Anti-corruption campaign Xi called for a crack down on corruption immediately after he ascended to power, starting an
anti-corruption campaign. In his inaugural speech as general secretary, Xi mentioned that fighting corruption was one of the toughest challenges for the party. A few months into his term, Xi outlined the
Eight-point Regulation, listing rules intended to curb corruption and waste during official party business; it aimed at stricter discipline on the conduct of officials. Xi vowed to root out "tigers and flies", that is, high-ranking officials and ordinary party functionaries. He also launched the
Party's Mass Line Education and Practice Activities, aiming CCP cadres to use
mass line and instill Party discipline. The campaign lasted from 2013 to 2014. Xi's anti-corruption campaign has led to the downfall of prominent incumbent and retired CCP officials, including members of the PSC. Xi initiated cases against former CMC vice chairmen
Xu Caihou and
Guo Boxiong, former PSC member and security chief
Zhou Yongkang and former CCP General Office director
Ling Jihua. Xi has overseen significant reforms of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), CCP's highest
internal control institution. He and CCDI Secretary
Wang Qishan further institutionalized CCDI's independence from the day-to-day operations of the CCP, improving its ability to function as a
bona fide control body. According to
The Wall Street Journal, anti-corruption punishment to officials at or above the vice ministerial level need approval from Xi. In 2017, the campaign led to the downfall of Chongqing Party Secretary and Politburo member
Sun Zhengcai. In March 2018, the
National Supervisory Commission was established as the highest state supervisory and anti-corruption authority in an effort to aid the CCDI. In January 2018, Xi launched a three-year
Special Campaign to Crack Down on Organized Crime and Eliminate Evil that lasted until 2020. After the special campaign exposed problems in the legal system, the CCP announced a campaign to
educate and rectify the political and legal teams in July 2020. Especially since 2023, Xi has also overseen significant anti-corruption efforts in the military, with some targets involving those that rose to prominence under his leadership. Those targeted included former defense ministers
Li Shangfu and
Wei Fenghe, CMC vice chairmen
He Weidong and
Zhang Youxia, and CMC member
Miao Hua. In addition, former Xinjiang Party Secretary and Politburo member
Ma Xingrui was put under investigation in 2026.
Bloomberg News estimated that as October 2025, at least 14 generals out of 79 appointed under Xi's leadership have been ousted. Xi has introduced stringent restrictions on
naked officials, CCP officials with spouses or children residing abroad, eventually culminating in a 2025 campaign to require cadres of vice-ministerial rank or above being required to either repatriate family members or resign from office.
Political developments Political observers have called Xi the most powerful Chinese leader since Chairman
Mao Zedong, especially since the ending of presidential two-term limits in 2018. Xi has departed from the CCP's previous
collective leadership practices. In the opinion of at least one political scientist, Xi "has surrounded himself with cadres he met while stationed on the coast, Fujian and
Shanghai and in Zhejiang." Observers have said that Xi has seriously diluted the influence of the once-dominant
Tuanpai, also called the Youth League Faction, which were CCP officials who rose through the Communist Youth League (CYLC). Xi has had a
cult of personality constructed around himself since entering office with books, cartoons, pop songs and dance routines honouring his rule. In March 2018, the
first session of the
13th National People's Congress passed
constitutional amendments including removal of term limits for the president and vice president, the creation of a National Supervisory Commission, as well as enhancing the central role of the CCP. Xi was reappointed as president, now without term limits, while Li Keqiang was reappointed premier. meeting the press, October 2022 In its sixth plenary session in November 2021, CCP adopted the
Resolution on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century, which evaluated the party's historical legacy from its
foundation in 1921 until its
100th anniversary in 2021. This was the third of historical resolution after ones adopted by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. In comparison with the other historical resolutions, Xi's one did not herald a major change in how the CCP evaluated its history. To accompany the historical resolution, the CCP promoted the terms
Two Establishments and
Two Upholds, calling the CCP to unite around and protect Xi's core status within the party. The
20th Party National Congress, held between 16 and 22 October 2022, has overseen amendments in the
CCP constitution, with the overall result of the Congress further strengthening Xi's power. Xi was subsequently re-elected as general secretary of the CCP and chairman of the CMC for a third term during the
first plenary session of the
20th Central Committee held on 23 October 2022, held immediately after the Party Congress. Xi's re-election made him the first party leader since Mao Zedong to be chosen for a third term. The new Politburo Standing Committee elected by the Central Committee was filled almost completely with people close to Xi, with four out of the seven members of the previous PSC stepping down. Xi was unanimously re-elected as the president and chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission on 10 March 2023 during the
first session of the
14th National People's Congress. At the same time, Xi ally
Li Qiang succeeded Li Keqiang as the Premier.
