Reasons advanced for the revolution and its
populist,
nationalist, and later
Shia Islamic character include: • A backlash against
imperialism; • The
1953 Iranian ''coup d'état''; • A rise in expectations created by the
1973 oil revenue windfall; • An overly ambitious economic program; • Anger over a short, sharp
economic contraction in 1977–1978; and • Other shortcomings of the previous regime. The Shah's regime was seen as oppressive, brutal, corrupt, and lavish by some of the society's classes at that time. It also suffered from some basic functional failures that brought economic
bottlenecks,
shortages, and inflation. The Shah was perceived by many as beholden to—if not a puppet of—a non-Muslim
Western power (i.e., the United States) whose culture was affecting that of Iran. At the same time, support for the Shah may have waned among Western politicians and media—especially under the
administration of US President
Jimmy Carter—as a result of the Shah's support for
OPEC petroleum price increases earlier in the decade. When President Carter enacted a
human rights policy which said that countries guilty of human rights violations would be deprived of American arms or aid, this helped give some Iranians the courage to post open letters and
petitions in the hope that the repression by the government might subside. The revolution that substituted the monarchy of
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi with
Islam and
Khomeini is credited in part to the spread of the
Shi'a version of the
Islamic revival. While often described mainly as a religious revolt, the revolution also grew from a mix of nationalist goals, political populism, and religious radicalism. It resisted
westernization and saw
Ayatollah Khomeini as following in the footsteps of the Shi'a
Imam Husayn ibn Ali, with the Shah playing the role of Husayn's foe, the hated tyrant
Yazid I. Other factors include the underestimation of Khomeini's
Islamist movement by both the Shah's reign—who considered them a minor threat compared to the
Marxists and
Islamic socialists—and by the
secularist opponents of the government—who thought the
Khomeinists could be sidelined.
Tobacco Protest (1891) At the end of the 19th century, the Shi'a clergy (
ulama) had a significant influence on
Iranian society. The clergy first showed itself to be a powerful political force in opposition to the monarchy with the 1891
Tobacco protest. On 20 March 1890, the long-standing Iranian monarch
Nasir al-Din Shah granted a concession to
British Major G. F. Talbot for a full monopoly over the production, sale, and export of tobacco for 50 years. At the time, the Persian tobacco industry employed over 200,000 people, so the concession represented a major blow to Persian farmers and
bazaaris whose livelihoods were largely dependent on the lucrative tobacco business. The boycotts and protests against it were widespread and extensive as result of
Mirza Hasan Shirazi's
fatwa (judicial decree). Within two years, Nasir al-Din Shah found himself powerless to stop the popular movement and cancelled the concession. The Tobacco Protest was the first significant Iranian resistance against the Shah and foreign interests, revealing the power of the people and the
ulama influence among them. On the other hand, during the early rise of Reza Shah,
Abdul-Karim Ha'eri Yazdi founded the
Qom Seminary and created important changes in
seminaries. However, he would avoid entering into political issues, as did other religious leaders who followed him. Hence, no widespread anti-government attempts were organized by the clergy during the rule of Reza Shah. However, the future Ayatollah
Khomeini was a student of Sheikh Abdul Karim Ha'eri.
Anglo-Soviet invasion and Mohammad Reza Shah (1941–1951) In 1941, an
invasion of allied British and Soviet troops deposed Reza Shah, who was considered friendly to
Nazi Germany, and installed his son,
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as Shah. Iran remained under Soviet occupation until the
Red Army withdrew in June 1946. The post-war years were characterized by political instability, as the Shah clashed with the pro-Soviet Prime Minister
Ahmad Qavam, the communist
Tudeh Party grew in size and influence and the Iranian Army had to deal with Soviet-sponsored separatist movements in
Iranian Azerbaijan and
Iranian Kurdistan.
