Initiation On the evening of 3 December, at about 17:35, the
Pakistan Air Force (PAF) launched surprise pre-emptive strikes on eight Indian airfields, including
Agra, which was from the border. At the time of the attack, the
Taj Mahal had been camouflaged with lots of twigs and leaves and draped with burlap, because its marble glowed prominently in the moonlight. These pre-emptive strikes, known as
Operation Chengiz Khan, were inspired by the success of Israeli
Operation Focus in the Arab–Israeli
Six-Day War. Unlike the Israeli attack on Arab airbases in 1967, which involved a large number of Israeli planes, Pakistan flew too few planes to inflict significant damage. In an address to the nation on radio that same evening, Prime Minister Gandhi held that the air strikes were a declaration of war against India and the
Indian Air Force (IAF) responded with initial air strikes the same night. These expanded to massive retaliatory air strikes the next morning. This air action marked the start of all-out war; Gandhi ordered the mobilisation of troops and launched a full-scale invasion of East Pakistan. This involved Indian forces in
coordinated air, sea and land assaults. The main Indian objective on the eastern front was to capture Dacca, and on the western front to contain Pakistani forces.
Ground operations The Indian army was better equipped than the Pakistanis and enjoyed significant numerical superiority over them. of Pakistani territory; this land gained by India in
Azad Kashmir,
Punjab and
Sindh sectors was later ceded in the
Simla Agreement of 1972, as a gesture of goodwill. Casualties inflicted to Pakistan Army's
I Corps,
II Corps, and Pakistan Marines'
Punjab detachment were very high, and many soldiers and marines perished due to lack of operational planning and lack of coordination within the marine-army formations against Indian Army's
Southern and
Western Commands. By the time the war came to end, the army soldiers and marines were highly demoralised– both emotionally and psychologically– on the
western front and had no
will to put up a defensive fight against the approaching Indian Army soldiers.
Western Front Pakistans head of the army and the military operations during the war,
General Abdul Hamid Khan played a central role in directing Pakistan's Western front campaigns. He oversaw the launch of Operation Chengiz Khan, a preemptive strike on Indian airbases, aimed at crippling Indian airpower and initiating hostilities. Despite extensive planning, the operation inflicted only limited damage. On the Western front, General Hamid Khan commanded key offensives, including the assault towards
Ferozepur and ordered the offensive in
Chhamb under
Major General Iftikhar Janjua, which resulted in territorial gains. He also directed the attempted advance towards
Longewala, though this effort was ultimately repelled by Indian forces. Hamid Khan oversaw the II Corps offensive into the Indian state of Punjab. The plan involved advancing from
Bahawalnagar towards Bhatinda and Ludhiana. Under his directive, major elements of the 1st Armored Division began mobilization on December 15, 1971. Small advancements were made by Pakistani troops. However, due to subsequent orders to halt movements, the offensive was delayed and ultimately did not proceed before the ceasefire on December 17, 1971. His leadership during the conflict, while marked by bold initiatives, has been subject to scrutiny in post-war analyses. On 3 December, after the air strike carried out by the PAF, the 106 Infantry Brigade of the Pakistani forces under the command of Brig Mohammad Mumtaz Khan advanced towards the village of
Hussainiwala with 2000 troops and artillery support. The Indian side had deployed one battalion, 15 Punjab, under the command of Lt Col Shastry comprising 900 soldiers with support from the IAF. The 15 Punjab could not hold the village and had to retreat on 4 December towards the fortress called Kaiser-i-Hind outside Hussainiwala. The Indian forces were eventually pushed from the fortress a well. The Indian side suffered 125 casualties while the Pakistani forces lost 67 men. Simultaneously, Pakistani forces began an offensive on Chhamb, similar to the offensive carried out during the
Indo-Pakistani war of 1965. The Pakistani 23 Armoured Division under Maj Gen Iftikhar Janjua pushed through the region held by the Indian 10 Division with superior equipment commanded by Maj Gen Jaswant Singh. Till 9 December, the Pakistani commander Maj Gen Janjua perished but the Pakistani forces were able to force the Indian units to retreat by 11 December. Pakistan retained the territory won in this battle after the Simla Agreement. On 4 December, a Pakistani unit from the 18 Infantry Division commanded by Maj Gen B. M. Mustafa headed by Brig. Tariq Mir and Brig Jahanzeb Abab advanced towards the Rajasthan town of
Longewala. The town was held by an outnumbered Infantry Company under
Major K. S. Chandapuri and few border guards but had heavy IAF support. This company held several anti-tank guns, cannons and howitzers. The initial Pakistani armored advance was stalled by the Indian Anti-tank and Anti-Mech defenses from high ground and the Pakistani sappers were also pushed back by Indian small arm and artillery cannon fire. The IAF 122 squadron under the command of Wing Cdr D. M. Conquest equipped with
Hawker Hunter and
HAL HF-24 Marut also bombed the Pakistani units. By 7 December the
