Iran nuclear deal

Nuclear technology A fission-based "atomic" nuclear weapon uses a fissile material to cause a nuclear chain reaction. The most commonly used materials are uranium 235 and plutonium 239 . Both uranium 233 and reactor-grade plutonium have also been used. The amount of uranium or plutonium needed depends on the sophistication of the design, with a simple design requiring approximately 15 kg of uranium or 6 kg of plutonium and a sophisticated design requiring as little as 9 kg of uranium or 2 kg of plutonium. Plutonium is almost nonexistent in nature, and natural uranium is about 99.3% uranium 238 and only 0.7% . To make a weapon, either uranium must be enriched or plutonium must be produced. Uranium enrichment is required for nuclear power, although not to the same purity. For this reason, uranium enrichment is a dual-use technology required for both civilian and military purposes. Key strategies to prevent proliferation of nuclear arms include limiting the number of operating uranium enrichment plants and controlling the export of nuclear technology and fissile material. After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran's nuclear program fell into disarray as "much of Iran's nuclear talent fled the country in the wake of the Revolution". The new leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, initially opposed nuclear technology. In February 2003, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami acknowledged the existence of the facilities and acknowledged that Iran had undertaken "small-scale enrichment experiments" to produce low-enriched uranium for power plants. Over the following two months, the E.U. 3 agreement fell apart as talks over the Long Term Agreement broke down; the Iranian government "felt that the proposal was heavy on demands, light on incentives, did not incorporate Iran's proposals, and violated the Paris Agreement". In 2007, IAEA director-general Mohamed ElBaradei said that military action against Iran "would be catastrophic, counterproductive" and called for negotiations. ElBaradei specifically proposed a "double, simultaneous suspension, a time out" as a confidence-building measure, under which sanctions and enrichment would be suspended. In September 2009 U.S. President Barack Obama revealed the existence of an underground enrichment facility in Fordow, near Qom. Israel threatened military action. In June, Hassan Rouhani was elected president of Iran. In a 2006 negotiation with Europe, Rouhani said that Iran had used the negotiations to dupe the Europeans, saying that during the negotiations, Iran had mastered the conversion of uranium yellowcake at Isfahan. In August, three days after his inauguration, Rouhani called for negotiations with the P5+1. In September, Obama and Rouhani spoke by telephone, the first high-level contact between U.S. and Iranian leaders since 1979, and Secretary of State John Kerry met with Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. The IAEA began inspections under this interim agreement. That day, an IAEA report stated that Iran was adhering to the interim agreement, including stopping enrichment of uranium to 20%, beginning to dilute half of the stockpile of 20% enriched uranium to 3.5%, and halting work on the Arak heavy-water reactor. == Negotiations (2014–2015) ==

, Austria, on November 24, 2014 JCPOA was the culmination of a 20-month negotiation. and then to 1 July 2015. A framework was agreed on 2 April 2015 at Lausanne. Under this framework Iran tentatively agreed to accept restrictions, all of which would last a decade or longer, and to submit to increased inspections. Negotiations continued, ending in Vienna at the Palais Coburg. The agreement reflects the impact of a June 2015 public letter by a bipartisan group of U.S. diplomats, experts, and others that outlined concerns about various provisions and called for strengthening the agreement. Participants handwriting on top left side is a homage by Javad Zarif to his counterparts' efforts in the negotiations: "[I am] Sincere to Mr. Abbas [Araghchi] and Mr. Majid [Takht-Ravanchi]."In November 2015, U.S. State Department Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs Julia Frifield said: "The JCPOA is not a treaty or an executive agreement, and is not a signed document. The JCPOA reflects political commitments between Iran, the P5+1, and the EU." File:Wang Yi 2014 (cropped).jpg|ChinaWang Yi, Foreign Minister File:Laurent Fabius January 2015.jpg|FranceLaurent Fabius, Foreign Minister File:Frank-Walter Steinmeier Feb 2014 (cropped).jpg|GermanyFrank-Walter Steinmeier, Minister of Foreign Affairs File:Federica Mogherini Official.jpg|European UnionFederica Mogherini, High Representative File:Mohammad Javad Zarif 2014.jpg|IranMohammad Javad Zarif, Minister of Foreign Affairs File:Sergey Lavrov 2014.jpg|RussiaSergey Lavrov, Foreign Minister File:Philip Hammond, Secretary of State for Defence.jpg|United KingdomPhilip Hammond, Foreign Secretary File:John Kerry official Secretary of State portrait.jpg|United StatesJohn Kerry, Secretary of State ==Provisions==