Media and censorship Since Xi became general secretary, censorship has stepped up. Xi has overseen the increased coordination and consolidation of censorship authorities, raising their efficiency, and under his leadership censorship practices have tightened. Xi has called on for more
positive energy at Chinese media, referring to the need for uplifting messages as opposed to critical or negative ones. At the
Symposium on News Reporting and Public Opinion in 2016, Xi stated that "
party and government-owned media must hold the family name of the party" and that the state media "must embody the party's will, safeguard the party's authority". Chairing the 2018 China Cyberspace Governance Conference, Xi committed to "fiercely crack down on criminal offenses including hacking, telecom fraud, and violation of citizens' privacy." Xi's administration has overseen more Internet restrictions imposed, and is described as being "stricter across the board" on speech than previous administrations. A law enacted in 2013 authorized a three-year prison term for bloggers who shared more than 500 times any content considered "defamatory". The State Internet Information Office summoned influential bloggers to a seminar to instruct them to avoid writing about politics, the CCP, or making statements contradicting official narratives. Many bloggers stopped writing about controversial topics, and
Weibo went into decline, with much of its readership shifting to
WeChat users speaking to limited social circles. It also launched
Operation Qinglang campaigns since 2016 to "clean up" the Chinese internet. China under Xi has taken a strong stand to control internet usage inside China, including
Google,
Facebook and
Wikipedia, advocating Internet censorship under the concept of
internet sovereignty. Likewise, the situation for users of Weibo has been described as a change from fearing one's account would be deleted, to fear of arrest. Under Xi's administration, China started enforcing an
Internet real-name system for online platforms, requiring them to collect users' real names, ID numbers, and other information when providing services.
Reforms In November 2013, at the conclusion of the
third plenum of the 18th Central Committee, the Communist Party adopted the
Decision on Several Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform, a far-reaching reform agenda that alluded to changes in both economic and social policy. Xi signaled at the plenum that he was consolidating control of the massive internal security organization that was formerly the domain of Zhou Yongkang. The
Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms—another
ad hoc policy coordination body led by Xi upgraded to a commission in 2018—was also formed to oversee the implementation of the reform agenda. Termed "comprehensive deepening reforms", they were said to be the most significant since Deng Xiaoping's 1992 Southern Tour. The plenum also announced economic reforms and resolved to abolish the
laogai system of "
re-education through labour", which was largely seen as a blot on China's human rights record. The system has faced significant criticism for years from domestic critics and foreign observers. in 2021, at the 100th anniversary of the CCP, Xi declared that China achieved its goal of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects. In January 2016, a
two-child policy replaced the
one-child policy, which was in turn was replaced with a
three-child policy in May 2021. In July 2021, all family size limits as well as penalties for exceeding them were removed. Since abandoning population control restrictions, China has pursued
pro-natalist policies in an attempt to boost the birth rate.
Political reforms Xi's administration taken a number of changes to the structure of the CCP and state bodies, especially in a large overhaul in 2018. These reforms have been characterized by the integration of CCP and state bodies. Beginning in 2013, the CCP under Xi has created a series of Central Leading Groups: supra-ministerial steering committees, designed to bypass existing institutions when making decisions, and ostensibly make policy-making a more efficient process. Xi was also believed to have diluted the authority of premier Li Keqiang, taking authority over the economy which has generally been considered to be the domain of the premier. February 2014 oversaw the creation of the
Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatization with Xi as its leader. The State Internet Information Office (SIIO), previously under the
State Council Information Office (SCIO), was transferred to the central leading group and renamed in English into the Cyberspace Administration of China. As part of managing the financial system, the
Financial Stability and Development Committee, a State Council body, was established in 2017. Chaired by vice premier
Liu He during its existence, the committee was disestablished by the newly established Central Financial Commission during the 2023 Party and state reforms. Xi has increased the role of the
Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission at the expense of the
State Council. 2018 has seen the
deepening the reform of the Party and state institutions. In that year, several
central leading groups including
reform, cyberspace affairs,
finance and economics, and
foreign affairs were upgraded to commissions. The powers of the Central Publicity Department was strengthened, which now oversaw the newly established
China Media Group (CMG). 2023 has seen further reforms to the CCP and state bureaucracy called the
plan on reforming Party and state institutions, which included the strengthening of Party control over the financial and technology domains. This included the creation of two CCP bodies for overseeing finance; the
Central Financial Commission (CFC), as well as the revival of the
Central Financial Work Commission (CFWC) that was previously dissolved in 2002. Several regulatory responsibilities were also transferred from the
People's Bank of China (PBC) to another regulatory body, while the PBC reopened offices around the country that were closed in a previous reorganization. In 2024, the CCP's role was strengthened further with the
Organic Law of the State Council amended to add a clause about following CCP ideology and policies.