Battle of Longewala was decisively won by India. Pakistani I Corps attempted to cut Indian transport lines between Punjab and Jammu by advancing on the
Shakargarh sector on 6 December. Lt Gen Irshad Ahmed Khan commanded two infantry and one armored division into battle. The region was heavily reinforced by the Indian
I Corps commanded by
Lt Gen Khem Karan Singh holding three infantry divisions, two independent armored brigades and two artillery brigades. The resultant battle raged till the end of the war on 16 December and recorded heavy losses on both sides. Despite being numerically superior than the Indian side, Pakistan failed at capturing the region and the Indian units pushed back and threatened Sialkot. The
Battle of Basantar was deemed an Indian victory. Between 8 and 14 December, India captured an 800 km2 stretch of the Karakoram range in the Northern region of
Ladakh in the
Battle of Turtuk under the command of
Col Udai Singh.
Eastern Front Pre-war operations Before the official declaration of war between the two countries, Indian army had already been attacking the territory along the border with East Pakistan. This served the purpose of confusing Lt Gen Amir Niazi, the Martial Law Administrator of East Pakistan. These battles fought before the official declaration of war included the
Battle of Dhalai,
Garibpur,
Boyra and
Hilli. On 28 October,
Lt Gen Sagat Singh, commander of the IV Corps ordered the advance of Indian forces into the region of Dhalai near Tripura. Three battalions from the Corps fought against the battalion sized deployment of the
12th Frontier Force of Pakistan. The six day battle resulted in an Indian victory and provided for a launch pad for IAF reconnaissance mission into East Pakistan. On 22 November, 8 Grenadiers under the command of Lt Col Shamsher Singh advanced on the mountain position of Hilli. For this objective, the town of Morapara was attacked. In the fierce battle, heavy losses were incurred by the Indian side but by 24 November, a huge portion of Morapara was captured.
After the declaration of war Contrary to the 1965 war, which had emphasised set-piece battles and slow advances, this time the strategy adopted was a swift, three-pronged assault of nine infantry divisions with attached armoured units and close air support that rapidly converged on Dacca, the capital of East Pakistan. On 4 December, 5 Gorkha rifles of the 59 Mountain brigade was tasked with capturing the Gazipur tea factory bungalow overlooking the important city of Sylhet. In the late night operation carried out by Major Shyam Kelkar, India was able to force Pakistani forces to retreat despite heavy casualties including Maj Kelkar. On 7 December, after a major buildup of forces around the city of Sylhet, Lt Gen Sagat Singh ordered the 4/5th battalion of the Gorkha regiment to carry out a
heliborne operation under the command of Lt Col A. B. Harolikar. The first wave of attacks was carried out on the same day with a hundred soldiers landed into the city, followed by more after 12 hours. The Indian forces expected the city to have been abandoned by the Pakistani commanders. Contrary to their beliefs, the city was defended by 2 brigades which responded with heavy firing towards the attacking Indian forces. This also caused an interruption in the heliborne operations and limited the access to the Indian forces. These attacks were followed by IAF
Hunter air strikes on 11 December. The Pakistani forces under Brig S. A. Hassan
raised the white flag on 15 December. On 9 December, the Indian forces under the 57 Mountain division were tasked with crossing the Meghna river through the Coronation bridge between the town of Ashuganj and Bairab Bazaar. Ashuganj was heavy defended by the Pakistani forces and the following battle resulted in heavy casualties on both sides. The Pakistani 14 Division ordered the destruction of the bridge, allowing for the Pakistani troops to ferry across the Meghna rivier and strengthen the defense of Bhairab Bazaar. The Indian forces were able to cross the Meghna river with the help of local fishing boats and 14
Mil Mi-4 helicopters. By 12 December, the Indian forces had secured the crossing points on the Meghna and had located several battalions across the river. Indian units had also come within artillery range of Dacca. On 11 December, the 2nd Para regiment battalion carried out the
Tangail Airdrop and engaged with the ill-trained
Razakars to enable the 1 Maratha light infantry to secure the Poongli bridge over the Jamuna river. This battle was an Indian victory and helped Indian forces close on Dhaka by 12 December. On 13 December, Indian and Mukti Bahini forces attacked the city of Shiromoni. The Indian forces suffered heavy losses at the Badamtola ambush. The battle continued till after the singing of the Instrument of Surrender by the commander of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan,
Lt Gen A. A. K. Niazi on 16 December, since the commander of forces in Shiromoni, Brig Hayat Khan insisted on continuing the battle. Brig Khan surrendered to the Indian forces a day later on 17 December. The Indian campaign's "
blitzkrieg" techniques exploited weaknesses in the Pakistani positions and bypassed opposition; this resulted in a swift victory. Faced with insurmountable losses, the Pakistani military capitulated in less than a fortnight and psychological panic spread in the Eastern Command's military leadership. Upon hearing the ultimatum, the
East-Pakistan government collapsed when the Lt-Gen.
