War Powers Resolution

Under the United States Constitution, war powers are divided. Under Article I, Section 8, Congress has the power to: • declare war • grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal (i.e., license private citizens to capture enemy vessels) • raise and support Armies (for terms up to two years at a time) • provide and maintain a Navy • make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces • provide for calling forth the Militia • make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water • provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia; and • govern such Part of [the militia] as may be employed in the Service of the United States. Section 8 further provides that the states have the power to: • Appoint the Officers of the Militia; and • train the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. Article II, Section 2 provides that: • "The president shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States" It is generally agreed that the commander-in-chief role gives the president power to repel attacks against the United States and makes the president responsible for leading the armed forces. The president has the right to sign or veto congressional acts, such as a declaration of war, and Congress may override any such presidential veto. Additionally, when the president's actions (or inactions) provide "Aid and Comfort" to enemies or levy war against the United States, then Congress has the power to impeach and remove (convict) the president for treason. For actions short of treason, they can remove the president for "Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors", the definition of which the Supreme Court has left up to Congress. Therefore, the war power was intentionally split between Congress and the Executive to prevent unilateral executive action that is contrary to the wishes of Congress, and require a super-majority for legislative action that is contrary to the wishes of the president. Past presidential administrations have engaged the U.S. in conflict as well as directed U.S. military efforts without the approval of Congress. President Franklin Roosevelt directed the U.S. Navy to protect British shipping vessels during WW2 as well as ordering the occupation of Greenland and Iceland. ==History==

Background and passage During the Vietnam War, the United States found itself involved for many years in situations of intense conflict without a declaration of war. Many members of Congress became concerned with the erosion of congressional authority to decide when the United States should become involved in a war or the use of armed forces that might lead to war. It was prompted by news leaking out that President Nixon conducted secret bombings of Cambodia during the Vietnam War without notifying Congress. The War Powers Resolution bill was a contest between Congress and the Presidency on who has specific rights regarding wartime authorities. According to the committee report "The issue concerns the 'twilight zone' of concurrent authority which the Founding Fathers gave the Congress and the President over the war powers of the National Government." President Nixon's opposition to the bill was noted by Representative Gerald R. Ford (who would become Nixon's vice president and presidential successor) who read aloud a telegram from the president in which Nixon warned he would veto the legislation due to its "dangerous and unconstitutional restrictions". The War Powers Resolution was passed by both the House of Representatives and Senate but was vetoed by President Richard Nixon. Implementation, 1993–2002 With the War Powers Resolution's passing, both the deployment of troops to conflict and the stationing of troops past 60 days would now need prior congressional approval. The president would now need to routinely consult with Congress for the duration of the conflict. The resolution is considered to be a critically important bill in reestablishing congressional capabilities. As of March 2026 the War Powers Resolution Reporting Project lists 132 times presidents have submitted "48 hour reports." Congress invoked the War Powers Resolution in the Multinational Force in Lebanon Act (P.L. 98-119), which authorized the Marines to remain in Lebanon for 18 months during 1982 and 1983. In addition, the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 1991 (), which authorized United States combat operations against Iraqi forces during the 1991 Gulf War, stated that it constituted specific statutory authorization within the meaning of the War Powers Resolution. The Reagan Administration harbored extensive reservations about the War Powers Resolution's constitutionality and efficacy. Legal Advisor to the State Department Abraham Sofaer argued that the WPR's deadlines "creates unwise limitations on Presidential authority to deploy U.S. forces in the interests of U.S. national security" and that "the President's constitutional authority cannot in any case even be impermissibly infringed by statute." More specifically, the Administration sought to make clear that the resolution should not be applied to anti-terrorist operations, a use of force, according to Sofaer, "that is more analogous to law enforcement activity by policy in the domestic context than it is to the 'hostilities' between states." On November 9, 1993, the House used a section of the War Powers Resolution to state that U.S. forces should be withdrawn from Somalia by March 31, 1994; Congress had already taken this action in appropriations legislation. Under President Clinton, war powers were at issue in former Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Haiti, and under President George W. Bush in responding to terrorist attacks against the U.S. after September 11, 2001. "[I]n 1999, President