahamian also states that Khomeini had argued "for years" that women's suffrage was "unIslamic." Before the Revolution, Khomeini opposed allowing women to serve in parliament, likening it to prostitution. We are against this prostitution. We object to such wrongdoings ... Is progress achieved by sending women to the majlis? Sending women to these centers is nothing but corruption.
Religious philosophy, fiqh, teachings Khomeini made a number of changes to Shia clerical system. Along with his January 1989 ruling that sharia was subordinate to the revolution, he affirmed against tradition that the fatwa pronounced by a grand ayatollah survived that ayatollah (such as the fatwa to kill Salman Rushdie), and defrocked Ayatollah
Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari, a political opponent.
Fiqh In
Fiqh, (Islamic jurisprudence) some scholars have argued Khomeini championed innovative reinterpretations of doctrine, prompted by the challenges of managing a country of 50 million plus. • Use of
Maslaha, or
maslahat (`expedient interests` or `public welfare`). This was a common concept among Sunni, but "before the 1979 revolution most" Shi'ite jurists had "rejected maslahat as a dangerous innovation (
bid‘ah)." • Wider use of "secondary ordinances". Clerics had traditionally argued that the government could issue these "when addressing a narrow range of contractual issues not directly addressed in the Qur'an." Khomeini called for their use to deal with the deadlock between the
Majles and the
Council of Guardians •
Ijtihad Esmat Esmat is perfection through faith. Khomeini believed not only that truly just and divine Islamic government need not wait for the return of the
12th Imam/Mahdi, but that "divinely bestowed freedom from error and sin" (
esmat) was not the exclusive property of the prophets and imams.
Esmat required "nothing other than perfect faith" and could be achieved by a Muslim who reaches that state.
Hamid Dabashi argues Khomeini's theory of Esmat from faith helped "to secure the all-important attribute of infallibility for himself as a member of the awlia' [friend of God] by eliminating the simultaneous theological and Imamological problems of violating the immanent expectation of the Mahdi." Thus, by "securing" this "attribute of infallibility for himself", Khomeini reassured Shia Muslims who might otherwise be hesitant about granting him the same ruling authority due the 12 Imams. no
The Prophets Khomeini believed the
Islamic prophets have not yet achieved their "purpose". In November 1985, he told radio listeners, "I should say that so far the purpose of the Prophets has seldom been realized. Very little." Aware of the controversial nature of the statement he warned more conservative clerics that "tomorrow court mullahs . . . [should] not say that Khomeini said that the Prophet is incapable of achieving his aims." He also controversially stated that
Fatimah, the daughter of Muhammad, was superior in status to the prophets of God. Khomeini's authority and charismatic personality prevented less popular jurists from protesting these changes as un-Islamic
bid‘ah.
Istishhad Perhaps the most significant legacy of Khomeini internationally is a broader definition of
martyrdom to include
Istishhad, or "self-martyrdom". Khomeini believed martyrdom could come not only from "inadvertent" death but "deliberate" as well. While martyrdom has always been celebrated in Islam and martyrs promised a place in heaven, (Q3:169–71) the idea that
opportunities for martyrdom were important has not always been so common. Writing in 2006,
Vali Nasr states that "until fairly recently" willingness to die for the cause" (with suicide bombing or other means) was seen as a "predominantly Shia phenomenon, tied to the myths of
Karbala and the
Twelfth Imam", though it has since spread to Sunni Islam.
Iran–Iraq War Khomeini not only praised the large numbers of young Shia Iranians who became "shahids" during the Iran–Iraq War but asserted the war was "God's hidden gift", or as one scholar of Khomeini put it, "a vital outlet through which Iran's young martyrs experienced mystical transcendence." Khomeini explained: "If the great martyr (Imam
Husayn ibn Ali) ... confined himself to praying ... the great tragedy of Kabala would not have come about ... Among the contemporary ulema, if the great Ayatollah ... Shirazi ... thought like these people [who do not fight for Islam], a war would not have taken place in Iraq ... all those Muslims would not have been martyred." Death might seem like a tragedy to some but in reality... If you have any tie or link binding you to this world in love, try to sever it. This world, despite all its apparent splendor and charm, is too worthless to be loved Khomeini never wavered from his faith in the war as God's will, and observers have related a number of examples of his impatience with those who tried to convince him to stop it. When the war seemed to become a stalemate with hundreds of thousands killed and civilian areas being attacked by missiles, Khomeini was approached by Ayatollah
Mehdi Haeri Yazdi, a grand ayatollah and former student with family ties to Khomeini. He pleaded with Khomeini to find a way to stop the killing, saying, "it is not right for Muslims to kill Muslims." Khomeini answered reproachfully, asking him, "Do you also criticize God when he sends an earthquake?" On another occasion Khomeini showed his disdain for a delegation of Muslim heads of state who had come to Tehran to offer to mediate an end to the war by keeping them waiting for two hours, and speaking to them for only ten minutes without providing a translator before getting up and leaving. Vali Nasr writes that necessity may have been a motivator for use of martyrdom by "hundreds of thousands of volunteers" at least early on in the war when many of the "most seasoned officers" in Iran's military had been purged and the
hostage crisis "left Iran internationally isolated" and "conventional means of repelling the Iraqi invasion were hard to come by."
Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq While istishhad suicide attacks did not win the
Iran–Iraq War for Iran, suicide bombings did spread to
Lebanon, where observers agree they won victories for the Lebanese branch of the
Islamic Da'wa Party, Shia 'allies' of the Islamic Revolution. The 1983 bombings against U.S. and French peacekeeping troops by Hizballah killed over 300 and drove the US and French from Lebanon. Another longer bombing campaign did likewise to the Israeli army. Khomeini is credited, by some, with inspiring these "suicide bombers". The power of suicide operations as a military tactic has been described by Shia Lebanese as an equalizer where faith and piety are used to counter the superior military power of the Western unbeliever: You look at it with a Western mentality. You regard it as barbaric and unjustified. We, on the other hand, see it as another means of war, but one which is also harmonious with our religion and beliefs. Take for example, an Israeli warplane or, better still, the American and British air power in the Gulf War. .... The goal of their mission and the outcome of their deeds was to kill and damage enemy positions just like us ... The only difference is that they had at their disposal state-of-the-art and top-of-the-range means and weaponry to achieve their aims. We have the minimum basics ... We ... do not seek material rewards, but heavenly one in the hereafter. The victory of Hezbollah is known to have inspired the
Sunni groups
Hamas in Palestine, and
al-Qaeda in its worldwide bombing campaign. In the years after Khomeini's death, "Martyrdom operations" or "suicide bombing" spread beyond Shia Islam and beyond attacks on military and are now a major force in the Muslim world. According to one estimate, as of early 2008, 1,121 Muslim suicide bombers have blown themselves up in Iraq alone. Ironically and tragically, by the early twenty first century, thousands of Muslims, particularly Shia, have become victims, not just initiators, of martyrdom operations. In the Iraq civil war,
Salafi Jihadi ideologue
Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi declared "all-out war" on Shia Muslims in Iraq in 2005 in response to a US-Iraqi offensive on the town of
Tal Afar. Sunni
suicide bombers targeted not only thousands of civilians, but
mosques, shrines, wedding and funeral processions, markets, hospitals, offices, and streets. From at least 2003 to 2006 attacks were "mostly" by Sunnis against Shia, and "by 2007 some of the Shia
ulema have responded by declaring suicide bombing
haram: 'حتي كساني كه با انتحار ميآيند و ميزنند عدهاي را ميكشند، آن هم به عنوان عمليات انتحاري، اينها در قعر جهنم هستند''Even those who kill people with suicide bombing, these shall meet the flames of hell.'"
Shia rituals Khomeini showed little interest in the rituals of Shia Islam such as the
Day of Ashura. Unlike earlier Iranian
shahs or the
Awadh's nawabs, he never presided over any Ashura observances, nor visited the enormously popular
shrine of the eighth Imam in
Mashad. This discouraging of popular Shia piety and Shia traditions by Khomeini and his core supporters has been explained by at least one observer as a product of their belief that Islam was first and foremost about obedience to
Islamic law, and that the revolution itself was of "equal significance" to
Battle of Karbala where the
Imam Husayn was martyred. This legacy is reflected in the disdain for Shia shrines in other countries shown by Iranian officials, such as
Faezeh Rafsanjani, when visiting Pakistan and other countries, and the surprise sometimes shown by their Shia hosts; and some compared his treatment to the personality cults of such figures as
Joseph Stalin,
Mao Zedong and
Fidel Castro. However, his followers went beyond creating a personality cult to transforming Khomeini into what biographer
Baqer Moin called, "a semi-divine figure". In late November 1978, when millions of Iranians were waiting impatiently for Khomeini's return from exile, a rumor swept the land that his face could be seen in the moon. Many gathered excitedly on rooftops and the power of the belief was so "intense and the claim so unwaveringly firm that those who 'could not see' said otherwise". Vali Nasr writes of "the messianic symbols and language" used Khomeini's network/followers to "give him an aura of power". Khomeini was the first and only Iranian cleric to be addressed as "Imam", a title hitherto reserved in Iran for the
twelve infallible leaders of the early Shi'a. He was also associated with the
Mahdi or 12th Imam of Shia belief in a number of ways. One of his titles was ''Na'eb-e Imam
(Deputy to the Twelfth Imam). His enemies were often attacked as taghut and Mofsed-e-filarz'', religious terms used for enemies of the Twelfth Imam. Many of the officials of the overthrown Shah's government executed by Revolutionary Courts were convicted of "fighting against the Twelfth Imam"implying that the revolution was the promised return of the Twelfth Imam". An allegedly eight-century