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) covered 109 pages, including five annexes. The major provisions are: Nuclear Stocks Over 15 years, Iran would reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 97%, from 10,000 kg to 300 kg, and limit enrichment to 3.67%, sufficient for civilian nuclear power and research, but not for weaponry. This represented a "major decline" in Iran's nuclear activity. Iran had produced stockpiles near 20% (medium-enriched uranium). Centrifuges Iran initially possessed centrifuges sufficient for one nuclear weapon, but not for nuclear power. Over ten years, Iran would secure over two-thirds of its centrifuges in storage, reducing active units to 6,104 centrifuges, with only 5,060 allowed to enrich uranium. Iran agreed to build no enrichment facilities for 15 years. Spent fuel was to be sent out of the country. For 15 years Iran agreed not to research or engage in spent fuel reprocessing, build additional heavy-water reactors, or accumulate heavy water. oversight "over Iran's entire nuclear supply chain, from uranium mills to its procurement of nuclear-related technologies". For sites such as Fordow and Natanz, the IAEA was to have 24-hour access to nuclear facilities and maintain continuous monitoring (including via surveillance equipment). The agreement authorized the IAEA to use sophisticated monitoring technology, such as fiber-optic equipment seals that could send the IAEA information; satellite imagery to detect covert sites; sensors to detect minute nuclear specimens; and tamper- and radiation-resistant cameras. Other tools included software to gather information and detect anomalies, and datasets on imports. Iran could either allow the inspection or propose alternatives that satisfied the IAEA's concerns. This allowed the U.S. and its allies to insist on responses that Iran, Russia or China could not veto. After three days of non-compliance, sanctions would be automatically reimposed. Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs supported these estimates. By contrast, Alan J. Kuperman, coordinator of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project at University of Texas at Austin, disagreed, arguing that the breakout time would be only three months. After ten years or more, the breakout time would gradually decrease. • exceed the 300 kg of 3.5% LEU limit; • exceed the zero kg of near 20% LEU limit; • keep operating 19 "hot cells" that exceed the size limit; • maintain control of 50 tonnes of heavy water that exceeded the 130-tonne limit by storing the excess at an Iran-controlled facility in Oman. Sanctions Iran had to submit a full report on its nuclear history before it could receive any sanctions relief. At the time of the agreement, Iran was subject to a variety of sanctions imposed by an array of organizations. Once IAEA verified compliance with the nuclear-related measures, U.N. sanctions would terminate. Some E.U. sanctions would terminate and some would suspend. That would allow Iran to recover approximately $100 billion of its assets frozen in overseas banks. No U.N. or E.U. nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures were to be imposed. Additional E.U. sanctions would be lifted after eight years of compliance, including some on the Revolutionary Guards. The U.S. agreed to suspend its nuclear-related secondary sanctions. This was not tied to a date or compliance but was expected to occur "roughly in the first half of 2016". Some sanctions would continue: those on conventional weapon sales for five years; those on ballistic missile technologies for eight. But sanctions related to human rights, missiles, and support for terrorism remained in effect. Many U.S. sanctions apply worldwide; E.U. sanctions apply only in Europe. Complaints by a non-Iran party that were not resolved to the complainant's satisfaction within 35 days would allow the complainant to cease performing its commitments, notify the S.C., or both. Expiration "Transition Day" was to occur either eight years after Adoption Day or earlier if the IAEA reached its broader conclusion on Iran's nuclear program. At that point, the UN would lift restrictions on missiles, Iran was expected to pursue ratification of its Additional Protocol, the EU must end its remaining nuclear-related sanctions, and the United States would remove specific items from its sanctions list and work toward ending certain sanctions through legislative means. "Termination Day" was set for October 18, 2025—ten years after Adoption Day. It would mark the end of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 and the council's formal closure of Iran's nuclear file. With this, the mechanism allowing any participant to unilaterally reimpose prior UN sanctions on Iran's nuclear program without risk of veto, known as the snapback provision, would also expire. International reaction Mohammad Javad Zarif and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry shaking hands at the end of negotiations on 14 July 2015, Vienna. They shook hands on 26 September 2013 in the United Nations Headquarters for the first time. The JCPOA received a mixed international reaction. Many countries expressed hope that it could achieve its goals, while Iranian adversaries in the Middle East, including Israel and Saudi Arabia, Unique elements JCPOA was the first of its kind in the annals of non-proliferation. The 159-page JCPOA document and its five appendices is the longest text of a multinational agreement since World War II, according to BBC Persian. and backed a multinational agreement within the framework of a resolution (2231). For the first time in U.N. history, a country—Iran—was able to rid itself of six U.N. resolutions—1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, 1929—without abiding by them for a single day. All other cases ended by regime change, war, or acquiescence. Gary Sick said that during the history of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), no country other than Iran had ever voluntarily agreed to such restrictions. with Hossein Fereydoun, the brother of 7th President of Iran Hassan Rouhani and Mohammad Javad Zarif during the announcement of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. During the final negotiations, Kerry stayed in Vienna