Legal reforms The party under Xi announced a raft of
legal reforms at the fourth plenum held in the fall 2014, and he called for "
Chinese socialistic rule of law" immediately afterwards. The party aimed to reform the legal system, which had been perceived as ineffective at delivering justice and affected by corruption, local government interference and lack of constitutional oversight. The plenum, while emphasizing the absolute leadership of the party, also called for a greater role of the constitution in the affairs of state and a strengthening of the role of the National People's Congress Standing Committee in interpreting the constitution. It also called for more transparency in legal proceedings, more involvement of ordinary citizens in the legislative process, and an overall "professionalization" of the legal workforce. The party also planned to institute cross-jurisdictional circuit legal tribunals as well as giving provinces consolidated administrative oversight over lower level legal resources, which is intended to reduce local government involvement in legal proceedings. There have been several reforms to the court system under Xi, including transferring the authority over local court finance and personnel from local governments to the provincial-level, establishing a personnel quota system, emphasizing "lifetime accountability" for judges for their judicial decisions, and specification of case transferring procedures between various courts. In 2014, China started efforts to pass a unified
Civil Code, which was eventually adopted in 2020. In 2015, Xi's administration oversaw the establishment of two circuit courts under the Supreme People's Court, followed by four other circuit courts being established in 2016.
Hangzhou Internet Court was established as a court of special jurisdiction in 2017, followed by the establishment of Beijing Internet Court and Guangzhou Internet Court.
Shanghai Financial Court was established in 2018 as a specialized financial court. Under Xi, an increasing share of laws passed by the NPC explicitly affirmed the leadership of the CCP, with the share increasing from 4% in 2018 to nearly 70% in 2024.
Military reforms Since taking power in 2012, Xi has undertaken an overhaul of the
People's Liberation Army, including both political reform and its modernization.
Military-civil fusion has advanced under Xi. Xi has been active in his participation in military affairs, taking a direct hands-on approach to military reform. In addition to being the chairman of the CMC and leader of the
Central Leading Group for Military Reform founded in 2014 to oversee comprehensive military reforms, Xi has delivered numerous high-profile pronouncements vowing to clean up malfeasance and complacency in the military. Xi has repeatedly warned that the depoliticization of the PLA from the CCP would lead to a collapse similar to that of the Soviet Union. Xi held the New Gutian Conference in 2014, gathering China's top military officers, re-emphasizing the principle of "
the party has absolute control over the army" first established by Mao at the 1929
Gutian Congress. Xi's tenure saw an emphasis on the
chairman responsibility system, highlighting the CMC chairman's absolute leadership over the Central Military Commission and the military. Xi announced a reduction of 300,000 troops from the PLA in 2015, bringing its size to 2 million troops. Xi described this as a gesture of peace, while analysts such as Rory Medcalf have said that the cut was done to reduce costs as well as part of PLA's modernization. In November 2015, the Central Leading Group for Military Reform announced extensive reforms in the PLA called
Deepening National Defense and Military Reform. In 2016, Xi reduced the number of
theater commands of the PLA from seven to five. He has also abolished the four autonomous general departments of the PLA, replacing them with 15 agencies directly reporting to the CMC. and the
Joint Logistics Support Force. PLA Second Artillery Corps was also upgraded to the
PLA Rocket Force. In March 2016, the CMC announced the
abolishment of paid services by the PLA and the
People's Armed Police (PAP) by 2019, meaning activities like military-run hospitals and hotels open to the public. On 21 April 2016, Xi was named
commander-in-chief of the country's new CMC
Joint Operations Command Center. In 2018, the PAP was placed under the sole control of the CMC; the PAP was previously under the joint command of the CMC and the State Council through the Ministry of Public Security. The PLA went through further extensive reforms in 2024; the Strategic Support Force was dissolved and the
Aerospace Force, the
Cyberspace Force and the
Information Support Force was established as arms of the PLA, joining the Joint Logistics Support Force. Under Xi,
China's official military budget has more than doubled, reaching a record $282 billion in 2026. Though predating Xi, his administration has taken a more assertive stance towards maritime affairs, and has boosted CCP control over the maritime security forces. The
PLA Navy has grown rapidly under Xi, with China adding more warships, submarines, support ships and major amphibious vessels during certain years than the United Kingdom or the United States did. Aircraft carriers
Shandong and
Fujian entered into service under Xi in 2019 and 2025 respectively. In 2017, China established the navy's first
overseas base in Djibouti. Xi has also undertaken an expansion of China's nuclear arsenal, with him calling China to "establish a strong system of strategic deterrence." The
Federation of American Scientists (FAS) has estimated China's total nuclear arsenal to be 600 in 2025, with the
US Department of Defense estimating that China's arsenal could reach 1,000 by 2030.
