, September 22, 1973. Kissinger's mother, Paula, holds the Bible as President Nixon looks on. Kissinger served as
National Security Advisor and
Secretary of State under President
Richard Nixon and continued as Secretary of State under Nixon's successor
Gerald Ford. With the death of
George Shultz in February 2021, Kissinger was the last surviving member of the Nixon administration Cabinet. The relationship between Nixon and Kissinger was unusually close, and has been compared to the relationships of
Woodrow Wilson and
Colonel House, or
Franklin D. Roosevelt and
Harry Hopkins. In all three cases, the State Department was relegated to a backseat role in developing foreign policy. Kissinger and Nixon shared a penchant for secrecy and conducted numerous "backchannel" negotiations, such as that through the Soviet Ambassador to the United States,
Anatoly Dobrynin, that excluded State Department experts. Historian
David Rothkopf looked at the personalities of Nixon and Kissinger, saying: They were a fascinating pair. In a way, they complemented each other perfectly. Kissinger was the charming and worldly Mr. Outside who provided the grace and intellectual-establishment respectability that Nixon lacked, disdained and aspired to. Kissinger was an international citizen. Nixon very much a classic American. Kissinger had a worldview and a facility for adjusting it to meet the times, Nixon had pragmatism and a strategic vision that provided the foundations for their policies. Kissinger would, of course, say that he was not political like Nixon—but in fact he was just as political as Nixon, just as calculating, just as relentlessly ambitious ... these self-made men were driven as much by their need for approval and their neuroses as by their strengths. A proponent of
Realpolitik, Kissinger played a dominant role in
United States foreign policy between 1969 and 1977. In that period, he extended the policy of
détente. This policy led to a significant relaxation in U.S.–Soviet tensions and played a crucial role in 1971 talks with the People's Republic of China premier
Zhou Enlai. The talks concluded with a
rapprochement between the United States and China, and the formation of a new strategic anti-Soviet Sino-American alignment. He was jointly awarded the
1973 Nobel Peace Prize with
Lê Đức Thọ for helping to establish a
ceasefire and U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. The ceasefire, however, was not durable. and Kissinger appeared deeply ambivalent about it—he donated his prize money to charity, did not attend the award ceremony, and later offered to return his prize medal. As National Security Advisor in 1974, Kissinger directed the much-debated
National Security Study Memorandum 200.
Détente and opening to the People's Republic of China Kissinger initially had little interest in China when he began his work as National Security Adviser in 1969, and the driving force behind the rapprochement with China was Nixon. Like Nixon, Kissinger believed that relations with China would help the United States exit the Vietnam War and obtain long-term strategic benefits in confrontations with the Soviet Union. In April 1970, both Nixon and Kissinger promised
Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek, that they would never abandon
Taiwan or make any compromises with
Mao Zedong, although Nixon did speak vaguely of his wish to improve relations with the People's Republic. and
Mao Zedong, negotiated rapprochement with China. Kissinger made two trips to the People's Republic in July and October 1971 (the first of which was made in secret) to confer with Premier
Zhou Enlai, then in charge of
Chinese foreign policy. During his visit to Beijing, the main issue turned out to be Taiwan, as Zhou demanded the United States recognize that Taiwan was a legitimate part of the People's Republic, pull
U.S. forces out of Taiwan, and end military support for the
Kuomintang regime. Kissinger gave way by promising to pull U.S. forces out of Taiwan, saying two-thirds would be pulled out when the Vietnam war ended and the rest to be pulled out as
Sino-American relations improved. In October 1971, as Kissinger was making his second trip to the People's Republic, the issue of which Chinese government deserved to be represented in the United Nations came up again. Out of concern to not be seen abandoning an ally, the United States tried to promote a compromise under which both Chinese regimes would be
United Nations members, although Kissinger called it "an essentially doomed rearguard action". While American ambassador to the United Nations
George H. W. Bush was lobbying for the "
two Chinas" formula, Kissinger was removing favorable references to Taiwan from a speech that then Secretary of State
William P. Rogers was preparing, as he expected the country to be expelled from the United Nations. During his second visit to Beijing, Kissinger told Zhou that according to a public opinion poll 62% of Americans wanted Taiwan to remain a United Nations member and asked him to consider the "two Chinas" compromise to avoid offending American public opinion. Zhou responded with his claim that the People's Republic was the legitimate government of all China, and no compromise was possible. Kissinger said that the United States could not totally sever ties with Chiang, who had been an ally in World War II. Kissinger told Nixon that Bush was "too soft and not sophisticated" enough to properly represent the United States at the United Nations and expressed no anger when the
United Nations General Assembly voted to expel Taiwan and give China's seat on the
United Nations Security Council to the People's Republic. Kissinger's trips paved the way for the groundbreaking
1972 summit between Nixon, Zhou, and
Chinese Communist Party Chairman
Mao Zedong, as well as the
formalization of relations between the two countries, ending 23 years of diplomatic isolation and mutual hostility. The result was the formation of a tacit strategic anti-
Soviet alliance between China and the United States. Kissinger's diplomacy led to economic and cultural exchanges between the two sides and the establishment of "
liaison offices" in the Chinese and American capitals, though full normalization of relations with China would not occur until 1979.