for 17 days, the longest interval a Cabinet official had devoted to a single international negotiation in more than four decades. Zarif broke the record for an Iranian Foreign Minister staying far from home with an 18-day stay in Vienna, and set the record of 106 days of negotiations over 687 days, more than any other chief nuclear negotiator in 12 years. The negotiations became the longest continuous negotiations with the presence of all five foreign ministers of the permanent Security Council members. On 27 April 2015, Kerry visited the official residence of the Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations to meet his counterpart. The encounter was the first since the Iran hostage crisis. On the sidelines of the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly, President Obama shook hands with Zarif, the first such greeting in history. The event was unique in the form of diplomatic ranks, as a head of state shook hands with a minister. Obama said, "Too much effort has been put into the JCPOA and we all should be diligent to implement it." ==Incorporation and implementation==

Incorporation into international law by the Security Council The S.C. formally endorsed the agreement on 20 July 2015. On 15 July, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power circulated a 14-page draft to Council members. by a 15–0 vote. Hekmati, Abedini, and Rezaian were released in a January 2016 prisoner exchange, which Kerry said the nuclear agreement had accelerated. Iranian review Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei gave President Hassan Rouhani guidelines for how to proceed. On 21 June 2015, the Iranian Parliament (Majlis) formed a committee to study the JCPOA and decided to wait at least 80 days before voting. Zarif and Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) chief Ali Akbar Salehi defended the deal in Parliament. He claimed a popular mandate to make an agreement based on his election in 2013 and said the alternative was suffering under continued sanctions. On 2 September, Iranian defense minister Hossein Dehqan said that Iran would not allow the IAEA to visit every site or facility it wished. On 3 September, Khamenei said that the Majlis should make the final decision. The same day, Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani voiced his support. Most prominent opposition leaders, including Mir-Hossein Mousavi, a 2009 presidential candidate under house arrest for his role as a leader of the Green Movement, also announced their support. The Majlis commission for examining the JCPOA invited Ali Shamkhani, as well as members of a former nuclear negotiation team including Ali Bagheri and Abbasi, to a hearing. During the session, ex-chief negotiator Saeed Jalili said that "approximately 100 absolute rights" of Iran had been conceded and that the deal turned Iran's right to adopt nuclear technology under the NPT into mere permission. He claimed that the deal violated the terms Khamenei set. Commission members Masoud Pezeshkian and Abbas Ali Mansouri Arani criticized Jalili's testimony. In another session, negotiators Abbas Araqchi and Majid Takht-Ravanchi defended the deal. The leading reformist newspapers, Etemad and Shargh, supported the deal. The leading conservative papers, Ettelaat and Kayhan, criticized its terms. On 13 October the Iranian Parliament approved the JCPOA supplemented by text unilaterally added by Iran and not agreed to by the P5+1, with 161 votes in favor, 59 against, and 13 abstentions. Review period in the U.S. Congress The agreement's legal status in the U.S. was disputed. Under U.S. law, the JCPOA is a non-binding political commitment. According to the State Department, it is neither an executive agreement nor a treaty (as defined in U.S. law). In contrast to treaties, which require two-thirds of the Senate to consent to ratification, executive commitments require no congressional approval and are not legally binding under domestic law, though they may carry weight under international law. In May 2015, the U.S. enacted the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA), which gave Congress a defined period to review any nuclear agreement with Iran. Under the Act, once the JCPOA was submitted, Congress had 60 days to pass a resolution of approval or disapproval or take no action. Additional time was allotted to allow for potential presidential vetoes and override votes. On 19 July 2015, the State Department formally transmitted the JCPOA to Congress, along with an unclassified verification report and a classified annex from the Intelligence Community. A resolution of disapproval failed in the Senate, as did a resolution of approval in the House. As a result, the agreement went into effect after the congressional review period expired. Congress and the administration Obama repeatedly urged Congress to support the agreement, noting the inspections regime's vigor and criticizing opponents for failing to offer a viable alternative. Vice President Joe Biden met with Senate Foreign Relations Committee Democrats, seeking their support. Republicans generally rejected the deal. Cruz said that under the agreement "the Obama administration will become the financier of terrorism against America in the world." Former Governor Mike Huckabee of Arkansas, a candidate for the 2016 Republican presidential nomination, called Obama "naive". Obama cited the support of Democrats typically associated with strong defense backgrounds, saying, "This is a deal that has been endorsed by people like Brent Scowcroft and Sam Nunn... historic Democratic and Republican leaders on arms control and on keeping America safe". Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell promised that Republicans would discuss the agreement respectfully in September. Democrat Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer distinguished the nuclear and non-nuclear aspects. His conclusion was: "when it comes to the nuclear aspects of the agreement within ten years, we might be slightly better off with it. However, when it comes to the nuclear aspects after ten years and the non-nuclear aspects, we would be better off without it." Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said that JCPOA "puts U.S. in a far better place in terms of insight and access" than no agreement. Committee hearings A Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing took place on 23 July. Kerry, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, and Moniz testified. Chair Bob Corker said the agreement codified rather than dismantled the Iranian program. Ranking member Benjamin Cardin remained neutral. Other Democrats, led by Barbara Boxer, expressed support. Corker and Cardin requested to review the IAEA-Iran document. Kerry, Lew, and Moniz said that without JCPOA, international sanctions would collapse. Republican Committee chair Ed Royce claimed that the deal traded permanent sanctions relief for temporary restrictions and criticized the inspection regime. Ranking member Eliot Engel was not in support. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Kerry, Moniz, and Lew appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Carter and Dempsey had been invited to testify by Republican Chair John McCain, who opposed the deal. Ranking member Jack Reed stressed the need to independently validate the deal. Carter assured the committee that the U.S. could employ military force if needed and that he did not expect other Iranian misbehavior to stop, another reason to limit its nuclear program. Dempsey testified that the agreement reduced the chances of a near-term military conflict. Some Republican lawmakers called such agreements "secret side deals" that restructured the deal. State Department spokesman John Kirby responded the P5+1 had been fully briefed and that related questions could be addressed in a classified setting. Congressional reactions The Washington Post listed 12 issues raised by U.S. senators including Corker, Bob Menendez, Jim Risch, Marco Rubio, and Ron Johnson, including the efficacy of inspections at undeclared sites; the effectiveness of the snapback sanctions; the significance of limits on enrichment; the significance of IAEA side agreements; the effectiveness of inspections of military sites; the consequences of walking away from an agreement; and the effects of lifting sanctions. Republican leaders vowed to kill the agreement. One area of disagreement was the consequences of walking away, and whether renegotiation was a realistic option. and that other countries would not continue to support the existing sanctions regime. Representative Sander M. Levin announced his support. Senator Cardin said that if the agreement were implemented, the U.S. should increase military aid to Israel and friendly Gulf states. The Associated Press reported that the classified U.S. Intelligence Community assessment concluded the agreed inspection regime would diminish Iran's ability to conceal a covert weapons program. Ten active and former Democratic members of the House Select Committee on Intelligence (including Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi and Intelligence Committee ranking member Adam Schiff) cited this assessment, which was available for members of Congress to read, as a reason to support the agreement. Congressional votes A resolution of disapproval was initially expected to pass both the House and Senate. Two-thirds of both houses are required to override a presidential veto. On 20 August 2015, Pelosi claimed that House Democrats had the votes to sustain a veto of a resolution of disapproval. By 20 August, about 60 House Democrats had announced their support, versus about 12 opponents. This proved to be moot, since by 8 September, all senators had announced their commitments, with 42 in support (40 Democrats and two independents) and 58 opposed (54 Republicans and four Democrats). Initially, the House leadership planned to vote on a resolution of disapproval. Speaker John Boehner instead chose to advance a resolution of approval to force Democratic supporters to formally register their views. The same day, Congress passed resolutions claiming that the requirements of a congressional review period were not met (by party-line vote) and that that would prevent the U.S. from lifting any sanctions (all Republicans and two Democrats in favor). The discussion extended to the wider public. Major campaign donors took sides, with opponents (Sheldon Adelson, Paul Singer, and Haim Saban) outspending supporters (Ploughshares Fund, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, George Soros, S. Daniel Abraham, Tim Gill, Norman Lear, Margery Tabankin, and Arnold Hiatt) by millions of dollars. Some groups welcomed the JCPOA, such as the National Iranian American Council (NIAC), and Iranian American Bar Association. Public letters of support abounded (often bipartisan): • 73 Middle East and foreign affairs scholars supported the deal. Signatories included John Esposito, Ehsan Yarshater, Noam Chomsky, Peter Beinart, John Mearsheimer, and Stephen Walt. • More than 100 former U.S. ambassadors and senior State Department officials. Signatories included Daniel C. Kurtzer, James R. Jones, Frank E. Loy, Princeton N. Lyman, Jack F. Matlock Jr., Donald F. McHenry, Thomas E. McNamara, and Thomas R. Pickering. • 60 national-security leaders. Others included Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, R. Nicholas Burns, Thomas R. Pickering; Ryan Crocker, Stuart Eizenstat; Eric T. Olson, Michele Flournoy, and Robert Einhorn. many of whom had held Q clearances and been longtime government advisers. Signatories included James E. "Hoss" Cartwright, Joseph P. Hoar, Merrill McPeak, and Lloyd W. Newton, Signers included Valerie Plame, Joseph C. Wilson, Hans Blix; Morton H. Halperin; and experts from the Brookings Institution, Stimson Center, and other think tanks. • 340 rabbis organized by Ameinu. Signers included Sharon Brous, Burton Visotzky, Nina Beth Cardin, Lawrence Kushner, Sharon Kleinbaum, and Amy Eilberg. Signatories included Levin, Barney Frank, Mel Levine, Steve Rothman, and Robert Wexler. Signers included Leon A. "Bud" Edney, James A. Lyons, William G. Boykin, and Thomas McInerney. American Israel Public Affairs Committee spent millions opposing it. J Street came out in support, and planned a $5 million advertising effort. In the first week of August J Street launched a $2 million, three-week ad campaign in support of the agreement, with TV ads in Colorado, Maryland, Michigan, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. Leaders of the Reform Jewish movement stayed neutral. Conversely, in late August a group of 900 rabbis signed an open letter by Kalman Topp and Yonah Bookstein calling upon Congress to reject the agreement. The Orthodox Union and American Jewish Committee also announced opposition to the agreement. in New York City. The bus ad was sponsored by New York Assemblyman Dov Hikind, an opponent of the agreement.United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) opposed the deal, although the group's president and co-founder, nonproliferation expert Gary Samore, disagreed. Foundation for American Security and Freedom and Veterans Against the Deal ran opposing ads. Supporters included MoveOn.org, Americans United for Change, and Global Zero. Colin Powell expressed support. Retired U.S. Senators Carl Levin and John Warner published a supporting op-ed. Retired Republican Richard Lugar and Democrat J. Bennett Johnston wrote in support of the agreement. Foreign diplomats joined the debate. Israeli ambassador to the U.S. Ron Dermer was an opponent. European ambassadors including Sir Peter Westmacott supported it. The Roman Catholic Church expressed support, led by Bishop Oscar Cantú. Michael Mandelbaum claimed that nonproliferation ultimately depended on deterrence, not agreements. Alan Dershowitz claimed that the involvement of Russia and China made the deal irrelevant. European Union On the same day that the S.C. approved its resolution, the E.U. formally approved the JCPOA via a vote of the E.U. Foreign Affairs Council (the group of E.U. foreign ministers) meeting in Brussels. This set into motion the lifting of certain E.U. sanctions, including those prohibiting the purchase of Iranian oil. The E.U. continued its sanctions relating to human rights and prohibiting the export of ballistic missile technology. On 20 September 2015, Director-General Yukiya Amano of the IAEA went to the Parchin missile production facility, along with Director of Safeguards Tero Varjoranta, to obtain clarifications on the site's nuclear activities. The next day, Amano professed satisfaction with the samples submitted by the Iranians to the IAEA. IAEA experts were not physically present during the sampling, but Amano said the procedure met "strict agency criteria". In June 2016, IAEA investigators reported that they had reported traces of uranium found at the Parchin facility in December 2015. Implementation Day After the IAEA certified that Iran had met the relevant JCPOA requirements, all nuclear sanctions were lifted by the UN, the E.U. and the U.S. on 16 January 2016, "Implementation Day". That day Washington imposed sanctions on 11 companies and individuals for supplying Iran's ballistic missile program. According to Kerry, $1.7 billion in debt with interest was to be paid to Tehran. But some Iranian financial institutions, including Ansar Bank, Bank Saderat, Bank Saderat PLC, and Mehr Bank, remained on the SDN List and U.S. sanctions with respect to Iran, including existing terrorism, human rights and ballistic missiles-related sanctions, remained in effect. Status in U.S. law In a letter sent to then Representative Mike Pompeo, the State Department said that the JCPOA "is not a treaty or an executive agreement, and is not a signed document". According to the Congressional Research Service, different definitions of "treaty" are used in international and U.S. law. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "The term 'treaty' has a broader meaning under international law than under domestic law. Under international law, 'treaty' refers to any binding international agreement. Under domestic U.S. law, 'treaty' signifies only those binding international agreements that have received the advice and consent of the Senate." Deterrence Michael Eisenstadt, Director of the Military and Security Studies Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, wrote that deterrence must remain the "core imperative" for U.S. policy. Einhorn wrote that maintaining a credible deterrent was essential. Obama stated that the U.S. would continue its policy of deterring any Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons, including via military force. Flexibility meant that Obama rejected specifying "the penalties for smaller violations of the accord" in advance. Dennis Ross and David Petraeus said that deterrence including military force was essential to preventing Iran from nuclear weapons and called on Obama to clearly state that policy. According to Khamenei, his fatwa and not JCPOA was the reason Iran would not acquire nuclear weapons. ==Subsequent developments==

