The Russification of
Uralic-speaking people, such as
Vepsians,
Mordvins,
Maris, and
Permians, indigenous to large parts of western and central Russia had already begun with the original eastward expansion of
East Slavs. Written records of the oldest period are scarce, but
toponymic evidence indicates that this expansion was accomplished at the expense of various
Volga-Finnic peoples, who were gradually assimilated by Russians; beginning with the
Merya and the
Muroma early in the 2nd millennium AD. In the
13th to
14th century, the Russification of the
Komi began but it did not penetrate the Komi heartlands until the 18th century. However, by the 19th century, Komi-Russian
bilingualism had become the norm and there was an increasing Russian influence on the
Komi language. After the Russian defeat in the
Crimean War in 1856 and the
January Uprising of 1863, Tsar Alexander II increased Russification to reduce the threat of future rebellions. Russia was populated by many minority groups, and forcing them to accept the Russian culture was an attempt to prevent self-determination tendencies and separatism. In the 19th century, Russian settlers on traditional Kazakh land (misidentified as Kyrgyz at the time) drove many of the
Kazakhs over the border to China. Russification was extended to non-Muscovite ethnographic groups that composed former
Kievan Rus, namely
Ukrainians and
Belarusians, whose vernacular language and culture developed differently from that of Muscovy due to separation after the partitioning of Kievan Rus. The mentality behind Russification when applied to these groups differed from that applied to others, in that they were claimed to be part of the
All-Russian or Triune Russian nation by the Russian Imperial government and by subscribers to
Russophilia. Russification competed with contemporary nationalist movements in Ukraine and Belarus that were developing during the 19th century. Russian Imperial authorities as well as modern Russian nationalists asserted that Russification was an organic national consolidation process that would accomplish the goals of homogenizing the Russian nation as they saw it, and reversing the effects of
Polonization.
In the Soviet Union After the
1917 revolution, authorities in the
USSR decided to abolish the use of the
Arabic alphabet in native languages in Soviet-controlled Central Asia, in the
Caucasus, and in the Volga region (including
Tatarstan). This detached the local Muslim populations from exposure to the language and writing system of the
Quran. Until the late 1930s, the new alphabet for these languages was based on the
Latin alphabet and inspired by the
Turkish alphabet. In 1939–1940, the Soviets decided that a number of these languages (including
Tatar,
Kazakh,
Uzbek,
Turkmen,
Tajik,
Kyrgyz,
Azerbaijani, and
Bashkir) would henceforth use variations of the
Cyrillic script (see
Cyrillization in the Soviet union). Not only that, the spelling and writing of these new Cyrillic words must also be in accordance with the Russian language. Some historians evaluating the
Soviet Union as a colonial
empire, applied the "
prison of nations" idea to the USSR. Thomas Winderl wrote "The USSR became in a certain sense more a prison-house of nations than the old Empire had ever been."
Korenizatsiya Stalin's
Marxism and the National Question (1913) provided the basic framework for nationality policy in the Soviet Union. The early years of said policy, from the early 1920s to the mid-1930s, were guided by the policy of
korenizatsiya ("indigenization"), during which the new Soviet regime sought to reverse the long-term effects of Russification on the non-Russian populations. As the regime was trying to establish its power and
legitimacy throughout the former Russian empire, it went about constructing regional administrative units, recruiting non-Russians into leadership positions, and promoting non-Russian languages in government administration, the courts, the schools, and the mass media. The slogan then established was that local cultures should be "socialist in content but national in form." That is, these cultures should be transformed to conform with the Communist Party's socialist project for the Soviet society as a whole but have active participation and leadership by the indigenous nationalities and operate primarily in the local languages. During this timeframe, the
Ukrainian SSR experienced a language and cultural revival as prior policies prohibiting the use of Ukrainian language were lifted and efforts were made to promote Ukrainian culture. Early nationality policies shared with later policy the object of assuring control by the Communist Party over all aspects of Soviet political, economic, and social life. The early Soviet policy of promoting what one scholar has described as "ethnic particularism" and another as "institutionalized multinationality", had a double goal. On the one hand, it had been an effort to counter Russian chauvinism by assuring a place for non-Russian languages and cultures in the newly formed Soviet Union. On the other hand, it was a means to prevent the formation of alternative ethnically based