Mosaddegh and The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (1951–1952) From 1901 on, the
Anglo-Persian Oil Company (renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1935), a British oil company, enjoyed a monopoly on sale and production of Iranian oil. It was the most profitable British business in the world. Most Iranians lived in poverty while the wealth generated from Iranian oil played a decisive role in maintaining Britain as a preeminent global power. In 1951, Iranian Prime Minister
Mohammad Mosaddegh pledged to throw the company out of Iran, reclaim the
petroleum reserves and free Iran from foreign powers. In 1952, Mosaddegh
nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and became a national hero. The British, however, were outraged and accused him of stealing. The British unsuccessfully
sought punishment from the
International Court of Justice and the United Nations, sent warships to the
Persian Gulf, and finally imposed a crushing
embargo. Mosaddegh was unmoved by Britain's campaign against him. One European newspaper, the
Frankfurter Neue Presse, reported that Mosaddegh "would rather be fried in Persian oil than make the slightest concession to the British." The British considered an armed invasion, but U.K. Prime Minister
Winston Churchill decided on a coup after being refused American military support by US President
Harry S. Truman, who sympathized with nationalist movements like Mosaddegh's and had nothing but contempt for old-style
imperialists like those who ran the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Mosaddegh, however, learned of Churchill's plans and ordered the
British embassy to be closed in October 1952, forcing all British diplomats and agents to leave the country. Although the British were initially turned down in their request for American support by President Truman, the election of
Dwight D. Eisenhower as US president in November 1952 changed the American stance toward the conflict. This, paired with
Cold War paranoia and fears of communist influence, contributed to American strategic interests. On 20 January 1953, US Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles and his brother,
C.I.A. Director
Allen Dulles, told their British counterparts that they were ready to move against Mosaddegh. In their eyes, any country not decisively allied with the United States was a potential enemy. Iran had immense oil wealth, a long border with the
Soviet Union, and a
nationalist prime minister. The prospect of a fall into
communism and a "second China" (after
Mao Zedong won the
Chinese Civil War) terrified the Dulles brothers.
Operation Ajax was born, in which the only
democratic government Iran ever had was deposed.
Iranian coup d'état and US influence On 15 August 1953 a coup d'état was initiated to remove Mosaddegh, with the support of the United States, the United Kingdom and most of the Shia clergy. Mosaddegh was removed from power and put under house arrest, while lieutenant general
Fazlollah Zahedi was appointed as new Prime Minister by the Shah. The sovereign, who was mainly seen as a figurehead at the time, eventually managed to break free from the shackles of the Iranian elites and impose himself as an autocratic reformist ruler. The coup reinstated Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as an absolute monarch and significantly increased
United States influence over Iran. Economically, American firms gained considerable control over Iranian oil production, with US companies taking around 40 percent of the profits. Politically, Iran acted as a counterweight to the
Soviet Union and aligned closely with the
Western Bloc. Additionally, the US provided the Shah both the funds and the training for
SAVAK, Iran's infamous
secret police, with
CIA assistance.
SAVAK's repression unfolded with little scrutiny or challenge from the US. By the late 1970s, popular resistance to the Shah's rule had reached a breaking point.
White Revolution (1963–1979) The White Revolution was a far-reaching series of reforms in
Iran launched in 1963 by
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and lasting until 1979. Mohammad Reza Shah's reform program was built especially to weaken those classes that supported the traditional system. It consisted of several elements including
land reform; sales of some
state-owned factories to finance the land reform; the
enfranchisement of women;
nationalization of forests and pastures; formation of a literacy
corps; and the institution of
profit-sharing schemes for workers in industry. The Shah pushed the White Revolution as a step toward
westernization, and it was a way for him to
legitimize the
Pahlavi dynasty. Part of the reason for launching the White Revolution was that the Shah hoped to eliminate the influence of landlords and to create a new base of support among the peasants and the working class. Thus, the White Revolution in Iran was an attempt to introduce reform from above and preserve traditional power patterns. Through land reform, the essence of the White Revolution, the Shah hoped to ally himself with the
peasantry in the countryside, and hoped to sever their ties with the
aristocracy in the city. What the Shah did not expect, however, was that the White Revolution led to new
social tensions that helped create many of the problems that he was trying to avoid. The Shah's reforms more than quadrupled the combined size of the two classes that posed the greatest challenges to his monarchy in the past — the
intelligentsia, and the urban
working class. Their resentment of the Shah also grew, as they were now stripped of organizations that had represented them in the past, such as political parties, professional associations, trade unions, and independent newspapers. The land reform, instead of allying the peasants with the government, produced large numbers of independent farmers and landless laborers who became loose political cannons, with no loyalty to the Shah. Many of the masses resented the increasingly corrupt government; their loyalty to the clergy, who were viewed as more concerned with the fate of the populace, remained consistent or increased. As
Ervand Abrahamian pointed out: "The White Revolution had been designed to preempt a
Red Revolution. Instead, it paved the way for an Islamic Revolution." In theory, oil money funneled to the elite was supposed to be used to create jobs and factories, eventually distributing the money, but instead the wealth tended to remain concentrated in the hands of the very few at the top.
