National government Léon Blum was a French socialist politician and three-time
Prime Minister of France. Although his tenure was brief during his two tenures in the 1930s as prime minister, his policies played a key role in French policy during the events leading up to World War II. As Prime Minister in the left-wing
Popular Front government in 1936–1937, he provided a series of major economic and social reforms. Blum declared neutrality in the
Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) to avoid the civil conflict spilling over into France itself. Once out of office in 1938, he denounced the
appeasement of Germany. When Germany
defeated France in 1940, he became a staunch opponent of
Vichy France. After the fall of the Blum government,
Édouard Daladier became head of government on 10 April 1938, orienting his government towards the centre and ending the Popular Front. Along with
Neville Chamberlain,
Benito Mussolini and
Adolf Hitler, Daladier signed the
Munich Agreement in 1938, which gave
Nazi Germany control over the
Sudetenland. After Hitler's
invasion of Poland in 1939, Britain and France declared war on Germany. During the
Phoney War, France's failure to aid
Finland against the
Soviet Union's invasion during the
Winter War led to Daladier's resignation on 21 March 1940 and his replacement by
Paul Reynaud. Daladier remained Minister of Defence until 19 May, when Reynaud took over the portfolio personally after the
French defeat at Sedan. Reynaud opposed the
Munich Agreement of September 1938, when France and the United Kingdom gave way before Hitler's proposals for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. After the outbreak of
World War II Reynaud became the penultimate
Prime Minister of the
Third Republic in March 1940. He was also vice-president of the
Democratic Republican Alliance center-right party. Reynaud was Prime Minister during the German defeat of France in May and June 1940; he persistently refused to support an armistice with Germany, as premier in June 1940, he unsuccessfully attempted to save France from German occupation in World War II, and resigned on 16 June. After unsuccessfully attempting to flee France, he was arrested by
Philippe Pétain's administration. Surrendering to German custody in 1942, he was imprisoned in Germany and later Austria until liberation in 1945, where he was released after the
Battle of Itter Castle in which one of the leaders, German Major
Josef Gangl, declared a hero by the
Austrian resistance, took a sniper's bullet to save Reynaud.
Diplomatic situation with Nazi Germany The most important factor in French foreign policy was the
Remilitarization of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936 in defiance of the
Treaty of Versailles, which had been declared to be a permanent demilitarized zone. With the Rhineland remilitarized, for the first time since 1918 German military forces could menace France directly, and equally importantly the Germans started to build the Siegfried line along the Franco-German border. The assumption behind the French alliance system in Eastern Europe was that the French Army would use the demilitarized status of the Rhineland to launch an offensive into western Germany if the
Reich should invade any of France's allies in Eastern Europe, namely Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia. With the building of the Siegfried Line, it was possible for Germany to invade any of France's Eastern European allies with the majority of the
Wehrmacht being sent east with the remainder of the Wehrmacht staying on the defensive in the Rhineland to halt any French offensive into Germany, a situation that boded ill for the survival of the French alliance system in Eastern Europe. A further complication for the French was the greater population of Germany as France could only field a third of the young men that the
Reich could field along with the greater size of the German economy. To even the odds against the
Reich, it was the unanimous opinion of all French foreign policy and military experts that France needed allies. The nation that France wanted the most as an ally was Great Britain, which had the world's largest navy and provided that Britain made the "continental commitment" of sending another large expeditionary force to France like the BEF of the First World War would allow the French to face any challenge from Germany on more even terms. The need for the "continental commitment" allowed Britain to have a sort of veto power over French foreign policy in the interwar period as the French wanted the "continental commitment" very badly, and thus could not afford to alienate the British too much. The other major ally the French wanted was the Soviet Union. However, the lack of a common German-Soviet frontier, the unwillingness of Romania and especially Poland to grant the Red Army transit rights, and the strong British dislike of the alliance that the French signed with the Soviet Union in 1935 all presented problems from the French viewpoint. Blum's foreign policy was one of attempting to improve relations with Germany to avoid a war while seeking to strengthen France's alliances and to conclude an alliance with Britain.
