The phrase "new world order" as used to herald in the post-Cold War era had no developed or substantive definition. There appear to have been three distinct periods in which it was progressively redefined, first by the Soviets and later by the United States before the Malta Conference and again after
George H. W. Bush's speech of September 11, 1990. • At first, the new world order dealt almost exclusively with
nuclear disarmament and security arrangements.
Mikhail Gorbachev would then expand the phrase to include
United Nations strengthening and
great power cooperation on a range of
North–South economic, and security problems. Implications for
NATO, the
Warsaw Pact, and
European integration were subsequently included. • The
Malta Conference collected these various expectations and they were fleshed out in more detail by the press.
German reunification,
human rights and the
polarity of the
international system were then included. • The
Gulf War crisis refocused the term on
superpower cooperation and regional crises. Economic North–South problems, the integration of the Soviets into the international system and the changes in economic and military polarity received greater attention.
Mikhail Gorbachev's formulation The first press reference to the phrase came from Russo-Indian talks on November 21, 1988.
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi used the term in reference to the commitments made by the
Soviet Union through the
Declaration of Delhi of two years previous. The new world order which he describes is characterized by "
non-violence and the principles of peaceful coexistence". He also includes the possibility of a sustained peace, an alternative to the nuclear
balance of terror, dismantling of
nuclear weapons systems, significant cuts in strategic arms and eventually a general and complete disarmament. Three days later, a
Guardian article quotes
NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner as saying that the Soviets have come close to accepting NATO's doctrine of military stability based on a mix of nuclear as well as
conventional arms. In his opinion, this would spur the creation of "a new security framework" and a move towards "a new world order". However, the principal statement creating the new world order concept came from
Mikhail Gorbachev's December 7, 1988 speech to the United Nations General Assembly. His formulation included an extensive list of ideas in creating a new order. He advocated strengthening the central role of the United Nations and the active involvement of all members—the Cold War had prevented the United Nations and its Security Council from performing their roles as initially envisioned. The de-
ideologizing of relations among states was the mechanism through which this new level of cooperation could be achieved. Concurrently, Gorbachev recognized only one world economy—essentially an end to
economic blocs. Furthermore, he advocated Soviet entry into several important international organizations, such as the
CSCE and
International Court of Justice. Reinvigoration of the
United Nations peacekeeping role and recognition that superpower cooperation can and will lead to the resolution of regional conflicts was especially key in his conception of cooperation. He argued that the use of force or the threat of the use of force was no longer legitimate and that the strong must demonstrate restraint toward the weak. As the major powers of the world, he foresaw the United States, the Soviet Union, Europe, India, China, Japan and Brazil. He asked for cooperation on
environmental protection, on
debt relief for
developing countries, on disarmament of nuclear weapons, on preservation of the
ABM treaty and on a convention for the elimination of
chemical weapons. At the same time, he promised the significant withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe and Asia as well as an end to the jamming of
Radio Liberty. Gorbachev described a phenomenon that could be described as a global political awakening: In the press, Gorbachev was compared to
Woodrow Wilson giving the Fourteen Points, to
Franklin D. Roosevelt and
Winston Churchill promulgating the
Atlantic Charter and to
George Marshall and
Harry S. Truman building the
Western Alliance. While visionary, his speech was to be approached with caution as he was seen as attempting a fundamental redefinition of international relationships, on economic and environmental levels. His support "for independence, democracy and social justice" was highlighted, but the principle message taken from his speech was that of a new world order based on
pluralism, tolerance and cooperation. A month later,
Time Magazine ran a longer analysis of the speech and its possible implications. The promises of a new world order based on the forswearing of military use of force was viewed partially as a threat, which might "lure the West toward complacency" and "woo Western Europe into neutered
neutralism". However, the more overriding threat was that the
West did not yet have any imaginative response to Gorbachev—leaving the Soviets with the moral initiative and solidifying Gorbachev's place as "the most popular world leader in much of
Western Europe". The article noted as important his de-ideologized stance, willingness to give up use of force, commitment to troop cuts in Eastern Europe (accelerating political change there) and compliance with the ABM treaty. According to the article, the new world order seemed to imply shifting of resources from military to domestic needs; a world community of states based on the