Clinton kept the bombing campaign in Kosovo going for more than two weeks after the 60-day deadline had passed. Even then, however, the Clinton legal team opined that its actions were consistent with the War Powers Resolution because Congress had approved a bill funding the operation, which they argued constituted implicit authorization. That theory was controversial because the War Powers Resolution specifically says that such funding does not constitute authorization." Clinton's actions in Kosovo were challenged by a member of Congress as a violation of the War Powers Resolution in the D.C. Circuit case Campbell v. Clinton, but the court found the issue was a non-justiciable political question. It was also accepted that because Clinton had withdrawn from the region 12 days prior the 90-day required deadline, he had managed to comply with the act. After the 1991 Gulf War, the use of force to obtain Iraqi compliance with United Nations resolutions, particuarly through enforcement of Iraqi no-fly zones, remained a war powers issue. In October 2002 Congress enacted the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq , which authorized President George W. Bush to use force as necessary to defend the United States against Iraq and enforce relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions. This was in addition to the Authorization for Use of Military Force of 2001. Libya, 2011 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton testified to congress in March 2011 that the Obama administration did not need congressional authorization for its military intervention in Libya or for further decisions about it, despite congressional objections from members of both parties that the administration was violating the War Powers Resolution. During that classified briefing, she reportedly indicated that the administration would sidestep the Resolution's provision regarding a 60-day limit on unauthorized military actions. Months later, she stated that, with respect to the military operation in Libya, the United States was still flying a quarter of the sorties, and The New York Times reported that, while many presidents had bypassed other sections of the War Powers Resolution, there was little precedent for exceeding the 60-day statutory limit on unauthorized military actions – a limit which the Justice Department had said in 1980 was constitutional. The State Department publicly took the position in June 2011 that there was no "hostility" in Libya within the meaning of the War Powers Resolution, contrary to legal interpretations in 2011 by the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel. May 20, 2011, marked the 60th day of U.S. combat in Libya (as part of the UN resolution) but the deadline arrived without President Obama seeking specific authorization from the U.S. Congress. President Obama notified Congress that no authorization was needed, since the U.S. leadership had been transferred to NATO, and since U.S. involvement was somewhat "limited". In fact, as of April 28, 2011, the U.S. had conducted 75 percent of all aerial refueling sorties, supplied 70 percent of the operation's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and contributed 24 percent of the total aircraft used in the operation. By September, the U.S. had conducted 26 percent of all military sorties, contributing more resources to Operation Unified Protector than any other NATO country. The State Department requested (but never received) express congressional authorization. On Friday, June 3, 2011, the U.S. House of Representatives voted (268-145) to rebuke President Obama for maintaining an American presence in the NATO operations in Libya, which they considered a violation of the War Powers Resolution. Yale Law Professor Bruce Ackerman stated that Obama's position "lacks a solid legal foundation. And by adopting it, the White House has shattered the traditional legal process the executive branch has developed to sustain the rule of law over the past 75 years." Syria, 2012–2017 In late 2012 or early 2013, at the direction of U.S. president Barack Obama, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was put in charge of Timber Sycamore, a covert program to arm and train the rebels who were fighting against Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, while the State Department supplied the Free Syrian Army with non-lethal aid. Following the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Civil War on several occasions, including the Ghouta chemical attack on 21 August 2013, Obama asked Congress for authorization to use military force in Syria, which Congress rejected. Instead, Congress passed Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2015 that specified that the Defense Secretary was authorized "...to provide assistance, including training, equipment, supplies, and sustainment, to appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrian groups and individuals...." The bill specifically prohibited the introduction of U.S. troops or other U.S. forces into hostilities. The bill said: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to constitute a specific statutory authorization for the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein hostilities are clearly indicated by the circumstances." In spite of the prohibition, Obama, and later U.S. president Donald Trump, introduced ground forces into Syria, and the United States became fully engaged in the country, though these troops were primarily for training allied forces. On April 6, 2017, the United States launched 59 BGM-109 Tomahawk missiles at Shayrat airbase in Syria in response to Syria's alleged use of chemical weapons. Constitutional scholar and law professor Stephen Vladeck has noted that the strike potentially violated the War Powers