Munich agreement ,
Daladier,
Hitler,
Mussolini and
Ciano pictured before they sign the Munich Agreement, which gave the Czechoslovak border areas to Germany Daladier's last government was in power at the time of the negotiations preceding the
Munich Agreement during which France pressured
Czechoslovakia to hand the
Sudetenland to
Nazi Germany. In April–May 1938, British Prime Minister
Neville Chamberlain strongly but unsuccessfully pressed Daladier to renounce the French-Czechoslovak alliance, which led to Britain becoming involved in the crisis. From the British perspective, the problem was not the Sudetenland but the French-Czechoslovak alliance. British military experts were almost unanimous that Germany would defeat France in a war unless Britain intervened. The British thought that allowing Germany to defeat France would unacceptably alter the balance of power, and so Britain would have no choice but to intervene if a French-German war broke out. The alliance would have turned any German attack on Czechoslovakia into a French–German war. As British Foreign Secretary
Lord Halifax stated at a Cabinet meeting in March 1938, "Whether we liked or not, we had to admit the plain fact that we could not afford to see France overrun." At the Anglo-French summit on 28–29 April 1938, Chamberlain pressured Daladier to renounce the alliance with Czechoslovakia, only to be firmly informed that France would stand by its obligations, which forced the British to be involved very reluctantly in the Sudetenland Crisis. The summit of 28–29 April 1938 represented a British "surrender" to the French, rather than a French "surrender" to the British since Daladier made it clear France would not renounce its alliance with Czechoslovakia. Unlike Chamberlain, Daladier had no illusions about Hitler's ultimate goals. In fact, he told the British in a late April 1938 meeting that Hitler's real aim was to eventually secure "a domination of the Continent in comparison with which the ambitions of
Napoleon were feeble". Daladier went on to say, "Today, it is the turn of Czechoslovakia. Tomorrow, it will be the turn of
Poland and
Romania. When Germany has obtained the oil and wheat it needs, she will turn on the West. Certainly we must multiply our efforts to avoid war. But that will not be obtained unless Great Britain and France stick together, intervening in
Prague for new concessions [i.e. to the Sudeten Germans] but declaring at the same time that they will safeguard the independence of Czechoslovakia. If, on the contrary, the Western Powers capitulate again, they will only precipitate the war they wish to avoid." Despite being on the opposite sides of the ideological divide, starting on 14 April 1938 the Conservative MP
Winston Churchill started a correspondence with Blum, sending him a series of letters written in his idiosyncratic French, encouraging him to support rearmament and oppose appeasement. During the Sudetenland crisis of 1938, Daladier accepted the offer of the British Prime Minister
Neville Chamberlain to serve as an "honest broker" in an attempt to find a compromise. Chamberlain met with Adolf Hitler at a summit at
Berchtesgaden where he agreed that the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia would be transferred to Germany. At a subsequent Anglo-German summit at Bad Godesberg, Hitler rejected Chamberlain's plan over a secondary issue as he demanded that the Sudetenland be transferred to Germany before 1 October 1938 while the Anglo-French plan called for a transfer to occur after 1 October. For a time in September 1938, it appeared that Europe was on brink of a war again. The fact that the issue at stake was only a secondary issue, namely the timetable for transferring the Sudetenland, after the primary issue had been settled struck many as bizarre. The Munich Agreement that ended the crisis was a compromise as it was affirmed that the Sudetenland would be transferred to Germany but after only 1 October, albeit on a schedule that favored the German demand to have the Sudetenland "go home to the
Reich" as soon as possible. When the Munich Agreement was signed on 30 September 1938, Blum wrote that he felt "
soulagement honteux" ("shameful relief") as he wrote that he was happy that France would not be going to war with Germany, but he felt ashamed of an agreement that favored Germany at the expense of Czechoslovakia. On 1 October 1938, Blue wrote in
Le Populaire: "There is not a woman and a man to refuse MM. Neville Chamberlain and Édouard Daladier their rightful tribute of gratitude. War is avoided. The scourge recedes. Life can become natural again. One can resume one's work and sleep again. One can enjoy the beauty of an autumn sun. How would it be possible for me not to understand this sense of deliverance when I feel it myself?" Blum's contorted position of voting for the Munich Agreement, but being opposed to further appeasement was largely an attempt to hold together the Socialists. In the months that followed, Blum became more critical of the "men of Munich". The principal object of his criticism was not Daladier - whom he knew to be a reluctant appeaser - but rather the Foreign Minister,
Georges Bonnet. Bonnet was known to be the advocate of some sort of Franco-German understanding under which France would recognize Eastern Europe as being in the German sphere of influence and abandon all of France's allies in Eastern Europe. Blum focused his criticism on Bonnet as the main advocate of appeasement in the cabinet.