rule of law; a dwindling of security alliances like NATO and the Warsaw Pact; and an inevitable move toward European integration. The author of the
Time article felt that
George H. W. Bush should counter Gorbachev's "
common home" rhetoric toward the Europeans with the idea of "common ideals", turning an alliance of necessity into one of shared values. Gorbachev's repudiation of
expansionism leaves the United States in a good position, no longer having to support
anti-communist dictators and able to pursue better goals such as the environment;
nonproliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; reducing
famine and poverty; and resolving regional conflicts. In
A World Transformed, Bush and
Brent Scowcroft's similarly concern about losing leadership to Gorbachev is noted and they worry that the Europeans might stop following the U.S. if it appears to drag its feet. As Europe passed into the new year, the implications of the new world order for the
European Community surfaced. The European Community was seen as the vehicle for integrating East and West in such a manner that they could "pool their resources and defend their specific interests in dealings with those superpowers on something more like equal terms". It would be less exclusively tied to the U.S. and stretch "from
Brest to
Brest-Litovsk, or at least from
Dublin to
Lublin". By July 1989, newspapers were still criticizing Bush for his lack of response to Gorbachev's proposals. Bush visited Europe, but "left undefined for those on both sides of the
Iron Curtain his vision for the new world order", leading commentators to view the U.S. as over-cautious and reactive, rather than pursuing long-range strategic goals.
Malta Conference In
A World Transformed, Bush and Scowcroft detail their crafting of a strategy aimed at flooding Gorbachev with proposals at the
Malta Conference to catch him off guard, preventing the U.S. from coming out of the summit on the defensive. The Malta Conference on December 2–3, 1989 reinvigorated discussion of the new world order. Various new concepts arose in the press as elements on the new order. Commentators expected the replacement of containment with superpower cooperation. This cooperation might then tackle problems such as reducing armaments and troop deployments, settling regional disputes, stimulating economic growth, lessening East–West trade restrictions, the inclusion of the Soviets in international economic institutions and protecting the environment. Pursuant to superpower cooperation, a new role for NATO was forecast, with the organization perhaps changing into a forum for negotiation and treaty verification, or even a wholesale dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact following the resurrection of the four-power framework from World War II (i.e. the United States, United Kingdom, France and Russia). However, continued U.S. military presence in Europe was expected to help contain "historic antagonisms", thus making possible a
new European order. In Europe, German reunification was seen as part of the new order. However,
Strobe Talbott saw it as more of a brake on the new era and believed Malta to be a holding action on part of the superpowers designed to forestall the "new world order" because of the German question. Political change in Eastern Europe also arose on the agenda. The Eastern Europeans believed that the new world order did not signify superpower leadership, but that superpower dominance was coming to an end. In general, the new security structure arising from superpower cooperation seemed to indicate to observers that the new world order would be based on the principles of political liberty, self-determination and non-intervention. This would mean an end to the sponsoring of military conflicts in third countries, restrictions on global arms sales, and greater engagement in the
Middle East (especially regarding
Syria,
Palestine and
Israel). The U.S. might use this opportunity to more emphatically promote
human rights in China and
South Africa. A
New York Times editorial was the first to assert that at stake in the collective response to Saddam was "nothing less than the new world order which Bush and other leaders struggle to shape". In
A World Transformed, Scowcroft notes that Bush even offered to have Soviet troops amongst the coalition forces liberating Kuwait. Bush places the fate of the new world order on the ability of the U.S. and the Soviet Union to respond to Hussein's aggression. The idea that the Persian Gulf War would usher in the new world order began to take shape. Bush notes that the "premise [was] that the United States henceforth would be obligated to lead the world community to an unprecedented degree, as demonstrated by the
Iraqi crisis, and that we should attempt to pursue our
national interests, wherever possible, within a framework of concert with our friends and the
international community". On March 6, 1991, President Bush addressed
Congress in a speech often cited as the Bush administration's principal policy statement on the new world order in the Middle East following the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Critics held that Bush and Baker remained too vague about what exactly the order entailed:
The New York Times observed that the
American left was calling the new world order a "rationalization for imperial ambitions" in the Middle East while the
right rejected new security arrangements altogether and fulminated about any possibility of United Nations revival.