Resolution. In June 2015, Jim McGovern introduced in the House which was cosponsored by 5 other representatives. The same month, the House voted (288-139) against the resolution. In March 2023, Matt Gaetz introduced in the House, cosponsored by 4 other representatives. The same month, the House voted (321-103) against the resolution. Yemen, 2018–2019 Bernie Sanders introduced in the Senate during the 115th Congress in February 2018, but the Senate voted to table the motion in March 2018. Interest grew in the bill after the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018, with the Senate also approving holding Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman responsible for Khashoggi's death. The Senate voted (56-41) to invoke the War Powers Resolution in December 2018. However, the House of Representatives did not vote on the resolution before the conclusion of the 115th Congress. was introduced in the 116th Congress in January 2019. The bill was approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives. The bill was vetoed by President Trump on April 16, 2019. On May 2, 2019, the Senate failed to reach the two-thirds majority vote in order to override the veto. Iran, 2020 In January 2020, Tim Kaine (D–VA) introduced in the Senate which was cosponsored by 33 other representatives, Bernie Sanders (I–VT) introduced in the Senate which was cosponsored by 13 other representatives, and Ro Khanna (D–CA) introduced in the House which was cosponsored by 106 other representatives. The Trump administration stated that the attack on Qasem Soleimani was carried out in accordance with the War Powers Resolution under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) resolution of 2002. The legalities of using the AUMF for endless conflicts has been a source of debate. On February 13, 2020, the Senate passed (55-45). The Democratic-controlled House of Representatives passed it March 11, 2020 (227-186). Trump vetoed the resolution on May 6, 2020, stating that it mistakenly "implies that the president's constitutional authority to use military force is limited to defense of the United States and its forces against imminent attack." Kaine stated Trump's veto could enable "endless wars" and "unnecessary war in the Middle East". The Senate attempted to override the veto the following day. The attempt needed at least 67 votes to override, with it failing by a vote of 49–44. Niger, 2023 In September 2023, Rand Paul introduced in the Senate, cosponsored by Mike Lee and Roger Marshall. In October 2023, the Senate voted (86-11) against the resolution. Iran, 2025 In June 2025, Thomas Massie introduced in the House which was cosponsored by 94 other representatives. It was referred to a committee where it remained until March 2026. In the Senate, Tim Kaine introduced which failed to discharge from committee (47-53) and Bernie Sanders introduced the 'No War Against Iran Act' () which was cosponsored by 7 other Senators. The 'No War Against Iran Act' was referred to a committee. Caribbean and Venezuela, 2025–2026 House In the House: • Jason Crow sponsored , in September 2025, which was cosponsored by 55 other representatives • Ilhan Omar sponsored , in September 2025, which was cosponsored by 23 other representatives • Gregory Meeks sponsored , in November 2025, which was cosponsored by 41 other representatives. • Jim McGovern sponsored , in December 2025, which was cosponsored by 46 other representatives Senate In the Senate: • Adam Schiff sponsored , in September 2025, which was cosponsored by 8 other representatives • Tim Kaine sponsored , in October 2025, which was cosponsored by 18 other representatives, Kaine also sponsored , in December 2025, which was cosponsored by 30 other representatives • Ruben Gallego sponsored , in December 2025, cosponsored by Tim Kaine On January 8, 2026, the Senate voted (52-47) to discharge S.J.Res. 98 (“to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities within or against Venezuela that have not been authorized by Congress.”) from committee. On January 14, Vice President JD Vance broke a (50-50) tie vote to block the resolution. S.J.Res 83 and 90 both failed a motion to discharge, in October and November 2025 respectively. Iran, 2026 • March 4, 2026: Senate blocks (53-47), along party lines with the exceptions of Rand Paul (R-KY) who voted for the resolution and John Fetterman (D-PA) who voted against the resolution. • March 18, 2026: Senate blocks (53-47) • March 24, 2026: Senate blocks (53-47) • April 15, 2026: Senate blocks (52-47); Jim Justice did not vote. • April 22, 2026: Senate blocks (51-46); Chuck Grassley, Dave McCormick and Mark Warner did not vote and Jim Justice voted nay , , , , , , , , , have also been introduced "to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities within or against the Islamic Republic of Iran that have not been authorized by Congress." On March 5, 2026, H.Con.Res. 38, introduced in June 2025 by Thomas Massie (R-KY-4), was blocked in the House of Representatives (212-219), roughly on party lines. 4 Democrats (Henry Cuellar, Jared Golden, Greg Landsman, Juan Vargas) voted against the resolution. 2 Republicans (Massie and Warren Davidson) voted for the resolution and Tony Gonzales did not vote. On 16 April 2026, the House voted (214-213) against which was introduced in June 2025 by Gregory Meeks. 212 Democrats and Massie voted yea, Warren Davidson voted present, Lauren Boebert, Thomas Kean Jr., and Nancy Mace did not vote, all other Republicans and Jared Golden voted nay. Cuba, 2026 In March 2026, Tim Kaine introduced in the Senate, cosponsored by Adam Schiff and Ruben Gallego. ==Questions regarding constitutionality==