Vietnam War discussing the Vietnam situation in
Camp David, 1972 (with
Alexander Haig) Kissinger discussed being involved in
Indochina prior to his appointment as National Security Adviser to Nixon. According to Kissinger, his friend
Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., the Ambassador to Saigon, employed Kissinger as a consultant, leading to Kissinger visiting Vietnam once in 1965 and twice in 1966, where Kissinger realized that the United States "knew neither how to win or how to conclude" the Vietnam War. The Paris peace talks had become stalemated by late 1969 owing to the obstructionism of the South Vietnamese delegation. The South Vietnamese president
Nguyễn Văn Thiệu did not want the United States to withdraw from Vietnam, and out of frustration with him, Kissinger began secret peace talks with Le Duc Thọ in
Paris parallel to the official talks that the South Vietnamese were unaware of. In June 1971, Kissinger supported Nixon's effort to ban the
Pentagon Papers saying the "hemorrhage of state secrets" to the media was making diplomacy impossible. On August 1, 1972, Kissinger met Thọ again in Paris, and for first time, he seemed willing to compromise, saying that political and military terms of an armistice could be treated separately and hinted that his government was no longer willing to make the overthrow of Thiệu a precondition. On the evening of October 8, 1972, at a secret meeting of Kissinger and Thọ in Paris came the decisive breakthrough in the talks. Thọ began with "a very realistic and very simple proposal" for a ceasefire that would see the Americans pull all their forces out of Vietnam in exchange for the release of all the
POWs in North Vietnam. Kissinger accepted Thọ's offer as the best deal possible, saying that the "mutual withdrawal formula" had to be abandoned as it had been "unobtainable through ten years of war ... We could not make it a condition for a final settlement. We had long passed that threshold". In the fall of 1972, both Kissinger and Nixon were frustrated with Thiệu's refusal to accept any sort of peace deal calling for withdrawal of American forces. On October 21 Kissinger and the American ambassador
Ellsworth Bunker arrived in Saigon to show Thiệu the peace agreement. Thiệu refused to sign the peace agreement and demanded very extensive amendments that Kissinger reported to Nixon "verge on insanity". Though Nixon had initially supported Kissinger against Thiệu,
H.R. Haldeman and
John Ehrlichman urged him to reconsider, arguing that Thiệu's objections had merit. Nixon wanted 69 amendments to the draft peace agreement included in the final treaty and ordered Kissinger back to Paris to force Thọ to accept them. Kissinger regarded Nixon's 69 amendments as "preposterous" as he knew Thọ would never accept them. As expected, Thọ refused to consider any of the 69 amendments, and on December 13, 1972, left Paris for Hanoi. Kissinger by this stage was worked up into a state of fury after Thọ walked out of the Paris talks and told Nixon: "They're just a bunch of shits. Tawdry, filthy shits". On January 8, 1973, Kissinger and Thọ met again in Paris and the next day reached an agreement, which in main points was essentially the same as the one Nixon had rejected in October with only cosmetic concessions to the Americans. Thiệu once again rejected the peace agreement, only to receive an ultimatum from Nixon which caused Thiệu to reluctantly accept the peace agreement. On January 27, 1973, Kissinger and Thọ signed a peace agreement that called for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Vietnam by March in exchange for North Vietnam freeing all the U.S. POWs. Along with Thọ, Kissinger was awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize on December 10, 1973, for their work in negotiating the ceasefires contained in the
Paris Peace Accords on "Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam", signed the previous January. According to
Irwin Abrams in 2001, this prize was the most controversial to date. For the first time in the history of the Peace Prize, two members left the
Nobel Committee in protest. Thọ rejected the award, telling Kissinger that peace had not been restored in South Vietnam. Kissinger wrote to the Nobel Committee that he accepted the award "with humility", and "donated the entire proceeds to the children of American service members killed or missing in action in Indochina". After the
Fall of Saigon in 1975, Kissinger attempted to return the award. In a 1998 interview, Kissinger said: "some countries, the Chinese in particular supported
Pol Pot as a counterweight to the Vietnamese supported people and
We at least tolerated it." Kissinger said he did not approve of this due to
the genocide and said he "would not have dealt with Pol Pot for any purpose whatsoever." He further said: "The Thais and the Chinese did not want a Vietnamese-dominated
Indochina.