Pat Buchanan predicted that the Persian Gulf War would in fact be the demise of the new world order, the concept of United Nations peacekeeping and the U.S.'s role as global policeman. The
Los Angeles Times reported that the speech signified more than just the rhetoric about superpower cooperation. In fact, the deeper reality of the new world order was the U.S.' emergence "as the single greatest power in a multipolar world". Moscow was crippled by internal problems and thus unable to project power abroad. While hampered by economic malaise, the U.S. was militarily unconstrained for the first time since the end of World War II. Militarily, it was now a unipolar world as illustrated by the Persian Gulf crisis. While diplomatic rhetoric stressed a U.S.-Soviet partnership, the U.S. was deploying troops to
Saudi Arabia (a mere 700 miles from the Soviet frontier) and was preparing for war against a former Soviet
client state. Further, U.S. authority over the Soviets was displayed in 1. The unification of Germany, withdrawal of Soviet forces, and almost open appeal to Washington for aid in managing the Soviet transition to democracy; 2. Withdrawal of Soviet support for Third World clients; and 3) Soviets seeking economic aid through membership in Western international economic and trade communities. The speech was indeed pivotal but the meaning hidden. A pivotal interpretation of the speech came the same month a week later on September 18, 1990.
Charles Krauthammer then delivered a lecture in Washington in which he introduced the idea of American
unipolarity. By the fall 1990, his essay was published in
Foreign Affairs titled "The Unipolar Moment". It had little to do with Kuwait. The main point was the following: Meanwhile, some pundits claimed that the new world order is all about Iraq. Krauthammer was puzzled: The new world order has nothing at all to do with Iraq. It is the direct result of the collapse of the Soviet empire. The end of the Cold War changed the world order. The Gulf War simply revealed it. Such a shift of focus for Krauthammer could only be an attempt to deny the fact of unipolarity. Already in 1991, Krauthammer recognized a unipolar
denialism that would characterize the prevailing view ever since: It is hardly news to say that we have entered a period of Pax Americana and are living in a unipolar world. "Why deny it?" Besides denialism, Krauthammer mentioned a phenomenon of
declinism ever prophesied for the United States and drew another conclusion which aged well: "If the Roman empire had declined at this rate, you'd be reading this column in Latin." The same year, by contrast,
Lawrence Freedman argued that a "unipolar" world is now taken seriously: Washington's capacity to exert overwhelming military power and leadership over a multinational coalition provides the "basis for a
Pax Americana". Indeed, one of the problems with Bush's phrase was that "a call for 'order' from Washington chills practically everyone else, because it sounds suspiciously like a
Pax Americana". The unipolarity, Krauthammer noted, is the "most striking feature of the post-Cold War world". stated that the "moment" is lasting and lasting with "acceleration". He replied to those who still refused to acknowledge the fact of unipolarity: "If today's American primacy does not constitute unipolarity, then nothing ever will". On the latter occasion, Krauthammer added perhaps his most significant comment—the new unipolar world order represents a "unique to modern history" structure.