Economy and technology The
Decision of the third plenary session of the 13th Central Committee announced "market forces" would begin to play a "decisive" role in allocating resources. This meant that the state would gradually reduce its involvement in the distribution of capital, and restructure
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to allow further competition, potentially by attracting foreign and private sector players in industries previously highly regulated. This policy aimed to address the bloated state sector that had unduly profited from re-structuring by purchasing assets at below-market prices, assets no longer being used productively. However, by 2017, Xi's promise of economic reforms was said to have stalled by external observers. China's economy has grown under Xi, more than doubling from CN¥54.8 trillion (US$8.7 trillion) in 2012 to CN¥140.2 trillion (US$20.1 trillion) in 2024, while China's nominal GDP per capita increased from CN¥40,431 (US$6,408) in 2012 to CN¥99,665 (US$14,318) in 2025, surpassing the world average in 2021, though growth has slowed from 7.9% in 2012 to 5% in 2024. Xi has increased state control over the economy, voicing support for SOEs, CCP control of SOEs has increased, while limited steps towards market liberalization, such as increasing mixed ownership of SOEs were undertaken. Under Xi, an increasing number of private companies have established Party branches. From 2012 to 2022, the share of the market value of private sector firms in China's top listed companies increased from 10% to over 40%. He has overseen the relaxation of restrictions on
foreign direct investment (FDI) and increased cross-border holdings of stocks and bonds. Xi launched the
Shanghai Free-Trade Zone in 2013. In 2018, Xi announced the
Shanghai Stock Exchange STAR Market, which opened in 2019. He also proposed the establishment of the
Hainan Free Trade Port. In 2020,
The Wall Street Journal reported that Xi ordered a halt to
Ant Group's
initial public offering (IPO), in reaction to its founder
Jack Ma criticizing government regulation in finance. Under Xi,
government guidance funds, public-private investment funds set up by or for government bodies, have raised more than $900 billion for early funding to companies that work in sectors the government deems as strategic. Xi's administration has overseen a decrease in offshore IPOs by Chinese companies, with most Chinese IPOs taking place either in Shanghai or Shenzhen , and has increasingly directed funding to IPOs of companies that works in sectors it deems as strategic, including
electric vehicles,
biotechnology,
renewable energy,
artificial intelligence,
semiconductors and other high-technology manufacturing. He has stated China has abandoned a growth-at-all-costs strategy which Xi refers to as "GDP heroism". Instead, Xi said other social issues such as environmental protection are important. Xi has made eradicating extreme poverty through
targeted poverty alleviation a key goal. In 2015, he launched the
battle against poverty. The campaign concluded by 2021, when Xi declared a "complete victory" over extreme poverty, saying nearly 100 million have been lifted out of poverty under his tenure, though some experts said China's
poverty threshold was lower than that of the
World Bank. In 2020, premier Li Keqiang, citing the
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) said that China still had 600 million people living with less than 1000 yuan ($140) a month, although
The Economist said the methodology NBS used was flawed. When Xi took office in 2012, 58% of people in China were living on less than $8.30 per day, in 2022 this had fallen to 22%. In 2017, Xi stated the
primary contradiction of China's conditions in the new era as "the contradiction between the people's ever-growing need for a better life and unbalanced and inadequate development." In this context, "unbalanced" refers to rural-urban inequalities, regional inequalities, inequalities between the rich and poor, and structural imbalances in the economy.
Strategy for Integrated Development of the Yangtze River Delta and the
Guangdong–Hong Kong–Macao Greater Bay Area. Xi supports
dual circulation, a reorientation of the economy towards domestic consumption while remaining open to foreign trade and investment. Xi has prioritised boosting
productivity. Xi has attempted to reform the property sector to combat the steep increase in prices and cut the economy's dependence on it. In the 19th CCP National Congress, Xi declared "
houses are for living, not for speculation." In 2020, Xi's government formulated the "
three red lines" policy that aimed to deleverage the heavily indebted property sector. Xi has supported a
property tax, for which he has faced resistance from members of the CCP. His administration pursued a debt-deleveraging campaign, seeking to slow and cut the unsustainable amount of debt China has accrued during its growth. Since 2021, China has faced a
property sector crisis, with decreasing house prices, shrinking of the real estate sector and bankruptcies of many property developers, partially as a result of Xi's efforts to decrease the sector's role in the Chinese economy. Xi has heavily emphasized the role of advanced manufacturing and technology development to drive China's future economic growth. Since shortly after taking office as General Secretary, Xi emphasised the use of industrial policy to increase domestic innovation and reduce reliance on foreign technology. Xi's administration has promoted
Made in China 2025 plan that aims to make China self-reliant in key technologies; although publicly China de-emphasised this plan due to the outbreak of a
China–United States trade war, majority of its goals were considered achieved by 2024. Since the outbreak of the trade war in 2018, Xi has further pushed calls for "self-reliance", especially on technology. China's domestic spending on R&D has significantly increased, surpassing the European Union (EU) and reaching a record $564 billion in 2020. In 2023, Xi put forward
new productive forces, this refers to a new form of productive forces derived from continuous sci-tech breakthroughs and innovation that drive strategic emerging and future industries in a more intelligent
information era. Under Xi, China made rapid advances in key technological areas, becoming a world leader in tech such as
electric vehicles,
lithium batteries and solar panels. Common prosperity has been used as the justification for
large-scale crackdowns and regulations towards the perceived "excesses" of several sectors, most prominently tech and tutoring industries. Actions taken include fining large tech companies and passing laws such as the
Data Security Law. China introduced severe restrictions on private tutoring in the name of promoting social equality, effectively eliminating the private education industry and enacting the
Double Reduction Policy. There have been other cultural regulations including restrictions on minors playing video games and crackdowns on celebrity culture. The push for common prosperity has also included salary and bonus cuts, especially across the financial sector, as well as crackdowns on wealth flaunting.