political movements, including
pan-Islamism and
pan-Turkism. One way of accomplishing this was to promote what some regard as artificial distinctions between ethnic groups and languages rather than promoting the amalgamation of these groups and a common set of languages based on Turkish or another regional language. The Soviet nationalities policy from its early years sought to counter these two tendencies by assuring a modicum of cultural autonomy to non-Russian nationalities within a
federal system or structure of government, though maintaining that the ruling Communist Party was monolithic, not federal. A process of
"national-territorial delimitation" (
:ru:национально-территориальное размежевание) was undertaken to define the official territories of the non-Russian populations within the Soviet Union. The federal system conferred the highest status to the titular nationalities of union republics, and lower status to the titular nationalities of autonomous republics, autonomous provinces, and autonomous okrugs. In all, some 50 nationalities had a republic, province, or okrug of which they held nominal control in the federal system. Federalism and the provision of native-language education ultimately left as a legacy a large non-Russian public that was educated in the languages of their ethnic groups and that identified a particular homeland on the territory of the Soviet Union. After Stalin begun reversing this policy, Russification of the constituent republics of the USSR intensified, with prominent cultural figures executed. In Ukraine, the
Executed Renaissance refers to the many prominent figures during the cultural renaissance under Lenin who were subsequently repressed and executed under the Stalinist government's Russification policy.
World War II By the late 1930s, policies had shifted. Purges in some of the national regions, such as
Ukraine, had occurred already in the early 1930s. Before the turnabout in Ukraine in 1933, a purge of
Veli İbraimov and his leadership in the
Crimean ASSR in 1929 for "national deviation" led to the Russianization of government, education, and the media and to the creation of a special alphabet for Crimean Tatar to replace the Latin alphabet. Of the two dangers that
Joseph Stalin had identified in 1923, now
bourgeois nationalism (local nationalism) was said to be a greater threat than Great Russian chauvinism (great power chauvinism). In 1937,
Faizullah Khojaev and
Akmal Ikramov were removed as leaders of the
Uzbek SSR, and in 1938, during the
third great Moscow show trial, convicted and subsequently put to death for alleged anti-Soviet nationalist activities. After Stalin, an ethnic Georgian, became the undisputed leader of the Soviet Union, the Russian language gained greater emphasis. In 1938, Russian became a required subject of study in every Soviet school, including those in which a non-Russian language was the principal medium of instruction for other subjects (e.g., mathematics, science, and social studies). In 1939, non-Russian languages that
had been given Latin-based scripts in the late 1920s
were given new scripts based on the
Cyrillic script. Before and during World War II,
Joseph Stalin deported to Central Asia and
Siberia many entire nationalities for their alleged and largely disproven
collaboration with the German invaders:
Volga Germans,
Crimean Tatars,
Chechens,
Ingush,
Balkars,
Kalmyks, and others. Shortly after the war, he deported many
Ukrainians,
Balts, and
Estonians to Siberia as well. After the war, the leading role of the Russian people in the Soviet family of nations and nationalities was promoted by Stalin and his successors. This shift was most clearly underscored by Communist Party General Secretary Stalin's Victory Day toast to the Russian people in May 1945: The view was reflected in the new
State Anthem of the Soviet Union which started with: "An unbreakable union of free republics,
Great Russia has sealed forever." Anthems of nearly all Soviet republics mentioned "Russia" or "Russian nation" singled out as "brother", "friend", "elder brother" (
Uzbek SSR) or "stronghold of friendship" (
Turkmen SSR). Although the official literature on nationalities and languages in subsequent years continued to speak of there being 130 equal languages in the USSR, in practice a hierarchy was endorsed in which some nationalities and languages were given special roles or viewed as having different long-term futures.