We didn't want the Vietnamese to dominate. I don't believe we did anything for Pol Pot. But I suspect we closed our eyes when some others did something for Pol Pot."
Interview with Oriana Fallaci On November 4, 1972, Kissinger agreed to an interview with Italian journalist
Oriana Fallaci. Kissinger, who rarely engaged in one-on-one interviews with the press and knew very little about Fallaci, accepted her request after reportedly being impressed with her 1969 interview with
Võ Nguyên Giáp. The interview turned out to be a political and public relations disaster for Kissinger as he agreed that Vietnam was a "useless war", implied that he preferred to have dinner with
Lê Đức Thọ over
Nguyễn Văn Thiệu (in her 1976 book
Interview with History, Fallaci recalled that Kissinger agreed with many of her negative sentiments towards Thiệu in a private discussion before the interview), and engaged in a now infamous exchange with the hard-pressing Fallaci, with Kissinger comparing himself to a
cowboy leading the Nixon administration: {{blockquote|{{dialogue Nixon was enraged by the interview, in particular the comedic "cowboy" comparison which infuriated Nixon. For several weeks afterwards, he refused to see Kissinger and even contemplated firing him. At one point, Kissinger, in desperation, drove up unannounced to Nixon's
San Clemente residence but was rejected by
Secret Service personnel at the gates. Fallaci described the interview with the evasive, monotonous, non-expressive Kissinger as the most uncomfortable and most difficult she ever did, criticizing Kissinger as a "intellectual adventurer" and a self-styled
Metternich. In the second, more famous,
Blood Telegram the word '
genocide' was again used to describe the events, and further that with its continuing support for West Pakistan the U.S. government had "evidenced ...
moral bankruptcy". As a direct response to the dissent against U.S. policy, Kissinger and Nixon ended Archer Blood's tenure as United States consul general in East Pakistan and put him to work in the State Department's Personnel Office. Christopher Clary argues that Nixon and Kissinger were unconsciously biased, leading them to overestimate the likelihood of Pakistani victory against Bengali rebels. Kissinger was particularly concerned about the expansion of Soviet influence in the
Indian subcontinent as a result of
a treaty of friendship recently signed by India and the Soviet Union, and sought to demonstrate to China (Pakistan's ally and an enemy of both India and the Soviet Union) the value of a tacit alliance with the United States. Kissinger had also come under fire for private comments he made to Nixon during the Bangladesh–Pakistan War in which he described Indian prime minister
Indira Gandhi as a "
bitch" and a "
witch". He also said "the Indians are bastards", shortly before the war. Kissinger later expressed his regret over the comments.
Europe As National Security Adviser under Nixon, Kissinger pioneered the policy of
détente with the
Soviet Union, seeking a relaxation in tensions between the two superpowers. As a part of this strategy, he negotiated the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (culminating in the
SALT I treaty) and the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with
Leonid Brezhnev,
General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. Negotiations about strategic disarmament were originally supposed to start under the
Lyndon Johnson administration but were postponed in protest upon the
invasion by Warsaw Pact troops of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Nixon felt his administration had neglected relations with the Western European states in his first term and in September 1972 decided that if he was reelected that 1973 would be the "Year of Europe" as the United States would focus on relations with the states of the
European Economic Community (EEC) which had emerged as a serious economic rival by 1970. Applying his favorite "
linkage" concept, Nixon intended henceforward economic relations with Europe would not be severed from security relations, and if the EEC states wanted changes in American tariff and monetary policies, the price would be defense spending on their part.