Foreign policy , Russian President
Vladimir Putin and Pakistani Prime Minister
Shehbaz Sharif during the
2025 China Victory Day Parade in Hamburg. Xi has taken a harder line on security issues as well as foreign affairs, projecting a more
nationalistic and assertive China on the world stage. His political program calls for a China more united and confident of its own value system and political structure. Foreign analysts and observers have frequently said that Xi's main foreign policy objective is to restore China's position on the global stage as a
great power. Xi advocates "baseline thinking" in China's foreign policy: setting explicit red lines that other countries must not cross. In the Chinese perspective, these tough stances on baseline issues reduce strategic uncertainty, preventing other nations from misjudging China's positions or underestimating China's resolve in asserting what it perceives to be in its national interest. Xi's foreign policy thoughts are collectively known as
Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy. Xi has promoted
major-country diplomacy, stating that China is already a "big power" and breaking away from previous Chinese leaders who had a more precautious diplomacy. Diplomats under Xi have adopted a hawkish foreign policy posture called "
wolf warrior diplomacy" starting from the late 2010s; this form of diplomacy peaked in the early 2020s and declined afterwards. October 2020, he said that "
the East is rising and the West is declining", saying that the power of the Western world was in decline as exemplified by their COVID-19 response, and that China was entering a period of opportunity because of this. Xi has frequently alluded to
community with a shared future for mankind, which Chinese diplomats have said does not imply an intention to change the international order, but which foreign observers say China wants a new order that puts it more at the centre. During the Xi administration, China seeks to shape international norms and rules in emerging policy areas where China has an advantage as an early participant. Xi describes such areas as "new frontiers", and they include policy areas such as space, deep sea, polar regions, the Internet, nuclear safety, anticorruption, and climate change. Xi has put an emphasis on increasing China's "international discourse power" () to create a more favorable global opinion of China in the world. In this pursuit, Xi has emphasised the need to "
tell China's stories well", meaning expanding China's external propaganda () and communications. Xi has expanded the focus and scope of the
united front, which aims to consolidate support for CCP in non-CCP elements both inside and outside China, and has accordingly expanded the United Front Work Department. In 2013, Xi announced the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a global infrastructure and economic development project. Encompassing much of Africa and Eurasia, the BRI became central to Chinese foreign policy and is the largest infrastructure investment by a great power since the Marshall Plan. In 2015, Xi announced the founding of the
Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, seen as a competitor to other multilateral banks such as the
World Bank and the
Asia Development Bank. Xi has unveiled the
Global Development Initiative (GDI), the
Global Security Initiative (GSI), the
Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI), and the
Global Governance Initiative (GGI) in 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2025 respectively, aiming to increase China's influence in the international order. Under Xi, China has, along with Russia, also focused on increasing relations with the
Global South in order to blunt the effect of
international sanctions.
Africa During Xi's administration, China has maintained cordial relationships with each Africa government except
Eswatini, which recognizes Taiwan but not the PRC. Under Xi, China has cut back lending to Africa after fears that African countries could not repay their debts to China. Xi has also promised that China would write off debts of some African countries. In 2025, China announced that it would remove nearly all import tariffs on African countries. at the
16th BRICS Summit in
Kazan, Russia, October 2024
Asia Under Xi, China initially took a more critical stance on North Korea due to
its nuclear tests. However, starting in 2018, the relations started to improve due to
meetings between Xi and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Xi has initially improved relationships with South Korea, Starting in 2017, China's relationship with South Korea soured over the
Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD), a missile defense system,
deployment of the latter, but improved after South Korea halted further deployments the THAAD. China–Japan relations have initially soured under Xi's administration; the most thorny issue between the two countries remains the dispute over the
Senkaku Islands, which China calls Diaoyu. However, the relations later started to improve, though
deteriorated in 2025 after comments made by Prime Minister
Sanae Takaichi regarding a potential defense of
Taiwan. Since Xi came to power, China has been rapidly building and militarizing islands in the South China Sea, a decision
Study Times of the
Central Party School said was personally taken by Xi. Relations between China and India had ups and downs under Xi. The two countries had a
standoff in Depsang in 2013, and
again had a standoff over a Chinese construction of a road in
Doklam, a territory both claimed by
Bhutan, India's ally, and China, in 2017. The most serious crisis in the relationship came when the two countries had a
deadly clash in 2020 at the
Line of Actual Control, leaving some soldiers dead. The relationship later improved starting from 2024. While China has historically been wary of getting closer to the
Middle East countries, Xi has changed this approach, getting closer to both Iran and Saudi Arabia. and European Commission President
Ursula von der Leyen in Beijing, China, April 2023
Europe China's efforts under Xi has been for the European Union (EU) to stay in a neutral position in their contest with the U.S. China and the EU announced the
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) in 2020, although the deal was later frozen due to mutual sanctions over Xinjiang. Xi has cultivated
stronger relations with Russia, particularly in the wake of the
Ukraine crisis of 2014. During the
Russo-Ukrainian war, Xi expressed opposition to
sanctions against Russia and asserted China's
support for Russia on issues of sovereignty and security, but also said China is committed to respecting "the territorial integrity of all countries", while China has cast itself as a neutral party.
