After the
Partition of India in 1947, India and Pakistan have been in conflict over several issues, including the disputed territory of
Jammu and Kashmir.
Multiple wars and conflicts, especially the
1971 Indo-Pakistan War and the subsequent
Indian nuclear tests motivated Pakistan to become a
nuclear power as part of its defence and energy strategies. Pakistan's subsequent pursuit of nuclear weapons was supported not only by domestic scientific development but also by financial assistance from several allied states during the early stages of the program, including
Libya and
Saudi Arabia.
Initial non-weapon policy (Pre-1971) In 1953, Foreign Minister
Muhammad Zafarullah Khan publicly stated that "Pakistan does not have a policy towards the atom bombs". Pakistan's nuclear energy programme was established and started in 1956, following the establishment of
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). Pakistan became a participant in US President
Eisenhower's
Atoms for Peace program. Although proposals to develop nuclear weapons were made in the 1960s by several officials and senior scientists, Pakistan followed a strict non-nuclear weapon policy from 1956 until 1971, as PAEC under its chairman
Ishrat Hussain Usmani made no efforts to acquire
nuclear fuel cycle technology for the purposes of an active nuclear weapons programme. The PARR-I reactor was, under the agreement signed by PAEC and ANL, provided by the US Government in 1965, and scientists from PAEC and
ANL had led the construction. In 1965, Salam's efforts finally paid off, and a
Canadian firm signed a deal to provide the 137MWe
CANDU reactor in
Paradise Point, Karachi. In the
Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, which was the second of four openly declared
Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts, Pakistan solicited
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) assistance, but came under arms supply embargo in
United Nations Security Council Resolution 211.
Foreign minister (later Prime minister)
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto aggressively began the advocating the option of "nuclear weapons programmes" but such attempts were dismissed by Finance minister
Muhammad Shoaib and chairman
Ishrat Hussain Usmani.
Development of nuclear weapons (Post-1971) The
Bangladesh Liberation War was a defeat for Pakistan, which led to it losing roughly of territory as well as losing more than half its population to the newly independent state of
Bangladesh. In addition to the psychological setback for Pakistan, Pakistan seemed to be isolated internationally, and in great danger; it felt that it could rely on no one but itself. During this early phase of the program Bhutto also sought financial and political support from friendly Muslim and Arab states, and countries such as
Libya and
Saudi Arabia provided financial assistance that helped sustain Pakistan's nuclear effort. At a
United Nations Security Council meeting, Bhutto drew comparisons between the
Instrument of Surrender that ended the 1971 war, and the
Treaty of Versailles, which Germany was forced to sign in 1919. There, Bhutto vowed never to allow a repeat. Pakistan began developing nuclear weapons in January 1972 under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who delegated the program to the Chairman of the
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)
Munir Ahmad Khan with a commitment to having the device ready by the end of 1976. At the Multan meeting on 20 January 1972, Bhutto stated, "What
Raziuddin Siddiqui, a Pakistani, contributed for the United States during the
Manhattan Project, could also be done by scientists in Pakistan, for their own people". Siddiqui was a Pakistani
theoretical physicist who, in the early 1940s, worked on both the
British nuclear program and the Manhattan Project. In December 1972, Dr.
