Corruption At the onset of the
Syrian revolution, corruption in Syria was endemic, and the country was ranked 129th in the 2011
Corruption Perceptions Index. Since the 1970s, Syria's economy has been dominated by the patronage networks of Ba'ath party elites and
Alawite loyalists of the Assad family, who established control over Syria's public sectors based on kinship and nepotism. The pervasive nature of corruption had been a source of controversy within the Ba'ath party circles and the wider public; as early as the 1980s. Bashar al-Assad's economic liberalisation program during the 2000s became a symbol of corruption and nepotism, as the scheme's beneficiaries were Alawite loyalists who seized a significant portion of the privatised sectors and business assets. The government's actions alienated the vast majority of the Syrian public, particularly the rural and urban working classes, who strongly disliked the resulting economic disparities that became overtly visible. The persistence of corruption, sectarian bias towards Alawites, nepotism and widespread bribery that existed in party, bureaucracy and military led to popular anger that resulted in the eruption of the 2011 Syrian Revolution. The protests were the most fierce in working-class neighbourhoods, which had long bore the brunt of the regime's exploitation policies that privileged its own loyalists. According to
ABC News, as a result of the Syrian civil war, "government-controlled Syria is truncated in size, battered and impoverished." Economic sanctions (the
Syria Accountability Act) were applied long before the Syrian civil war by the U.S. and were joined by the EU at the outbreak of the civil war, causing disintegration of the Syrian economy. These sanctions were reinforced in October 2014 by the EU and U.S. Industry in parts of the country that are still held by the government is heavily state-controlled, with
economic liberalisation being reversed during the current conflict. The
London School of Economics has stated that as a result of the Syrian civil war, a
war economy has developed in Syria. A 2014
European Council on Foreign Relations report also stated that a war economy has formed: A
UN commissioned report by the Syrian Centre for Policy Research states that two-thirds of the Syrian population now lives in "extreme poverty". Unemployment stands at 50 percent. In October 2014, a $50 million mall opened in
Tartus which provoked criticism from government supporters and was seen as part of an Assad government policy of attempting to project a sense of normalcy throughout the civil war. A government policy to give preference to families of slain soldiers for government jobs was cancelled after it caused an uproar Taking advantage of the increased role of the state as a result of the civil war, Bashar and his wife Asma have begun annexing Syria's economic assets from their loyalists, seeking to displace the old business elites and monopolise their direct control of the economy.
Maher al-Assad, the brother of Bashar, has also become wealthy by overseeing the operations of Syria's state-sponsored
captagon drug industry and seizing much of the spoils of war. The ruling couple currently owns vast swathes of Syria's shipping, real estate, telecommunications and banking sectors. Significant changes have been happening to Syrian economy since the government's confiscation campaigns launched in 2019, which involved major economic assets being transferred to the Presidential couple to project their power and influence. Particularly noteworthy dynamic has been the rise of
Asma al-Assad, who heads Syria's clandestine economic council and is thought to have become "a central funnel of economic power in Syria". Through her Syria Trust NGO, the backbone of her financial network, Asma vets the foreign aid coming to Syria; since the government authorises UN organisations only if it works under state agencies. Corruption has been rising sporadically in recent years, with Syria being considered the most corrupt country in the
Arab World. As of 2022, Syria is the ranked second worst globally in the
Corruption Perceptions Index.