Israeli policy and Soviet Jewry , 1973. According to notes taken by
H. R. Haldeman, Nixon "ordered his aides to exclude all
Jewish-Americans from policy-making on Israel", including Kissinger. One note quotes Nixon as saying "get K. [Kissinger] out of the play—
Haig handle it". He had a negative view of American Jews who lobbied for aid to Soviet Jews, calling them "bastards" and "self-serving". He went on to state that, "If it were not for the accident of my birth, I would be
antisemitic" and "any people who has been persecuted for two thousand years must be doing something wrong."
Arab–Israeli conflict In September 1973, Nixon fired
William P. Rogers as Secretary of State and replaced him with Kissinger. He would later state he had not been given enough time to know the Middle East as he settled into the State Department. Kissinger later admitted that he was so engrossed with the Paris peace talks to end the Vietnam war that he and others in Washington missed the significance of the
Egyptian-Saudi alliance. Egyptian president
Anwar Sadat expelled Soviet advisors from Egypt in May 1972, attempting to signal to the U.S. that he was open to disentangling Egypt from the Soviet sphere of influence; Kissinger offered secret talks on a settlement for the Middle East, though nothing came of the offer. By March 1973, Sadat had moved back towards the Soviets, closing the largest arms package between Egypt and the Soviet Union and allowing for the return of Soviet military personnel and advisors to Egypt. On October 6, 1973, at 6:15 am, assistant secretary for Near Eastern affairs
Joseph Sisco, informed Kissinger that Egypt and Syria were about to go to war with Israel. Sisco had been warned by U.S. ambassador to Israel,
Kenneth Keating, who two hours previously had been urgently summoned by Israel's Prime Minister Golda Meir who believed conflict was imminent. Prioritising
détente, Kissinger's first phone call (at 6:40 am) was to Soviet ambassador and good friend
Anatoly Dobrynin. He would later make calls to British ambassador
Rowland Baring and the U.N. secretary-general
Kurt Waldheim. Kissinger did not inform President Richard Nixon or
White House chief of staff Alexander Haig about the start of the
Yom Kippur War until either 8:35 or 9:25 am. as both were spending the weekend at Key Biscayne discussing
Spiro Agnew's imminent resignation. According to Kissinger his urgent calls to the Soviets and Egyptians were ineffective. On October 12, under Nixon's direction, and against Kissinger's initial advice, while Kissinger was on his way to Moscow to discuss conditions for a cease-fire, Nixon sent a message to Brezhnev giving Kissinger full negotiating authority. Kissinger wanted to stall a ceasefire to gain more time for Israel to push across the
Suez Canal to the African side, and wanted to be perceived as a mere presidential emissary who needed to consult the White House all the time as a stalling tactic. The
arms lift enraged King
Faisal of Saudi Arabia, and he retaliated on October 20, 1973, by placing a
total embargo on oil shipments to the United States, to be joined by all of the other oil-producing Arab states except
Iraq and
Libya. On November 7, 1973, Kissinger flew to
Riyadh to meet King Faisal and to ask him to end the oil embargo in exchange for promising to be "even handed" in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Despite Kissinger's efforts to charm him, Faisal refused to lift the oil embargo. Only on March 19, 1974, did the King end the oil embargo, after Sadat reported to him that the United States was being more "even handed" and after Kissinger had promised to sell Saudi Arabia weapons that it had previously denied under the grounds that they might be used against Israel. Kissinger pressured the Israelis to
cede some of the newly captured land back to its Arab neighbors, contributing to the first phases of Israeli–Egyptian non-aggression. In 1973–1974, Kissinger engaged in "shuttle diplomacy" flying between
Tel Aviv,
Cairo, and
Damascus in a bid to make the armistice the basis of a permanent peace. Kissinger's first meeting with
Hafez al-Assad lasted 6 hours and 30 minutes, causing the press to believe for a moment that he had been kidnapped by the Syrians. In his memoirs, Kissinger described how, during the course of his 28 meetings in Damascus in 1973–74, Assad "negotiated tenaciously and daringly like a
riverboat gambler to make sure he had exacted the last sliver of available concessions". Kissinger's efforts resulted in two ceasefires between Egypt and Israel,
Sinai I in January 1974, and
Sinai II in September 1975.