Presaging the Iraq War of 2003 ,
Secretary of State under George H. W. Bush
The Economist published an article explaining the drive toward the Persian Gulf War in terms presaging the run-up to the
Iraq War of 2003. The author notes directly that despite the coalition, in the minds of most governments this is the U.S.' war and
George W. Bush "chose to stake his political life on defeating Mr Hussein". An attack on Iraq would certainly shatter Bush's alliance, they assert, predicting calls from United Nations Security Council members saying that diplomacy should have been given more time and that they will not wish to allow a course of action "that leaves America sitting too prettily as sole remaining superpower". When the unanimity of the Security Council ends, "all that lovely talk about the new world order" will too. When casualties mount, "Bush will be called a warmonger, an
imperialist and a bully". The article goes on to say that Bush and
James Baker's speechifying cannot save the new world order once they launch a controversial war. It closes noting that a wide consensus is not necessary for U.S. action—only a hardcore of supporters, namely
Gulf Cooperation Council states (including Saudi Arabia),
Egypt and Britain. The rest need only not interfere. In a passage with similar echoes of the future, Bush and Scowcroft explain in
A World Transformed the role of the
United Nations Secretary-General in attempting to avert the Persian Gulf War. Secretary-General
Javier Pérez de Cuéllar arrived at
Camp David to ask what he could do to head off the war. Bush told him that it was important that we get full implementation on every United Nations resolution: "If we compromise, we weaken the UN and our own credibility in building this new world order," I said. "I think Saddam Hussein doesn't believe force will be used—or if it is, he can produce a stalemate". Additional meetings between Baker or Pérez and the Iraqis are rejected for fear that they will simply come back empty-handed once again. Bush feared that Javier will be cover for Hussein's manipulations. Pérez suggested another Security Council meeting, but Bush saw no reason for one.
Following the Persian Gulf War Following the Persian Gulf War which was seen as the crucible in which great power cooperation and collective security would emerge the new norms of the era—several academic assessments of the "new world order" idea were published.
John Lewis Gaddis, a Cold War historian, wrote in
Foreign Affairs about what he saw as the key characteristics of the potential new order, namely unchallenged American primacy, increasing integration, resurgent
nationalism and religiosity, a diffusion of security threats and collective security. He casts the fundamental challenge as one of integration versus fragmentation and the concomitant benefits and dangers associated with each. Changes in
communications, the international economic system, the nature of security threats and the rapid spread of new ideas would prevent nations from retreating into
isolation. In light of this, Gaddis sees a chance for the
democratic peace predicted by
liberal international relations theorists to come closer to reality. However, he illustrates that not only is the fragmentary pressure of nationalism manifest in the former Communist bloc countries and the
Third World, but it is also a considerable factor in the West. Further, a revitalized
Islam could play both integrating and fragmenting roles—emphasizing common identity, but also contributing to new conflicts that could resemble the
Lebanese Civil War. The integration coming from the new order could also aggravate
ecological,
demographic and
epidemic threats. National
self-determination, leading to the breakup and reunification of states (such as Yugoslavia on one hand and Germany on the other) could signal abrupt shifts in the balance of power with a destabilizing effect. Integrated markets, especially energy markets, are now a security liability for the world economic system as events affecting
energy security in one part of the globe could threaten countries far removed from potential conflicts. Finally, diffusion of security threats required a new security paradigm involving low-intensity, but more frequent deployment of peacekeeping troops—a type of mission that is hard to sustain under budgetary or public opinion pressure. Gaddis called for aid to Eastern European countries, updated security and economic regimes for Europe, United Nations-based regional conflict resolution, a slower pace of international economic integration and paying off the U.S.
debt. However, statesman
Strobe Talbott wrote of the new world order that it was only in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War that the United Nations took a step toward redefining its role to take account of both interstate relations and intrastate events. Furthermore, he asserted that it was only as an unintended postscript to Desert Storm that Bush gave meaning to the "new world order" slogan. By the end of the year, Bush stopped talking about a new world order and his advisers explained that he had dropped the phrase because he felt it suggested more enthusiasm for the changes sweeping the planet than he actually felt. As an antidote to the uncertainties of the world, he wanted to stress the old verities of territorial integrity, national sovereignty and international stability.
