From the 16th to the 20th centuries the Muslim world felt the external impact of European colonialism that brought a new era. Unlike the 7th century Byzantine Greeks and
Sasanian Persians, the 18th and 19th century British, French, Russian, etc. were conquerors, and unlike the medieval Turks and Mongols that had also conquered large areas of Muslim land, the Europeans had little interest in conversion to Islam or adopting Muslim ways.
Early modern empires (15th–16th centuries) In the early modern period between 1453 and 1526, three major states were founded by Muslim dynastic monarchies—in the Mediterranean (
Ottoman), Iran (
Safavid), and South Asia (
Mughal). They were known as the
Gunpowder empires for their use and development of the newly invented
firearms, especially
cannon and small arms, which allow them to expand and centralize their empires. By the early 17th century, the descendants of their founders controlled much of the Muslim world, stretching from the
Balkans and
North Africa to the
Bay of Bengal, with a combined population estimated at between 130 and 160 million. The empires all benefited from alliances between rulers and religious officials. The Muslim
Mughal dynasty ruled a
majority-Hindu population along with smaller
religious minorities, and were necessarily tolerant of other faiths. Much of the territory it gained (the
Balkans,
North Africa, and the
Levant) came from the land of
an older, related Abrahamic religion to the north, i.e.
Christianity.
Christendom was poorer and less sophisticated; its attempts to gain back lost territory from the Muslim world mostly unsuccessful for many centuries. The
Ottoman Empire began its expansion into Europe by invading the European portions of the
Byzantine Empire in the 14th and 15th centuries up until the
capture of Constantinople in 1453, establishing Islam as the state religion of the newly-founded empire. The
Ottoman Turks further expanded into
Southeastern Europe and consolidated their political power by invading and conquering huge portions of the
Serbian Empire,
Bulgarian Empire, and the remaining territories of the
Byzantine Empire in the 14th and 15th centuries. The empire reached its xenith of territorial expansion in Europe in the 16th century. They were useful in preventing both the
slave rebellions and the
breakup of the Empire itself, especially due to the
rising tide of nationalism among European peoples in its Balkan provinces from the 17th century onwards.
European kingdoms began establishing embassies and diplomatic missions to the
Ottoman Empire between the 15th and 16th centuries in order to create closer, and more friendly, relationships with the
Ottoman Turks (
see also:
Franco-Ottoman alliance).
Ottoman and Muslim decline The fear of
Ottoman expansion and its implications on
religion in Europe finally dissipated by the 17th century. Starting in the second half of the 17th century, with the end of the
Battle of Vienna and the
Treaty of Karlowitz (1699), this changed; Ottoman expansionism ended with their defeat in the
Great Turkish War (1683–1699). The Ottoman Empire, for centuries the mightiest Muslim state and referred to as the "cruel Turk" among Europeans, now was looked down upon by the other European countries as the "
Sick man of Europe", During the last hundred years of the Ottoman Empire
it gradually lost almost all of its European territories, until it was
defeated and eventually collapsed in 1922. This included the
French conquest of Algeria (1830). as well. The
First World War brought the
defeat and
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, (
see also:
Abolition of the Caliphate,
Abolition of the Ottoman sultanate,
Kemalism, and
Secularism in Turkey). understanding of
Ottoman history. However, by 1978, historians had begun to reexamine the fundamental assumptions of the Ottoman decline thesis. In addition to military advances, the economic development and worldwide colonization and exploration of Europeans and westerners meant their merchants had a vast array of products and commodities from across the world to sell to Muslims—including products (sugar, coffee, paper) that had originally been Muslim export products but that Westerners could now grow more cheaply in their colonies. Furthermore, the middlemen handling and profiting from the new western imports were usually not Muslims but foreigners or religious minorities (usually Christians), “seen and treated” as marginal. After World War II, colonies in Africa and Asia were freed but the new decolonized states were fragmented, no longer empires, and Western economic influence remained, and went well beyond commodities.