Abdus Salam directed a secretly coded memo to Pakistani scientists working at the
International Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP) in Italy to report to the Chairman of the
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC),
Munir Ahmad Khan, informing them about the program what was to be equivalent of the US "
Manhattan Project." In an effort to instill a sense of pride, Salam noted that the heads of the Manhattan Engineer District were theoreticians, and informed the scientists at ICTP that a similar division was being established at PAEC; this marked the beginning of the "Theoretical Physics Group" (TPG). Other
theoreticians at
Quaid-e-Azam University would also join the TPG, then led by Salam who had done ground-breaking work for TPG. Among them was
Riazuddin,
Fayyazuddin,
Masud Ahmad, and
Faheem Hussain who were the cornerstone of the TPG. Tedious mathematical work on
fast neutron calculations,
relativity, complex
hydrodynamics and
quantum mechanics were conducted by the TPG led by Salam until 1974 when he left Pakistan in protest, though he kept close contact with TPG. No such endeavours of the kind had taken place in the country and
computerized numerical control (CNC) and basic computing facilities were non-existent at that time (though later acquired). For this purpose, the calculations on the
high-performance computing and
numerical analysis were performed by Dr. Tufail Naseem, a
PhD graduate in mathematics from
Cambridge University, assisted by other members of Mathematics Division– the division of
pure mathematics at PAEC under Dr. Raziuddin Siddiqui and
Asghar Qadir. About the lack of CNC facilities, Munir Ahmad Khan famously marked: "If the
Americans could do it without CNC machines in the 1940s, why can't we do the same now.". With
Abdus Salam departing, Munir Ahmad eventually led the TPG and assisted in the calculations. Two types of weapon design were analyzed: the
Gun-type fission weapon and the
implosion nuclear weapon. The program turned to the more technically difficult implosion-type weapon design, contrary to the relatively simple 'gun-type' weapon. Since PAEC, which consisted of over twenty laboratories and projects under
reactor physicist Munir Ahmad Khan, was falling behind schedule and having considerable difficulty producing
fissile material,
Abdul Qadeer Khan, a metallurgist working on centrifuge enrichment for
Urenco, joined the program at the behest of the Bhutto administration by the end of 1974. Producing fissile material was pivotal to the
Kahuta Project's success and thus to Pakistan obtaining the capability to detonate a nuclear weapon by the end of 1984. He pushed for the feasibility of
highly enriched uranium (HEU) fissile material and collaborated under
Bashiruddin Mahmood at the PAEC, a move that irked A. Q. Khan. Preliminary studies on
gaseous centrifuge were already studied by PAEC in 1967 but yielded few results. A. Q. Khan advanced
uranium enrichment from the expertise he had from the
Urenco Group in the Netherlands. Under A. Q. Khan's supervision, the
Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL) was set-up and engaged in clandestine efforts to obtain the necessary
materials technology and
electronic components for its developing uranium enrichment capabilities. The TPG succeeded in the earlier implosion-type weapon design in 1977–78, with the first
cold test conducted in 1983 by
Ishfaq Ahmad. The program evolved towards the
boosted fission weapon designs that were eventually used in the
Chagai-I tests in 1998. Enormous production was undertaken by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission for feasibility of
weapons grade plutonium but parallel efforts were mounted toward
weapons-grade uranium after India's test, the
Smiling Buddha, in 1974. In 1983, Khan was
convicted in absentia by the Court of Amsterdam for stealing centrifuge blueprints, though the conviction was overturned on a
legal technicality. A
nuclear proliferation ring was established by Khan through Dubai to smuggle
URENCO nuclear technology to KRL after founding the
Zippe method for the
gas centrifuge On 11 March 1983, PAEC, led by Munir Ahmad Khan, carried out its first
subcritical testing of a working nuclear device. This is also called a cold test, and was codenamed
Kirana-I. There were 24 more cold tests from 1983 to 1994. Coordination between each site was overseen by the Directorate of Technical Development (DTD) under Dr. Zaman Sheikh (a
chemical engineer) and
Hafeez Qureshi, a
mechanical engineer. First
implosion design was built by TPG in 1977 and the DTD eventually conducted the
cold-test on 11 March 1983, codename
Kirana-I. Dr.
Ishrat Hussain Usmani's contribution to the nuclear energy programme is also fundamental to the development of atomic energy for civilian purposes as he, with efforts led by Salam, established PINSTECH, that subsequently developed into Pakistan's premier nuclear research institution. In addition to sending hundreds of young Pakistanis abroad for training, he laid the foundations of the Muslim world's first nuclear power reactor KANUPP, which was inaugurated by Munir Ahmad Khan in 1972. Scientists and engineers under Khan developed the
nuclear capability for Pakistan within the late 1970s, and under his leadership PAEC had carried out a cold test of nuclear devices at
Kirana Hills, evidently made from non-weaponized plutonium. The former chairman of PAEC, Munir Khan, was credited as one of the pioneers of Pakistan's atomic bomb by a study from the London
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), on Pakistan's atomic bomb program. In his semi-official works of the Pakistani nuclear program history,
Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, Major General Feroz Hassan Khan wrote that Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz al Saud's visits to Pakistan's atomic facilities were not proof of a nuclear-sharing agreement between the two countries. However, Khan also acknowledged that "Saudi Arabia provided generous financial support to Pakistan that enabled the nuclear program to continue." Scholars of Pakistan's nuclear history describe this financial assistance as part of broader strategic cooperation between
Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan during the Cold War period, particularly as Pakistan faced economic constraints and international pressure and sanctions while advancing its nuclear program. Following India's surprise
nuclear test, codenamed
Smiling Buddha in 1974, the first confirmed nuclear test by a nation outside the permanent five members of the
United Nations Security Council, the goal to develop nuclear weapons received considerable impetus. Finally, on 28 May 1998, a few weeks after India's second nuclear test (
Operation Shakti), Pakistan detonated five nuclear devices in the
Ras Koh Hills in the
Chagai district,
Balochistan. This operation was named
Chagai-I by Pakistan, the underground iron-steel tunnel having been long-constructed by
provincial martial law administrator General
Rahimuddin Khan during the 1980s. The Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission reported that the five nuclear tests conducted on May 28 generated a seismic signal of 5.0 on the Richter scale, with a total yield of up to 40 KT (equivalent TNT). Dr. A.Q. Khan claimed that one device was a boosted fission device and that the other four were sub-kiloton nuclear devices. The last test of Pakistan was conducted at the sandy
Kharan Desert under the codename
Chagai-II, also in Balochistan, on 30 May 1998. Pakistan's fissile material production takes place at Nilore, Kahuta, and
Khushab Nuclear Complex, where weapons-grade plutonium is refined. Pakistan thus became the seventh country in the world to successfully develop and test nuclear weapons, although according to a letter sent by A.Q. Khan to General Zia, the capability to detonate a nuclear bomb using highly enriched uranium as fissile material produced at KRL had already been achieved by KRL in 1984. During the early stages of
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, the government of
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto sought financial and political backing from several
Muslim-majority countries and Arab states following the
Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. Scholars of Pakistan's nuclear history note that Bhutto approached a number of governments in the
Middle East as Pakistan accelerated its nuclear development in response to
India's strategic capabilities. Bhutto undertook a diplomatic tour of Muslim states in the Arab world and the Middle East shortly after the 1972 Multan Conference in order to mobilize political and financial support. These visits included
Iran,
Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates,
Turkey,
Syria,
Morocco,
Egypt,
Algeria,
Tunisia and
Libya. Khan notes that Libya became one of Pakistan's closest partners during this period, with Libyan and Pakistani officials holding meetings in Paris in 1973 to discuss nuclear cooperation and financial assistance, and estimates of Libyan support reaching $500 million. There was also material assistance from
Libya in addition to financial support.
Libyan assistance reportedly included uranium ore concentrate (“yellowcake”) acquired from
Niger and transferred to
Pakistan between 1976 and 1982.
Libya controlled uranium deposits in the Ouzo Strip in
Chad during the 1970s, which may have also further contributed to its ability to supply nuclear materials. In his historical study of Pakistan's nuclear program, retired
Pakistan Army major general and scholar Feroz Hassan Khan wrote that Saudi Arabia provided financial assistance that helped sustain the program during periods of economic pressure and international sanctions. This helped Pakistan sustain the development of its nuclear program during its early years when the country faced economic constraints, sanctions and international pressure.
Alleged Israeli interference In 1981, three
West German engineering firms were targeted in bomb attacks and several others received threatening phone calls, allegedly carried out by the
Israeli secret service. All of the companies were suspected of selling
dual use technology to Pakistan for use in their nuclear weapons program. Former Pakistan Army brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan alleged that in 1982 India worked with Israel to plan an attack similar to the previous year's
surprise airstrike on Iraq's nuclear reactor, where Israeli
F-16 fighters bombers escorted by
F-15 air superiority aircraft would take off from
Udhampur Air Force Station in
Indian administered Kashmir and then fly low over
the Himalayas to avoid early radar detection before attacking the Pakistani uranium enrichment centrifuge complex in the
Rawalpindi city of
Kahuta. Israel F-16 aircraft were also allegedly twice spotted in Pakistani air space in the days before the
1998 nuclear tests were carried out. Pakistan was so alarmed by the sighting that their then ambassador to
the UN, Ahmed Kamal, held an emergency meeting with the UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan to seek reassurance from the international community that an attack was not imminent.
Policy Pakistan is not known to have an offensive chemical weapons programme, and in 1993 Pakistan signed and ratified the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and has committed itself to refrain from developing, manufacturing, stockpiling, or using chemical weapons. Pakistan is not a party to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and is not bound by any of its provisions. In 1999, Prime Ministers
Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan and
Atal Bihari Vajpayee of India signed the
Lahore Declaration, agreeing to a bilateral moratorium on further
nuclear testing. This initiative was taken a year after both countries had publicly tested nuclear weapons. (See
Pokhran-II,
Chagai-I and
II) Since the early 1980s, Pakistan's nuclear proliferation activities have not been without controversy. However, since the arrest of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the government has taken concrete steps to ensure that
Nuclear proliferation is not repeated and have assured the IAEA about the transparency of Pakistan's upcoming
Chashma Nuclear Power Plant. In November 2006, The
International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors approved an agreement with the
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission to apply safeguards to new nuclear power plants to be built in the country with Chinese assistance.