Trump administration (2017) The U.S. certified in April 2017 and in July 2017 that Iran was complying with the deal. On 13 October 2017, President Trump announced that he would not make the certification required under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, accusing Iran of violating the spirit of the deal and calling on Congress and international partners to "address the deal's many serious flaws", though he stopped short of terminating the agreement. Trump left Congress to decide whether to reimpose sanctions. His aides sought to enact rules indicating how the U.S. could reimpose sanctions. Trump listed three items that could provoke the U.S. to reject the deal: intercontinental ballistic missile development, Iranian refusal to extend the constraint period, and evidence that Iran had reduced the time needed to manufacture a bomb to fewer than 12 months. Rouhani, Theresa May, Emmanuel Macron, Angela Merkel, and European Union foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini said the agreement was working well and that no one country could break it, reconfirming support for the deal. Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov confirmed that Iran was in compliance. On April 30, the U.S. and Israel said that Iran had not disclosed a past covert nuclear weapons program to the IAEA, as required. Project Cassandra Project Cassandra was a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) initiative launched in 2008 to disrupt Hezbollah's funding networks by targeting its involvement in international drug trafficking and money laundering. The operation uncovered significant links between Hezbollah and organized crime, but its later years were marked by controversy over allegations that enforcement efforts were slowed to protect the JCPOA negotiations—a claim former officials disputed. U.S. withdrawal (May 2018) On 8 May 2018, the U.S. officially withdrew from the JCPOA after Trump signed a Presidential Memorandum ordering reinstatement of sanctions. The IAEA continued to certify Iranian compliance. Other signatories said they would comply with the deal even absent the U.S. Consequences of U.S. withdrawal The U.S. adopted a policy of "maximum pressure", led by global sanctions. The Iranian rial fell by 20%, from 35,000 to the dollar to 42,000 in 2021. International banks that traded with Iran paid heavy fines. The U.S. flag was set on fire in Iran's Parliament. According to Israel Defense Forces sources, IRGC Quds Forces based in Syria launched rockets at Israeli military targets the next evening, the first time Iran had directly targeted Israel. All major European companies abandoned doing business with Iran out of fear of U.S. punishment. Iranian demands and European measures Khamenei presented seven conditions for Europe to sustain JCPOA. Among them was that European powers must take steps to preserve business relations with Iranian banks and purchase Iranian oil. He rejected holding discussions about Iran's ballistic missile program and regional activities. On 7 August 2018, the E.U. enacted a blocking statute to defeat U.S. sanctions on countries trading with Iran. In November 2018, U.S. sanctions came back into effect, intended to force Iran to alter its policies, including its support for militant groups in the region and its development of ballistic missiles. Reactions by Iran (2019) One year after the U.S. withdrawal, Iran took countermeasures. Iran halted its required sales of excess enriched uranium and heavy water to other countries. Rouhani said that Iran would resume enrichment beyond 3.67% if other parties could not let Iran benefit from JCPOA's economic provisions. On 8 May, Iran announced it would suspend implementation of parts of JCPOA, threatening further action in 60 days absent exemption from U.S. sanctions. On 1 July 2019, Iran announced that it had breached the limit set on its stockpile of low-enriched uranium, which the IAEA confirmed. On 7 July, Iran announced that it had started to increase uranium enrichment beyond the agreed 3.67% limit. IAEA said its inspectors would verify Iran's actions. Zarif sent a letter to Mogherini notifying her about Iran's noncompliance. On 4 November, Iran doubled the number of advanced centrifuges it operated. It began enriching uranium to 4.5%. On 5 November 2019, Iranian nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi announced that Iran would enrich uranium to 5% at Fordow, adding that it already had the capability to enrich uranium to 20%. On 5 January 2020, Iran declared that it would no longer abide by the deal's limitations but would continue to coordinate with IAEA. Diplomatic conflict (2020) In 2020, Trump and Pompeo asserted that the U.S. remained a "participant" in the agreement, despite having formally withdrawn, in an effort to persuade the S.C. to reimpose pre-agreement sanctions on Iran for its breaches. Reentry negotiations 2021 New U.S. President Joe Biden stated his intention to reinstate the deal. Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett advised against this, saying that stopping Iran's aggression and preventing Iran from building nuclear weapons should be the priority. In April, talks between the original parties started in Vienna. Biden put the meetings on hold in June. Enrique Mora, E.U. coordinator for reviving negotiations with Iran, attended President Ebrahim Raisi's inauguration. Iran sought E.U. assurances that the U.S. withdrawal would not be repeated. On 14 October, Iran and the E.U. agreed to further negotiations. Iranian deputy foreign minister Ali Bagheri reiterated Mora's statement that "the E.U. was ready to collaborate with Iran and the other parties". A joint statement by French, German, U.K., and U.S. leaders on 30 October welcomed Biden's interest in reestablishing JCPOA. Talks resumed on 29 November, with representatives from Iran, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the U.K. Bagheri presented Iran's draft. Western negotiators rejected it. Iranian negotiators insisted that the U.S. lift all sanctions before Iran would scale back its nuclear program. On 9 December, negotiations continued, with Russia and China pushing Iran to revise its stance. 2022 On 20 February, 250 members of the 290-member Iranian parliament, which had been controlled by hardliners since 2020, issued a statement urging Raisi to comply with their requirements for reestablishing JCPOA. The U.S. engaged in indirect talks with Iran, mediated by China, Russia and E.U. JCPOA revival became a priority for the Biden administration when the Russian invasion of Ukraine spiked global energy prices. JCPOA would add about a million barrels/day of Iranian oil to the international market, which would lower crude oil prices. Throughout the year, leaders on both sides made statements assessing the state of talks. Points of contention included: • the IAEA investigation about undeclared materials from three nuclear sites; • the presence of IRGC on the list of terrorist organizations; • Russian demands to explicitly protect its economic relations with Iran (eventually Russia received U.S. guarantees to protect its trade with Iran from international sanctions); • additional sanctions relief. By May, talks had stalled. On 7 May, Mora visited Iran to restart them. In June, Tehran said it was removing 27 U.N. surveillance cameras. On 16 June, the Biden administration announced sanctions against Iran's petrochemical industry. On 6 July, the U.S. initiated legal proceedings against entities based in Singapore, Vietnam, and the United Arab Emirates for evading sanctions. In July, indirect talks between the U.S. and Iran failed. In August European negotiators presented a "final" text, after another round. The draft did not include removal of the IRGC's terrorism designation. In September, Iran increased its oil exports to China, circumventing sanctions. A delegation visited Tehran on 18 December to discuss the nuclear material discovered at three sites. Earlier Iran reported it had enriched uranium to its highest level of 60%, one step away from weapons grade. On 20 December, a meeting was held in Amman, Jordan. The IAEA censured Iran twice in 2022 for failing to cooperate. 2023 An IAEA report on the Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant found that two cascades of IR-6 centrifuges were configured in a way "substantially different" from what Iran had previously declared. Iran claimed the difference was due to a human error. On 31 January, the U.S. State Department authorized a sanctions waiver, which allowed Russia to develop the enrichment site, a move that some criticized because it allowed Iran to develop its nuclear program with Russian-state controlled firms. On 4 March, Grossi met with Raisi and other top Iranian officials. Earlier, IAEA had detected uranium particles enriched up to 83.7% at Fordow. In the meantime, Iran gave assurances that it would reinstall monitoring equipment at sensitive locations. In early June, European powers resumed internal talks. Preliminary negotiations with France, Germany, the U.K., and Ali Bagheri Kani again took place in Oslo. A U.S. State Department official acknowledged that direct connections had been under way, the first since 2018. Both sides had released prisoners accused of espionage and terrorism. On 18 June, indirect talks between Iran and the U.S. began in Oman after the U.S. allowed the release of blocked Iraqi payments to Iran. On 4 July, Iran-Iraq Joint Chamber of Commerce chairman Yahya Ale Eshaq confirmed the release of $10 billion, to be used for unsanctioned goods. This allowed Iran to double its trade with Iraq. As a consequence, IAEA imposed no additional punitive measures on Iran, as European allies saw no benefit. Israel said it opposed "mini-agreements" with Iran, as well as the original agreement. In late August, after months of negotiations, first in Oman and then with Qatari officials in New York, agreements between the U.S. and Iran led to a gradual easing of sanctions on Iranian oil sales, particularly for eastern markets such as China. Iranian oil sales reached their highest since 2018, allowing prices to drop below $85 a barrel. Skeptical analysts claimed this was simply to keep U.S. gasoline prices in check for the 2024 election. The U.S. State Department insisted on continued sanctions enforcement, while some reports indicated that Iran was slowing its uranium enrichment. Iranian oil production reached 3 million barrels per day in July, with a further increase to at least 3.4 million barrels in August. In late August, IAEA confirmed that Iran had slowed its program to enrich uranium to 60%. Concurrently, the sale of Iranian crude increased. Some oil sanctions were lifted. In the first week of September, the U.S. State Department officially released $6 billion in frozen assets and finalized an exchange of five prisoners each. The funds could be used only for unsanctioned goods. A September IAEA report confirmed an enrichment slowdown, but claimed that no reporting progress had been made and that the camera equipment at the enrichment site remained inaccessible. In mid-September, the IAEA/Iran relationship further deteriorated when Iran rejected IAEA nuclear inspectors. This was formally permitted by Iran's safeguards agreement. On 18 September, Raisi spoke at the U.N. General Assembly and said that Iran would never give up its right to peaceful nuclear energy. He urged Western powers to return to the nuclear deal. Israel left the assembly hall in protest. In October, Qatar and the U.S. put Iran's access to blocked funds on hold due to the Gaza war, although Iran denied any involvement in the attack. 