United States at the
APEC summit in
Busan, South Korea, October 2025 Xi has called
China–United States relations in the contemporary world a "new type of great-power relations", a phrase the
Obama administration had been reluctant to embrace. Xi has indirectly spoken out critically on the U.S. "strategic pivot" to Asia. Relations with the U.S. soured after
Donald Trump became president in 2017. Since 2018, U.S. and China have been engaged in an escalating
trade war. In 2020, the relations further deteriorated due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
National security Xi has devoted a large amount of work towards national security, calling for the establishment of a
holistic national security concept that encompasses "all aspects of the work of the party and the country." He introduced the concept in 2014, which he defined as taking "the security of the people as compass, political security as its roots, economic security as its pillar, military security and cultural security as its protections, and that relies on the promotion of international security." A new
National Security Commission was formed in 2014 with Xi at its helm, centralizing national security decision-making. Since its creation by Xi, the National Security Commission has established local security committees, focusing on dissent. Believing it to be an important foundation of national security, Xi's administration has prioritized efforts to establish
food security by pushing for as much as self-sufficiency in food as possible, while launching the
Clean Plate campaign in 2013 and 2020 to combat food waste. He has additionally given priority to energy security; China is the world's largest energy consumer, having consumed more energy than the United States, the European Union and Japan combined in 2024. China has made heavy investments in its energy grid and designed policies to lessen dependence on foreign energy imports by investing in renewable energy as well as
coal. Xi has championed the
Fengqiao experience, calling on officials to contain and resolve conflicts at the grassroots level without needing to involve higher legal bodies. In the name of national security, Xi's government has passed numerous laws including the
Counterespionage Law in 2014, the
National Security Law and the
Counterterrorism Law in 2015, the
Cybersecurity Law and the
Law on Administration of Foreign NGOs' Activities within China in 2016, the
National Intelligence Law in 2017, and the
Data Security Law in 2021. Under Xi,
China's mass surveillance network has dramatically grown, with comprehensive profiles being built for each citizen.
Grid-style social management, which involves subdividing China's counties into smaller zones, and assigning each zone to a person that reports all activity to the local government on a regular basis, has risen in prominence under Xi. Public security spending has increased significantly under Xi, reaching $210 billion in 2020, more than double from the decade prior; this was accompanied by a significant decrease in crime. Xi's leadership has also seen a more prominent role taken by the
Ministry of State Security, which expanded its public profile.
Hong Kong throw eggs at Xi Jinping's portrait on
National Day.During his leadership, Xi has supported and pursued a greater political and economic integration of
Hong Kong to mainland China, including through projects such as the
Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge. He has pushed for the
Greater Bay Area project, which aims to integrate Hong Kong, Macau, and nine other cities in Guangdong. Many of the views held by the central government and eventually implemented in Hong Kong were outlined in a white paper published by the State Council in 2014 named ''
The Practice of the 'One Country, Two Systems' Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region'', which outlined that the scope of Hong Kong's autonomy is not inherent, but solely determined by the Central Authorities’ delegation of power. Under Xi, the Chinese government also declared the
Sino-British Joint Declaration to be legally void. and the eventual rejection of the reform bill in the Legislative Council due to a walk-out by the
pro-Beijing camp to delay to vote. In the 2017 chief executive election,
Carrie Lam was victorious, reportedly with the endorsement of the CCP Politburo. Xi supported the
Hong Kong Government and Carrie Lam against the protesters in the
2019–2020 Hong Kong protests, which broke out after a
proposed bill that would allow extraditions to mainland China. He has defended the
Hong Kong Police Force's use of force, saying that "We sternly support the Hong Kong police to take forceful actions in enforcing the law, and the Hong Kong judiciary to punish in accordance with the law those who have committed violent crimes." While
visiting Macau on 20 December 2019 as part of the 20th anniversary of its return to China, Xi warned of foreign forces interfering in Hong Kong and
Macau, while also hinting that Macau could be a model for Hong Kong to follow. In 2020, the NPCSC passed a
national security law in Hong Kong that dramatically expanded government clampdown over the opposition in the city; amongst the measures were the dramatic restriction on political opposition and the creation of the
Office for Safeguarding National Security outside Hong Kong jurisdiction to oversee the enforcement of the law. In his 2022 visit, he swore in
John Lee Ka-chiu as chief executive, a former police officer that was backed by the Chinese government to expand control over the city.