Military and diplomatic policies In an attempt to improve productivity in the French armament industry, especially its aviation industry, the Finance Minister
Paul Reynaud, supported by Daladier, brought in a series of sweeping laws that undid much of the Popular Front's economic policies, most notably ending the 48 hour work week. Blum joined forces with the Communists in opposing the Daladier government's economic policies, and supported the general strike called by the Communists on 30 November 1938. Daladier called out the French Army to operate essential services and had the French police use tear gas to evict striking workers at the Renault works. The use of the military to operate essential services while sending out the police to arrest the strike leaders broke the general strike. In a speech, Blum accused Daladier of using repressive methods to crush the French working class and revert France back to the pre-1936 economic system. Complicating matters was the beginning of a major crisis in Italo-French relations. On 30 November 1938 – the same day as the general strike – a carefully staged "spontaneous" demonstration organized by the Italian Foreign Minister Count
Galeazzo Ciano took place in the Italian Chamber of Deputies where on cue all of the deputies rose up to shout "Tunis, Corsica, Nice, Savoy!"
Benito Mussolini had intended to use what he called "Sudeten methods" on France as the Italian media started a violent anti-French campaign demanding that France cede Corsica, Nice, Savoy and Tunisia to Italy. Daladier responded with a series of resolute speeches on French radio where he rejected all of the Italian demands, which won him much popularity in France. From the viewpoint of Blum, being opposed to Daladier at a time when he won himself many accolades as the defender of France's territorial integrity against Italy was politically difficult. At the next session of the
Chambre des députés on 9 December 1938, the Popular Front formally came to an end as Daladier chose to base his majority of the parties of the right and center. Despite the end of the Popular Front, Blum did not press for a vote of no-confidence or new elections. Blum believed that Daladier would win an election if one was called, and the Socialists did not vote for a Communist motion of no-confidence in the Daladier government.
Strategic missteps When
war was declared in 1939,
Maurice Gamelin was France's commander in chief, with
his headquarters at the
Château de Vincennes, a facility completely devoid of telephonic or any other electronic links to his commanders in the field: a massive oversight in the face of the Wehrmacht's subsequent swift and flexible '
Blitzkrieg' tactics. France saw little action during the
Phoney War, apart from a few French divisions crossing the German border in the
Saar Offensive, who advanced a mere . They stopped even before reaching Germany's unfinished
Siegfried Line. According to
General Siegfried Westphal, a German staff officer on the Western Front, if France had attacked in September 1939 German forces could not have held out for more than one or two weeks. Gamelin ordered his troops back behind the Maginot Line, but only after telling France's ally, Poland, that France had broken the Siegfried Line and that help was on its way . Before the war, he had expected the Polish Army to hold out against Germany for six months. Gamelin prohibited any bombing of the industrial areas of the
Ruhr, in case the Germans retaliated. The French mobilisation had called up many essential workers, which disrupted vital French industries in the first weeks of the campaign. Gamelin's vision for France's defence was based upon a static defence along the Franco-German border, which was reinforced by the Maginot Line. However, the Line did not extend along the Belgian frontier. During the winter of 1939–40, which was one of the coldest of the 20th century, work on the extension of the Line along the Belgian frontier was slow and not of the same quality as the original defences. Gamelin, along with many other members of the French High Command, saw the
Ardennes as unlikely to be attacked and chose to defend it with only ten reserve divisions and few fortifications. Much of the French army was posted further northwest along the Belgian frontier. According to General
Hasso von Manteuffel, a German
Panzer commander, France had more and better tanks than Germany, but chose to disperse them. Gamelin's own views had changed from a purely defensive strategy relying on the Maginot Line. French strategists predicted a German drive across northern
Belgium, as in 1914. Gamelin favoured an aggressive advance northward to meet the attacking German forces in Belgium and the