Reaction to European colonialism The fight for Islamic resurgence against Western encroachment might be divided into two contrasting approaches: meeting the enemy on its own terms and fighting "him with his own weapons", on the battlefield, in politics and in general by "modernizing". Or alternately with religious revival, since Islam is by definition superior to all faiths, failures and defeats in the temporal world must mean that those defeated Muslims are practicing authentic Islam and their states are not authentic Islamic states. Muslims must then return to the pure authentic Islam of the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions, discarding innovations and accretions to achieve victory over disbelievers. The first Muslim reaction to European colonization was of "peasant and religious", not urban origin. "Charismatic leaders", generally members of the
ulama or leaders of religious orders, launched the call for
jihad and formed tribal coalitions.
Islamic law (
sharīʿa), in defiance of local common law, was imposed to unify tribes. Examples include
Abd al-Qadir in
Algeria,
Muhammad Ahmad in
Sudan,
Shamil in the Caucasus, the
Senussi in
Libya and
Chad, Mullah-i Lang in
Afghanistan, the
Akhund of Swat in India, and later,
Abd al-Karim in
Morocco. Despite "spectacular victories" such as the
annihilation of the British army in Afghanistan in 1842 and the taking of
Kharoum in 1885, all these movements eventually failed The second Muslim reaction to European encroachment later in the century and early 20th century was not violent resistance but the adoption of some Western political, social, cultural and technological ways. Members of the urban elite, particularly in
Egypt,
Iran, and
Turkey, advocated and practiced "Westernization". The "paradigm of the executive as a force unchecked by either the sharia of the scholars or the popular authority of an elected legislature became the dominant paradigm in most of the Sunni Muslim world in the 20th century."
Pan-Islamism Pan-Islamism (in the sense of "Islamic unity or at least cooperation") was promoted in the
Ottoman Empire during the last quarter of the 19th century by the Ottoman sultan
Abdul Hamid II for the purpose of preventing secession movements of the Muslim peoples within the empire's territories and mobilizing Muslim opinion in support of "the faltering Ottoman state". The claim that the head of the last Muslim state of any size and power independent of Europe was "the head of all Islam", served as a rallying point for Sunni Muslims until the 1924 abolition of the Ottoman caliphate.
Early movement leaders The major leaders of the Pan-Islamist movement were the triad of
Jamal al-Din Afghani (1839–1897),
Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), and
Sayyid Rashid Rida (1865–1935). All were active in
anti-colonial efforts to confront European penetration of Muslim lands, believed Islamic unity to be the strongest force to mobilize Muslims against imperial domination.
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (who was actually from
Iran, not
Afghanistan, and brought up
Shīʿa, not
Sunnī) was an Islamic political activist who travelled throughout the
Muslim world during the late 19th century urging
pan-Islamic unity in
colonial India against the
British Empire. Al-Afghani's ideology has been described as a welding of "traditional" religious antipathy toward non-Muslims "to a modern critique of
Western imperialism and an appeal for the unity of Islam", urging the adoption of Western sciences and institutions that might strengthen Islam. He was thought to not have any deep faith in Islam, nor in a
constitutional government—which he doubted was a viable political alternative in the Islamic world—but was very interested in the overthrow of any Muslim rulers he saw as lax and/or subservient and their replacement with ones who were strong and patriotic.
Muhammad Abduh, an
Egyptian Islamic scholar,
judge, was a central figure of the Arab
Nahḍa (awakening), and
Islamic Modernism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. he helped publish a newspaper in Paris with him calling for a return to the original principles and ideals of Islam, and greater unity among Islamic peoples. As a
qāḍī in Egypt, he was involved in many decisions, some of which were considered quite liberal, such as calling for Muslims to accept interest on loans and meat butchered by
non-Muslims. He promoted both religious and scientific education. Islamic jurist
Muhammad Rashid Rida—a student of Abduh and Afghani—positioned himself as the successor to those two pan-Islamists and anti colonialists. He called for a unified Islam based on revival of the Islamic caliphate led by
Arabs and the
reformation of Muslims. Inspired by stories of the purity of the early eras of Muhammad and the Rashidun, he was more interested in
Wahhabism than
modernism, and preached for a puritanical Islam where
Islamic law (
sharīʿa) was implemented. According to Rida, the state-sponsored scholars neglected the revival of early Islamic traditions in the
Muslim community (
Ummah). His influential Islamic journal
Al-Manār promoted
anti-British revolt, as well as Islamic revivalism based on the tenets of
Salafism (
Salafiyya).
