Peace Corps volunteers on August 28, 1961 An agency to enable Americans to volunteer in
developing countries appealed to Kennedy because it fit in with his campaign themes of self-sacrifice and volunteerism, while also providing a way to redefine American relations with the
Third World. His use of war rhetoric for peaceful ends made his appeal for the new idea compelling to public opinion. On March 1, 1961, Kennedy signed
Executive Order 10924 that officially started the Peace Corps. He appointed his brother-in-law,
Sargent Shriver, to serve the agency's first director. Due in large part to Shriver's effective lobbying efforts, Congress approved the permanent establishment of the Peace Corps program on September 22, 1961.
Tanganyika (present-day
Tanzania) and
Ghana were the first countries to participate in the program. Kennedy took great pride in the Peace Corps, and he ensured that it remained free of CIA influence, but he largely left its administration to Shriver. Kennedy also saw the program as a means of countering the stereotype of the "
Ugly American" and "
Yankee imperialism," especially in the emerging nations of post-colonial Africa and Asia. In the first twenty-five years, more than 100,000 Americans served in 44 countries as part of the program. Most Peace Corps volunteers taught English in schools, but many became involved in activities like construction and food delivery.
The Cold War and flexible response Kennedy's foreign policy was dominated by American confrontations with the
Soviet Union, manifested by proxy contests in the global state of tension known as the
Cold War. Like his predecessors, Kennedy adopted the policy of
containment, which sought to stop the spread of communism. President Eisenhower's
New Look policy had emphasized the use of
nuclear weapons to
deter the threat of Soviet aggression. By 1960, however, public opinion was turning against New Look because it was not effective in stemming communist-inspired Third World revolutions. Fearful of the possibility of a global
nuclear war, Kennedy implemented a new strategy known as
flexible response. This strategy relied on conventional arms to achieve limited goals. As part of this policy, Kennedy expanded the
United States special operations forces, elite military units that could fight unconventionally in various conflicts. Kennedy hoped that the flexible response strategy would allow the U.S. to counter Soviet influence without resorting to war. At the same time, he ordered a massive build-up of the nuclear arsenal to establish superiority over the Soviet Union. In pursuing this military build-up, Kennedy shifted away from Eisenhower's deep concern for budget deficits caused by military spending. In contrast to Eisenhower's warning about the perils of the
military-industrial complex, Kennedy focused on rearmament. From 1961 to 1964 the number of nuclear weapons increased by 50 percent, as did the number of
B-52 bombers to deliver them. The new ICBM force grew from 63
intercontinental ballistic missiles to 424. He authorized 23 new Polaris submarines, each of which carried 16 nuclear missiles. Meanwhile, he called on cities to prepare
fallout shelters for nuclear war. In January 1961,
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev declared his support for
wars of national liberation. Kennedy interpreted this step as a direct threat to the "free world."
Decolonization and developing countries , the first president of an independent
Ghana, March 1961 Between 1960 and 1963, twenty-four
countries gained independence as the process of
decolonization continued. Many of these nations sought to avoid close alignment with either the United States or the Soviet Union, and in 1961, the leaders of
India,
Yugoslavia,
Indonesia,
Egypt, and
Ghana created the
Non-Aligned Movement. Kennedy set out to woo the leaders and people of the Third World, expanding economic aid and appointing knowledgeable ambassadors. His administration established the
Food for Peace program and the
Peace Corps to provide aid to developing countries in various ways. The Food for Peace program became a central element in American foreign policy, and eventually helped many countries to develop their economies and become commercial import customers. During his presidency, Kennedy sought closer relations with Indian Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru through increased economic aid and a tilt away from
Pakistan, but made little progress in bringing India closer to the United States. Kennedy hoped to minimize Soviet influence in Egypt through good relations with President
Gamal Abdel Nasser, but Nasser's
hostility towards
Saudi Arabia and
Jordan closed off the possibility of closer relations. In Southeast Asia, Kennedy helped mediate the
West New Guinea dispute, convincing Indonesia and the
Netherlands to agree to
a plebiscite to determine the status of
Dutch New Guinea.
Congo Crisis in 1962 Having chaired a subcommittee on Africa of the U.S. Senate's
Foreign Relations Committee, Kennedy had developed a special interest in Africa. During the election campaign, Kennedy managed to mention Africa nearly 500 times, often attacking the Eisenhower administration for losing ground on that continent, and stressed that the U.S. should be on the side of anti-colonialism and self-determination. Kennedy considered the
Congo Crisis to be one of the most important foreign policy issues facing his presidency. The
Republic of the Congo was given its independence from Belgian colonial rule on June 30, 1960, and was almost immediately torn apart by what President Kennedy described as "civil strife, political unrest and public disorder." In fact, Kennedy wasn't even aware Lumumba had been killed until February 13, 1961. On October 2, 1962, Kennedy signed United Nations bond issue bill to ensure U.S. assistance in financing United Nations peacekeeping operations in the Congo and elsewhere. Around this time, the Kennedy administration was making private attempts to convince Tshombe to reunite the breakaway Katanga that he led with the Congo, in advance of UN intervention.