Sectarianism Hafez al-Assad's government was widely counted amongst the most repressive Arab
dictatorships of the 20th century. As Bashar inherited his father's mantle, he sought to implement "authoritarian upgrading" by purging those from his father's generation and staffing the party and military with loyalist Alawite officers, further entrenching the sectarianism within the system. While officially the Ba'athist government adheres to a strict secularist doctrine, in practice it has implemented sectarian engineering policies in the society to suppress dissent and monopolise its absolute power. The regime has attempted to portray itself to the outside world as "the protector of minorities" and instills the fear of the majority rule in the society to mobilise loyalists from minorities. Assad loyalist figures like
Michel Samaha have advocated sectarian mobilisation to defend the regime from what he labelled as the "sea of
Sunnis". Assad regime has unleashed sectarian violence through private Alawite militias like the
Shabiha, particularly in Sunni areas. Alawite religious iconography and communal sentiments are common themes used by
Alawite warrior-shaykhs who lead the Alawite militias; as justification to commit massacres, abductions and torture in opposition strongholds. Various development policies adopted by the regime had followed a sectarian pattern. An urbanisation scheme implemented by the government in the city of Homs led to expulsions of thousands of Sunni residents during the 2000s, while Alawite majority areas were left intact. Even as
Syrian Ba'athism absorbed diverse communal identities into the homogenous unifying discourse of the state; socio-political power became monopolised by Alawite loyalists. Despite officially adhering to non-confessionalism,
Syrian Armed Forces have also been institutionally sectarianised. While the conscripts and lower-ranks are overwhelmingly non-Alawite, the higher ranks are packed by Alawite loyalists who effectively control the logistics and security policy. Elite units of the Syrian military such as the
Tiger Forces,
Republican Guard,
4th Armoured Division, etc. regarded by the government as crucial for its survival; are composed mostly of Alawites. Sunni officers are under constant surveillance by the secret police, with most of them being assigned with Alawite assistants who monitor their movements. Pro-regime
paramilitary groups such as the
National Defense Force are also organised around sectarian loyalty to the Ba'athist government. During the
Syrian Revolution uprisings, the
Ba'athist government deployed a securitisation strategy that depended on sectarian mobilisation, unleashing violence on protestors and extensive crackdowns across the country, prompting opposition groups to turn to armed revolt. Syrian society was further sectarianised following the
Iranian intervention in the Syrian civil war, which witnessed numerous
Khomeinist militant groups sponsored by Iran fight in the side of the Assad government. The president made key decisions with counsel from a small number of security advisors, ministers, and senior members of the ruling Ba'ath Party, with scant regard for punishing, arresting, or prosecuting officials who violated human rights. The surveillance system of the
Mukhabarat was pervasive, with the total number of agents working for its various branches estimated to be as high as 1:158 ratio with the civilian population. Security services shut down civil society organisations, curtailed freedom of movement within the country and banned non-Ba'athist political literature and symbols. In 2010,
Human Rights Watch published the report "
A Wasted Decade" documenting repression during Assad's first decade of
emergency rule; marked by arbitrary arrests, censorship and discrimination against
Syrian Kurds. in 2006 Throughout the 2000s,
Mukhabarat agents carried out routine
abductions,
arbitrary detentions and
torture of civilians. Numerous
show trials were conducted against dissidents, filling Syrian prisons with journalists and human rights activists. Members of Syria's
General Intelligence Directorate had long enjoyed broad privileges to carry out extrajudicial actions and they have immunity from criminal offences. In 2008, Assad extended this immunity to other departments of security forces. In addition, some 600 Lebanese political prisoners were thought to be held in government prisons since the
Syrian occupation of Lebanon, with some held for as long as over 30 years. From 2006, the Assad government expanded the use of travel bans against political dissidents. In an interview with
ABC News in 2007, Assad stated: "We don't have such [things as] political prisoners," though
The New York Times reported the arrest of 30 Syrian political dissidents who were organising a joint opposition front in December 2007, with 3 members of this group considered to be opposition leaders being remanded in custody. The government also denied permission for human rights organisations and independent NGOs to work in the country. Following the protests of the
Syrian revolution in 2011, Assad partially relaxed the veil ban. in solidarity with the people of Syria. The sign reads: "Stop torture and inhumane treatment of prisoners in Syria!"