Persian Gulf (left) in
Riyadh on March 19, 1975. In the far background behind Faisal is his half-brother, the future
King Fahd. A major concern for Kissinger was the possibility of Soviet influence in the
Persian Gulf. In April 1969,
Iraq came into conflict with
Iran when Shah
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi renounced the 1937 treaty governing the
Shatt-al-Arab river. On December 1, 1971, after two years of skirmishes along the border, President
Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr broke off
diplomatic relations with Iran. In May 1972, Nixon and Kissinger visited
Tehran to tell the Shah that there would be no "second-guessing of his requests" to buy American weapons. At the same time, Nixon and Kissinger agreed to a plan of the Shah's that the United States together with Iran and Israel would support the
Kurdish peshmerga guerrillas fighting for independence from Iraq. Kissinger later wrote that after Vietnam, there was no possibility of deploying American forces in the Middle East, and henceforward Iran was to act as America's surrogate in the Persian Gulf. Kissinger described the
Ba'athist regime in Iraq as a potential threat to the United States and believed that building up Iran and supporting the
peshmerga was the best counterweight.
Turkish invasion of Cyprus Following a
period of steady relations between the U.S. Government and the
Greek military regime after 1967, Secretary of State Kissinger was faced with the
coup by the Greek junta and the
Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July and August 1974. In an August 1974 edition of
The New York Times, it was revealed that Kissinger and the State Department were informed in advance of the impending coup by the Greek junta in Cyprus. Indeed, according to the journalist, the official version of events as told by the State Department was that it felt it had to warn the Greek military regime not to carry out the coup. Kissinger was a target of
anti-American sentiment which was a significant feature of Greek public opinion at the time—particularly among young people—viewing the U.S. role in Cyprus as negative. In a demonstration by students in
Heraklion, Crete, soon after the second phase of the Turkish invasion in August 1974, slogans such as "Kissinger, murderer", "Americans get out", "No to Partition" and "Cyprus is no Vietnam" were heard. Some years later, Kissinger expressed the opinion that the
Cyprus issue was resolved in 1974.
The New York Times and other major newspapers were highly critical, and even State Department officials did not hide their dissatisfaction with his alleged arrogance and ignorance of the basic facts of the issue. However, Kissinger never felt comfortable with the way he handled the Cyprus issue. Journalist
Alexis Papahelas stated that Kissinger's "facial expression changes markedly when someone—usually Greek or Cypriot—refers to the crisis". Later, in the face of international pressure, Kissinger changed his stance, viewing the past hardline position in the Panama Canal issue as a hindrance to American relations with Latin America and an international setback that the Soviet Union would approve of. During the 1970 Cienfuegos Crisis, in which the
Soviet Navy was strongly suspected of building a
submarine base in the Cuban city of
Cienfuegos, Kissinger met with
Anatoly Dobrynin,
Soviet Ambassador to the United States, informing him that the United States government considered this act a violation of the agreements made in 1962 by President John F. Kennedy and Premier
Nikita Khrushchev in the wake of the
Cuban Missile Crisis, prompting the Soviets to halt construction of their planned base in Cienfuegos. In February 1976, Kissinger considered launching air strikes against ports and military installations in Cuba, as well as deploying
U.S. Marine Corps battalions based at the U.S. Navy base at
Guantanamo Bay, in retaliation for Cuban president
Fidel Castro's decision in late 1975 to
send troops to newly independent Angola to help the
MPLA in its fight against
UNITA and South Africa during the start of the
Angolan Civil War.
Intervention in Bolivia Following the uprising of October 7, 1970, General
Juan José Torres came to power in Bolivia, forming a left-wing nationalist government with an "anti-imperialist" stance. His policies, which included the nationalization of some American-owned property, led to the U.S. exerting external pressure over his government. On June 11, 1971, Nixon and Kissinger discussed the possibility of supporting a coup in Bolivia, and later in July, the
40 Committee approved covert funding towards Torres's opposition. Torres was successfully overthrown by the
Nationalist Popular Front, led by Hugo Banzer, on August 21, 1971.