Educational reforms An analysis of textbook publishing found that education was offered for at least one year and it was also offered to children who were in at least the first class (grade) in 67 languages between 1934 and 1980. Educational reforms were undertaken after
Nikita Khrushchev became First Secretary of the Communist Party in the late 1950s and launched a process of replacing non-Russian schools with Russian ones for the nationalities that had lower status in the federal system, the nationalities whose populations were smaller and the nationalities which were already bilingual on a large scale. Nominally, this process was guided by the principle of "voluntary parental choice." But other factors also came into play, including the size and formal political status of the group in the Soviet federal hierarchy and the prevailing level of bilingualism among parents. By the early 1970s schools in which non-Russian languages served as the principal medium of instruction operated in 45 languages, while seven more indigenous languages were taught as subjects of study for at least one class year. By 1980, instruction was offered in 35 non-Russian languages of the peoples of the USSR, just over half the number in the early 1930s. In most of these languages, schooling was not offered for the complete ten-year curriculum. For example, within the
Russian SFSR in 1958–59, full 10-year schooling in the native language was offered in only three languages: Russian,
Tatar, and
Bashkir. And some nationalities had minimal or no native-language schooling. By 1962–1963, among non-Russian nationalities that were indigenous to the RSFSR, whereas 27% of children in classes I-IV (primary school) studied in Russian-language schools, 53% of those in classes V-VIII (incomplete secondary school) studied in Russian-language schools, and 66% of those in classes IX-X studied in Russian-language schools. Although many non-Russian languages were still offered as a subject of study at a higher class level (in some cases through complete general secondary school – the 10th class), the pattern of using the Russian language as the main medium of instruction accelerated after Khrushchev's parental choice program got underway. Pressure to convert the main medium of instruction to Russian was evidently higher in urban areas. For example, in 1961–62, reportedly only 6% of
Tatar children living in urban areas attended schools in which
Tatar was the main medium of instruction.
Rapprochement The promotion of federalism and of non-Russian languages had always been a strategic decision aimed at expanding and maintaining Communist Party rule. On the theoretical plane, the Communist Party's official doctrine was of eventual national differences and nationalities as such would disappear. In official party doctrine as it was reformulated in the Third Program of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union introduced by
Nikita Khrushchev at the 22nd
Party Congress in 1961, although the program stated that ethnic distinctions would eventually disappear and a single common language would be adopted by all nationalities in the Soviet Union, "the obliteration of national distinctions, and especially language distinctions, is a considerably more drawn-out process than the obliteration of class distinctions." At the time, Soviet nations and nationalities were further flowering their cultures and drawing together (сближение – sblizhenie) into a stronger union. In his Report on the Program to the Congress, Khrushchev used even stronger language: that the process of further rapprochement (sblizhenie) and greater unity of nations would eventually lead to a merging or fusion (слияние – sliyanie) of nationalities. Khrushchev's formula of rapprochement-fusing was moderated slightly when
Leonid Brezhnev replaced Khrushchev as General Secretary of the Communist Party in 1964 (a post he held until his death in 1982). Brezhnev asserted that rapprochement would lead ultimately to the complete unity of nationalities. "Unity" is an ambiguous term because it can imply either the maintenance of separate national identities but a higher stage of mutual attraction, similarity between nationalities or total disappearance of ethnic differences. In the political context of the time, rapprochement-unity was regarded as a softening of the pressure toward Russification that Khrushchev had promoted with his endorsement of sliyanie. The 24th Party Congress in 1971 launched the idea that a new "
Soviet people" was forming on the territory of the USSR, a community for which the common language – the language of the "Soviet people" – was the Russian language, consistent with the role that Russian was playing for the fraternal nations and nationalities in the territory already. This new community was labeled a people (народ –
narod), not a nation (нация –
natsiya), but in that context the Russian word
narod ("people") implied an
ethnic community, not just a civic or political community. October 13, 1978, the Soviet Council of Ministers enacted (but did not officially publish) 1978 Decree No. 835, titled "On measures to further improve the teaching and learning of the Russian language in the Union Republics", directing mandating the teaching of
Russian, starting in first grade, in the other 14 Republics. The new rule was accompanied by a statement that Russian was a "second native language" for all Soviet citizens and "the only means of participation in social life across the nation." The Councils of Ministers of the Republics across the USSR enacted resolutions based on Decree No. 835. Other aspects of Russification contemplated that native languages would gradually be removed from newspapers, radio and television in favor of Russian. Thus, until the end of the Soviet era, doctrinal rationalization had been provided for some of the practical policy steps that were taken in the areas of education and the media. First of all, the transfer of many "national schools" (schools based on local languages) to Russian as a medium of instruction accelerated under Khrushchev in the late 1950s and continued into the 1980s. Second, the new doctrine was used to justify the special place of the Russian language as the "language of inter-nationality communication" (язык межнационального общения) in the USSR. Use of the term "inter-nationality" (межнациональное) rather than the more conventional "international" (международное) focused on the special
internal role of Russian language rather than on its role as a language of international discourse. That Russian was the most widely spoken language, and that Russians were the majority of the population of the country, were also cited in justification of the special place of the Russian language in government, education, and the media. At the 27th CPSU Party Congress in 1986, presided over by
Mikhail Gorbachev, the 4th Party Program reiterated the formulas of the previous program: During the Soviet era, a significant number of ethnic Russians and Ukrainians migrated to other Soviet republics, and many of them settled there. According to the last census in 1989, the Russian 'diaspora' in the non-Russian Soviet republics had reached 25 million.