Foreign Affairs journal released an editorial on the Syrian situation in the wake of the 2011 protests: Under Ba'athist rule, non-Arab ethnic groups in Syrian society were heavily marginalized. Ethnic minority groups in Syria like the
Kurds,
Turkmen,
Circassians,
Chechens, etc. were systematically persecuted and oppressed under discriminatory state policies. The
2012 constitution pushed by the Assad regime, which was widely criticized by Syrian opposition and civil society activists, entrenched the discriminatory
Arab nationalist policies of the Ba'athist system. Languages other than
Arabic were not recognized in the Ba'athist constitutions; and Ba'ath party's front groups such as the "Ba'ath Vanguard" and "
Shabibat al-Thawra" indoctrinated students with racist and chauvinist ideas in Syrian state educational institutions. Kurds, in particular, were heavily repressed and systemically targeted by the state apparatus. Hundreds of thousands of
Syrian Kurds were stripped of citizenship, and several Kurdish localities were Arabized. Assad regime also imposed several restrictions upon Syrian Kurds from speaking the Kurdish language, and launched crackdowns against those who taught the
Kurdish language privately. Several Kurdish tutors were
forcibly disappered or subjected to prolonged imprisonments under charges of fomenting "seperatism", treason, and undermining the stability of the Ba'athist state. Between 2011 and 2013, the Ba'athist state security apparatus tortured and killed over 10,000
civil activists,
political dissidents,
journalists,
civil defense volunteers and those accused of treason and terror charges, as part of a campaign of deadly crackdown ordered by Assad. In June 2023,
UN General Assembly voted in favour of establishing an independent body to investigate the whereabouts of hundreds of thousands of missing civilians who have been forcibly disappeared, killed or languishing in Assad regime's
dungeons and
torture chambers. The vote was condemned by Russia, North Korea and Iran. In 2023,
Canada and Netherlands
filed a lawsuit against Syria at the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), charging the latter with violating the
United Nations Convention Against Torture. The joint petition accused the Syrian regime of organizing "unimaginable physical and mental pain and suffering" as a strategy to collectively punish the Syrian population. Russia vetoed
UN Security Council efforts to prosecute Bashar al-Assad at the International Criminal Court.
Repression of Kurds Ba'athist Syria had long banned
Kurdish language in schools and public institutions; and discrimination against
Kurds steadily increased during the rule of Bashar al-Assad. State policy officially suppressed Kurdish culture; with more than 300,000 Syrian Kurds being rendered stateless. Kurdish grievances against state persecution eventually culminated in the
2004 Qamishli Uprisings, which were crushed down violently after sending Syrian military forces. The ensuing crackdown resulted in the killings of more than 36 Kurds and injuring at least 160 demonstrators. More than 2000 civilians were arrested and tortured in government detention centres. Restrictions on Kurdish activities were further tightened following the Qamishli massacre, with the
Assad regime virtually banning all Kurdish cultural gatherings and political activism under the charges of "inciting strife" or "weakening national sentiment". During 2005–2010,
Human Rights Watch verified security crackdowns on at least 14
Kurdish political and cultural gatherings.
Censorship On 22 September 2001, Assad decreed a Press Law that tightened government control over all literature printed or published in Syria; ranging from newspapers to books, pamphlets and periodicals. Publishers, writers, editors, distributors, journalists and other individuals accused of violating the Press Law are imprisoned or fined. Censorship has also been expanded into the
cyberspace, and various websites are banned. Numerous bloggers and content creators have been arrested under various "national security" charges. Another decree in 2008 obligated internet cafes to keep records of their customers and report them routinely to the police. Websites such as
Arabic Wikipedia,
YouTube, and
Facebook were
blocked intermittently between 2008 and February 2011.
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) ranked Syria as the third dangerous country to be an online blogger in 2009. Individuals are arrested based on a wide variety of accusations; ranging from undermining "national unity" to posting or sharing "false" content.
Crackdowns, ethnic cleansing, and forced disappearances The
crackdown ordered by Bashar al-Assad against Syrian protesters was the most ruthless of all military clampdowns in the entire
Arab Spring. As violence deteriorated and death toll mounted to the thousands; the European Union, Arab League and United States began imposing wide range of sanctions against Assad regime. By December 2011,
United Nations had declared the situation in Syria to be a "
civil war". By this point, all the protestors and armed
resistance groups had viewed the unconditional resignation of Bashar al-Assad as part of their core demands. In July 2012,
Arab League held an emergency session demanding the "swift resignation" of Assad and promised "safe exit" if he accepted the offer. Assad rebuffed the offers, instead seeking foreign military support from Iran and Russia to defend his embattled regime through
scorched-earth tactics, massacres, sieges, forced starvations, ethnic cleansing, etc. The crackdowns and extermination campaigns of Assad regime resulted in the
Syrian refugee crisis; causing the
forced displacement of 14 million Syrians, with around 7.2 million refugees. This has made the Syrian refugee crisis the largest
refugee crisis in the world; and
UNHCR High Commissioner
Filippo Grandi has described it as "the biggest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time and a continuing cause for suffering."