Hadith attributed to the Imam
Musa al-Kazim was repeated in Iran as a tribute to Khomeini: "A man will come out from
Qom and he will summon people to the right path. There will rally to him people resembling pieces of iron, not to be shaken by violent winds, unsparing and relying on God". Vali Nasr reports that As the revolution gained momentum, the awe exhibited towards Khomeini spread to some non-supporters, one of which called him "magnificently clear-minded, single-minded and unswerving." His image was as "absolute, wise, and indispensable leader of the nation": The Imam, it was generally believed, had shown by his uncanny sweep to power, that he knew how to act in ways which others could not begin to understand. His timing was extraordinary, and his insight into the motivation of others, those around him as well as his enemies, could not be explained as ordinary knowledge. This emergent belief in Khomeini as a divinely guided figure was carefully fostered by the clerics who supported him and spoke up for him in front of the people. Even many
secularists opponents were said to feel the power of his "messianic" appeal. Comparing him to a father figure who retains the enduring loyalty even of children he disapproves of, journalist
Afshin Molavi writes that defenses of Khomeini are "heard in the most unlikely settings": His
mausoleum is said (by Vali Nasr) to have been modeled (by his successors) after the
shrine of the Imam Reza in
Mashhad, and visitors "actively encouraged to perform rituals usually reserved for visits to an imam's final resting place".
Sternness and austerity Companions and followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini have shared many stories of his concern for others and his disinterest in personal wealth and comfort. While the Imam was sometimes flexible over doctrine, changing positions on divorce, music, birth control, he was much less accommodating with those he believed to be the enemies of Islam. Khomeini emphasized not only righteous militancy and rage but hatred, And I am confident that the Iranian people, particularly our youth, will keep alive in their hearts anger and hatred for the criminal Soviet Union and the warmongering United States. This must be until the banner of Islam flies over every house in the world.
Salman Rushdie's apology for his book (following Khomeini's fatwa to kill the author) was rejected by Khomeini, who told Muslims: "Even if Salman Rushdie repents and becomes the most pious man of all time, it is incumbent on every Muslim to employ everything he has got, his life and wealth, to send him to Hell." Khomeini attributed some of his reversals to advisers he claimed had persuaded him to make unwise decisions against his better judgment, appointing people to posts who he later denounced. "I swear to God that I was against appointing Medi Bazargan as the first prime minister, too, but I considered him to be a decent person. I also swear to God that I did not vote for Bani Sadr to become president either. On all these occasions I submitted to the advice of my friends." Before being revised in April 1989, the Iranian constitution called for the supreme leader to be a leading cleric (
Marja), something Khomeini says he opposed "since from the very beginning." He also preached of Islam's essentially serious nature: Allah did not create man so that he could have fun. The aim of creation was for mankind to be put to the test through hardship and prayer. An Islamic regime must be serious in every field. There are no jokes in Islam. There is no humor in Islam. There is no fun in Islam. There can be no fun and joy in whatever is serious. Islam does not allow swimming in the sea and is opposed to radio and television serials. Islam, however, allows marksmanship, horseback riding and competition ... and the all-encompassing nature of Islam, and thus of its law and its government, Islam and divine governments ... have commandments for everybody, everywhere, at any place, in any condition. If a person were to commit an immoral dirty deed right next to his house, Islamic governments have business with him. .... Islam has rules for every person, even before birth, before his marriage, until his marriages, pregnancy, birth, until upbringing of the child, the education of the adult, until puberty, youth, until old age, until death, into the grave, and beyond the grave.
Mysticism A number of writers have mentioned the importance of mysticism in the thinking of Khomeini. According to scholar
Vali Nasr, Khomeini's "politics and religious views reflected not so Shia history and theology (indeed, he was something of a theological innovator and maverick) as the authority that he claimed by virtue of his understanding of mystical doctrines. His was a new Shiism, interpreted by someone who claimed direct knowledge of the Truth." ==International tenets==