The War Powers Resolution has been controversial since it was passed. In passing the resolution, Congress specifically cites the Necessary and Proper Clause for its authority. Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, it is specifically provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. There is controversy over whether the War Powers Resolution's constraints on the president's authority as Commander-in-Chief are consistent with the Constitution. Presidents have therefore drafted reports to Congress required of the president to state that they are "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution rather than "pursuant to" so as to take into account the presidential position that the resolution is unconstitutional. One argument for the unconstitutionality of the War Powers Resolution by Philip Bobbitt argues "The power to make war is not an enumerated power" and the notion that to "declare" war is to "commence" war is a "contemporary textual preconception". Bobbitt contends that the Framers of the Constitution believed that statutory authorization was the route by which the United States would be committed to war, and that 'declaration' was meant for only total wars, as shown by the history of the Quasi-War with France (1798–1800). In general, constitutional powers are not so much separated as "linked and sequenced"; Congress's control over the armed forces is "structured" by appropriation, while the president commands; thus the act of declaring war should not be fetishized. Bobbitt also argues that "A democracy cannot ... tolerate secret policies" because they undermine the legitimacy of governmental action. A second argument concerns a possible breach of the "separation of powers" doctrine, and whether the resolution changes the balance between the Legislative and Executive functions. This type of constitutional controversy is similar to one that occurred under President Andrew Johnson with the Tenure of Office Act (1867). In that prior instance, the Congress passed a law (over the veto of the president) that required the president to secure Congressional approval for the removal of Cabinet members and other executive branch officers. The Act was repealed in 1887; in Myers v. United States (1926), when the Supreme Court of the United States struck down a similar law of 1876 relating to the postmaster general, they stated obiter that the 1867 Act had been unconstitutional. When Andrew Johnson violated the Act, the House of Representatives impeached him; action in the Senate to remove him failed by one vote during his impeachment trial. Here, the separation of powers issue is whether the War Powers Resolution requirements for Congressional approval and presidential reporting to Congress change the constitutional balance established in Articles I and II, namely that Congress is explicitly granted the sole authority to "declare war", "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" (Article 1, Section 8, Clauses 11 and 14), and to control the funding of those same forces, while the Executive has inherent authority as Commander in Chief. This argument does not address the other reporting requirements imposed on other executive officials and agencies by other statutes, nor does it address the provisions of Article I, Section 8 that explicitly gives Congress the authority to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces". The constitution specifically states that Congress is authorized "to provide and maintain a Navy" (Article 1 Section 8, Clause 13). The idea of "maintenance" of a Navy implies that Naval Forces would be a permanent fixture of national defense. Two types of Land Forces are described by the Constitution (Article 1 Section 8, Clauses 12 and 15): the Militia (armed citizenry organized into local defense forces and state volunteer regiments) which Congress can "call forth" and prescribe the "organizing, arming, and disciplining [training]" of, as Congress did in the Militia acts of 1792; and the Army, which Congress can "raise and support", through regular appropriation acts limited to no more than two years. This division matches how the Revolutionary War was fought, by the Continental Army, raised and supported by the Continental Congress, and local Militias and Volunteer Regiments, raised by the separate Colonies. After the war, under the Articles of Confederation, a small standing Army, the First American Regiment was raised and gradually increased in size over time by Congress before, following the Constitution's ratification, being transformed into the Regular Army. The availability of a standing Army, and the president of the United States being authorized as "Commander in Chief", implies his ability as a military commander to employ forces necessary to fulfill his oath to defend the constitution. There is also an unresolved legal question, discussed by Justice Byron R. White in INS v. Chadha of whether a "key provision of the War Powers Resolution", namely 50 U.S.C. 1544(c), constitutes an improper legislative veto. (See Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 971.) That section 1544(c) states "such forces shall be removed by the president if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution". Justice White argues in his dissent in Chadha that, under the Chadha ruling, 1544(c) would be a violation of the Presentment Clause. The majority in Chadha does not resolve the issue. Justice White does not address or evaluate in his dissent whether that section would fall within the inherent Congressional authority under Article I Section 8 to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces". A post-Chadha argument for the constitutionality of the concurrent resolution is that the War Powers Resolution does not delegate legislative authority to the president, and that the Chadha ruling applies only when Congress seeks to revoke a delegation of its authority. ==References==