Ethnic cleansing Eva Koulouriotis has described Bashar al-Assad as the "master of
ethnic cleansing in the 21st century". During the course of the civil war, Assad ordered depopulation campaigns throughout the country to re-shape its demography in favor of his regime and the military tactics have been compared to the
persecutions of the Bosnian war. Between 2011 and 2015,
Ba'athist militias are reported to have committed 49 ethno-sectarian
massacres for the purpose of implementing its social engineering agenda in the country.
Alawite loyalist militias known as the
Shabiha have been launched into
Sunni villages and towns, perpetrating numerous
anti-Sunni massacres. These include the
Houla,
Bayda and Baniyas massacres,
Al-Qubeir massacre, Al-Hasawiya massacre, and others which have resulted in hundreds of deaths with hundreds of thousands of residents fleeing under threats of regime persecution and
sexual violence. Pogroms and deportations were pronounced in central Syrian regions and Alawite majority coastal areas where the Syrian military and Hezbollah prioritise the establishment of strategic control by expelling Sunni residents and bringing in Iran-backed Shia militants. In 2016, UN officials criticised Bashar al-Assad for pursuing demographic engineering and ethnic cleansing in
Darayya district in Damascus under the guise of de-escalation deals.
War crimes Syrian government forces have pursued mass-killings of civilian populations as part of its war strategy throughout the conflict and is responsible for inflicting more than 90% of the
total civilian deaths in the Syrian civil war. The UN estimates a minimum of 306,000 civilian deaths occurred between 2011 and 2021. An additional 154,000 civilians have been
forcibly disappeared or subject to
arbitrary detentions across Syria between 2011 and 2023. As of 2023, more than 135,000 individuals are being
tortured, incarcerated or dead in
Ba'athist prison networks, including thousands of
women and
children. Since 2011, the Assad regime has arrested and detained children without trial until the age of 18, after which they are transferred to Syrian military field courts and killed. A 2024 investigative report by the Syrian Investigative Journalism Unit (SIRAJ) identified 24 Syrian children who were forcibly disappeared, had their assets confiscated, detained and later killed after they reached the age of 18. The report, based on inside sources within the Assad government, interviews with victims' families, and public sources, estimated that more than 6,000 detainees under the age of 18 were sentenced to death in the
Sednaya Prison and an Assadist military field court in
Al-Dimas between 2014 and 2017, citing eyewitness accounts of an insider within the Ba'athist military police. Numerous politicians, dissidents, authors and journalists have nicknamed Assad as the "butcher" of Syria for his war-crimes,
anti-Sunni sectarian mass-killings,
chemical weapons attacks and
ethnic cleansing campaigns. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation has stated that at least 10 European citizens were tortured by the Assad government while detained during the Syrian civil war, potentially leaving Assad open to prosecution by individual European countries for
war crimes.
Stephen Rapp, the
U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, stated in 2014 that the crimes committed by Assad are the worst seen since those of
Nazi Germany. In March 2015, Rapp further stated that the case against Assad is "much better" than those against
Slobodan Milošević of Serbia or
Charles Taylor of Liberia, both of whom were indicted by international tribunals. Charles Lister, Director of the Countering Terror and Extremism Program at
Middle East Institute, describes Bashar al-Assad as the "21st century's biggest war criminal". The
BBC Middle East editor conducting the interview,
Jeremy Bowen, later described Assad's statement regarding barrel bombs as "patently not true". As soon as
demonstrations arose in 2011–2012, Bashar al-Assad opted to implement the "
Samson option", the characteristic approach of the
Neo-ba'athist regime since the era of Hafez al-Assad; wherein protests were violently suppressed and demonstrators were shot and fired at directly by the armed forces. However, unlike Hafez; Bashar had even less loyalty and was politically fragile, exacerbated by alienation of the majority of the population. As a result, Bashar chose to crack down on dissent far more comprehensively and harshly than his father; and a mere allegation of collaboration was reason enough to get assassinated.