David Gergen suggested at the time that it was the
recession of 1991–1992 which finally killed the new world order idea within the
White House. The economic downturn took a deeper psychological toll than expected while domestic politics were increasingly frustrated by paralysis, with the result that the United States toward the end of 1991 turned increasingly pessimistic, inward and nationalistic. In 1992,
Hans Köchler published a critical assessment of the notion of the "new world order", describing it as an ideological tool of legitimation of the global exercise of power by the U.S. in a unipolar environment. In
Joseph Nye's analysis (1992), the
collapse of the Soviet Union did not issue in a new world order per se, but rather simply allowed for the reappearance of the liberal institutional order that was supposed to have come into effect in 1945. However, this success of this order was not a fait accomplis. Three years later,
John Ikenberry would reaffirm Nye's idea of a reclamation of the ideal post-World War II order, but would dispute the nay-sayers who had predicted post-Cold War chaos. By 1997,
Anne-Marie Slaughter produced an analysis calling the restoration of the post-World War II order a "chimera ... infeasible at best and dangerous at worst". In her view, the new order was not a liberal institutionalist one, but one in which state authority disaggregated and decentralized in the face of
globalization.
Samuel Huntington wrote critically of the "new world order" and of
Francis Fukuyama's
End of History theory in
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order: :The expectation of harmony was widely shared. Political and intellectual leaders elaborated similar views. The Berlin wall had come down, communist regimes had collapsed, the United Nations was to assume a new importance, the former Cold War rivals would engage in "partnership" and a "grand bargain," peacekeeping and peacemaking would be the order of the day. The President of the world's leading country proclaimed the "new world order"... :The moment of euphoria at the end of the Cold War generated an illusion of harmony, which was soon revealed to be exactly that. The world became different in the early 1990s, but not necessarily more peaceful. Change was inevitable; progress was not... The illusion of harmony at the end of that Cold War was soon dissipated by the multiplication of ethnic conflicts and "
ethnic cleansing," the breakdown of law and order, the emergence of new patterns of alliance and conflict among states, the resurgence of neo-
communist and
neo-fascist movements, intensification of religious
fundamentalism, the end of the "diplomacy of smiles" and "
policy of yes" in Russia's relations with the West, the inability of the United Nations and the United States to suppress bloody local conflicts, and the increasing assertiveness of a rising China. In the five years after the Berlin wall came down, the word "
genocide" was heard far more often than in any five years of the Cold War. :The one harmonious world paradigm is clearly far too divorced from reality to be a useful guide to the post–Cold War world. Two Worlds: Us and Them. While one-world expectations appear at the end of major conflicts, the tendency to think in terms of two worlds recurs throughout human history. People are always tempted to divide people into us and them, the in-group and the other, our civilization and those barbarians. Despite the criticisms of the new world order concept, ranging from its practical unworkability to its theoretical incoherence,
Bill Clinton not only signed on to the idea of the "new world order", but dramatically expanded the concept beyond Bush's formulation. The essence of Clinton's
election year critique was that Bush had done too little, not too much. American intellectual
Noam Chomsky, author of the 1994 book
World Orders Old and New, often describes the "new world order" as a post-Cold-War era in which "the
New World gives the orders". Commenting on the
1999 U.S.-NATO bombing of Serbia, he writes: Following the rise of
Boris Yeltsin eclipsing Gorbachev and the
election victory of Clinton over Bush, the term "new world order" fell from common usage. It was replaced by competing similar concepts about how the post-Cold War order would develop. Prominent among these were the ideas of the "era of
globalization", the "unipolar moment", the "end of history" and the "
Clash of Civilizations".
Viewed in retrospect A 2001 paper in
Presidential Studies Quarterly examined the idea of the "new world order" as it was presented by the Bush administration (mostly ignoring previous uses by Gorbachev). Their conclusion was that Bush really only ever had three firm aspects to the new world order: • Checking the offensive use of force. • Promoting
collective security. • Using great power cooperation. These were not developed into a policy architecture, but came about incrementally as a function of domestic, personal and global factors. Because of the somewhat overblown expectations for the new world order in the media, Bush was widely criticized for lacking vision. The Gulf crisis is seen as the catalyst for Bush's development and implementation of the new world order concept. The authors note that before the crisis the concept remained "ambiguous, nascent, and unproven" and that the U.S. had not assumed a leadership role with respect to the new order. Essentially, the Cold War's end was the permissive cause for the new world order, but the Persian Gulf crisis was the active cause. == Recent political usage ==