Cuba and the Soviet Union Bay of Pigs Invasion at Miami's
Orange Bowl.
Fulgencio Batista, a Cuban dictator friendly towards the United States, had been forced out office in 1959 by the
Cuban Revolution. Many in the United States, including Kennedy himself, had initially hoped that Batista's successor,
Fidel Castro would preside over democratic reforms. Dashing those hopes, by the end of 1960 Castro had embraced
Marxism, confiscated American property, and accepted Soviet aid. The Eisenhower administration had created a plan to overthrow Castro's regime though an invasion of Cuba by a counter-revolutionary insurgency composed of U.S.-trained, anti-Castro Cuban exiles led by
CIA paramilitary officers. Kennedy had campaigned on a hardline stance against Castro, and when presented with the plan that had been developed under the Eisenhower administration, he enthusiastically adopted it regardless of the risk of inflaming tensions with the Soviet Union. Some advisors, including Schlesinger,
Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles, and former Secretary of State
Dean Acheson, opposed the operation, but Bundy and McNamara both favored it, as did the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, despite serious reservations. Kennedy approved the final invasion plan on April 4, 1961. On April 15, 1961, eight CIA-supplied
B-26 bombers left Nicaragua to bomb Cuban airfields. The bombers missed many of their targets and left most of Castro's air force intact. On April 17, the 1,500 U.S.-trained
Cuban exile invasion force, known as
Brigade 2506, landed on the beach at Playa Girón in the
Bay of Pigs and immediately came under heavy fire. The goal was to spark a widespread popular uprising against Castro, but no such uprising occurred. Although the Eisenhower administration plan had called for an American airstrike to hold back the Cuban counterattack until the invaders were established, Kennedy rejected the strike because it would emphasize the American sponsorship of the invasion. CIA director Allen Dulles later stated that they thought the president would authorize any action required for success once the troops were on the ground. The invading force was defeated within two days by the
Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces; 114 were killed and over 1,100 were taken prisoner. Kennedy was forced to negotiate for the release of the 1,189 survivors. After twenty months, Cuba released the captured exiles in exchange for a ransom of $53 million worth of food and medicine. Despite the lack of direct U.S. military involvement, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the international community all recognized that the U.S. had backed the invasion. Kennedy focused primarily on the political repercussions of the plan rather than military considerations. In the aftermath, he took full responsibility for the failure, saying: "We got a big kick in the leg and we deserved it. But maybe we'll learn something from it." Kennedy's approval ratings climbed afterwards, helped in part by the vocal support given to him by Nixon and Eisenhower. Outside the United States, however, the operation undermined Kennedy's reputation as a world leader, and raised tensions with the Soviet Union. A secret review conducted by
Lyman Kirkpatrick of the CIA concluded that the failure of the invasion resulted less from a decision against airstrikes and had more to do with the fact that Cuba had a much larger defending force and that the operation suffered from "poor planning, organization, staffing and management". The Kennedy administration
banned all Cuban imports and convinced the
Organization of American States to expel Cuba. Kennedy dismissed Dulles as director of the CIA and increasingly relied on close advisers like Sorensen, Bundy, and Robert Kennedy as opposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIA, and the State Department.