Netherlands, as far removed from French territory as possible. This strategy, known as the
Dyle Plan, fitted with Belgian defensive plans and also with British objectives. Gamelin committed much of the motorised forces of the French Army and the entire
British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to this strategy. Such a strategy also meant that most of the French Army would leave its one-year-old prepared defensive positions in northern France to be committed to joining battle on an unknown Belgian defensive line. Despite reports of the build-up of German forces, and even knowing the date of the planned German attack, Gamelin did nothing until May 1940, stating that he would "await events". Then, when the Germans attacked, Gamelin insisted on moving 40 of his best divisions, including the BEF, northwards to conform to the Dyle Plan. In the first few days of the
Battle of Belgium, many Allied aircraft were attacked while still on the ground. The rest of the air support was concentrated on the French advance, rather than attacking the exposed column supplying the German advance. Quickly, the French and the British became fearful of being outflanked and they withdrew from the defensive lines drawn up across Belgium. They did not pull back fast enough to prevent them being outflanked by the German Panzer divisions. ) seen in
Frank Capra's film
Divide and Conquer The German wing that attacked further south was able to cross the River
Meuse faster than anticipated, aided by heavy
Luftwaffe aerial bombardment. Although almost all the crossings over the Meuse were destroyed by the French, one
weir north of
Sedan had been left intact and was only lightly defended. It was thus quickly captured and exploited by the Germans. Meanwhile, French guns were ordered to limit their firing in case they ran out of ammunition. German Colonel-General
Heinz Guderian disregarded his orders, and attacked aggressively on this front. In response, Gamelin withdrew forces in this area so that they could defend Paris, thinking this was the Germans' objective, rather than the coast.
Downfall of the Third Republic tank destroyed in 1940 The looming threat to France of Nazi Germany was delayed at the
Munich Conference of 1938. France and Great Britain abandoned
Czechoslovakia and appeased the Germans by giving in to their demands concerning the acquisition of the
Sudetenland (the portions of Czechoslovakia with German-speaking majorities). Intensive rearmament programs began in 1936 and were re-doubled in 1938, but they would only bear fruit in 1939 and 1940. Historians have debated two themes regarding the sudden collapse of the French government in 1940. One emphasizes a broad cultural and political interpretation, pointing to failures, internal dissension, and a sense of
malaise that ran through all French society. A second one blames the poor military planning by the French High Command. According to the British historian Julian Jackson, the
Dyle Plan conceived by French General
Maurice Gamelin was destined for failure, since it drastically miscalculated the ensuing attack by German
Army Group B into central
Belgium. The Dyle Plan embodied the primary war plan of
the French Army to stave off Wehrmacht
Army Groups A,
B, and
C with their much revered
Panzer divisions in the
Low Countries. As the French 1st, 7th, 9th armies and the
British Expeditionary Force moved in Belgium to meet Army Group B, the German Army Group A outflanked the Allies at the
Battle of Sedan of 1940 by coming through the
Ardennes, a broken and heavily forested terrain that had been believed to be impassable to armoured units. The Germans also rushed along the
Somme valley toward the
English Channel coast to catch the Allies in a large pocket that forced them into the disastrous
Battle of Dunkirk. As a result of this brilliant German strategy, embodied in the
Manstein Plan, the Allies were defeated in stunning fashion. France had to accept the terms imposed by
Adolf Hitler at the
Second Armistice at Compiègne, which was signed on 22 June 1940 in the same railway carriage in which the Germans had signed the
armistice that ended the First World War on 11 November 1918. The Third Republic officially ended on 10 July 1940, when the French parliament gave full powers to Marshal
Philippe Pétain, who proclaimed in the following days the
État Français (the "French State"), commonly known as the "Vichy Regime" or "
Vichy France" following its re-location to the town of
Vichy in central France.
Charles de Gaulle had made the
Appeal of 18 June earlier, exhorting all French not to accept defeat and to rally to
Free France and continue the fight with the Allies. ==Historiography==