Caliph claimants The era between World War I and World War II was perhaps the nadir of Islamic power. The
Ottoman caliphate had been abolished by the
Grand National Assembly of Turkey in 1924 (see
Atatürk's reforms), and only two Muslim-majority countries were "genuinely independent"—
Iran and
Turkey. But rather than providing a model of Islamic independence, both of these country's rulers—
Reza Shah and
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, respectively—were secular, nationalist, modernizing, Westernizing. Into the void left by came a succession of claimants to the caliphate—
Hussein bin Ali, King of Hejaz in 1924, King Abdulaziz bin Abdul Rahman
Ibn Saud in 1926 (both in Arabia),
King Fuad in 1926, and
King Faruq "at various times" (both in Egypt).
Hussein bin Ali Hussein bin Ali, the
Sharif and Emir of Mecca from 1908-1924, enthroned himself as
King of the Hejaz after proclaiming the
Great Arab Revolt against the
Ottoman Empire,
Political Islam movement leaders Following
World War I, the
defeat and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, and the subsequent
abolition of the Caliphate by the Turkish nationalist and revolutionary
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of the modern
Republic of Turkey, Following
Jamal al-Din Afghani,
Muhammad Abduh, and
Sayyid Rashid Rida were Sunni Islamist thinkers/leaders Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leader
Hasan al-Banna, Brotherhood editor author
Sayyid Qutb and Indian journalist and politician
Abul A'la Maududi who sought Muslim strength and unity under sharia law. Al-Banna emphasised that "Islam considers the government one of its pillars and relies on enforcement as much as on persuasion. ... The Prophet made 'government' one of the essential bonds of Islam and it is viewed in our books of jurisprudence as a part of the doctrine
osul (fundamental) and not as a subsidiary
foru. Islam consists of rule and execution, as well as of legislation and preaching. Neither part can be separated from the other." Qutb and Maududi followed the rejectionist Islamic view of
Muhammad Rashid Rida, condemning imitation of foreign ideas, including
Western democracy, which they distinguished from the Islamic doctrine of
shura (consultation between ruler and ruled). This perspective, which stresses comprehensive implementation of
sharia, was widespread in the 1970s and 1980s among various movements seeking to establish an
Islamic state, but its popularity has diminished in recent years. Nostalgia for the days of successful Islamic empires simmering under later
Western colonialism The Islamist political program generally begins by re-shaping the governments of existing Muslim nation-states; but the means of doing this varies greatly across movements and circumstances. Many
political Islamist movements, such as the
Jamaat-e-Islami and
Muslim Brotherhood, focus on vote-getting and coalition-building with other political parties. and
Ayman al-Zawahiri of
al-Qaeda have promoted the overthrow of secular governments.
Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian Islamist ideologue and prominent figurehead of the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, was influential in promoting the
pan-Islamist ideology in the 1960s. When he was executed by the
Egyptian government under the
regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser,
Ayman al-Zawahiri formed the organization
Egyptian Islamic Jihad to replace the government with an Islamic state that would reflect Qutb's ideas for the
Islamic revival that he yearned for. The
Qutbist ideology has been influential on
jihadist movements and
Islamic terrorists that seek to overthrow secular governments, most notably
Osama bin Laden and
Ayman al-Zawahiri of
al-Qaeda, as well as the
Salafi-jihadi terrorist group
ISIL/ISIS/IS/Daesh. They also took part in the
bombings in Madrid in 2004 and
London in 2005. The recruits often came from the ranks of
jihadists, from
Egypt,
Algeria,
Saudi Arabia, and
Morocco. The term "jihadist globalism" is also often used in relation to
Islamic terrorism as a
globalist ideology, and more broadly to the
war on terror. The Austrian-American academic
Manfred B. Steger, Professor of
Sociology at the
University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, proposed an extension of the term "jihadist globalism" to apply to all extremely violent strains of religiously influenced ideologies that articulate the global imaginary into concrete political agendas and terrorist strategies; these include
al-Qaeda,
Jemaah Islamiyah,
Hamas, and
Hezbollah, which he finds "today's most spectacular manifestation of religious globalism".