Protections In May 1999, during the anniversary of Pakistan's first nuclear weapons test, former prime minister
Nawaz Sharif claimed that Pakistan's nuclear security is the strongest in the world. According to Dr.
Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan's
nuclear safety program and nuclear security program is the strongest program in the world and there is no such capability in any other country for radical elements to steal or possess nuclear weapons. This claim is strongly disputed by foreign experts, citing the precedent of previous attacks of Pakistani military facilities and the nation's high level of instability.
Modernisation and expansion A Washington-based
Nuclear Watch think tank of
Boston University has reported that Pakistan is increasing its capacity to produce plutonium at its Khushab nuclear facility. The sixth nuclear test (codename:
Chagai-II) on 30 May 1998, at Kharan was quite a successful test of a sophisticated, compact, but "powerful plutonium bomb" designed to be carried by aircraft, vessels, and missiles. These are believed to be
tritium-boosted weapons. Only a few grams of tritium can result in an increase of the explosive yield by 300% to 400%." Citing new satellite images of the facility, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) said the imagery suggests construction of the second Khushab reactor is "likely finished and that the roof beams are being placed on top of the third
Khushab reactor hall". A third and a fourth reactor and ancillary buildings are observed to be under construction at the
Khushab site. In an opinion published in
The Hindu, former
Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran wrote that Pakistan's expanding nuclear capability is "no longer driven solely by its oft-cited fears of India" but by the "
paranoia about US attacks on its strategic assets." , Pakistan has been reportedly developing smaller, tactical nuclear weapons for use on the battlefield. This is consistent with earlier statements from a meeting of the National Command Authority (which directs nuclear policy and development) saying Pakistan is developing "a full-spectrum deterrence capability to deter all forms of aggression."
Arms control proposals Pakistan has over the years proposed a number of bilateral or regional non-proliferation steps and confidence building measures to India, including: • A joint Indo-Pakistan declaration renouncing the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons, in 1978. • South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, in 1978. • Mutual inspections by India and Pakistan of each other's nuclear facilities, in 1979. • Simultaneous adherence to the NPT by India and Pakistan, in 1979. • A bilateral or regional nuclear test-ban treaty, in 1987. • A South Asia Zero-Missile Zone, in 1994. India rejected all six proposals. However, India and Pakistan reached three bilateral agreements on nuclear issues. In 1989, they agreed not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. Since then they have been regularly exchanging lists of nuclear facilities on 1 January of each year. Another bilateral agreement was signed in March 2005 where both nations would alert the other on ballistic missile tests. In June 2004, the two countries signed an agreement to set up and maintain a hotline to warn each other of any accident that could be mistaken for a nuclear attack. These were deemed essential risk reduction measures in view of the seemingly unending state of misgiving and tension between the two countries, and the extremely short response time available to them to any perceived attack. None of these agreements limits the nuclear weapons programs of either country in any way.
Disarmament policy Pakistan has blocked negotiation of a
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty as it continues to produce fissile material for weapons. In a recent statement at the
Conference on Disarmament, Pakistan laid out its nuclear disarmament policy and what it sees as the proper goals and requirements for meaningful negotiations: • A commitment by all states to complete verifiable
nuclear disarmament; • Eliminate the discrimination in the current non-proliferation regime; • Normalize the relationship of the three
ex-NPT nuclear weapon states with those who are
NPT signatories; • Address new issues like access to
weapons of mass destruction by
non-state actors; • Non-discriminatory rules ensuring every state's right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy; • Universal, non-discriminatory and legally binding negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states; • A need to address the issue of missiles, including development and deployment of
Anti-ballistic missile systems; • Strengthen existing international instruments to prevent the
militarisation of outer space, including development of
ASATs; • Tackle the growth in armed forces and the accumulation and sophistication of conventional
tactical weapons. • Revitalise the UN disarmament machinery to address international security, disarmament and
proliferation challenges. Pakistan has repeatedly stressed at international fora like the
Conference on Disarmament that it will give up its nuclear weapons only when other nuclear armed states do so, and when disarmament is universal and verifiable. It rejects any unilateral disarmament on its part. == Infrastructure ==