Operation Mongoose In late-1961, the White House formed the Special Group (Augmented), headed by Robert Kennedy and including
Edward Lansdale, Secretary Robert McNamara, and others. The group's objective—to overthrow Castro via espionage, sabotage, and other covert tactics—was never pursued. In November 1961, he authorized
Operation Mongoose (also known as the Cuban Project). In March 1962, Kennedy rejected
Operation Northwoods, proposals for
false flag attacks against American military and civilian targets, and blaming them on the Cuban government in order to gain approval for a war against Cuba. However, the administration continued to plan for an invasion of Cuba in the summer of 1962. In the weeks immediately after the Vienna summit, more than 20,000 people
fled from East Berlin to the western sector in reaction to statements from the Soviet Union. Kennedy began intensive meetings on the Berlin issue, where Dean Acheson took the lead in recommending a military buildup alongside NATO allies. In a July 1961 speech, Kennedy announced his decision to add $3.25 billion to the defense budget, along with over 200,000 additional troops, stating that an attack on West Berlin would be taken as an attack on the U.S. On August 13, 1961, the Soviet Union and East Berlin began blocking further passage of East Berliners into West Berlin and erected
barbed wire fences across the city, which were quickly upgraded to the
Berlin Wall. Kennedy acquiesced to the wall, though he sent Vice President Johnson to West Berlin to reaffirm U.S. commitment to the enclave's defense. In the following months, in a sign of rising Cold War tensions, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union ended a moratorium on nuclear weapon testing. A brief stand-off between U.S. and Soviet tanks occurred at
Checkpoint Charlie in October following a dispute over free movement of Allied personnel. The crisis was defused largely through a backchannel communication the Kennedy administration had set up with Soviet spy
Georgi Bolshakov. In 1963, French President Charles de Gaulle was trying to build a Franco-West German counterweight to the American and Soviet spheres of influence. To Kennedy's eyes, this Franco-German cooperation seemed directed against
NATO's influence in Europe. To reinforce the U.S. alliance with West Germany, Kennedy travelled to West Germany in June 1963. On June 26, Kennedy toured West Berlin, culminating in his famous "
Ich bin ein Berliner" ("I am a Berliner") speech in front of hundreds of thousands of enthusiastic Berliners. Kennedy used the construction of the Berlin Wall as an example of the failures of communism: "Freedom has many difficulties, and democracy is not perfect. But we have never had to put a wall up to keep our people in, to prevent them from leaving us." In remarks to his aides on the Berlin Wall, Kennedy noted that "it's not a very nice solution, but a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war." The Kennedy administration viewed the growing
Cuba-Soviet alliance with alarm, fearing that it could eventually pose a threat to the United States. Kennedy did not believe that the Soviet Union would risk placing nuclear weapons in Cuba, but he dispatched CIA
U-2 spy planes to determine the extent of the Soviet military build-up. On October 14, 1962, the spy planes
took photographs of intermediate-range ballistic missile sites being built in Cuba by the Soviets. The photos were shown to Kennedy on October 16, and a consensus was reached that the missiles were offensive in nature. Following the Vienna Summit, Khrushchev came to believe that Kennedy would not respond effectively to provocations. He saw the deployment of the missiles in Cuba as a way to close the "
missile gap" and provide for the defense of Cuba. By late 1962, both the United States and the Soviet Union possessed
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of delivering nuclear payloads, but the U.S. maintained well over 100 ICBMs, as well as over 100
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBMs). By contrast, the Soviet Union did not possess SLBMs, and had less than 25 ICBMs. The placement of missiles in Cuba thus threatened to significantly enhance the Soviet Union's
first strike capability and even the nuclear imbalance. Kennedy himself did not believe that the deployment of missiles to Cuba fundamentally altered the strategic balance of the nuclear forces; more significant for him was the political and psychological implications of allowing the Soviet Union to maintain nuclear weapons in Cuba. in the Oval Office, October 23, 1962. Kennedy faced a dilemma: if the U.S. attacked the sites, it might lead to nuclear war with the U.S.S.R., but if the U.S. did nothing, it would be faced with the increased threat from close-range nuclear weapons (positioned approximately 90 mi (140 km) away from the Florida coast). The U.S. would also appear to the world as less committed to the defense of the Western Hemisphere. On a personal level, Kennedy needed to show resolve in reaction to Khrushchev, especially after the Vienna summit. To deal with the crisis, he formed an ad hoc body of key advisers, later known as
EXCOMM, that met secretly between October 16 and 28. The members of EXCOMM agreed that the missiles must be removed from Cuba, but differed as to the best method. Some favored an airstrike, possibly followed by an invasion of Cuba, but Robert Kennedy and others argued that a surprise airstrike would be immoral and would invite Soviet reprisals. The other major option that emerged was a
naval blockade, designed to prevent further arms shipments to Cuba. Though he had initially favored an immediate air strike, the president quickly came to favor the naval blockade the first method of response, while retaining the option of an airstrike at a later date. EXCOMM voted 11-to-6 in favor of the naval blockade, which was also supported by British ambassador
David Ormsby-Gore and Eisenhower, both of whom were consulted privately. On October 22, after privately informing the cabinet and leading members of Congress about the situation, Kennedy announced on national television that the U.S. had discovered evidence of the Soviet deployment of missiles to Cuba. He called for the immediate withdrawal of the missiles, as well as the convening of the