Taiwan in November 2015 in their capacity as the leader of mainland China and Taiwan respectively. In 2013, Xi coined the slogan "
both sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family" regarding
mainland China and
Taiwan.
Wang Yu-chi, Minister of Taiwan's
Mainland Affairs Council, spoke with
Zhang Zhijun, Director of the
Taiwan Affairs Office,
met in 2014, making the first official, high-level, government-to-government contact between the two sides since 1949. In November 2015, Xi met with Taiwanese president
Ma Ying-jeou, which marked the first time the political leaders of both sides of the
Taiwan Strait have met since the end of the
Chinese Civil War in mainland China in 1950. However, the relations started deteriorating after
Tsai Ing-wen of the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the
presidential elections in 2016. In the 19th Party Congress held in 2017, Xi reaffirmed six of the nine principles that had been affirmed continuously since the 16th Party Congress in 2002, with the notable exception of "Placing hopes on the
Taiwan people as a force to help bring about
unification". According to the
Brookings Institution, Xi used stronger language on potential
Taiwan independence than his predecessors towards previous DPP governments in Taiwan. Xi said that "we will never allow any person, any organisation, or any political party to split any part of the Chinese territory from China at any time at any form." Xi stated that people from Taiwan could receive national treatment in pursuing careers on the mainland and in February 2018 the PRC government announced 31 preferential policies for Taiwan people on matters of industry, finance, taxation, land use, employment, education, and health care. In January 2019, Xi gave a speech commemorating the 40th anniversary of the
Message to Compatriots in Taiwan, outlining
five points proposing unification under the
one country, two systems formula. He called on Taiwan to reject formal independence from China, saying: "We make
no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary means." Those options, he said, could be used against "external interference". Xi also said that they "are willing to create broad space for peaceful reunification, but will leave no room for any form of separatist activities." President Tsai responded to the speech by saying Taiwan would not accept a one country, two systems arrangement with the mainland, while stressing the need for all cross-strait negotiations to be on a government-to-government basis. Since 2018, the People's Liberation Army has conducted military drills around Taiwan with increasing frequency to pressure the DPP-led government. In 2025, China established the "
Commemoration Day of Taiwan's Restoration", a decision which Taiwan Affairs Office director
Song Tao said was done "personally" by Xi.
Human rights According to the
Human Rights Watch, Xi has "started a broad and sustained offensive on human rights" since he became leader in 2012. The HRW also said that repression in China is "at its worst level since the Tiananmen Square massacre." Since taking power, Xi has cracked down on grassroots activism, with hundreds being detained. He presided over the
709 crackdown on 9 July 2015, which saw more than 200 lawyers, legal assistants and human rights activists being detained. His term has seen the arrest and imprisonment of activists such as
Xu Zhiyong, as well as numerous others who identified with the
New Citizens' Movement. Prominent legal activist
Pu Zhiqiang of the
Weiquan movement was also arrested and detained. According to activists, "Xi is waging the most severe systematic
suppression of Christianity in the country since religious freedom was written into the Chinese constitution in 1982," and according to pastors and a group that monitors religion in China, has involved "destroying crosses, burning bibles, shutting churches and ordering followers to sign papers renouncing their faith." Under Xi, the CCP has embraced assimilationist policies towards ethnic minorities, scaling back
affirmative action in the country by 2019, and scrapping a wording in October 2021 that guaranteed the rights of minority children to be educated in their native language, replacing it with one that emphasized teaching the national language. In 2014, Xi called to foster a
sense of community for the Chinese nation among ethnic minorities. In 2020,
Chen Xiaojiang was appointed as head of the
National Ethnic Affairs Commission, the first Han Chinese head of the body since 1954. On 24 June 2022,
Pan Yue, another Han Chinese, became the head of the commission, with him reportedly holding assimilationist policies toward ethnic minorities. Xi outlined his official views relations between the majority Han Chinese and ethnic minorities by saying "[n]either
Han chauvinism nor
local ethnic chauvinism is conducive to the development of a community for the
Chinese nation." Xi's policies toward ethnic minorities were codified in the
Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress in 2026.
Xinjiang in
Ürümqi, August 2018 There were several terrorist attacks in
Xinjiang in 2013 and 2014; an
attack in Ürümqi in April 2014 occurred just after the conclusion of a visit by Xi to Xinjiang. Following these attacks, CCP leaders held a secret meeting to find a solution, leading to Xi to launch the
Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism in 2014, which involved mass detention, and surveillance of ethnic
Uyghurs there. Human rights groups and former inmates have described the camps as "concentration camps", where Uyghurs and other minorities have been forcibly assimilated into China's majority
ethnic Han society. This program has been called a
genocide by some observers, while
a report by the
UN Human Rights Office said they may amount to
crimes against humanity.