Rise and exile of Ayatollah Khomeini (1963–1979) Post-revolutionary leader —
Twelver Shia cleric
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini — first rose to political prominence in 1963 when he led opposition to the Shah and his
White Revolution. Khomeini was arrested in 1963 after declaring the Shah a "wretched, miserable man" who "embarked on the [path toward] destruction of Islam in Iran." Three days of major riots throughout Iran followed, with 15,000 dead from police fire as reported by opposition sources. However,
anti-revolutionary sources conjectured that just 32 were killed. Khomeini was released after eight months of house arrest and continued his agitation, condemning Iran's close cooperation with Israel and its
capitulations, or extension of
diplomatic immunity, to American government personnel in Iran. In November 1964, Khomeini was re-arrested and
sent into exile where he remained for 15 years (mostly in
Najaf, Iraq), until the revolution.
Ideology of the Iranian Revolution with pictures of Ruhollah Khomeini in their hands In this interim period of "disaffected calm," the budding Iranian revival began to undermine the idea of
Westernization as progress that was the basis of the Shah's secular reign, and to form the ideology of the 1979 revolution:
Jalal Al-e-Ahmad's idea of
Gharbzadegi—that Western culture was a plague or an intoxication to be eliminated;
Ali Shariati's vision of Islam as the one true liberator of the
Third World from oppressive
colonialism,
neo-colonialism, and
capitalism; and
Morteza Motahhari's popularized retellings of the Shia faith all spread and gained listeners, readers and supporters. Most importantly, Khomeini preached that revolt, and especially
martyrdom, against injustice and tyranny was part of Shia Islam, and that Muslims should reject the influence of both liberal capitalism and communism, ideas that inspired the revolutionary slogan "Neither East, nor West – Islamic Republic!" Away from public view, Khomeini developed the ideology of
velayat-e faqih (
guardianship of the jurist) as government, that Muslims—in fact everyone—required "guardianship," in the form of rule or supervision by the leading Islamic jurist or jurists. Such rule was ultimately "more necessary even than prayer and fasting" in Islam, as it would protect Islam from deviation from traditional
sharia law and in so doing eliminate poverty, injustice, and the "
plundering" of Muslim land by foreign non-believers. This idea of rule by Islamic jurists was spread through his book
Islamic Government, mosque sermons, and smuggled cassette speeches by Khomeini among his opposition network of students (
talabeh), ex-students (able clerics such as
Morteza Motahhari,
Mohammad Beheshti,
Mohammad-Javad Bahonar,
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and
Mohammad Mofatteh), and traditional businessmen (
bazaari) inside Iran.
Opposition groups and organizations Other opposition groups included
constitutionalist liberals—the democratic, reformist Islamic
Freedom Movement of Iran, headed by
Mehdi Bazargan, and the more secular
National Front. They were based in the urban middle class, and wanted the Shah to adhere to the
Iranian Constitution of 1906 rather than to replace him with a theocracy, but lacked the cohesion and organization of Khomeini's forces.