A.A.K. Niazi (Cdr. of
Eastern Command) and his deputy, V-Adm.
M.S. Khan, surrendered without offering any resistance. Another source states that Pakistan suffered around 8,000 killed and 25,000 wounded, while India had 3,000 dead and 12,000 wounded. The loss of
armoured vehicles was similarly imbalanced and this finally represented a defeat for Pakistan.
Naval operations of
Visakhapatnam near the eastern coast of India, making it the first submarine casualty in the waters around the
Indian subcontinent. had
blockaded Pakistan's trade and supply lines in
Bay of Bengal in Eastern theatre; Airforce
bombed and raided several towns and some cities in
East Pakistan.
Navy NHQ staffers and commanders of the
Pakistan Navy knew very well that unlike the
1965 war, the Navy was ill-prepared for the naval conflict with India. The Pakistan Navy was in no condition to fight an offensive war in deep water against the
Indian Navy, and neither was it in a condition to mount a serious defence against Indian Navy's seaborne encroachment. In the western theatre of the war, the Indian Navy's
Western Naval Command, under Vice admiral
S.N. Kohli, successfully launched a surprise attack on the
port of Karachi on the night of 4/5 December 1971 under the codename
Trident. The naval attack involving the Soviet-built
Osa-class missile boats sank the Pakistan Navy's destroyer and minesweeper while was also badly damaged. Pakistani naval sources reported that about 720 Pakistani sailors were killed or wounded, and Pakistan lost reserve fuel and many commercial ships, thus crippling the Pakistan Navy's further involvement in the conflict. On 9 December 1971, sank , inflicting 194 Indian casualties, and this attack was the first submarine kill since World War II. The
sinking of INS Khukri was followed by another Indian attack on the port of Karachi on the night of 8/9 December 1971 under the codename
Python. A
squadron of Indian Navy's Osa missile boats approached the Karachi port and launched a series of Soviet-acquired
Styx missiles, that resulted in further destruction of reserve fuel tanks and the sinking of three Pakistani merchant ships, as well as foreign ships docked in Karachi. The PAF did not attack the Indian Navy ships, and confusion remained the next day when the civilian pilots of
Pakistan International, acting as
reconnaissance war pilots, misidentified and the air force
attacked its own warship, inflicting major damages and killing several officers on board. In the eastern theatre of the war, the Indian
Eastern Naval Command, under Vice Admiral
Nilakanta Krishnan, completely isolated East Pakistan by a
naval blockade in the
Bay of Bengal, trapping the Eastern Pakistan Navy and eight foreign merchant ships in their ports. India also launched an amphibious assault,
Operation Beaver, near Cox's Bazar on 14 December 1971 due to unfounded fears of a Pakistani retreat into Burma, Led by "Romeo Force" with 1/3 Gorkha Rifles, the landing failed–only 12 Indian troops managing to disembark out of a battalion, the area was held by Pakistani regular troops. Pakistan countered the threat by sending the submarine , which
sank off the coast of
Visakhapatnam, due to an internal explosion, though whether this was triggered by Indian depth charges, diving to avoid them or some other reason has never been established. Due to a high number of defections, the Navy relied on deploying the
Pakistan Marines, led by
Rear Admiral Leslie Mungavin, where they had to conduct
riverine operations against the Indian Army, but they too suffered major losses, mainly due to their lack of understanding of
expeditionary warfare and the
wet terrain of East Pakistan. The damage inflicted on the Pakistan Navy stood at 7
gunboats, 1 minesweeper, 1 submarine, 2 destroyers, 3 patrol crafts belonging to the
Pakistan Coast Guard, 18 cargo, supply and communication vessels; and large-scale damage inflicted on the naval base and docks in the coastal town of Karachi. Three merchant navy ships –
Anwarbaksh,
Pasni and
Madhumathi – and ten smaller vessels were captured. Around 1900 personnel were lost, while 1413 servicemen were captured by Indian forces in Dacca. According to one Pakistani scholar,
Tariq Ali, Pakistan lost half its navy in the war.