Ibn Saud and Wahhabism Following Ibn Saud's
conquest of the Arabian Peninsula, pan-Islamism would be bolstered across the
Islamic world. During the second half of the 20th century, pan-Islamists
competed against left-wing nationalist ideologies in the
Arab world such as
Nasserism and
Ba'athism. At the height of the
Cold War in the 1960s and 1970s, Saudi Arabia and allied countries in the Muslim world led the Pan-Islamist struggle to fight the spread of
communist ideology and curtail the rising
Soviet influence in the world. As Saudi Arabia became an enormously wealthy petroleum exporter, it used its funds to propagate the Wahhabi school of Islam through the Muslim world, spending over $75 billion from 1982 to 2005 via international organizations such as
Muslim World League, the
World Assembly of Muslim Youth, the
International Islamic Relief Organization, etc.{{efn|various royal charities) Led by Prince Salman bin Abdul-Aziz,
Minister of Defense at the time, who became king in January 2015. and religious attaches at dozens of Saudi embassies, Mosque funding was combined with persuasion to propagate the
dawah Salafiyya; Ideologies coming from Europe that had for a time influence in the Muslim world included patriotism and liberalism in the 19th century. In the 1920, when Kemal Atatürk won the first major Muslim victory against a Christian power for centuries, defeating the Greeks and "facing down the mighty British Empire", he went on to secularize his country, converting what was left of the Ottoman Empire into the Turkish Republic, abolishing the caliphate, replacing
sharia law, with a
modified version of the
Swiss Civil Code, the
Arabic script with the
Latin script, and adopting a range of European practices, Westernizing his country. At first Atatürk's victory resounded throughout the Muslim world, though he was later reviled as a "traitor" by
Islamists. Arabism as a "common nationality" was first launched in the "late 19th and early 20th centuries". In the 1920s and 30s "nationalist leaders still dominated the political scene" in Muslim countries, and nationalist discourse alone was heard in public debate". However, with patriotism's fragmentation and liberalism's failure, others replaced them—fascism in the 1930s, communism from the 1950s to the 1980. Between the 1950s and the 1960s, the predominant ideology within the
Arab world was
pan-Arabism, which de-emphasized religion and encouraged the creation of
socialist,
secular states based on
Arab nationalist ideologies such as
Nasserism and
Baathism rather than Islam, By the 1990s, the secular ideologies of "liberalism, nationalism, capitalism, socialism, communism" had "failed utterly" to resolve the problems of the Muslim world (according to Bernard Lewis); and in the realm of political dissent in Muslim society, "from Cairo to Tehran, the crowds that in the 1950s demonstrated" against colonialism, and imperialism, were now simply anti-Westernism, and marched beneath the green banner of Islam, no longer "the red or national flag" (according to Olivier Roy). Atatürk's secularism was in retreat in Turkey.
Opposition to political Islam Dissenting from the orthodoxy that the Quran, Muhammad or the Rashidun had much to say about governance (or that Shura is a "pillar of Islam"), are some
Islamic Modernists.
Taha Hussein (1889-1973) writes: Jebran Chamieh also argues that while it is true Muhammad exercised the executive power, commanded armies, controlled the finances and revenues, made legal judgements, he created no organized system for these functions. Chamieh also points out that this practice (or lack thereof) was followed by the
Rashidun caliphate, who never established a "police force to keep law and order". When "the rebels attacked Caliph Othman in his house and assassinated him, no security measures were available to protect him. The caliphs did not establish an administration, a fiscal system, or a budget ... In the conquered lands, they retained the previous Byzantine and Persian administrative systems and kept the local employees to administer the country." Jebran Chemiah also notes that the two general comments on shura in the Quran say nothing further than that it is a good practice. The modality of the process, when, where and how shura should be used, whether the advise given must be followed, is not explained. Hadith, where obscure Quranic references are often explained when a theme from the Quran is thought worthy of explaining, say little or nothing. There is no evidence Muhammad held regular shura meetings with companions or ever felt their advice was binding on him when they gave it.