Internal Chinese government documents leaked to the press in November 2019 showed that Xi personally ordered a security crackdown in Xinjiang, saying that the party must show "absolutely no mercy" and that officials use all the "weapons of the
people's democratic dictatorship" to suppress those "infected with the virus of extremism." The papers also showed that Xi repeatedly discussed about
Islamic extremism in his speeches, likening it to a "virus" or a "drug" that could be only addressed by "a period of painful, interventionary treatment." In a July 2022 visit to Xinjiang, Xi urged local officials to always listen to the citizens' voices and to improve efforts in preserving ethnic minority culture. In a visit to Xinjiang the following year, Xi stated that the region was "no longer a remote area" and should open up more for
tourism to attract domestic and foreign visitors.
COVID-19 pandemic On 20 January 2020, Xi commented for the first time on the emerging
COVID-19 pandemic in Wuhan, and ordered "efforts to curb the spread" of the virus. He gave premier Li Keqiang some responsibility over the COVID-19 response, in what has been suggested by
The Wall Street Journal was an attempt to potentially insulate himself from criticism if the response failed. The government initially responded to the pandemic with a lockdown and censorship, with the initial response causing widespread backlash within China. He met with
Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the director-general of the World Health Organization (WHO), on 28 January.
Der Spiegel reported that in January 2020 Xi pressured Tedros Adhanom to hold off on issuing a
global warning about the outbreak of COVID-19 and hold back information on human-to-human transmission of the virus, allegations denied by the WHO. On 5 February, Xi met with Cambodian prime minister
Hun Sen in Beijing, the first foreign leader allowed into China since the outbreak. with Xi in March 2019 After getting the outbreak in Wuhan under control, Xi has favoured what has officially been termed "dynamic
zero-COVID policy" that aims to control and suppress the virus as much as possible within the country's borders. This has involved local lockdowns and mass-testing. While initially credited for China's suppression of the COVID-19 outbreak, the policy was later criticized by foreign and some domestic observers for being out of touch with the rest of the world and taking a heavy toll on the economy. Conversely, Xi has said that the policy was designed to protect people's life safety. On 23 July 2022, the
National Health Commission reported that Xi and other top leaders have taken the local COVID-19 vaccines. At the 20th CCP Congress, Xi confirmed the continuation of the zero-COVID policy, stating he would "unswervingly" carry out "dynamic zero-COVID" and promising to "resolutely win the battle", though China started a limited easing of the policies in the following weeks. In November 2022,
protests broke out against China's COVID-19 policies, with a
fire in a high-rise apartment building in Ürümqi being the trigger. The protests were held in multiple major cities, with some of the protesters demanding the end of Xi's and the CCP's rule. On 7 December 2022, China announced large-scale changes to its COVID-19 policy, including allowing quarantine at home for mild infections, reducing of
PCR testing, and decreasing the power of local officials to implement lockdowns, effectively ending the zero-COVID policy.
Environmental policy Xi identifies environmental protection as one of China's five major priorities for national progress. Xi has popularized a metaphor of "two mountains" to emphasize the importance of environmental protection. Xi mentioned the link between the COVID-19 pandemic and nature destruction as one of the reasons for the decision, saying that "Humankind can no longer afford to ignore the repeated warnings of nature." On 27 September, Chinese scientists presented a detailed plan how to achieve the target. In September 2021, Xi announced that China will not build "coal-fired power projects abroad", which was said to be potentially "pivotal" in reducing emissions. The Belt and Road Initiative did not include financing such projects already in the first half of 2021. Xi did not attend
COP26 personally. However, a Chinese delegation led by climate change envoy
Xie Zhenhua did attend. During the conference, the United States and China agreed on a framework to reduce
GHG emission by co-operating on different measures.
Governance style Known as a very secretive leader, little is known publicly about how Xi makes political decisions, or how he came to power. Xi's speeches generally get released months or years after they are made.
The Wall Street Journal reported that Xi prefers micromanaging in governance, in contrast to previous leaders such as
Hu Jintao who left details of major policies to lower-ranking officials. Chinese state media Xinhua News Agency said that Xi "personally reviews every draft of major policy documents" and "all reports submitted to him, no matter how late in the evening, were returned with instructions the following morning." With regard to behavior of Communist Party members, Xi emphasizes the "Two Musts" (members must not be arrogant or rash and must keep their hard-working spirit) and the "Six Nos" (members must say no to formalism, bureaucracy, gift-giving, luxurious birthday celebrations, hedonism, and extravagance). Xi called for officials to practice
self-criticism which, according to observers, is in order to appear less corrupt and more popular among the people. ==Political positions==