Nadim Shehadi, the director of
The Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies, stated that "In the early 1990s, Saddam Hussein was massacring his people and we were worried about the weapons inspectors," and claimed that "Assad did that too. He kept us busy with chemical weapons when he massacred his people." Contrasting the policies of Hafez al-Assad and that of his son Bashar, former
Syrian vice-president and
Ba'athist dissident
Abdul Halim Khaddam states: The Father had a mind and the Son has a loss of reason. How could the army use its force and the security apparatus with all its might to destroy Syria because of a protest against the mistakes of one of your security officials. The father would act differently. Father Hafez hit Hama after he encircled it, warned and then hit Hama after a long siege... But his son is different. On the subject of Daraa, Bashar gave instructions to open fire on the demonstrators. Human rights organisations and criminal investigators have documented Assad's war crimes and sent it to the
International Criminal Court for indictment. Since Syria is not a party to the
Rome Statute,
International Criminal Court requires authorisation from the
UN Security Council to send Bashar al-Assad to tribunal. As this gets consistently
vetoed by Assad's primary backer
Russia, ICC prosecutions have not transpired. On the other hand, courts in various European countries have begun prosecuting and convicting senior Ba'ath party members,
Syrian military commanders and
Mukhabarat officials charged with war crimes. In September 2015, France began an inquiry into Assad for
crimes against humanity, with French Foreign Minister
Laurent Fabius stating "Faced with these crimes that offend the human conscience, this bureaucracy of horror, faced with this denial of the values of humanity, it is our responsibility to act against the impunity of the killers". In February 2016, head of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria,
Paulo Pinheiro, told reporters: "The mass scale of deaths of detainees suggests that the government of Syria is responsible for acts that amount to extermination as a crime against humanity." The UN Commission reported finding "unimaginable abuses", including women and children as young as seven perishing while being held by Syrian authorities. The report also stated: "There are reasonable grounds to believe that high-ranking officersincluding the heads of branches and directoratescommanding these detention facilities, those in charge of the military police, as well as their civilian superiors, knew of the vast number of deaths occurring in detention facilities ... yet did not take action to prevent abuse, investigate allegations or prosecute those responsible". In March 2016, the
U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs led by
New Jersey Rep.
Chris Smith called on the Obama administration to create a war crimes
tribunal to investigate and prosecute violations "whether committed by the officials of the Government of Syria or other parties to the civil war". In June 2018, Germany's chief prosecutor issued an international arrest warrant for one of Assad's most senior military officials,
Jamil Hassan. Hassan is the head of Syria's powerful
Air Force Intelligence Directorate. Detention centers run by Air Force Intelligence are among the most notorious in Syria, and thousands are believed to have died because of
torture or neglect. Charges filed against Hassan claim he had command responsibility over the facilities and therefore knew of the abuse. The move against Hassan marked an important milestone of prosecutors trying to bring senior members of Assad's inner circle to trial for war crimes. In an investigative report about the
Tadamon Massacre, Professors
Uğur Ümit Üngör and Annsar Shahhoud found witnesses who attested that Assad gave orders for the
Syrian Military Intelligence to direct the
Shabiha to kill civilians.
2023–2025 arrest warrant and legal proceedings On 15 November 2023, France issued an arrest warrant against Assad over the use of banned chemical weapons against civilians in Syria. In May 2024, French anti-terrorism prosecutors requested the Paris appeals court to consider revoking Assad's arrest warrant, asserting his absolute immunity as a serving head of state. On 26 June 2024, the Paris appeals court determined that the international arrest warrant issued by France against Assad for alleged complicity in war crimes during the Syrian civil war remains valid. This decision was confirmed by attorneys involved in the case, who said the ruling marked the first instance where a national court acknowledged that the personal immunity of a serving head of state is not absolute. On 20 January 2025, a French court issued an arrest warrant against Assad for the 2017 killing of 59-year old dual French-Syrian national Salah Abou Nabout in a bombing in
Deraa.