Linguistics bilingual (Latvian-Russian)
street sign in
Rēzekne in 2011 Progress in the spread of the Russian language as a second language and the gradual displacement of other languages was monitored in Soviet censuses. The Soviet censuses of 1926, 1937, 1939, and 1959, had included questions on "native language" (родной язык) as well as "nationality." The 1970, 1979, and 1989 censuses added to these questions one on "other language of the peoples of the USSR" that an individual could "use fluently" (свободно владеть). It is speculated that the explicit goal of the new question on the "second language" was to monitor the spread of Russian as the language of internationality communication. Each of the official homelands within the Soviet Union was regarded as the only homeland of the titular nationality and its language, while the Russian language was regarded as the language for interethnic communication for the whole Soviet Union. Therefore, for most of the Soviet era, especially after the
korenizatsiya (indigenization) policy ended in the 1930s, schools in which non-Russian Soviet languages would be taught were not generally available outside the respective ethnically based administrative units of these ethnicities. Some exceptions appeared to involve cases of historic rivalries or patterns of assimilation between neighboring non-Russian groups, such as between Tatars and Bashkirs in Russia or among major Central Asian nationalities. For example, even in the 1970s schooling was offered in at least seven languages in
Uzbekistan: Russian,
Uzbek,
Tajik,
Kazakh,
Turkmen,
Kyrgyz, and
Karakalpak. While formally all languages were equal, in almost all Soviet republics the Russian/local
bilingualism was "asymmetric": the
titular nation learned Russian, whereas immigrant Russians generally did not learn the local language. In addition, many non-Russians who lived outside their respective administrative units tended to become Russified linguistically; that is, they not only learned Russian as a second language but they also adopted it as their home language or mother tongue – although some still retained their sense of
ethnic identity or origins even after shifting their native language to Russian. This includes both the traditional communities (e.g.,
Lithuanians in the northwestern
Belarus (
see Eastern Vilnius region) or the
Kaliningrad Oblast (
see Lithuania Minor)) and the communities that appeared during Soviet times such as
Ukrainian or
Belarusian workers in
Kazakhstan or
Latvia, whose children attended primarily the Russian-language schools and thus the further generations are primarily speaking Russian as their native language; for example, 57% of Estonia's Ukrainians, 70% of Estonia's Belarusians and 37% of Estonia's Latvians claimed Russian as the native language in the last Soviet census of 1989. Russian replaced
Yiddish and other languages as the main language of many Jewish communities inside the Soviet Union as well. Another consequence of the mixing of nationalities and the spread of
bilingualism and linguistic Russification was the growth of ethnic
intermarriage and a process of
ethnic Russification—coming to call oneself Russian by nationality or ethnicity, not just speaking Russian as a second language or using it as a primary language. In the last decades of the Soviet Union, ethnic Russification (or
ethnic assimilation) was moving very rapidly for a few nationalities such as the
Karelians and
Mordvinians. Whether children born in mixed families to one Russian parent were likely to be raised as Russians depended on the context. For example, the majority of children in North
Kazakhstan with one of each parent chose Russian as their nationality on their internal passport at age 16. Children of mixed Russian and Estonian parents living in
Tallinn (the capital city of
Estonia), or mixed Russian and Latvian parents living in
Riga (the capital of
Latvia), or mixed Russian and Lithuanian parents living in
Vilnius (the capital of
Lithuania) most often chose as their own nationality that of the titular nationality of their republic – not Russian. More generally, patterns of
linguistic and
ethnic assimilation (Russification) were complex and cannot be accounted for by any single factor such as educational policy. Also relevant were the traditional cultures and religions of the groups, their residence in urban or rural areas, their contact with and exposure to the Russian language and to ethnic Russians, and other factors.