Intervention in Chile shaking hands with Kissinger in 1976 Chilean
Socialist Party presidential candidate
Salvador Allende was elected in 1970, causing serious concern in Washington, D.C., due to his socialist and pro-Cuban politics. The Nixon administration, with Kissinger's input, authorized the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to encourage a
military coup that would prevent Allende's inauguration, but the plan was not successful. Prior to Allende's election Kissinger had said that "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist because of the irresponsibility of its own people". On September 11, 1973, Allende died during an army attack on the
presidential palace that was an element of a military coup launched by Army Commander-in-Chief
Augusto Pinochet, who then became the head of the
military junta which replaced Allende. In September 1976,
Orlando Letelier, a Chilean opponent of the new Pinochet regime,
was assassinated in Washington, D.C., with a car bomb. Previously, Kissinger had helped secure his release from prison, and had chosen to cancel an official U.S. letter to Chile warning them against carrying out any political assassinations. This murder was part of
Operation Condor, a covert program of political repression and assassination carried out by
Southern Cone nations that Kissinger has been
accused of being involved in. On September 10, 2001, after recent declassification of documents, relatives and survivors of General
René Schneider filed civil proceedings against Kissinger, in federal court in Washington, D.C., accusing him of collaborating in arranging Schneider's kidnapping which resulted in his death. The case was later dismissed by the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, citing
separation of powers: "The decision to support a coup of the Chilean government to prevent Dr. Allende from coming to power, and the means by which the United States Government sought to effect that goal, implicate policy makers in the murky realm of foreign affairs and national security best left to the political branches." Decades later, the CIA admitted its involvement in the kidnapping of General Schneider, but not his murder, and subsequently paid the group responsible for his death $35,000 "to keep the prior contact secret, maintain the goodwill of the group, and for humanitarian reasons".
Argentina Kissinger took a similar line as he had toward Chile when the
Argentine Armed Forces, led by
Jorge Videla, toppled the elected government of
Isabel Perón in 1976 with a process called the
National Reorganization Process by the military, with which they consolidated power, launching brutal reprisals and "
disappearances" against political opponents. An October 1987 investigative report in
The Nation broke the story of how, in a June 1976 meeting in the Hotel Carrera in
Santiago, Kissinger gave the military junta in neighboring Argentina the "green light" for their own clandestine repression against leftwing guerrillas and other dissidents, thousands of whom were kept in more than 400 secret
concentration camps before they were executed. During a meeting with Argentine foreign minister
César Augusto Guzzetti, Kissinger assured him that the United States was an ally but urged him to "get back to normal procedures" quickly before the
U.S. Congress reconvened and had a chance to consider sanctions. As the article published in
The Nation noted, as the state-sponsored terror mounted, conservative Republican U.S. Ambassador to Buenos Aires
Robert C. Hill was shaken, he became very disturbed, by the case of the son of a thirty-year embassy employee, a student who was arrested, never to be seen again,' recalled Juan de Onis, former reporter for
The New York Times. 'Hill took a personal interest.' He went to the Interior Minister, a general with whom he had worked on drug cases, saying, 'Hey, what about this? We're interested in this case.' He questioned (Foreign Minister Cesar)
Guzzetti and, finally, President
Jorge Videla himself. 'All he got was stonewalling; he got nowhere.' de Onis said. 'His last year was marked by increasing disillusionment and dismay, and he backed his staff on human rights right to the hilt." In a letter to
The Nation editor
Victor Navasky, protesting publication of the article, Kissinger claimed that: "At any rate, the notion of Hill as a passionate human rights advocate is news to all his former associates." Yet Kissinger aide
Harry W. Shlaudeman later disagreed with Kissinger, telling the oral historian William E. Knight of the
Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project: It really came to a head when I was Assistant Secretary, or it began to come to a head, in the case of Argentina where the dirty war was in full flower. Bob Hill, who was Ambassador then in
Buenos Aires, a very conservative Republican politician—by no means liberal or anything of the kind, began to report quite effectively about what was going on, this slaughter of innocent civilians, supposedly innocent civilians—this vicious war that they were conducting, underground war. He, at one time in fact, sent me a back-channel telegram saying that the Foreign Minister, who had just come for a visit to Washington and had returned to Buenos Aires, had gloated to him that Kissinger had said nothing to him about human rights. I don't know—I wasn't present at the interview. Navasky later wrote in his book about being confronted by Kissinger: 'Tell me, Mr. Navasky,' [Kissinger] said in his famous guttural tones, 'how is it that a short article in an obscure journal such as yours about a conversation that was supposed to have taken place years ago about something that did or didn't happen in Argentina resulted in sixty people holding placards denouncing me a few months ago at the airport when I got off the plane in
Copenhagen?' According to declassified state department files, Kissinger also hindered the
Carter administration's efforts to halt the mass killings by the 1976–1983 military dictatorship by visiting the country as