Chemical attacks The
Syrian military has deployed chemical warfare as a systematic military strategy in the
Syrian civil war, and is estimated to have committed over 300
chemical attacks, targeting civilian populations throughout the course of the conflict. Investigation conducted by the
GPPi research institute documented 336 confirmed attacks involving chemical weapons in Syria between 23 December 2012 and 18 January 2019. The study attributed 98% of the total verified chemical attacks to the Assad's regime. Almost 90% of the attacks had occurred after the
Ghouta chemical attack in August 2013. in the Ghouta chemical attack, the deadliest
chemical weapons attack in the 21st century Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention and OPCW member state in October 2013, and there are currently three OPCW missions with UN mandates to investigate chemical weapons issues in Syria. These are the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) to verify Syrian
declarations of CW Programme;
OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) tasked to identify the chemical attacks and type of weapons used; and the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) which investigates the perpetrators of the chemical attacks. The conclusions are submitted to the
United Nations bodies. In April 2021, Syria was suspended from OPCW through the public vote of member states, for not co-operating with the body's Investigation Identification Team (IIT) and violating the
Chemical Weapons Convention. Findings of another investigation report published the OPCW-IIT in July 2021 concluded that the Syrian regime had engaged in confirmed chemical attacks at least 17 times, out of the reported 77 chemical weapon attacks attributed to Assadist forces. As of March 2023, independent United Nations inquiry commissions have confirmed at least nine chemical attacks committed by forces loyal to the
Assad government. protest against Bashar al-Assad on the second anniversary of
Ghouta chemical attacks, 21 August 2015. The deadliest chemical attack have been the Ghouta chemical attacks, when Assad government forces launched the
nerve agent sarin into civilian areas during its brutal
Siege of Eastern Ghouta in early hours of 21 August 2013. Thousands of infected and dying victims flooded the nearby hospitals, showing symptoms such as foaming, body convulsions and other neurotoxic symptoms. An estimated 1,100–1,500 civilians; including women and children, are estimated to have been killed in the attacks. The attack was internationally condemned and represented the deadliest use of chemical weapons since the
Iran-Iraq war. On 21 August 2022, United States government marked the ninth anniversary of Ghouta Chemical attacks stating: "
United States remembers and honors the victims and survivors of the Ghouta attack and the many other chemical attacks we assess the Assad regime has launched. We condemn in the strongest possible terms any use of chemical weapons anywhere, by anyone, under any circumstances... The United States calls on the Assad regime to fully declare and destroy its
chemical weapons program... and for the regime to allow the
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons' Declaration Assessment Team." In April 2017, a
sarin chemical attack on Khan Sheikhoun killed more than 80 people. A joint report from the UN and international chemical weapons inspectors concluded that Assad regime perpetrated the sarin attack. In April 2018, a
chemical attack occurred in Douma, prompting the U.S. and its allies to accuse Assad of violating international law and initiated joint
missile strikes at chemical weapons facilities in Damascus and Homs. Both Syria and Russia denied involvement. The third report published on 27 January 2023 by the OPCW-IIT concluded that the Assad regime was responsible for the
2018 Douma chemical attack which killed at least 43 civilians.
Holocaust denial In a speech delivered at the
Ba'ath party's central committee meeting in December 2023, Bashar al-Assad claimed that there was "no evidence" of the killings of six million Jews during
the Holocaust. Emphasising that Jews were not the sole
victims of Nazi extermination campaigns, Assad alleged that the Holocaust was "politicized" by
Allied powers to facilitate the mass-deportation of
European Jews to Palestine, and that it was used as an excuse to justify the creation of Israel. Assad also accused the U.S. government of financially and militarily sponsoring the
rise of Nazism during the
inter-war period. ==Public image==