2024 Additional sanctions were imposed on the Iranian aviation sector due to its involvement with exports of missile components to Russia. Iran denied any deliveries. An IAEA report confirmed the expansion of Iran's enrichment program. Fordow was routinely enriching uranium to 60%. The report said that Iran informed the agency that eight clusters of advanced IR-6 centrifuges had been installed at the site but not brought online. The larger site at Natanz added 15 cascades, allowing an enrichment purity of 5%. IAEA board resolutions required Iran to cooperate with its investigations into uranium traces and called for inspectors to enter nuclear sites. AEOI spokesman Behrouz Kamalvandi met with representatives of Russia's Joint Institute for Nuclear Research to exchange technical details. On November 13, IAEA director Rafael Grossi visited Tehran, where he was welcomed by Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). Grossi, holding talks with Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and AEOI Chief Mohammad Eslami, had earlier said the JCPOA was an "empty shell" but that IAEA inspectors had no evidence that Iran was building a nuclear bomb. During the COP29 climate summit in Baku, he warned that "the international situation is becoming increasingly tense". 2025 In February 2025, Khamenei criticized the JCPOA, saying the Iranian team had been too generous and the U.S. had failed to uphold its commitments and ultimately withdrew from the deal. He said the JCPOA left a constant threat hanging over Iran (the snapback mechanism). He concluded that negotiating with such a government "is neither wise, nor intelligent, nor honorable". In September 2025, the UN security council rejected a resolution by China and Russia to delay "snapback sanctions" triggered by France, the UK, and Germany. European powers still adhere to agreements set forth by the JCPOA, and demand direct negotiations between Iran and the U.S. At the same time, Iran has welcomed IAEA inspectors to control the remaining undamaged nuclear sites. Iran has called the snapback sanctions "procedurally flawed" because they rely on terms of the 2015 agreement long abandoned by the U.S. Russia called the reimposition of sanctions "clumsy blackmail" and dismissed it as "null and void". Also in September 2025, Iran signed a $25 billion agreement with Russia to build four nuclear power reactors in Sirik, Iran. The Generation III reactors are expected to produce 5 GW of electricity. Iran, which suffers power shortages at times of high demand, currently has one operating nuclear power plant, in Bushehr. Also built by Russia, it has a capacity of 1 GW. On 28 September, UN sanctions were officially reimposed on Iran. On September 10, 2025, Grossi reached a confidential agreement with Araghchi in Cairo on practical steps to restore safeguards implementation. In November 2025, Araghchi said Iran was no longer enriching uranium. On November 30, 2025 the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution asking the Director General to report on implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions that were reimposed by the snapback, and said that "Iran must ... provide the agency without delay with precise information on nuclear material accountancy and safeguarded nuclear facilities in Iran, and grant the agency all access it requires to verify this information." Iran responded by declaring the Cairo agreement null and void. In December 2025, Grossi told an Austrian newspaper that IAEA inspectors remained in Iran but were unable to access damaged facilities in Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordo. On 28 September 2025, UN sanctions were officially reimposed on Iran. China and Russia rejected snapback sanctions. 2025 Iran-Israel war On June 13, 2025, Israel attacked Iran. According to the IAEA, Iran did not disclose "traces of uranium", which led to the conclusion that Iran might have developed nuclear weapons. The lack of support for the initial resolution complicated enforcement agreements. The Trump administration's inability to craft a new agreement with Iran has been viewed by some commentators as a major setback for U.S. foreign policy. According to the UN, Iran's nuclear programme was "exclusively peaceful", per the terms of the JCPOA, but inspectors later said they had been "unable to determine whether Iran's nuclear programme was exclusively peaceful". According to a June 2025 IAEA report, there had been no indication of a physical attack on the underground cascade hall containing part of the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Fordow and the main Fuel Enrichment Plant, but a power loss due to the attack might have caused the centrifuges there to malfunction. On June 21, 2025, the U.S. bombed three Iranian nuclear sites, Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, and claimed it had totally destroyed them, but according to Iranian news agencies, all three locations had been abandoned and equipment moved elsewhere. Damage to the deep underground Fordow site could not be confirmed, and no release of radioactive materials was reported. Iranian nuclear facilities are under IAEA routine inspection, and the atomic agency strongly discouraged military attacks on these facilities. ==See also==