In the Russian Federation (1991–present) The enforced Russification of Russia's remaining indigenous minorities continued in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially in connection with
urbanization and the declining population
replacement rates, which are particularly low among the groups in the west. As a result, several of Russia's indigenous languages and cultures are currently considered
endangered. Between the 1989 and 2002 censuses, over 100,000 Mordvins assimilated; as the Mordvin population totaled less than one million, this was considered a major loss. On 19 June 2018, the Russian
State Duma adopted a bill that made education in all languages but Russian optional, overruling previous laws by
ethnic autonomies, and reducing instruction in minority languages to only two hours a week. This bill has been likened by some commentators, such as in
Foreign Affairs, to the policy of Russification. The law came after a lawsuit in the summer of 2017, when a Russian mother allegedly claimed that her son had been "materially harmed" by learning the
Tatar language; commenting on this in a speech, Putin argued that it was wrong to force someone to learn a language that is not their own.
Chuvashia, Kabardino-Balkaria, the
Karachays, the
Avars,
Chechnya, and
Ingushetia. Twelve of Russia's ethnic autonomies, including five in the Caucasus called for the legislation to be blocked. On 10 September 2019,
Udmurt activist
Albert Razin self-immolated in front of the regional government building in
Izhevsk as it was considering passing the controversial bill to reduce the status of the
Udmurt language. Between 2002 and 2010 the number of Udmurt speakers dwindled from 463,000 to 324,000. Other languages in the Volga region recorded similar declines in the number of speakers; between the 2002 and 2010 censuses the number of
Mari speakers declined from 254,000 to 204,000 This is attributed to a gradual phasing out of indigenous language teaching both in the cities and rural areas while regional media and governments shift exclusively to Russian. In the
North Caucasus, the law came after a decade in which educational opportunities in the indigenous languages was reduced by more than 50%, due to budget reductions and federal efforts to decrease the role of languages other than Russian. The numbers of Ossetian, Kumyk and Avar speakers dropped by 43,000, 63,000 and 80,000 respectively. and later the
Federation Council. One of the amendments enshrined the Russian nation as the "state-forming nationality" (Russian:
государствообразующий народ) and Russian the “language of the state-forming nationality”. The amendment has been met with criticism from Russia's minorities who argue that it goes against the principle that Russia is a multinational state and will only marginalize them further. The amendments were welcomed by
Russian nationalists, such as
Konstantin Malofeev and
Nikolai Starikov. The changes in Constitution were preceded by "Strategy of government's national policy of Russian Federation", issued in December 2018, which stated that "all-Russian civic identity is founded on Russia cultural dominant, inherent to all nations of Russian Federation". With the release of the
latest census in 2022, results showed a catastrophic decline in the number of many ethnic groups, particularly peoples of the Volga region. Between 2010 and 2022, the number of people identifying as ethnic
Mari dropped by 22.6%, from 548,000 to 424,000 people. Ethnic
Chuvash and
Udmurts dropped by 25% and 30% respectively. More vulnerable groups like the
Mordvins and
Komi-Permyaks saw even larger declines, dropping by 35% and 40% respectively, the former of which resulted in Mordvins no longer being among the top ten largest ethnic groups in Russia. On 18 June 2025, the Russian Ministry of Education issued Order No. 467 on elementary education (grades 1-9). which turned the teaching of Russia's minority languages (school subject 'Mother Tongue') into optional electives. This order also makes the school subject 'Literature in the Mother Tongue' elective as well. The order was enforced on 1 September 2025, with the changes applied starting from the 2026/27 school year. In the context of these changes, the ministry aspires to remove specifically Ukrainian language and literature as school subjects. This measure de facto pertains to the Ukrainian territories under Russian occupation. The order also reduced the number of hours minority languages are taught at school, which became a controversial issue in Tatarstan. == By country/region ==