United Nations Security Council and the Organization of American States (OAS). Finally, he announced that the U.S. would begin a naval blockade of Cuba in order to intercept arms shipments. On October 23, in a unanimous vote, the OAS approved a resolution that endorsed the blockade and called for the removal of the Soviet nuclear weapons from Cuba. That same day, Adlai Stevenson presented the U.S. case to the UN Security Council, though the Soviet Union's
veto power precluded the possibility of passing a Security Council resolution. On the morning of October 24, over 150 U.S. ships were deployed to enforce the blockade against Cuba. Several Soviet ships approached the blockade line, but they stopped or reversed course to avoid the blockade. On October 25, Khrushchev offered to remove the missiles if the U.S. promised not to invade Cuba. The next day, he sent a second message in which he also demanded the removal of
PGM-19 Jupiter missiles from
Turkey. EXCOMM settled on what has been termed the "
Trollope ploy;" the U.S. would respond to the Khrushchev's first message and ignore the second. Kennedy managed to preserve restraint when a Soviet missile unauthorizedly downed a U.S. Lockheed U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over Cuba, killing the pilot
Rudolf Anderson. On October 27, Kennedy sent a letter to Khrushchev calling for the removal of the Cuban missiles in return for an end to the blockade and an American promise to refrain from invading Cuba. At the president's direction, Robert Kennedy privately informed Soviet Ambassador
Anatoly Dobrynin that the U.S. would remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey "within a short time after this crisis was over." Few members of EXCOMM expected Khrushchev to agree to the offer, but on October 28 Khrushchev publicly announced that he would withdraw the missiles from Cuba. Negotiations over the details of the withdrawal continued, but the U.S. ended the naval blockade on November 20, and most Soviet soldiers left Cuba by early 1963. meeting on October 29, 1962 The U.S. publicly promised never to invade Cuba and privately agreed to remove its missiles in Italy and Turkey; the missiles were by then obsolete and had been supplanted by submarines equipped with
UGM-27 Polaris missiles. In the aftermath of the crisis, a
Moscow–Washington hotline was established to ensure clear communications between the leaders of the two countries. The Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world closer to nuclear war than at any point before or since. In the end, "the humanity" of the two men prevailed. The crisis improved the image of American willpower and the president's credibility. Kennedy's approval rating increased from 66% to 77% immediately thereafter. Kennedy's handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis has received wide praise from many scholars, although some critics fault the Kennedy administration for precipitating the crisis with its efforts to remove Castro. Khrushchev, meanwhile, was widely mocked for his performance, and was removed from power in October 1964. According to Anatoly Dobrynin, the top Soviet leadership took the Cuban outcome as "a blow to its prestige bordering on humiliation."
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty , a major milestone in early
nuclear disarmament, on October 7, 1963. Troubled by the long-term dangers of
radioactive contamination and
nuclear weapons proliferation, Kennedy and Khrushchev agreed to negotiate a nuclear test ban treaty, originally conceived in Adlai Stevenson's 1956 presidential campaign. In their Vienna summit meeting in June 1961, Khrushchev and Kennedy had reached an informal understanding against nuclear testing, but further negotiations were derailed by the resumption of nuclear testing. In his address to the United Nations on September 25, 1961, Kennedy challenged the Soviet Union "not to an arms race, but to a peace race." Unsuccessful in his efforts to reach a diplomatic agreement, Kennedy reluctantly announced the resumption of atmospheric testing on April 25, 1962. Soviet-American relations improved after the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the powers resumed negotiations over a test ban treaty. Negotiations were facilitated by the Vatican and by the shuttle diplomacy of editor Norman Cousins. On June 10, 1963, Kennedy delivered a
commencement address at the
American University in Washington, D.C. Also known as "A Strategy of Peace", not only did Kennedy outline a plan to curb nuclear arms, but he also "laid out a hopeful, yet realistic route for world peace at a time when the U.S. and Soviet Union faced the potential for an escalating nuclear arms race." Kennedy also made two announcements: 1.) that the Soviets had expressed a desire to negotiate a nuclear test ban treaty, and 2.) that the U.S. had postponed planned atmospheric tests. "If we cannot end our differences," he said, "at least we can help make the world a safe place for diversity." The Soviet government broadcast a translation of the entire speech and allowed it to be reprinted in the controlled Soviet press. As a U.S. senator in 1956, Kennedy publicly advocated for greater U.S. involvement in Vietnam. During his presidency, Kennedy continued policies that provided political, economic, and military support to the
South Vietnamese government. with Vice President Johnson and Ambassador
Frederick Nolting, The
Viet Cong began assuming a predominant presence in late 1961, initially seizing the provincial capital of Phuoc Vinh. After a mission to Vietnam in October, presidential adviser General
Maxwell D. Taylor and Deputy National Security Adviser
Walt Rostow recommended the deployment of 6,000 to 8,000 U.S. combat troops to Vietnam. Kennedy increased the number of military advisers and
special forces in the area, from 11,000 in 1962 to 16,000 by late 1963, but he was reluctant to order a full-scale deployment of troops. However, Kennedy, who was wary about the region's successful war of independence against France, was also eager to not give the impression to the Vietnamese people that the United States was acting as the region's new colonizer, even stating in his journal at one point that the United States was "more and more becoming colonists in the minds of the people."