Islamic political theories Muslih and Browers identify three major Islamic theories on socio-political organization by prominent Islamic thinkers that conform to Islamic values and law. One Islamist view rejects democracy, but at least one other accommodates it: • The moderate Islamist view stresses the concepts of
maslaha (public interest),
ʿadl (justice), and
shura. Islamic leaders are considered to uphold justice if they promote public interest, as defined through
shura. In this view,
shura provides the basis for representative government institutions that are similar to Western democracy, but reflect Islamic rather than
Western liberal values.
Hasan al-Turabi,
Rashid al-Ghannushi, and
Yusuf al-Qaradawi have advocated different forms of this view. • The
liberal Islamic view is influenced by
Muhammad Abduh's emphasis on the role of reason in understanding religion. It stresses
democratic principles based on
pluralism and
freedom of thought. Authors like
Fahmi Huwaidi and
Tariq al-Bishri have constructed Islamic justifications for full citizenship of non-Muslims in an Islamic state by drawing on early Islamic texts. Others, like
Mohammed Arkoun and
Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, have justified pluralism and freedom through non-literalist approaches to textual interpretation.
Abdolkarim Soroush has argued for a "
religious democracy" based on religious thought that is democratic, tolerant, and just. Islamic liberals argue for the necessity of constant reexamination of religious understanding, which can only be done in a democratic context.
Muslim political opinion and theories As of the late 20th century (1988) scholar Bernard Lewis testifies to the popular power of Islam, which
Opinion polls (2012, 2018) Polls conducted by
Gallup and
Pew Research Center in
Muslim-majority countries indicate that most Muslims see no contradiction between democratic values and religious principles, desiring neither a
theocracy, nor a
secular democracy, but rather a political model where democratic institutions and values can coexist with the values and principles of
sharia. Opinions in the polls varied by country. • 2007 poll by Gallup found strong majorities in Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan agreeing with the statement the Shari'a must be the only source of legislation, while majorities in Indonesia and Iran agreed that it should be "a source but not the only source", and a majority in Turkey thought it should not be a source.
Islamic political attitudes Based on the Pew and Gallup opinion polls, Western scholars
John Esposito and
Natana J. DeLong-Bas distinguish four attitudes toward sharia and democracy prominent among Muslims, as of 2018: • Advocacy of democratic ideas, often accompanied by a claim that they are compatible with Islam, which can play a public role within a democratic system, as exemplified by many protestors who took part in the
Arab Spring uprisings; should administer "some" of the "religious and social affairs" of the Shi'i community. In its "absolute" form—the form advanced by the
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the basis of government in
Islamic Republic of Iran—the state and society are ruled by an Islamic jurist (
Ali Khamenei as of 2022). The theory was a variant of
Islamism, holding that since
sharia law has everything needed to rule a state (whether ancient or modern), and any other basis of governance will lead to injustice and sin, a state must be ruled according to sharia and the person who should rule is an expert in sharia. The theory of
sovereignty of the Guardianship of the Jurist (in fact of all Islam) explained by at least one conservative Shi'i scholar (
Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi), is contrasted with the theory of sovereignty in "most of the schools of political philosophy and other cultures". Non-Muslim cultures hold that "every man is free", and in democratic cultures in particular, "sovereignty ... belongs to the people". A ruler and government must have the consent of the governed to have
political legitimacy. Whereas in fact, sovereignty is God's. The "entire universe and whatever in it belongs to God ... the Exalted, and all their movements and acts must have to be in accordance with the command or prohibition of the Real Owner". Consequently, human beings "have no right to rule over others or to choose someone to rule", i.e. choose someone to rule themselves. In an Islamic state, rule must be according to God's law and the ruler must be best person to enforce God's law. The people's "consent and approval" are valuable for developing and strengthening the Islamic government but irrelevant for its legitimacy.