Air operations s during the war. After the attempted pre-emptive attack, the PAF adopted a defensive stance in response to the Indian retaliation. As the war progressed, the IAF continued to battle the PAF over conflict zones, but the number of sorties flown by the PAF decreased day–by–day. The IAF flew 4,000 sorties while the PAF offered little in retaliation, partly because of the paucity of non-Bengali technical personnel. This lack of retaliation has also been attributed to the deliberate decision of the PAF's
AHQ to cut its losses, as it had already incurred huge losses in the conflict in the liberation war in the East. The PAF avoided making contacts with the Indian Navy after the latter raided the port of Karachi twice, but the PAF did retaliate by bombing
Okha harbour, destroying the fuel tanks used by the boats that had attacked. In the east,
No. 14 Squadron "Tail Choppers" was destroyed and its CO,
Squadron Leader PQ Mehdi, was taken
POW, putting Pakistan's air command in Dhaka out of commission. India thereby achieved total
air superiority on the eastern front. At the end of the war, PAF pilots made successful escapes from East Pakistan to neighbouring
Burma; many PAF personnel had already left the East for Burma on their own before Dacca was overrun by the Indian military in December 1971.
Indian attacks on Pakistan As the Indian Army tightened its grip in East Pakistan, the IAF continued with its attacks against Pakistan as the campaign developed into a series of daylight anti-airfield, anti-radar, and close-support attacks by fighter jets, with night attacks against airfields and strategic targets by
Canberras and
An-12s, while Pakistan responded with similar night attacks with its
B-57s and
C-130s. The PAF deployed its
F-6s mainly on defensive
combat air patrol missions over their own bases, leaving the PAF unable to conduct effective offensive operations. Sporadic raids by the IAF continued against PAF forward air bases in Pakistan until the end of the war, and interdiction and close-support operations were maintained. The PAF played a more limited role in the operations. They were reinforced by
Mirages from an unidentified Middle Eastern ally (whose identity remains unknown). India flew 1,978 sorties in the East and about 4,000 in Pakistan, while the PAF flew about 30 and 2,840 at the respective fronts. .
T-55 tanks penetrating the
Indo-East Pakistan border towards
Dacca. -mounted
RCL gun which destroyed most of the tanks during the
Battle of Longewala Surrender of Pakistan Eastern Command The Instrument of Surrender of Pakistan Eastern Command stationed in East Pakistan was signed between Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, the GOC-in-C of Indian Eastern Command, and Lieutenant-General A.A.K. Niazi, the Commander of the Pakistan Eastern Command, at the
Ramna Race Course in Dacca at 16:31Hrs
IST on 16 December 1971. There was a problem over who would represent the Bangladesh government, as the three Bangladeshi
battalion commanders - Lt Cols
Shafiullah,
Khaled Musharraf and Ziaur Rahman - were located too far away to be airlifted on time. The responsibility fell on the only armed forces officer available, Gp Capt
AK Khondkar, chief of the newly formed
BAF. As the
surrender was accepted silently by Lieutenant-General Aurora, the surrounding crowds on the race course started shouting
anti-Pakistan slogans, and there were reports of abuses aimed at the surrendering commanders of Pakistani military. Indian officers and an Indian diplomat,
MEA joint secretary for Pakistan AK Ray, had to form a
human chain around Lt Gen Niazi to protect him from being
lynched. Initial counts recorded that approximately 79,676 war prisoners were uniformed personnel, and the overwhelming majority of the war prisoners were officers – most of them from the army and navy, while relatively small numbers were from the air force and marines; others in larger number were serving in paramilitary units. The remaining prisoners were civilians who were either family members of the military personnel or volunteers (
razakars). The
Hamoodur Rahman Commission and the
POW Investigation Commission reports instituted by Pakistan lists the Pakistani POWs as given in the table below. Apart from soldiers, it was estimated that 15,000 Bengali civilians were also made prisoners of war. == Foreign reaction and involvement ==