Videla's personal guest to attend the
1978 FIFA World Cup and praising the regime.
Brazil's nuclear weapons program Kissinger was in favor of accommodating
Brazil while it pursued
a nuclear weapons program in the 1970s. Kissinger justified his position by arguing that Brazil was a U.S. ally and on the grounds that it would benefit private
nuclear industry actors in the U.S. Kissinger's position on Brazil was out of sync with influential voices in the U.S. Congress, the State Department, and the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Rhodesia In September 1976, Kissinger was actively involved in negotiations regarding the
Rhodesian Bush War. Kissinger, along with South Africa's prime minister
John Vorster, pressured
Rhodesian prime minister
Ian Smith to hasten the transition to black
majority rule in
Rhodesia. With
FRELIMO in control of
Mozambique and even the
apartheid regime of South Africa reducing its support, Rhodesia's isolation was nearly complete. According to Smith's autobiography, Kissinger told Smith of Mrs. Kissinger's admiration for him, but Smith stated that he thought Kissinger was asking him to sign Rhodesia's "death certificate". Kissinger, bringing the weight of the United States, and corralling other relevant parties to put pressure on Rhodesia, hastened the end of white minority rule.
Portuguese Empire In contrast to the unfriendly disposition of the previous Kennedy and Johnson administrations towards the
Estado Novo regime of Portugal, particularly with regards to its attempts to maintain the
Portuguese Colonial Empire by waging the
Portuguese Colonial War against anti-colonial rebellions in defense of its empire, the Department of State under Kissinger adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards Portugal. In 1971, the administration of President Nixon successfully renewed the lease of the American military base in the
Azores, despite condemnation from the
Congressional Black Caucus and some members of the Senate. Though privately continuing to view Portugal contemptibly for its perceived atavistic foreign policy towards Africa, Kissinger publicly expressed thanks for Portugal's agreement to use its military base in
Lajes in the
Azores to resupply Israel in the Yom Kippur War. Following the
fall of the far-right Portuguese regime in 1974, Kissinger worried that the new government's hasty decolonization plan might benefit radical factions such as the
MPLA in
Angola. He also expressed concern that the inclusion of the
Portuguese Communist Party in the new Portuguese government could legitimize communist parties in other NATO member states, such as Italy.
East Timor with
Gerald Ford and Kissinger in Jakarta on December 6, 1975, one day before the
Indonesian invasion of East Timor The Portuguese decolonization process brought U.S. attention to the
former Portuguese colony of
East Timor, which declared its independence in 1975. Indonesian president
Suharto regarded East Timor as rightfully part of Indonesia. In December 1975, Suharto discussed invasion plans during a meeting with Kissinger and President Ford in the Indonesian capital of
Jakarta. Both Ford and Kissinger made clear that U.S. relations with Indonesia would remain strong and that it would not object to the proposed
annexation. They only wanted it done "fast" and proposed that it be delayed until after they had returned to Washington. Accordingly, Suharto delayed the operation for one day. Finally on December 7,
Indonesian forces invaded the former Portuguese colony. U.S. arms sales to Indonesia continued, and Suharto went ahead with the annexation plan. According to
Ben Kiernan, the invasion and occupation resulted in the
deaths of nearly a quarter of the Timorese population from 1975 to 1981.
Western Sahara The Kissingerian doctrine endorsed the forced concession of
Spanish Sahara to
Morocco. At the height of the 1975 Sahara crisis, Kissinger misled Gerald Ford into thinking the
International Court of Justice had ruled in favor of Morocco. Kissinger was aware in advance of the Moroccan plans for the invasion of the territory, materialized on November 6, 1975, in the so-called
Green March. ==Later roles==