Contemporary movements Some common political currents in Islam include: Sunni Traditionalism, Fundamentalist reformism,
Salafi jihadism,
Islamism,
Liberalism and progressivism within Islam. Of these, only Liberal/progressivism and Islamism embrace political action. •
Sunni Traditionalism, which accepts traditional commentaries on the
Quran,
hadith literature, and
sunnah, and "takes as its basic principle imitation (
taqlid), that is, refusal to innovate", follows one of the
four legal schools or ''Madh'hab'' (
Shafiʽi,
Maliki,
Hanafi,
Hanbali), and may include
Sufism. An example of Sufi traditionalism is the
Barelvi school in
Pakistan. •
Fundamentalist reformism or
revivalism, which criticizes the
Islamic scholastic tradition, the
commentaries, popular religious practices such as
visitation to and
veneration of the
shrines and tombs of Muslim saints, perceived deviations and superstitions; it aims to return to the
founding scriptures of Islam. This fundamentalist reformism generally developed in response to a perceived external threat (for example, the
influence of Hinduism on Islam). 18th-century examples of fundamentalist Muslim reformers are
Shah Waliullah Dehlawi in
British India and
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the
Arabian peninsula, founder of the Islamic doctrine and movement known as
Wahhabism.
Salafism and
Wahhabism worldwide, the
Deobandi school in
South Asia (mainly
Pakistan and
Afghanistan),
Ahl-i Hadith and
Tablighi Jamaat in
India,
Bangladesh,
Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Pakistan are modern examples of fundamentalist reformism and revivalism. Scholar Olivier Roy argues that unlike Islamists, "Neofundamentalism" (which includes Wahhabi and Salafi Islam)
have no political element as they reject political action (such as founding or joining a political party even if the party is an Islamic one) as unislamic. Politic action like economy, constitution, political party, revolution, social justice, etc., are Western conceptual categories Muslims should have nothing to do with, even if they are given "an Islamic slant." "Indulging in politics, even for a good cause, will by definition lead to
bid'a and
shirk by "giving of priority to worldly considerations over religious values." •
Salafi jihadism, (such as
Al Qaeda,
Boko Haram,
ISIS),
Sunni Salafism of those who seek to establish a global
caliphate through armed struggle. Salafi jihadism is often described as "religiopolitical"
Islamist and an "ideology". Notwithstanding this they have not engaged in any traditional
political (as opposed to murderous or religious) activities. Al Qaeda, for example, has had "no political branch, union, women's organization, student branch or press, and there are no fellow-travelers. The `masses` are left on the pavement ... In this sense Al Qaeda is more a mafia or a sect than a professional underground organisation." •
Islamism or
political Islam, embracing a return to the
sharia or Islamic law but adopting Western terminology such as
revolution,
ideology,
politics, and
democracy, and taking a more liberal attitude towards issues like
jihad and
women's rights. Contemporary examples include the
Jamaat-e-Islami,
Muslim Brotherhood,
Iranian Islamic Revolution,
Masyumi party,
United Malays National Organisation,
Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party and
Justice and Development Party (Turkey). •
Liberal and progressive movements within Islam generally define themselves in opposition to Islamist and Islamic fundamentalist political movements, but often embrace many of their
anti-imperialist and Islam-inspired liberal reformist elements. Liberal Muslims affirm the promotion of progressive values such as
democracy,
gender equality,
human rights,
LGBT rights,
women's rights,
religious pluralism,
interfaith marriage,
freedom of expression,
freedom of thought, and
freedom of religion; Also contributing to the weakening of the
juristic scholarly class and their moderating influence in Islam has been the
international propagation of Wahhabism and allied conservative schools of Islam by Saudi Arabian petroleum exporting funds. It has led to the growth of expressions of puritanical intolerance (Abou El Fadl argues), including
Salafi Jihadism with its terror attacks on civilians. Feldman believes it is no coincidence that the collapse of the influence of independent scholars of Islamic law has coincided with the rise of Islamist movements calling for enforcement of Islamic (
sharia) law. In an analysis of the
shura chapter of the Quran, Qutb argued that Islam requires only that the ruler consult with at least some of the ruled (usually the elite), within the general context of
divine laws that the ruler must execute. Al-Nabhani argued that the
shura is important and part of "the ruling structure" of the Islamic caliphate, "but not one of its pillars", and may be neglected without the caliphate's rule becoming un-Islamic. However, these interpretations formulated by Qutb and al-Nabhani are not universally accepted in the Islamic political thought, and
Islamic democrats consider the
shura to be an integral part and important pillar of the Islamic political system. Both of the following terms,
Islamic democracy and
Islamic fundamentalism, lump together a large variety of political groups with varying aims, histories, ideologies, and backgrounds. ==See also==