Communist groups—primarily the
Tudeh Party of Iran and the
Fedaian guerrillas—had been weakened considerably by government repression. Despite this the guerrillas did help play an important part in the final February 1979 overthrow delivering "the regime its
coup de grace." The most powerful guerrilla group—the
People's Mujahedin—was leftist Islamist and opposed the influence of the clergy as reactionary. Some important clergy did not follow Khomeini's lead. Popular ayatollah
Mahmoud Taleghani supported the left, while perhaps the most senior and influential ayatollah in Iran—
Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari—first remained aloof from politics and then came out in support of a democratic revolution. Khomeini worked to unite this opposition behind him (except for the unwanted '
atheistic Marxists'), focusing on the
socio-economic problems of the Shah's government (corruption and unequal income and development), while avoiding specifics among the public that might divide the factions—particularly his plan for
clerical rule, which he believed most Iranians had become prejudiced against as a result of propaganda campaign by Western
imperialists. In the post-Shah era, some revolutionaries who clashed with his theocracy and were suppressed by his movement complained of deception, but in the meantime anti-Shah unity was maintained.
1970–1977 Several events in the 1970s set the stage for the 1979 revolution. The 1971
2,500-year celebration of the Persian Empire at
Persepolis, organized by the government, was attacked for its extravagance. "As the foreigners reveled on drink forbidden by Islam, Iranians were not only excluded from the festivities, some were starving." Five years later, the Shah angered
pious Iranian Muslims by
changing the first year of the Iranian solar calendar from the Islamic
hijri to the ascension to the throne by
Cyrus the Great. "Iran jumped overnight from the Muslim year 1355 to the royalist year 2535." ,
William Sullivan,
Cyrus Vance,
Jimmy Carter, and
Zbigniew Brzezinski, 1977 The
oil boom of the 1970s produced an "alarming" increase in inflation, waste and an "accelerating gap" between the rich and poor, the city and the country, along with the presence of tens of thousands of unpopular skilled foreign workers. Many Iranians were also angered by the fact that the Shah's family was the foremost beneficiary of the income generated by oil, and the line between state earnings and family earnings blurred. By 1976, the Shah had accumulated upward of $1 billion from oil revenue; his family – including 63 princes and princesses had accumulated between $5 and $20 billion; and the family foundation controlled approximately $3 billion. By mid-1977 economic austerity measures to fight inflation disproportionately affected the thousands of poor and unskilled male migrants settling in the cities working in the construction industry. Culturally and religiously conservative, many went on to form the core of the revolution's demonstrators and "martyrs". All Iranians were required to join and pay dues to a new political party, the
Rastakhiz Party —all other parties were banned. That party's attempt to fight inflation with populist "anti-
profiteering" campaigns—fining and jailing merchants for high prices – angered and politicized merchants while fueling
black markets. In 1977 the Shah responded to the "polite reminder" of the importance of political rights by the new American president,
Jimmy Carter, by granting amnesty to some prisoners and allowing the
Red Cross to visit prisons. Through 1977 liberal opposition formed organizations and issued open letters denouncing the government. Against this background a first crucial manifestation of public expression of social discontent and political protest against the regime took place in October 1977, when the German-Iranian Cultural Association in Tehran hosted a series of literature reading sessions, organized by the newly revived Iranian Writers Association and the German
Goethe-Institute. In these "Ten Nights" (Dah Shab) 57 of Iran's most prominent poets and writers read their works to thousands of listeners. They demanded the end of censorship and claimed the freedom of expression. Also in 1977, the popular and influential modernist Islamist theorist
Ali Shariati died under mysterious circumstances. This both angered his followers, who considered him a martyr at the hands of SAVAK, and removed a potential revolutionary rival to Khomeini. Finally, in October Khomeini's son Mostafa died of an alleged heart attack, and his death was also blamed on SAVAK. A subsequent memorial service for Mostafa in Tehran put Khomeini back in the spotlight.
Outbreak By 1977, the Shah's policy of political
liberalization was underway. Secular opponents of the Shah began to meet in secret to denounce the government. Led by the leftist intellectual
Saeed Soltanpour, the Iranian Writers Association met at the
Goethe Institute in Tehran to read anti-government poetry. Khomeini remained silent after the incident, while in Iran with the spread of the news came a wave of protest and mourning ceremonies in several cities. The mourning of Mostafa was given a political cast by Khomeini's political credentials, their enduring opposition to the monarchy and their exile. This dimension of the ceremonies went beyond the religious credentials of the family. == Approaching revolution (1978) ==